Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Crawford L. Elder and Stanislaw Lesniewski

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7 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder]
     Full Idea: The very being, the identity, of any property consists at least in part in its contrasting as it does with its own proper contraries.
     From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 2.4)
     A reaction: See Elder for the details of this, but the idea that properties can only be individuated contextually sounds promising.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Maybe we should give up the statue [Elder]
     Full Idea: Some contemporary metaphysicians infer that one of the objects must go, namely, the statue.
     From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 7.2)
     A reaction: [He cites Zimmerman 1995] This looks like a recipe for creating a vast gulf between philosophers and the rest of the population. If it is right, it makes the true ontology completely useless in understanding our daily lives.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Class membership is not transitive, unlike being part of a part of the whole [Lesniewski, by George/Van Evra]
     Full Idea: Lesniewski distinguished the part-whole relationship from class membership. Membership is not transitive: if s is an element of t, and t of u, then s is not an element of u, whereas a part of a part is a part of the whole.
     From: report of Stanislaw Lesniewski (works [1916]) by George / Van Evra - The Rise of Modern Logic 7
     A reaction: If I am a member of a sports club, and my club is a member of the league, I am not thereby a member of the league (so clubs are classes, not wholes). This distinction is clearly fairly crucial in ontology.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
The loss of an essential property means the end of an existence [Elder]
     Full Idea: The loss of any essential property must amount to the end of an existence.
     From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 3)
     A reaction: This is orthodoxy for essentialists, and I presume that Aristotle would agree, but I have a problem with the essence of a great athlete, who then grows old. Must we say that they lose their identity-as-an-athlete?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder]
     Full Idea: Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages.
     From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 2.2)
     A reaction: Elder proposes this as his test for the essentialness of a property - his Test of Flanking Uniformities. A nice idea.
Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder]
     Full Idea: The properties of any essential nature are bound together....[122] so any case in which one of our envisioned familiar objects loses one of its essential properties will be a case in which it loses several.
     From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 3)
     A reaction: This sounds like a fairly good generalisation rather than a necessary truth. Is there a natural selection for properties, so that only the properties which are able to bind to others to form teams are able to survive and flourish?
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing.
     From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1