Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Collegium Conimbricense and GE Hughes/M Cresswell

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7 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
A 'value-assignment' (V) is when to each variable in the set V assigns either the value 1 or the value 0 [Hughes/Cresswell]
     Full Idea: A 'value-assignment' (V) is when to each variable in the set V assigns either the value 1 or the value 0.
     From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1)
     A reaction: In the interpreted version of the logic, 1 and 0 would become T (true) and F (false). The procedure seems to be called nowadays a 'valuation'.
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
The Law of Transposition says (P→Q) → (¬Q→¬P) [Hughes/Cresswell]
     Full Idea: The Law of Transposition says that (P→Q) → (¬Q→¬P).
     From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1)
     A reaction: That is, if the consequent (Q) of a conditional is false, then the antecedent (P) must have been false.
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 4. Soundness of PL
The rules preserve validity from the axioms, so no thesis negates any other thesis [Hughes/Cresswell]
     Full Idea: An axiomatic system is most naturally consistent iff no thesis is the negation of another thesis. It can be shown that every axiom is valid, that the transformation rules are validity-preserving, and if a wff α is valid, then ¬α is not valid.
     From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1)
     A reaction: [The labels 'soundness' and 'consistency' seem interchangeable here, with the former nowadays preferred]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A system is 'weakly' complete if all wffs are derivable, and 'strongly' if theses are maximised [Hughes/Cresswell]
     Full Idea: To say that an axiom system is 'weakly complete' is to say that every valid wff of the system is derivable as a thesis. ..The system is 'strongly complete' if it cannot have any more theses than it has without falling into inconsistency.
     From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1)
     A reaction: [They go on to say that Propositional Logic is strongly complete, but Modal Logic is not]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Unity by aggregation, order, inherence, composition, and simplicity [Conimbricense, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: The Coimbrans have five degrees of unity: by aggregation (stones), by order (an army), per accidens (inherence), per se composite unity (connected), and per se unity of simple things.
     From: report of Collegium Conimbricense (Aristotelian commentaries [1595], Phys I.9.11.2) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.3
     A reaction: [my summary of Pasnau's summary] Take some stones, then order them, then glue them together, then melt them together. The unity of inherence is a different type of unity from these stages. This is a hylomorphic view.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Secondary qualities come from temperaments and proportions of primary qualities [Conimbricense]
     Full Idea: Colors, flavours, smells, and other secondary qualities arise from the various temperaments and proportions of the primary qualities.
     From: Collegium Conimbricense (Aristotelian commentaries [1595], I.10.4 Gen&C), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2
     A reaction: This is a bit more subtle than merely mixing the primary qualities. What about the powers of the primary qualities? Presumably that is the 'temperaments'?
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing.
     From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1