11 ideas
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
20878 | We can discuss the criteria of a judgment, or the weight given to them, or their application [LaFollette] |
Full Idea: In discussing a movie you can challenge my criteria, the weight I give to those criteria, or my application of the criteria (the claim that the movie satisfies the criteria). | |
From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.008) | |
A reaction: I can't think of anything missing here, so it is a helpful start. |
20877 | Errors in moral practice might be inconsistent or inappropriate principles, or inappropriate application [LaFollette] |
Full Idea: I might make parallel 'mistakes' in ethical deliberation. For instance I might 1) use inconsistent ethical principles, 2) have inappropriate moral standards, and 3) apply moral standards inappropriately. | |
From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.005) | |
A reaction: I would want to get the word 'values' in there somewhere. Dogmatic application of moral rules might indicate a failure of values. |
20881 | The act/omission distinction is important for duties, but less so for consequences [LaFollette] |
Full Idea: Consequentialists, unlike deontologists, are unlikely to think that the act/omission distinction is fundamentally important. | |
From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.021) | |
A reaction: Not sure where virtue theory fits in here. Virtues tend to be applied more locally, where duty tends to be global. All moral theories must acknowledge that failure to act may be either a good or a bad thing, depending on circumstances |
22693 | The works we value most are in sympathy with our own moral views [John,E] |
Full Idea: The works we tend to value most highly are ones that are in sympathy with the moral views we actually accept. | |
From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], Intro) | |
A reaction: I would have to endorse this. She admits that we may rate other works very highly, but they won't appear on our list of favourites. This fact may well distort philosophical discussions of morality and art. |
22694 | We should understand what is morally important in a story, without having to endorse it [John,E] |
Full Idea: Our responses to literature should show that we grasp whatever counts as morally important within the narrative, but not necessarily that we judge and feel in the way deemed appropriate by the work. | |
From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], 'Accommodating') | |
A reaction: She gives as an example a story by Hemingway which places a high value on the courageous hunting of big game. A second example is the total amorality of a Highsmith novel. This idea seems exactly right to me. |
22695 | We value morality in art because that is what we care about - but it is a contingent fact [John,E] |
Full Idea: Moral value is valuable in art because people care about moral value. This runs deep, but it is a contingent matter, and the value of morality in art hinges on art's need to provide something precious to us. | |
From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], 'Contingency') | |
A reaction: I think this is exactly right. Thrillers are written with very little moral concern, for a readership which cares about brave and exciting deeds. Even there, violence has its ethics. |
22692 | A work can be morally and artistically excellent, despite rejecting moral truth [John,E] |
Full Idea: A work that rejects moral truth can be artistically excellent, in part because of its moral content. | |
From: Eileen John (Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism [2006], Intr) | |
A reaction: She cites the film 'Trainspotting', about desperate drug addicts, because it gives an amoral insight into their world. |
20886 | Are we only obligated by agreement, or should we always help the weak? [LaFollette] |
Full Idea: A fundamental question in morality is whether we are obligated to help only those we specifically agreed to help, or are we obligated to help others in need, because they are vulnerable? | |
From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.061) | |
A reaction: [He is considering J.J. Thomson's defence of abortion] The first option sounds extraordinary. If I don't make any agreements at all, then I cease to be a moral being? Not help strangers when they fall over? |
20880 | Should people be forced to make choices? [LaFollette] |
Full Idea: Should we give people choices they might not want to have? | |
From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.020) | |
A reaction: In personal life we encounter people who force us to make an unwanted choice (choose the wine, when you know nothing about wine). Politically, there is the sneaky move of giving unwanted choices, to disguise absence of desired choices. |
20879 | Too many options may open us to unwanted pressures, like being paid very little [LaFollette] |
Full Idea: Having options is not an unadulterated good. Options may make us vulnerable to unwanted pressure from others. For example, having the option to work for less than the minimum wage increases the chances of employers offering less. | |
From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.019) | |
A reaction: [J.D. Velleman is cited for this] A nice point, beginning to articulate my growing feeling that although freedom is generally a virtue, it is the most overrated virtue. |