48 ideas
4767 | Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The traditional conception of Reason is that all beliefs should be justified (that is, backed up by reasons) in order to be rational. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.6) | |
A reaction: I think it is the duty of all philosophers to either defend this traditional view, or quit philosophy for some other activity. Rorty suggests hermeneutics. In a democracy, rulers should be continually required to give reasons for their decisions. |
23277 | Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak] |
Full Idea: One of the pillars of the new pragmatism is the thought that the standards of objectivity come into being and evolve over time, but that being historically situated in this way does not detract from their objectivity. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Introduction to 'New Pragmatists' [2007], p.2) | |
A reaction: This looks to me like pragmatism finally coming to its senses. I would say that being any sort of 'social construct' (beloved of cultural relativists) in no way detracts from its capacity for objectivity and truth. |
19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak] |
Full Idea: The role of truth is to make disagreements matter, or to make sense of wanting to resolve disagreements. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2) | |
A reaction: [She cites Huw Price 2003] This suggests that the most important use of 'truth' is forensic. It is hard to make any sense of a law court without a robust sense of truth. Trial by jury, rather than some great personage, shows this value. |
19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak] |
Full Idea: For pragmatists there is an unseverable connection between making an assertion and claiming that it is true. ...Were we to get to a belief that is forever assertible...then we would have a true belief. There is nothing higher or better we could ask of it. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 1) | |
A reaction: She is particularly drawing on Peirce. She says his 'ideal end of enquiry' idea is a small aspect of his view of truth, which is mainly given here. I had taken the pragmatic view of truth to be silly, but I may rethink. |
19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak] |
Full Idea: 'P is true' is used to emphasise p, and avoid logic problems. The pragmatists says there are plenty of other uses: the aim of assertion or deliberation, the improvement of our views, distinguishing objectivity, explaining meaning, negation, consequence... | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2) | |
A reaction: Pragmatism seems to break 'true' down into its many uses, rather than having a specific theory of truth. This might be where ordinary language philosophy (how is the word 'true' used) meets pragmatism (how is the concept [true] used). |
19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak] |
Full Idea: The pragmatist says 'That's so' or 'that's true' are not just 'pro-sentential', but carry with them the thought that evidence does currently speak in favour of the statement asserted, and the prediction that it will continue to speak in favour. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 3) | |
A reaction: This is a very nice point made by a pragmatist against the flimsy view of truth held by various deflationary views. You ought to believe what is true, and stand by what you hold to be true. |
19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak] |
Full Idea: If truth is what satisfies our aims in first-order assertion and inquiry (as the pragmatist says), then there is no search for an elusive property, or a metaphysical property, or a property which we cannot grasp. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 3) | |
A reaction: This pragmatic approach is much more persuasive than the usual caricature of pragmatic truth (Idea 19097), but I'm beginning to wonder how you distinguish an 'inquiry' (or 'assertion') from other modes of thought. Do I smell a circularity? |
19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak] |
Full Idea: The pragmatist will say that truth is proper assertion, but different discourses have different standards for proper assertion. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 4) | |
A reaction: This remark shows that there is a pragmatic attitude towards truth behind most attempts to analyse the concept of assertion. When and why is assertion legitimate, and what motivates it? |
19101 | Disquotation is bivalent [Misak] |
Full Idea: The disquotational schema entails bivalence. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2 n10) | |
A reaction: A simple but interesting observation. Critics of Tarski observe that he depends on a bivalent logic. |
19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak] |
Full Idea: The point of the disquotational schema is that to say that a sentence is true is to assert it, and to assert a sentence is to say that it is true. We must then ask what it is to assert or endorse a proposition. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 4) | |
A reaction: [She is referring to the views of Crispin Wright] Most people would say that we assert something because we think it is true, and truth is obviously prior. Clearly if it has been asserted, that was because someone thought it was true. |
19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak] |
Full Idea: Disquotationalism is more like a telephone directory than a theory. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2 n7) | |
A reaction: [She cites Wilfred Sellars 1962:33] The idea is that there is a schema - 'p' is true iff p - and that all the acceptable sentences of a language can be expressed in this way, making a vast but finite list. It seems to replace 'theories'. |
19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
Full Idea: We must not move seamlessly from the thought that the correspondence theory must be deflated to the thought that any theory of truth must be deflated. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2) | |
