Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, David H. Sanford and G.F. Stout

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes

8511	Stout first explicitly proposed that properties and relations are particulars [Stout,GF, by Campbell,K]
	Full Idea: In modern times, it was G.F. Stout who first explicitly made the proposal that properties and relations are as particular as the substances that they qualify.
	From: report of G.F. Stout (The Nature of Universals and Propositions [1923]) by Keith Campbell - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars §1
	A reaction: Note that relations will have to be tropes, as well as properties. Williams wants tropes to be parts of objects, but that will be tricky with relations. If you place two objects on a table, how does the 'to the left of' trope come into existence?

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism

3061	Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
	Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing.
	From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations

8406	Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford]
	Full Idea: Although not all explanations are causal, anything which can be explained in any way can be explained causally.
	From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.79)
	A reaction: A nice bold claim with which I am in sympathy, but he would have a struggle proving it. Does this imply that causal explanations are basic, or in some way superior? Note that functional explanations would thus have underlying causal explanations.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation

8407	A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford]
	Full Idea: A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is jointly sufficient for it. This is a widely held but controversial view, and it is not a logical truth.
	From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.82)
	A reaction: This wouldn't work for an impossible occurrence. What are the necessary conditions to produce a large planet made of uranium? One of them would have to be a naturally impossible necessity.