37 ideas
22338 | An unexamined life can be virtuous [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: An unexamined life can be virtuous. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: Nice. A firm rejection of the intellectualist view of virtue, to which most Greeks subscribed. Jesus would have liked this one. |
22337 | Philosophy must keep returning to the beginning [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Philosophy has in a sense to keep trying to return to the beginning. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: This is a sign that philosophy is not like other subjects, and indicates that although the puzzles are not solved, they won't go away. Also that, unlike most other subjects, the pre-suppositions are not part of the subject. |
23563 | Philosophy moves continually between elaborate theories and the obvious facts [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: There is a two-way movement in philosophy, a movement towards the building of elaborate theories, and a move back again towards the consideration of simple and obvious facts. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: Nice. Without the theories there is no philosophy, but without continual reference back to the obvious facts the theories are worthless. |
5311 | If observation goes up a level, we expect the laws of the lower level to remain in force [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: When the observer shifts his attention from one level of organisation to the next, as from physics to chemistry, he expects to find obedience to all the laws of the levels below. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to state a necessary condition of reduction, but not a sufficient one. Wilson points out that new phenomena emerge at higher levels. This principle is similar to Hume's argument against miracles. You don't easily overthrow basic laws. |
5312 | A child first sees objects as distinct, and later as members of groups [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: From a single-minded effort to move objects a child's activity grows into a detached reflection on the movements themselves. The objects are first perceived as distinct entities, and then as members of groups to be classified. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This does not, of course, prove anything about the philosophical problems of universals, but it does seem to pinpoint the stage in human development when 'universals' are perceived. The basis seems to be groups or sets, but how do we spot those? |
5309 | Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: How does he know this proposition which he asserts so confidently? Obvious counterexamples seem to be utterly trivial beliefs, and self-destructive beliefs. What is the evolutionary value of low self-esteem? Still, you see his point. |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
22591 | We know perfection when we see what is imperfect [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: We know of perfection as we look upon what is imperfect. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals [1992], 13) | |
A reaction: This is in the context of a discussion of the ontological argument for God's existence, but I seize on it as a nice expression of the idealisation capacity of our minds. The alternative is that perfection is innate idea, since we aren't seeing it. |
22709 | We should first decide what are the great works of art, with aesthetic theory following from that [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Our aesthetic must stand to be judged by great works of art which we know to be such independently. …So let us start by saying that Shakespeare is the greatest of all artists, and let our aesthetic be the philosophical justification of this judgement. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.205) | |
A reaction: She offers this view in specific contradiction of Tolstoy, which says we should first have a theory, and then judge accordingly. I take Murdoch to be entirely right, but it means that our aesthetic theory will shift over time. |
22341 | Literature is the most important aspect of culture, because it teaches understanding of living [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: The most essential and fundamental aspect of culture is the study of literature, since this is an education in how to picture and understand human situations. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], i) | |
A reaction: It is significant that literature belongs more clearly to a nation or community than does most music or painting. You learn about Russians from their literature, but not much from their music. |
22715 | Great art proves the absurdity of art for art's sake [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: The work of the great artists shows up 'art-for-art's-sake' as a flimsy frivolous doctrine. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.218) | |
A reaction: She keeps referring to tragedy (as the greatest art), but it is hard to see how we learn love and morality from a great pot or a great abstract painting. Wilde makes the doctrine frivolous, but I think it contains a degree of truth. Music. |
22714 | Because art is love, it improves us morally [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: It is of course a fact that if art is love then art improves us morally, but this is, as it were, accidental. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.218) | |
A reaction: Is an enhancement of one's love necessarily a moral improvement? Love is a fine feeling, but how does it motivate? Has no wickedness ever been perpetrated in the name of love? 'All's fair in love and war'. |
22712 | Art and morals are essentially the same, and are both identical with love [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Art and morals are (with certain provisos) one. Their essence is the same. The essence of both of them is love. Love is the perception of individuals. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.215) | |
A reaction: The idea that art, morals and love are all just a single thing seems unhelpful. What about satire? What about duty without love? What about pure abstract painting? What about Stravinsky's highly formal view of his music? |