A reaction: This rather good essay offers the idea that Peircean pragmatic approaches to truth can meet the deflationary desires of the opponents of correspondence, without jettisoning all the crucial naturalistic connections with reality. Interesting. |
19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
Full Idea: Deflationist theories are not theories of truth, or theories of what truth is. ...They are theories which try to explain the role that 'true' plays in natural languages. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 3) | |
A reaction: [She cites Dorothy Grover 2001,2002] If so, then the modern axiomatic theory of truth sounds appealing, because it tries to give a fuller and more precise account than a mere list is disquotations could possibly give. |
4810 | Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Valid deductive arguments have the property of monotonicity; if the conclusion Q follows from the premises P, then it will also follow if further premises P* are added to P. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §9.2.1) | |
A reaction: For perversity's sake we could add a new premise which contradicted one of the original ones ('Socrates is a god'). Or one premise could be 'I believe..', and the new one could show that the belief was false. Induction is non-monotonic. |
4768 | The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The move from what can (or cannot) be known to exist to what does (or does not) exist has been dubbed the 'epistemic fallacy'. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.6) | |
A reaction: This should be a standard concept in all philosophical discussion. It is the commonest, simplest, and most profound blunder made by philosophers, and they do it all the time. |
19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak] |
Full Idea: If indefeasibility turns out to be something we can't sensibly aim at in a kind of inquiry, then the judgements that arise from that kind of 'inquiry' are not truth-apt. It is here that the realism/anti-realism debate resides. | |
From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 4) | |
A reaction: A very interesting way of presenting the issue, one that makes the debate sound (to me) considerably more interesting than hitherto. I may start using the word 'indefeasible' rather a lot, in my chats with the anti-realist philosophical multitude. |
14933 | Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them [Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross] |
Full Idea: For Psillos, properties in mature science are defined by the laws in which they feature. | |
From: report of Stathis Psillos (Scientific Realism [1999]) by J Ladyman / D Ross - Every Thing Must Go 3.5 | |
A reaction: This is a perfect example of the Humean approach getting everything the wrong way round. Laws are not primitives from which we derive our account of nature - they are generalisations built up from the behaviour of prior properties. |
17996 | Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The argument for fundamental powers is that fundamental particles are simple, without internal structure. Hence they have no parts which can be the bearers of further properties (powers or non-powers) which in turn ground the properties of the particles. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (What do powers do when they are not manifested? [2006], p.151), quoted by Anna Marmodoro - Do powers need powers to make them powerful? 'The Problem' | |
A reaction: If a power is basic, what has the power? I think the best answer is that at the fundamental level this is a false dichotomy. If you could zoom in, you would say that basic substance is active in a way that everyday stuff doesn't appear to be. |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
4807 | A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos] |
Full Idea: There can be predictions without explanations, as when a barometer successfully predicts storms, but on its own it does not explain them. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.8) | |
A reaction: Actually, barometers contribute to explanations. A reasonable predictor might offer no explanation ('if he's out, she's probably out too'), but an infallible predictor is almost certain to involve causation, which helps a lot in explanation. |
4808 | If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos] |
Full Idea: There can be explanations without predictions, as when we explain a previous position of Mars from its present one, plus a law. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.9) | |
A reaction: If we don't mind stretching the word, I think we can 'predict' the past, as where I predict the location of an Egyptian tomb from my study of papyruses. |
4811 | Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Unlike deductive arguments, induction is non-monotonic - that is, it can be invalidated by the addition of new premises. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §9.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is a fancy way of stating the obvious, which is that induction is not a type of deduction. Hume is sometimes accused of this false assumption. Presumably induction is rational, even if it is not actually logical. |
4812 | Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The three types of explanation are 'epistemic' (the event is expectable because of a law), or 'modal' (the event is necessary because of a law), or 'ontic' (it is shown how the event fits into the world's causal structure). | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §11.1) | |
A reaction: Prediction, necessity or causes. It is hard to think of any other way to explain something. Presumably you would exclude necessities if you didn't believe in them. Hume would go for prediction, on the basis of regularities. Personally, I want it all. |
4802 | Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Explanation has to do with understanding; just citing a cause would not offer an adequate understanding, unless it was accompanied by the citation of a law that connects the two events. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.2) | |
