|
10198
|
If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
|
|
Full Idea:
If nothing existed except two electrons, which are indiscernible, it remains possible that differences will emerge later. Even if this universe has eternal symmetry, such differences are still logically, metaphysically, physically and causally possible.
|
|
From:
Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
|
|
A reaction:
The question then is whether the two electrons have hidden properties that make differences possible. Zimmerman assumes that 'laws' of an indeterministic kind will do the job. I doubt that. Can differences be discerned after the event?
|
|
10199
|
Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
|
|
Full Idea:
Possible differences which may later become discernible could be treated as differences in a counterpart, which is similar to, but not identical with, the original object.
|
|
From:
Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.307)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] This is a reply to Idea 10198, which implies that two things could never be indiscernible over time, because of their different possibilities. One must then decide issues about rigid designation and counterparts.
|
|
8954
|
Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó]
|
|
Full Idea:
The vocabulary of geometry is sufficient to identify the circle, but could not be used to identify any circular paint patch. The reason must be that the circle lacks certain properties that can distinguish paint patches from one another.
|
|
From:
Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Nominalism [2003], 2.2)
|
|
A reaction:
I take this to be support for the traditional view, that abstractions are created by omitting some of the properties of physical objects. I take them to be fictional creations, reified by language, and not actual hidden entities that have been observed.
|
|
8955
|
Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó]
|
|
Full Idea:
In current discussions, abstract entities are usually distinguished as 1) in principle imperceptible, 2) incapable of causal interaction, 3) not located in space-time. The first is often explained by the second, which is in turn explained by the third.
|
|
From:
Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Nominalism [2003], 2.2)
|
|
A reaction:
Szabó concludes by offering 3 as the sole criterion of abstraction. As Lewis points out, the Way of Negation for defining abstracta doesn't tell us very much. Courage may be non-spatiotemporal, but what about Alexander the Great's courage?
|
|
14608
|
A-theorists, unlike B-theorists, believe some sort of objective distinction between past, present and future [Zimmerman,DW]
|
|
Full Idea:
To be an A-theorist is to believe in some sort of objective distinction between what is present and past and future. ..To be a B-theorist is to deny the objectivity of our talk about past, present and future.
|
|
From:
Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 2)
|
|
A reaction:
The A/B distinction originates with McTaggart. All my intuitions side with the A-theory, certainly to the extent that the present seems to be objectively privileged in some way (despite special relativity).
|