22347 | Appreciating beauty in art or nature opens up the good life, by restricting selfishness [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: The appreciation of beauty in art or nature is not only the easiest available spiritual exercise; it is also a completely adequate entry into (and not just analogy of) the good life, since it checks selfishness in the interest of seeing the real. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
A reaction: Not keen on 'spiritual' exercises, but I very much like 'seeing the real' as a promotion of the good life. The hard bit is to know what reality you are seeing in a work of art. [p.84] Her example is the sudden sight of a hovering kestrel. |
5310 | Philosophers study the consequences of ethics instead of its origins [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Philosophers examine the precepts of ethical systems with reference to their consequences and not their origins. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: He is interested in biological origins, but it strikes me that every moral theory has some account of the origins of morality, be it pure reason, or the love of pleasure, or human nature, or eternal ideas, or the will of God, or selfish desires. |
22187 | Genetic behaviours that have enhanced human success include aggression, rape and xenophobia [Wilson,EO, by Okasha] |
Full Idea: Wilson claimed that many human behaviours, including aggression, rape, and xenophobia, had a genetic basis, and were adaptations favoured by natural selection because they enhanced the reproductive success of our ancestors. | |
From: report of Edmund O. Wilson (Sociobiology [1975]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 7 | |
A reaction: This led to the Sociobiology Wars, when E.O. Wilson was attacked by Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould. |
5313 | The rules of human decision-making converge and overlap in a 'human nature' [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: The rules followed in human decision-making are tight enough to produce a broad overlap in the decisions taken by all individuals, and hence a convergence powerful enough to be labelled 'human nature'. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This is a nice empirical criterion for asserting the existence of human nature, and it seems right to examine decisions, rather than more thoughtless or conformist behaviour. Existentialists dream of new possibilities, but the old ways always seem best… |
5316 | We undermine altruism by rewarding it, but we reward it to encourage it [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: By sanctifying altruism in order to reward it we make it less true, but by that means we promote its recurrence in others. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: So is my preference for not rewarding (or even noticing) altruism an anti-social tendency. The very conspicuous charity of sponsorship seems somehow inferior to the truly anonymous gift. Or super-altruism is very public, to encourage it in others? |
5318 | Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: By 'hard-core' he means suicidally self-sacrificing, rather than extensive. This seems a good thesis. It strikes me that the development of civil society is often impeded by family loyalty, such as in the case of the Mafia. |
22339 | Love is a central concept in morals [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Love is a central concept in morals. ....[p.30] The central concept of morality is 'the individual' thought of as knowable by love, thought of in the light of the command 'Be ye therefore perfect'. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a critique of the chillier aspects of utilitarianism and Kantian duty. Love doesn't seem essential to Aristotle's concept of virtue either, and Murdoch's tradition seems to be Christian. I'm undecided about this idea. |
22348 | Ordinary human love is good evidence of transcendent goodness [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Is not ordinary human love ...striking evidence of a transcendental principle of good? | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
A reaction: Sorry to be mean, but I would say not. Love is tied up with sexual desire, and with family and tribal loyalty, and can be observed in quite humble animals. (Love, I should quickly add, is a very good thing indeed. Really). |
22713 | Love is realising something other than oneself is real [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.215) | |
A reaction: I suspect that this is a necessary condition for love, but not the thing itself. The realisation she describes may not be love. You would attain her realisation if you shared a prison cell with a terrifying psychopath. |
5317 | The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: This is a key element of social contract theory. It shows why natural selection of truly altruistic traits might be beneficial to individuals, provided they are surrounded by possible recipricators. We trust those who are genuine and sincere. |
22343 | If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: If I attend properly I will have no choices, and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: I take it this is an expression of what we now call Particularism. It is not just that every moral situation is subtly morally different, but that the particulars of the situation will lead directly to moral choices (in a 'healthy' agent). |
22340 | It is hard to learn goodness from others, because their virtues are part of their personal history [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: It is the historical, individual, nature of the virtues as actually exemplified which makes it difficult to learn goodness from another person. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: A penetrating remark, which strikes me as true. When confronted with a virtuous person you might want to acquire their virtue, just as you might want them to teach you algebra, but their virtues are too bound up with their individuality. |
22349 | Art trains us in the love of virtue [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: The enjoyment of art is a training in the love of virtue. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], III) | |