A reaction: It is surely undeniable that being told the cause but not the law will increase our understanding. Understanding and explanation come in degrees. Full understanding would require an explanation of the law, and beyond. Any relevant truth helps. |
4804 | The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The 'deductive-nomological' model became known as the 'covering law model': its main thesis is that laws and only laws adequately explain the occurrence of singular events. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.2) | |
A reaction: But presumably you need other events to derive a law, so you could say that a singular event can only be explained if it isn't singular. A regularity pattern would offer a partial explanation, before any law had been derived. |
4805 | If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos] |
Full Idea: If we use geometry and optics to explain the length of shadow cast by a flag-pole, this seems to be reversible, so that the shadow will explain the length of the pole. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.5) | |
A reaction: A neat example which presumably implies that an explanation must involve temporal statements. The laws of physics are totally reversible in time, and so will not suffice to explain events on their own. Time's arrow becomes an axiom of explanation? |
4395 | There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos] |
Full Idea: There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: A crucial basic point, which must be drummed into the minds of ruthless Quinean naturalists, who want to explain everything by quarks and electrons |
4806 | An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Knocking over an ink bottle explains the stain on the carpet, and it is not in doubt because you cannot quote the laws involved; a 'causal story' can give a complete explanation without a law. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.6) | |
A reaction: But why is he so clumsy, and the bottle so unstable? Was it really (Freudian) an 'accident'? There is no end to complete explanation. But 'I was clumsy this once' and 'I am always clumsy' are equally good explanations. |
4404 | Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers focus on the so-called 'pragmatics of explanation' - that an explanation is an answer to a 'why' question, and the relevant answer will depend on the presuppositions or interests of the questioner. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems to me right. Explanation is an entirely human business, not a feature of nature, and most explanations will track back to the big bang if you have the patience, but they always terminate because of pragmatic considerations. But fobbing off? |
4803 | An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos] |
Full Idea: An explanation amounts to the removal of the initial surprise that accompanied the occurrence of the event. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.2) | |
A reaction: This is a nice simple point. It makes explanation relative. God requires no explanations, small children require many. The implication is that explanations make events predictable, which means they must either offer inductive generalisations, or laws. |
4769 | It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos] |
Full Idea: There is a problem if causation is the object of our analysis, but is also presupposed (as an empirical principle of human psychology) for the functioning of the mind. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.7) | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound like a major problem. If it is, it is presumably impossible to analyse the mind, because a mind is presupposed in the process of analysis. |
4770 | Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.8) | |
A reaction: This is the core of Hume's is/ought claim - what he calls the mind 'spreading itself'. It is a powerful claim. Personally I think we have become TOO sceptical here, and have the delusion that crucial features of nature are created within our minds. |
4399 | Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The platitudes of causation are that 1) causes make a difference (counterfactually or probabilistically), 2) causes are recipes for events, 3) causes explain their effects, and 4) causes are evidence for effects. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: A nice piece of analysis which offers some problems for anyone (like Russell) who wants to analyse causation completely out of our conceptual scheme. |
4400 | Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos] |
Full Idea: While Humeans base their theories on the intuition of regularity, their opponents base theirs on the intuition that there is an intrinsic relation between the properties of two particular things involved (like a hammer and a vase). | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: I favour the intrinsic relation of properties view, but this leaves the question of whether we can explain a relation, apart from observing the regularities associated with the properties. |
4403 | We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos] |
Full Idea: We cannot distinguish between good and bad explanations of some phenomena, unless we first distinguish between causal and non-causal explanations. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems right, but it pushes us towards the idea that causation is non-analysable, and must be taken as a metaphysically basic axiom. If naturalistic accounts fail, that may be only alternative. |
4789 | Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The three ways to divide theories on causation are: between generalist and singularist, between intrinsic and extrinsic characterisations of the causal relationship, and between reductive and non-reductive approaches. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5) | |
A reaction: Okay. I vote for singularist, intrinsic and reductive. I'm guessing that that pushes me towards Salmon and Dowe's theory of the 'transfer of conserved quantities', which is certainly reductive, doesn't need regularities in the events, and seems intrinsic. |
