|
16700
|
In order to speak about time and successive entities, the 'present' must be enlarged [Wycliff]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is clear from the way in which one must speak about time and other successive entities that talk about 'the present' must be enlarged. Otherwise it would have to be denied that any successive entity could exist, which is impossible.
|
|
From:
John Wycliff (De ente praedicamentali [1375], 20 p.189), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
|
|
A reaction:
This is a lovely idea, even if it is not quite clear what it means. The mind seems to stretch out the now anyway (as the 'specious present'), so why not embrace that in language and conscious thought?
|
|
16701
|
To be successive a thing needs parts, which must therefore be lodged outside that instant [Wycliff]
|
|
Full Idea:
If something is successive, it is successive with respect to its individual parts, which cannot exist at the same instant. Therefore it follows that many of its parts are lodged outside that instant.
|
|
From:
John Wycliff (De ente praedicamentali [1375], 20 p.189), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
|
|
A reaction:
An obvious would be to say that there are therefore no successive entities, but Wycliff is appealing to our universal acceptance of them, and offering a transcendental argument. Nice move.
|
|
16618
|
Intellectual and moral states, and even the soul itself, depend on prime matter for their existence [Blasius, by Pasnau]
|
|
Full Idea:
Blasius argued that prime matter is the subject of all our intellectual and moral states. This implies that such states cannot exist apart from the body, which seems to imply further that the soul itself cannot exist apart from the body.
|
|
From:
report of Blasius of Parma (Les quaestiones de anima (lectures on the soul) [1385], I.8 p.65) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.3
|
|
A reaction:
It seems that, under pressure, Blasius recanted this view in lectures given eleven years later.
|