Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Diogenes Laertius and Donald C. Williams

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11 ideas

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Dialectic is when men converse by putting short questions and giving brief answers to those who question them.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.52)
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC]
     Full Idea: I shall divert the word 'trope' to stand for the abstract particular which is, so to speak, the occurrence of an essence.
     From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.115)
     A reaction: Thus tropes entered philosophical discussion. Presumably the precedent for an 'abstract particular' would be a particular occurrence of the number 7.
A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC]
     Full Idea: Any possible world, and hence, of course, this one, is completely constituted by its tropes and connections of location and similarity.
     From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.116)
     A reaction: Note that Williams regularly referred to possible worlds in 1953. This is a full-blooded trope theory, which asserts that objects are bundles of tropes, so that both particulars and universals are ontologically taken care of.
'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC]
     Full Idea: 'Socrates is wise' means that the concurrence sum (Socrates) includes a trope which is a member of the similarity set (Wisdom).
     From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.119)
     A reaction: Resemblance has to be taken as a basic (and presumably unanalysable) concept, which invites Russell's objection (Idea 4441).
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Sceptics say that every demonstration depends on things which demonstrates themselves, or on things which can't be demonstrated.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11)
     A reaction: This refers to two parts of Agrippa's Trilemma (the third being that demonstration could go on forever). He makes the first option sound very rationalist, rather than experiential.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing.
     From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1
Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Sceptics actually assert two dogmas: that nothing should be defined, and that every argument has an opposite argument.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11)
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: When sceptics say that they define nothing, and that every argument has an opposite argument, they here give a positive definition, and assert a positive dogma.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.11.11)
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Induction is an argument which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally other truths which resemble them; there are two kinds, one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.23)
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cyrenaics place pleasure wholly in motion, whereas Epicurus admits it as a condition.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 10.28)
     A reaction: Not a distinction we meet in modern discussions. Do events within the mind count as 'motion'? If so, these two agree. If not, I'd vote for Epicurus.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 6.Men.3)