4790 | If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos] |
Full Idea: If causation is taken to be an 'intrinsic' relation, then that c causes e will have to depend entirely on the properties of c and e, and the relations between c and e. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.2) | |
A reaction: This view would move us towards 'essentialism', that the essences of objects produce the events and the laws, rather than external imposed forces and laws. |
4402 | Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The logical empiricists (esp. Hempel) analysed the concept of causation in terms of causal explanation, and analysed the latter as a species of deductive argument, with one premises stating a universal law (the so-called Deductive-Nomological model). | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: This feels wrong, as deduction seems insufficiently naturalistic, and the assumption of a law as premise seems to beg heaps of questions. |
4774 | Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos] |
Full Idea: If counterfactual claims can be made about causation, this suggests that there is more to it than mere regular succession. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §2.2) | |
A reaction: Interesting. Even Hume makes counterfactual claims in his first definition of cause, and all claims of causation seem to go beyond the immediate evidence. |
4793 | "All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The statement "all gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" seems to have all the features demanded of a lawlike statement, yet it can hardly be said to express a law. It is a merely true universal generalisation. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §5.3) | |
A reaction: Nice example. A trickier case is "all cubes of uranium are smaller than one cubic mile", which sounds like part of a law. It suggests a blurred borderline between the two. How much gold is there in the universe? Is that fact a natural necessity? |
4397 | Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos] |
Full Idea: A rather important objection to Humeanism has been that regularity is not sufficient for causation. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: Obviously a crucial problem, but the Humean view can defend itself by introducing other constant conjunctions. We don't observe events in isolation, but as part of a pattern of regularities. |
4401 | It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos] |
Full Idea: It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: Good example, but it doesn't demolish the regularity view. We should come to conscious minds last. There aren't many other unfailing regularities that are not laws. |
4792 | A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The Humean view depends on the conjunction of two general theses: first, causation is tied to regularity; secondly, causal facts supervene on non-causal facts. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.4) | |
A reaction: If causation is just regularities, this means it is patterns observed by us, which means causation doesn't actually exist. So Hume is wrong. Singular causation is possible, and needs explanation. |
4801 | The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos] |
Full Idea: A regularity can be used to predict a future event irrespective of whether it is deemed causal or not. A farmer can predict that dawn has broken on hearing the cock's crow. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.1) | |
A reaction: This seems a highly significant criticism of any view that says regularity leads to causation, which is the basis of induction, which leads to counterfactual claims, and thus arrives a the laws of nature. |
4796 | Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos] |
Full Idea: In the 'web-of-laws' approach, laws are those regularities that are members of a coherent system of regularities, in particular, a system that can be represented as a deductive axiomatic system, striking a good balance between simplicity and strength. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §5.6) | |
A reaction: Psillos attribute this view to Mill, Ramsey and Lewis. It is the obvious candidate for a fully developed Humean empiricist system, where regularities reinforce one another. I think laws are found in mechanisms, not in regularities, which are symptoms. |
4799 | Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Many philosophers will find dispositional essentialism unappealing, not least because it seems to fail to explain how (and in virtue of what) there is this supposed fundamental distinction between essential and non-essential properties. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002]) | |
A reaction: Maybe there is no precise definition, but any idiot can see that some properties of gold are essential (mass) and others non-essential (attractive to jackdaws). It's a fair question, but is this the strongest objection to essentialism? |
4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
Full Idea: In "had the acrobat jumped, there would have been a safety net" the antecedent of the counterfactual (the jumping) is temporally later than the consequent (the installation of the net). | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §3.3) | |
A reaction: This blocks anyone (e.g. David Lewis) who tries to define counterfactual claims entirely in terms of a condition followed by a consequence. Nice example. |
4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The counterfactual theory is a non-Humean relation between singular events; the thought is that causation makes a difference - to say that c causes e is to say that if c hadn't occurred, e wouldn't have occurred either. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.4) | |
A reaction: Helpful. I'm beginning to think that this theory is wrong. It gives an account of how we see causation, and a test for it, but it says nothing about what causation actually is. |