A reaction: Very Aristotelian to talk of 'training'. Unfortunately it is children who have the greatest need for training, but most art is aimed at mature adults. Can you be too old to be trained by art, even if you enjoy it? |
22346 | Moral reflection and experience gradually reveals unity in the moral world [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Reflection rightly tends to unify the moral world, and increasing moral sophistication reveals increasing unity. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
A reaction: As an example she suggests asking what is the best type of courage. Connections to other virtues will emerge. That is a persuasive example. We all have strong views on what type of courage is the most admirable. |
22350 | Only trivial virtues can be possessed on their own [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: It would be impossible to have only one virtue, unless it were a very trivial one such as thrift. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], III) | |
A reaction: A nicely nuanced commitment to the unity of virtue. You might exhibit courage alone in a brute animal way, but the sort of courage we all admire is part of more extended virtues. |
20765 | Man is a brave naked will, separate from a background of values and realities [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Existentialists no longer see man against a background of values, of realities, which transcend him. We picture man as a brave naked will. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (Against Dryness: a polemical sketch [1983], p.46), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 7 'Subjectivism' | |
A reaction: It is one thing to deny the values, and another to deny the realities. This piece is a 'polemic', and reads more like an exhortation than a truth. Many of us are, at best, cowardly naked wills. |
22351 | Only a philosopher might think choices create values [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: The ordinary person does not, unless corrupted by philosophy, believe that he creates values by his choices. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], III) | |
A reaction: This looks like a swipe at Nietzsche, more than anyone. Sartre and co talk less about values, other than authenticity. Philosophy can definitely be corrupting. |
22342 | Kantian existentialists care greatly for reasons for action, whereas Surrealists care nothing [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: What may be called the Kantian wing and the Surrealist wing of existentialism may be distinguished by the degree of their interest in reasons for action, which diminishes to nothing at the Surrealist end. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
A reaction: Presumably for all existentialists moral decisions are the most important aspect of life, since they define what you are, but the Surrealist wing seem to be nihilists about that, so they barely count as existentialists. For them life is sleepwalking. |
20662 | The biology of societies: kin selection, parenting, mating; status, territory, contracts [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Societies are ordered around six sociobiological principles: kin selection; parental investment; mating strategy; status; territorial expansion and defence; contractual agreement. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (Consilience [1998], 19 'Intro'), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I trust such a precise list. Personally I'm in society because I'm too frightend to drop out. So where is 'defence'? Still, I like attempts at assembling such a list. Politics needs grounding. |
5308 | The only human purpose is that created by our genetic history [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: No species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This invites the question of what that purpose is perceived to be. Some people feel an imperative to play the piano all day, so presumably genetic history has created that feeling. Presumably we can also choose a purpose, even extinction. |
5314 | Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and fast, biological evolution is Darwinian and slow [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and very fast, whereas biological evolution is Darwinian and usually very slow. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: An intriguing point, given how discredited Lamarckian evolution is. It links with the Dawkins idea of 'memes' - cultural ideas which spread very fast. Is biological evolution suddenly about to become Lamarckian, as culture influences biology? |
5315 | Over 99 percent of human evolution has been in the hunter-gatherer phase [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Selection pressures of hunter-gatherer existence have persisted for over 99 percent of human genetic evolution. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This seems a key point to bear in mind when assessing human nature. Hunter-gathering isn't just one tendency in our genetics; it more or less constitutes everything we are. |
22345 | Moral philosophy needs a central concept with all the traditional attributes of God [Murdoch] |
Full Idea: God was (or is) a single perfect transcendent non-representable and necessarily real object of attention. ....Moral philosophy should attempt to retain a central concept which has all these characteristics. | |
From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
A reaction: This is a combination of middle Platonism (which sees the Form of the Good as the mind of God) and G.E. Moore's indefinable ideal of goodness. Murdoch connects this suggestion with the centrality of love in moral philosophy. I disagree. |
5320 | It is estimated that mankind has produced 100,000 religions [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Since the first recorded religion (in Iraq 60,000 years ago) it is estimated that mankind has produced in the order of one hundred thousand religions. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: If asked to guess the number, I would probably have said '200'! This staggering figure seems to argue both ways - it suggest a certain arbitrariness in the details of religions, but an extremely intense drive to have some sort of religious belief. |