Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, C.D. Broad and Eustachius a Sancto Paulo

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


10 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substances 'substand' (beneath accidents), or 'subsist' (independently) [Eustachius]
     Full Idea: It is proper to substance both to stretch out or exist beneath accidents, which is to substand, and to exist per se and not in another, which is to subsist.
     From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], I.1.3b.1.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.2
     A reaction: This reflects Aristotle wavering between 'ousia' being the whole of a thing, or the substrate of a thing. In current discussion, 'substance' still wavers between a thing which 'is' a substance, and substance being the essence.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Prime matter is free of all forms, but has the potential for all forms [Eustachius]
     Full Idea: Everyone says that prime matter, considered in itself, is free of all forms and at the same time is open to all forms - or, that matter is in potentiality to all forms.
     From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], III.1.1.2.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
     A reaction: This is the notorious doctrine developed to support the hylomorphic picture derived from Aristotle. No one could quite figure out what prime matter was, so it faded away.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad]
     Full Idea: A thing is simply a long event, throughout the course of which there is either qualitative similarity or continuous qualitative change, together with a characteristic spatio-temporal unity.
     From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], 10 'Duration')
     A reaction: At least he is trying to give some sort of principle that links the stages of the event together.
If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad]
     Full Idea: We call a lightning flash or a motor accident an event, but refuse to apply this to the cliffs of Dover. ...But quantitative differences (of time) give no good grounds for calling one bit of history an event, and refusing the name to another bit.
     From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], p.54), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 2.3 n13
     A reaction: Wiggins calls this proposal a 'terrible absurdity', but it seems to me to demand attention. There is a case to be made for a 'process' to be the fundamental category of our ontology, with stable physical objects seen in that light.
Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad]
     Full Idea: It is plainly contrary to common sense to say that the phases in the history of a thing are parts of the thing.
     From: C.D. Broad (Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy [1933], I.349-50), quoted by Richard Cartwright - Scattered Objects n18
     A reaction: Nicely expressed! To suggest that me ten years ago is a mere part of some huge me, or that you are only talking to a part of me now, is a very long way indeed from normal usage.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
     Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory.
     From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1
     A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing.
     From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett]
     Full Idea: Not only the present but also the past exist, but the future (so long as it is the future) does not.
     From: report of C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923]) by Michael Dummett - Thought and Reality 1
     A reaction: This is quite appealing, and seems right if you believe that every truth has a truthmaker, and that there are no truths about the future. And yet the whole misery of people dying is that they cease to exist.
We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad]
     Full Idea: One theory accepts the reality of the present and the past, but holds that the future is simply nothing at all. Nothing has happened to the present by becoming past except that fresh slices of existence have been added to the total history of the world.
     From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II)
     A reaction: This is now known as Broad's 'Growing Block' view of time. It is tempting to say that neither past nor future exist, but it seems undeniable that statements about the past can be wholly true, unlike those about the future.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad]
     Full Idea: We imagine presentness moving, like the spot of light from a policeman's bulls eye traversing the fronts of houses in a street. What is illuminated is present, what was illuminated is past, and what is not yet illuminated is the future.
     From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II)
     A reaction: This is the 'moving spotlight' compromise theory, which retains the B-series eternal sequence of ordered events, but adds the A-series privileged present moment. Le Poidevin says Broad represents time twice over.