8 ideas
15797 | All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer] |
Full Idea: I propose a dispositional ontology for the physical world, according to which a) every structural property is a dispositional one, b) a physical object is an ordered set of dispositions, and c) every event manifests a dispositional property of the world. | |
From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], Intro) | |
A reaction: Mumford says this is consistent with ontology as a way of describing the world, rather than being facts about the world. I like Fetzer's sketch, which sounds to have a lot in common with 'process philosophy'. |
15800 | All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer] |
Full Idea: Every atomic event in the world's history is a manifestation of some dispositional property of the world and every physical object is an instantiation of some set of dispositions; hence, every structural property is dispositional in kind. | |
From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 5) | |
A reaction: I quite like this drastic view, but there remains the intuition that there must always be something which has the disposition. That may be because I have not yet digested the lessons of modern physics. |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
15675 | We don't condemn people for being bad at reasoning [Finlayson] |
Full Idea: We do not morally disapprove of people who are incompetent reasoners. | |
From: James Gordon Finlayson (Habermas [2005], Ch.6:83) | |
A reaction: Well, we don't morally disapprove simply of their lack of reasoning ability, but we may morally disapprove of their actions, which have arisen entirely from the disability. |
15674 | One can universalise good advice, but that doesn't make it an obligation [Finlayson] |
Full Idea: 'Early to bed and early to rise' is a universalizable maxim, but, though it might be good advice, there is obviously no such obligation. | |
From: James Gordon Finlayson (Habermas [2005], Ch.6:83) | |
A reaction: I take it that Kant's rule won't distinguish moral guidance from prudential guidance. Unfair, I think. I may be a lark, but when I universalise this maxim I see that it can't be willed as a universal rule, because we should tolerate the owls. |
15662 | The 'culture industry' is an advertisement for the way things are [Finlayson] |
Full Idea: Critical theory said that culture unwittingly played the role of an advertisement for the way things are. Horkheimer and Adorno referred to this phenomenon as the 'culture industry'. | |
From: James Gordon Finlayson (Habermas [2005], Ch.1:04) | |
A reaction: An interesting perspective. However, absolutely everything is an advertisement for what it offers. I think this is especially true of moral (and immoral) actions. |
15798 | Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer] |
Full Idea: Kinds of things are specific arrangements of dispositions. | |
From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 2) | |
A reaction: A 'disposition' doesn't seem quite the right word for what is basic to the physical world, though Harré and Madden make a good case for the 'fields' of physic being understood in that way. I prefer 'power', though that doesn't solve anything. |
15799 | Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer] |
Full Idea: Lawlike sentences are conceived as logically general dispositional statements attributing permanent dispositional properties to every member of a reference class. ...Their basic form is that of subjunctive generalizations. | |
From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 3) | |
A reaction: I much prefer talk of 'lawlike sentences' to talk of 'laws'. At least they imply that the true generalisations about nature are fairly fine-grained. Why not talk of 'generalisations' instead of 'laws'? Fetzer wants dispositions to explain everything. |