13 ideas
| 12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
| Full Idea: With respect to scientific usage, we can say that the real essence of a thing will consist very largely of powers or, in modern terms, dispositional properties. | |
| From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.718) | |
| A reaction: Once again, Copi is a hero. I personally love the word 'powers' in metaphysics (and dislike the word 'properties', which is lost in a fog of confusion). See Molnar on 'powers' and Mumford on 'dispositions'. |
| 10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami] |
| Full Idea: The 'explanatory characterization' says that the essential properties of an object are the object's deepest explanatory properties, which explain the other properties of the object - and which Copi claims is mind-independent. | |
| From: report of Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954]) by Adolph Rami - Essential vs Accidental Properties §2 | |
| A reaction: It is, of course, normal to see a good explanation as being dependent on the interests of the audience. Perhaps this account should be in terms of causal powers. See Shoemaker on properties. |
| 12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi] |
| Full Idea: In the sphere of scientific enquiry the distinction between real and nominal essence tends to disappear; the scientist's classification of things is intended to be in terms of their real essences. | |
| From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.716) | |
| A reaction: Thus we have disputes over what is the 'real' classification of natural kinds such as animals. There is not much point in a classification system that does not at least reflect some aspects of reality. |
| 12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi] |
| Full Idea: If we can distinguish the different kinds of change (alteration, locomotion, growth, diminution), then we can say that a given attribute is essential to an object if its loss would result in the destruction of that object. | |
| From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.707-8) | |
| A reaction: As Copi is aware, this is a necessary condition for a property for essence, but not sufficient. If an attribute were necessary but non-essential, its loss would also be destruction. We say the essential attributes must also have some explanatory role. |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
| From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
| 20877 | Errors in moral practice might be inconsistent or inappropriate principles, or inappropriate application [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: I might make parallel 'mistakes' in ethical deliberation. For instance I might 1) use inconsistent ethical principles, 2) have inappropriate moral standards, and 3) apply moral standards inappropriately. | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.005) | |
| A reaction: I would want to get the word 'values' in there somewhere. Dogmatic application of moral rules might indicate a failure of values. |
| 20878 | We can discuss the criteria of a judgment, or the weight given to them, or their application [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: In discussing a movie you can challenge my criteria, the weight I give to those criteria, or my application of the criteria (the claim that the movie satisfies the criteria). | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.008) | |
| A reaction: I can't think of anything missing here, so it is a helpful start. |
| 20881 | The act/omission distinction is important for duties, but less so for consequences [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: Consequentialists, unlike deontologists, are unlikely to think that the act/omission distinction is fundamentally important. | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.021) | |
| A reaction: Not sure where virtue theory fits in here. Virtues tend to be applied more locally, where duty tends to be global. All moral theories must acknowledge that failure to act may be either a good or a bad thing, depending on circumstances |
| 20886 | Are we only obligated by agreement, or should we always help the weak? [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: A fundamental question in morality is whether we are obligated to help only those we specifically agreed to help, or are we obligated to help others in need, because they are vulnerable? | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.061) | |
| A reaction: [He is considering J.J. Thomson's defence of abortion] The first option sounds extraordinary. If I don't make any agreements at all, then I cease to be a moral being? Not help strangers when they fall over? |
| 20879 | Too many options may open us to unwanted pressures, like being paid very little [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: Having options is not an unadulterated good. Options may make us vulnerable to unwanted pressure from others. For example, having the option to work for less than the minimum wage increases the chances of employers offering less. | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.019) | |
| A reaction: [J.D. Velleman is cited for this] A nice point, beginning to articulate my growing feeling that although freedom is generally a virtue, it is the most overrated virtue. |
| 20880 | Should people be forced to make choices? [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: Should we give people choices they might not want to have? | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.020) | |
| A reaction: In personal life we encounter people who force us to make an unwanted choice (choose the wine, when you know nothing about wine). Politically, there is the sneaky move of giving unwanted choices, to disguise absence of desired choices. |
| 12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi] |
| Full Idea: Modern science seeks to know the real essences of things, and its increasing successes seem to be bringing it progressively nearer to that goal. | |
| From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.715) | |
| A reaction: This is from a notable pioneering paper, which outlined scientific essentialism even before Marcus and Kripke began to offer a modern account of essence to give it backing. Compare Popper, who thinks essences are will-o-the-wisps. |
| 12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi] |
| Full Idea: Contrary to Locke, I should hold that real essences are in principle knowable, and contrary to Aristotle, I should hold that non-essential or accidental properties can also be objects of scientific knowledge. | |
| From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.717) | |
| A reaction: Copi has just become my hero. Aristotle's account of definition is on the brink of allowing fine-tuned essences, but he thinks universal understanding blocks knowledge of individuals. But cross-referencing of universals pinpoints individuals. |