22 ideas
1564 | True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: There is no difference between a true statement and a false statement, because they can use exactly the same words. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §4) |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
1559 | Thracians think tattooing adds to a girl's beauty, but elsewhere it is a punishment [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: Thracians think that tattooing enhances a girl's beauty, whereas for everyone else tattooing is a punishment for a crime. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2) |
1561 | Anything can be acceptable in some circumstances and unacceptable in others [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: Anything can be acceptable under the right circumstances, and unacceptable under the wrong circumstances. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2) |
1560 | Lydians prostitute their daughters to raise a dowery, but no Greek would marry such a girl [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: The Lydians find it acceptable for their daughters to work as prostitutes to raise money for getting married, but no one in Greece would be prepared to marry such a girl. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2) |
1567 | How could someone who knows everything fail to act correctly? [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: If someone knows the nature of everything, how could he fail to be able also to act correctly in every case? | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §8) |
1563 | Every apparent crime can be right in certain circumstances [Anon (Diss), by PG] |
Full Idea: It can be right, in certain circumstances, to steal, to break a solemn promise, to rob temples, and even (as Orestes did) to murder one's nearest and dearest. | |
From: report of Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: Not sure about the last one! I suppose you can justify any hideousness if the fate of the universe depends on it. It must be better to die than the perform certain extreme deeds. |
5901 | Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham] |
Full Idea: Bentham has not made up his mind whether he thinks that 'right' means 'productive of the general happiness', or that being productive of the general happiness is what makes acts right (and he would have thought the difference unimportant). | |
From: comment on Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]) by W. David Ross - The Right and the Good §I | |
A reaction: The issue is whether rightness exists as a concept separate from happiness. I take it Bentham would vote for the first reading, as he has no interest in what is right, apart from increasing happiness. |
1562 | It is right to lie to someone, to get them to take medicine they are reluctant to take [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: It is right to lie to your parents, in order to get them to take a good medicine they are reluctant to take. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3) | |
A reaction: I dread to think what the medicines were which convinced the writer of this. A rule such as this strikes me as dangerous. Justifiable in extreme cases. House on fire etc. |
5934 | Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham] |
Full Idea: Most of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure refer to further pleasures, or are irrelevant to the pleasure; we are left with intensity and duration as the characteristics on which depend the value of a pleasure qua pleasure, and there is nothing to add. | |
From: comment on Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]) by W. David Ross - The Right and the Good §VI | |
A reaction: I agree. When Bentham produces his list he seems to be trying to add a bogus enrichment to what is really a rather crude and basic notion of the aim of life. Your simple hedonist appears to only desire high intensity and long duration. |
5271 | Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and science of music and poetry. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Constitutional Code I [1827], p.139), quoted by J.R. Dinwiddy - Bentham p.114 | |
A reaction: Mill quoted this with implied outrage, but Bentham was attacking public subsidies to the arts when he said it. It is a basic idea in the debate on pleasure - that pleasures are only distinguished by their intensity, not some other value. |
3777 | Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], I.1) | |
A reaction: Ridiculous. Both halves are false. We pursue things for other reasons, and to deny this makes his idea a tautology. Deep ecology has nothing to do with human pleasure or pain. |
3554 | Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham] |
Full Idea: It is easy to fall into Bentham's mindless assumption that happiness must be a specific state of feeling good about something, but it is mysterious why anyone would think morality a good strategy for achieving this. | |
From: comment on Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.7 |
3781 | The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham] |
Full Idea: It behoves the legislator to understand the force of pleasures and pains, which is their value. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], IV.1) |
20977 | Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense — nonsense upon stilts. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights [1796]) | |
A reaction: If you want your opinion to be remembered, express it memorably! I take natural rights to be the basic principles and values which are obvious to almost everyone when they come for formulate legal rights (which are the only true rights). |
3778 | The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham] |
Full Idea: The interest of the community is the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], I.4) |
1566 | The first priority in elections is to vote for people who support democracy [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: A lottery is not democratic, because every state contains people who are not democratic, and if the lottery chooses them they will destroy the democracy. People should elect those who are observed to favour democracy. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §7) |
21003 | Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Right, the substantive right, is the child of law; from real laws come real rights; but from imaginary laws, from 'law of nature' can come only imaginary rights. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights [1796], II.523), quoted by Amartya Sen - The Idea of Justice 17 'Ethics' | |
A reaction: I am coming to agree with this. What are called 'natural rights' are just self-evident good reasons why someone should be allowed a right. A right can, of course, come from an informal agreement. The question is: why award that particular legal right? |
1565 | We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §6) |
20280 | Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham] |
Full Idea: A full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational animal than an infant of a day, or even a month, old. But suppose they be otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], XVIII 1 n), quoted by Peter Singer - Practical Ethics 03 | |
A reaction: This is certainly an inspiring, and even shocking question, which never seems to have been so directly asked before in the entire history of European thought. Awesome. |
3779 | Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham] |
Full Idea: Unnatural, when it means anything, means unfrequent. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], II.14 n8.9) |
3780 | We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham] |
Full Idea: It is necessary to know first whether a thing is right in order to know from thence whether it be conformable to the will of God. | |
From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], II.18) |