7 ideas
| 17951 | A logos may be short, but it contains reference to the whole domain of the object [Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: A thing's logos, apparently short as it may be, is implicitly a very rich statement since it ultimately involves familiarity with the whole domain to which that particular object belongs. | |
| From: Alexander Nehamas (Episteme and Logos in later Plato [1984], p.234) | |
| A reaction: He may be wrong that the logos is short, since Aristotle (Idea 12292) says a definition can contain many assertions. |
| 17950 | The logos enables us to track one particular among a network of objects [Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: The logos (the definition) is a summary statement of the path within a network of objects that one will have to follow in order to locate a particular member of that network. | |
| From: Alexander Nehamas (Episteme and Logos in later Plato [1984], p.234) | |
| A reaction: I like this because it confirms that Plato (as well as Aristotle) was interested in the particulars rather than in the kinds (which I take to be general truths about particulars). |
| 17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: The theory of Forms is not a theory of universals but a first attempt to explain how predication, the application of a single term to many objects - now considered one of the most elementary operations of language - is possible. | |
| From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxvii) |
| 17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: Only Tallness and nothing else really is tall; everything else merely participates in the Forms and, being excluded from the realm of Being, belongs to the inferior world of Becoming. | |
| From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xxviii) | |
| A reaction: This is just as weird as the normal view (and puzzle of participation), but at least it makes more sense of 'metachein' (partaking). |
| 17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: The Greek 'episteme' is usually translated as 'knowledge' but, I argue, closer to our notion of understanding. | |
| From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xvi) | |
| A reaction: He agrees with Julia Annas on this. I take it to be crucial. See the first sentence of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. It is explanation which leads to understanding. |
| 6457 | Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent [Vesey] |
| Full Idea: Whereas a sensation is by definition mental, a sense-datum might be mind-independent. | |
| From: Godfrey Vesey (Collins Dictionary of Philosophy [1990], p.266) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be what Russell is getting at in 1912, as he clearly separates sense-data from sensations. Discussions of sense-data always assume they are mental, which may make them redundant - but so might making them physical. |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
| From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |