259 ideas
21916 | Philosophers can't be religious, and don't need to be; philosophy is perilous but free [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: No one who is religious attains to philosophy; he does not need it. No one who really philosophizes is religious; he walks without leading-strings, perilously but free. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], II p.241-3), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3 | |
A reaction: This is a direct reply to the opposite view expressed by Schleiermacher (and quoted by Lewis). I would say that to be a philosopher one must give priority to the philosophy, ahead of any religious beliefs. Thinking must be free. |
4171 | Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 027) | |
A reaction: I think what draws people to philosophy is an interest in whatever is timeless. Contingent reality is so frustrating and exhausting. Hence I agree. |
4186 | Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Every person is conscious of all philosophical truths, but to bring them to conceptual awareness, to reflection, is the business of the philosopher. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.68) | |
A reaction: I like this. All human beings are philosophical. It seems unlikely, though, that we are all pre-conceptually conscious of the higher levels of philosophical logic. |
12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Who cares what gets called 'philosophy'? It's my impression that most of what happened in philosophy before 1950 wouldn't qualify according to the present usage. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.5) | |
A reaction: A rather breath-taking remark. Fodor is, of course, a devotee of David Hume, and of Descartes, but he never seems to refer to Greeks at all. Personally I presume that if you aren't doing what Plato and Aristotle were interested in, it ain't philosophy. |
12171 | Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The more correct the subsumption of objects from one point of view, and the greater and more glaring the incongruity from another point of view, the greater is the ludicrous effect which is produced by this contrast. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 013), quoted by Roger Scruton - Laughter §5 | |
A reaction: This accounts for ludicrous humour, but there seem to be plenty of other types. Exceptional stupidity is usually amusing without necessarily being incongruous. Though it is a departure from the sensible norm. |
21366 | Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The task of metaphysics is not to pass over experience in which the world exists, but to understand it thoroughly, since inner and outer experience are certainly the principal source of all knowledge. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 428), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will' | |
A reaction: I wonder to what extent he meant ordinary experience, and to what extent he was advocating the study if science? |
21474 | Metaphysics studies the inexplicable ends of explanation [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The plummet touches the bottom of the sea now at a greater depth, now at a less, but is bound to reach it somewhere sooner or later; the study of this inexplicable devolves upon metaphysics. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], I:1) | |
A reaction: This definition of metapysics contains the germ of despair about the subject. Does he hope that metaphysicians can explain what nobody else can? |
12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Attempts to define a term frequently elicit necessary but not sufficient conditions for membership of its extension. This is called the 'X problem', as in 'kill' means 'cause to die' plus X. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.2.1 n3) | |
A reaction: Fodor is one of the great sceptics about definition. I just don't see why we have to have totally successful definitions before we can accept the process as a worthwhile endeavour. |
2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Lots of philosophers fear that if concepts don't have analyses, justification breaks down. My own guess is that concepts don't have analyses and that justification will survive all the same. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 3 n2) |
2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The general truth is that nothing ever reduces to anything, however hard philosophers may try. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) |
2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The most important thing that has happened in cognitive science was Turing's invention of the notion of mechanical rationality (because some inferences are rational in virtue of the syntax of their sentences). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.17) |
2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
Full Idea: There seems to be an emerging naturalist consensus that is Realist in ontology and epistemology, externalist in semantics, and computationalist in cognitive psychology, which nicely allows us to retain our understanding of ourselves as rational creatures. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
21918 | Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
Full Idea: Schopenhauer said the principle of sufficient reason is not susceptible to proof for the simple reason that it is presupposed in any argument or proof. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], §14 p.32-3) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3 | |
A reaction: I would have thought it might be disproved by a counterexample, such as the Gödel sentence of his incompleteness proof, or quantum effects which seem to elude causation. Personally I believe the principle, which I see as the first axiom of philosophy. |
4187 | 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The Principle may be stated as 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be', which is a generalisation of the assumption which justifies the question 'Why?', which is the mother of all science. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.I) | |
A reaction: This faith is the core of philosophy, to be maintained against all defeatists like Wittgenstein and Colin McGinn. Reality must be rational, or we wouldn't be here to think about it. (Maybe!) |
12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
Full Idea: There are practically no defensible examples of definitions; for all the examples we've got, practically all the words (/concepts) are undefinable. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I don't think a definition has to be defined all the way down. Aristotle is perfectly happy if you can get a concept you don't understand down to concepts you do. Understanding is the test, not further definitions. |
2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Transcendental arguments ran: "If it weren't that P, we couldn't know (now 'say' or 'think' or 'judge') that Q; and we do know (now…) that Q; therefore P". Old and new arguments tend to be equally unconvincing, because of their empiricist preconceptions. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 3) |
2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
Full Idea: A psychology that can't make sense of such facts as that mental processes are typically truth-preserving is ipso facto dead in the water. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.3) |
2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §3) |
12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
Full Idea: I'm inclined to think that 'and' is defined by its truth-table (and not, for example, by its 'inferential-role'). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Sounds right, on my general principle that something can only have a function if it has an intrinsic nature. The truth-table just formalises normal understanding of 'and', according to what it makes true. |
3005 | 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If the concept 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from the concept 'Oedipus's mother', that's all right because the two concepts are connected with different properties. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 84) |
12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Names in thought (in contrast to, say, descriptions in thought) afford a primitive way of bringing John before the mind. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App) | |
A reaction: I think the 'file' account of concepts which Fodor has now latched onto gives a wonderful account of names. They are simple if you haven't opened the file yet (like 'Louis', in Evans's example). |
12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Paderewski (as pianist and as politician) has two names in Mentalese. If you think there are two Paderewskis, it's important that what you get when you retrieve the pianist file differs from the politician file. You can then merge the two files. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App) | |
A reaction: The same will apply to 'Hespherus' and 'Phosphorus'. We can re-separate the 'morning star' and 'evening star' files if we wish to discuss ancient Egyptian attitudes to such things. I love this idea of Fodor's. Explanations flow from it. |
12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The truth of P-and-Q is (roughly) a function of the truth of P and the truth of Q; but the consistency of P&Q isn't a function of the consistency of P and the consistency of Q. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.4.5 n33) | |
A reaction: This is a nice deep issue. Fodor is interested in artificial intelligence at this point, but I am interested in the notion of coherence, as found in good justifications. Even consistency isn't elementary logic, never mind coherence. |
4168 | Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: In my system matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which exist only for each other, and so exist only relatively. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I.Supp) | |
A reaction: A plausible picture, but built from dualist presuppositions. Personally I think intellect is built out of matter, so I am not going down Schopenhauer's road. |
12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
Full Idea: People say 'exist' is ambiguous, because of the difference between 'chairs exist' and 'numbers exist'. A reply goes: the difference between the existence of chairs and the existence of numbers is strikingly like the difference between chairs and numbers. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: To say 'numbers are objects which exist' is, to me, either a funny use of 'exist' or a funny use of 'object'. I think I will now vote for the latter. Just as 'real number' was a funny use of 'number', but we seem to have got used to it. |
21470 | For me the objective thing-in-itself is the will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Thing in itself signifies that which exists independently of our perception, that which actually is; …to Kant it was '= x'; to me it is will. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], IV:61) | |
A reaction: Does he mean his own will, which is plausible since he has direct experience of it, or is he referring will in general - whatever that is? |
21926 | Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
Full Idea: Schopenhauer radically departs from his fellow idealists in his assertion of the irrational character of reality. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4 | |
A reaction: This is the rejection of the original confidence about rationality of the stoics. And yet Schopenauer saw the principle of sufficient reason as axiomatic. Not sure how to reconcile those. Lewis identifies this idea as 'Romantic'. |
4167 | The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The world has two poles - the knowing subject and crude matter, which are both completely unknowable, the former because it is the knower, the latter because without form and quality it cannot be perceived. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp) | |
A reaction: A nice concept, that all of reality comes from their relationship, but the two components are intrinsically unknowable. Does God the Knower know his own mind? |
21920 | No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
Full Idea: Schopenhauer dispenses with Kant's a priori categories, since all interrelations between representations are given through the principle of sufficient reason. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how Schopenhauer manages this move. Is it the stoic idea that reality has a logical structure, which can be inferred? Sounds good to me. Further investigation required. |
2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Damn near everything we know about the world (e.g. a mountain) suggests that unimaginably complicated to-ings and fro-ings of bits and pieces at the extreme microlevel manage somehow to converge on stable macrolevel properties. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This is clearly true, and is a vital part of the physicalist picture of the mind. Personally I prefer the word 'processes' to 'properties', since no one seems to really know what a property is. A process is an abstraction from events. |
7014 | A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor] |
Full Idea: 'Is a particle and my coin is heads' and 'is a particle and my coin is tails' are perfectly well defined predicates and they pick out perfectly well defined (relational) properties of physical particles. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: (Somewhat paraphrased). This is a very nice offering for the case that all predicates are properties, and hence that 'properties' is an entirely conventional category. It strikes me as self-evident that Fodor is not picking out 'natural' properties. |
12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Using dispositional analyses in aid of ontological reductions is what empiricism taught us. If you are down on cats, reduce them to permanent possibilities of sensation; if you are down on electrons, reduce them to possibilities of experimental outcome. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: The cats line is phenomenalism; the electrons line is instrumentalism. I like this as a serious warning about dispositions, even where they seem most plausible, as in the disposition of glass to break when struck. Why is it thus disposed? |
2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It's a mistake to try to construe the notion of an instance in terms of the notion of a good instance (e.g. Platonic Forms); the latter is patently a special case of the former, so the right order of exposition is the other way round. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 4) |
21362 | Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
Full Idea: For Schopenauer there are physical necessity, logical necessity, mathematical necessity and moral necessity. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 2 'Fourfold' | |
A reaction: These derive from four modes of explanation, by causes, by grounding in truths or facts, by mathematical reality, and by motives. Not clear why mathematics gets its own necessity. I like metaphysics derived from explanations, though. Necessity makers. |
12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Statistically, logically, nomologically, conceptually, and metaphysically possible. That's all the kinds of possibility there are this week, but feel free to add others. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.4.3) | |
A reaction: There's also epistemic possibility (possibility 'for all I know'), but I suppose that isn't the real thing. How about 'imaginative possibility' (possibility 'as far as I can imagine')? |
4192 | All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Necessity has no meaning other than the irresistible sequence of the effect where the cause is given. All necessity is thus conditioned, and absolute or unconditioned necessity is a contradiction in terms. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.VIII) | |
A reaction: I.e. there is only natural necessity, and no such thing as metaphysical necessity. But what about logical necessity(e.g. 2+3=5)? I think there may be metaphysical necessity, but we can't know much about it, and we are over-confident in assessing it. |
4190 | All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.IV) | |
A reaction: Based, I take it, on Hume. Presumably he means a posteriori understanding, as it hardly fits an understanding of arithmetic. Understanding needs more than just causation. What aspects of causation? |
21479 | Knowledge is not power! Ignorant people possess supreme authority [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Knowledge is power. The devil it is! One man can have a great deal of knowledge without its giving him the least power, while another possesses supreme authority but next to no knowledge. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], III:43) | |
A reaction: He is referring to Bacon's famous adage. Bacon may be right about military affairs, but not about politics. |
12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Maybe some of your beliefs are inferred 'online' from what you have in your files, along with your inferential rules. 'Shakespeare didn't have a telephone' is a classic example, which we infer if the occasion arises. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App) | |
A reaction: A highly persuasive example. There seem to be a huge swathe of blatantly obvious beliefs (especially negative ones) which may never cross our minds during an entire lifetime, but to which we certainly subscribe. |
2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: There is no agreed way of counting beliefs. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.16) |
12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Thought about the world is prior to thought about how to change the world. Accordingly, knowing that is prior to knowing how. Descartes was right, and Ryle was wrong. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: The classical example is knowing how to ride a bicycle, when few people can explain what is involved. Clearly you need quite a bit of propositional knowledge before you step on a bike. How does Fodor's claim work for animals? |
4165 | Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: By taking Cogito Ergo Sum as the only certainty, and by his provisionally regarding the existence of the world as problematical, the essential starting point of all philosophy was found, and its true focus in the subjective, the individual consciousness. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp) | |
A reaction: Some people think this was a disaster, not a triumph. Descartes could have doubted himself and accepted the world as his starting point. |
21361 | For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
Full Idea: Schopenhauer is not a realist about material things, but an idealist: that is, material things would not exist, for him, without the mind. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 2 'Fourfold' | |
A reaction: Janaway places his views as close to Kant's, but it is not clear that Kant would agree that no mind means no world. Did Schopenhauer believe in the noumenon? |
21923 | Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB on Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Some say Schopenhauer would be less misunderstood if he had used 'force' or 'energy' rather than 'will' to characterise inner natures. But this would have steered his idealism towards materialism, of which he was an avowed opponent. | |
From: comment on Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4 | |
A reaction: I presume therefore that Nietzsche's will to power is a commitment to materialism, since it occurs in material objects as well as minds. |
4162 | The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The world which surrounds man exists only as idea - that is, only in relation to something else, the one who conceives the idea, which is himself. If any truth can be enunciated a priori, it is this. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 001) | |
A reaction: Yes, but the idea we have is of a real world. It is definitely not part of the idea that it is an idea (unlike my idea for a Christmas present). |
21922 | We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The double knowledge of the nature and action of our own body is the key to the inner being of every phenomenon in nature. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 105), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4 | |
A reaction: Lewis calls this 'the heart of his philosophy'. Bodily awareness comes from acts of willing. So Lewis says 'the thing-in-itself is revealed to us in willing'. We experience Being and causation. Is he trying to combine idealism with the thing-in-itself? |
21913 | Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Kant's greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing-in-itself. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 417 App), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3 | |
A reaction: This is Schopenhauer firmly opposing the Absolute Idealism of Kant's successors, who dismissed the 'thing-in-itsef'. |
21919 | Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: To be object for a subject and to be representation is to be one and the same thing. All representations are objects for a subject, all objects for a subject are representations. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], §16 p.41-2), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3 | |
A reaction: This is pure idealism in early Schopenhauer, derived from Kant. Are being 'an object for a subject' and being an object 'in itself' two different things? Compare Idea 21914, written later. I think Nietzsche's 'perspective' representations helps here. |
2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Berkeley seems to have believed that tables and chairs are logically homogeneous with afterimages. I assume that he was wrong to believe this. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.16) |
21476 | A priori propositions are those we could never be seriously motivated to challenge [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: A dictate of reason is the name we give to certain propositions which we hold to be true without investigation, and of which we think ourselves so firmly convinced we should be incapable of seriously testing them even if we wanted to. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], I:12) | |
A reaction: This is closer to the cautious way modern thinkers are inclined to express the idea. Even Quine would be reasonably happy with this. |
2990 | Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Contrary to commonsense, it looks as though much of what is in the mind is unlearned. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 15) |
3008 | Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If I had to design homo sapiens, I would have made commonsense knowledge of homo sapiens psychology innate; that way nobody would have to spend time learning it. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p.132) |
3009 | Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor] |
Full Idea: God gave the male stickleback the idea that whatever is red is a rival. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p.133) |
4164 | Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: What the eye, the ear, or the hand feels, is not perception, it is merely data. Only when the understanding passes from the effect to the cause does the world lie before us as perception extended in space. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 004) | |
A reaction: These certainly seems to be a sense-data theory. Philosophers are much more ready to separate the data from the understanding than neuroscientists are. |
4163 | All perception is intellectual [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: All perception is intellectual. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 004) | |
A reaction: Even in slugs? I suspect that this is a tautology. Schopenhauer will only allow my vision or hearing to become 'perception' when an intellectual element enters into it. |
2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Why mightn't fleshing out the standard psychological account of perception itself count as learning what perceptual justification amounts to? | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 1) |
2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Pinker's rationalism involves four main ideas: mind is a computational system, which is massively modular with a lot of innate structure resulting from evolution. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.17) |
3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The laws of associations were held to explicate the semantic coherence of intentional processes, which adjust the causal relations among Ideas to reflect corresponding relations among the things that they're ideas of. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.296) | |
A reaction: With the support of evolution, and the backing of a correspondence theory of truth, plus more sophistication in the associations, this might work. |
12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The essential problem is to explain how thinking manages reliably to preserve truth; and Associationism, as Kant rightly pointed out to Hume, hasn't the resources to do so. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: One might be able to give an associationist account of truth-preservation if one became a bit more externalist about it, so that the normal association patterns track their connections with the external world. |
2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
Full Idea: According to empiricists, the fundamental mental process is not theory construction but abstraction. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.12) |
12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Pragmatism is perhaps the worst idea that philosophy ever had. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Not an argument, but an interesting sign of the times. Most major modern American philosophers, such as Quine, seem to fit some loose label of 'pragmatist'. I always smell a feeble relativism, and a refusal to face the interesting questions. |
2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
Full Idea: That there is more in the content of a concept than there is in the experiences that prompt us to form it is the burden of the traditional rationalist critique of empiricism (as worked out by Leibniz and Kant). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.12) |
2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Premeditated cognitive management is possible if knowing the contents of one's thoughts would tell you what would make them true and what would cause you to have them. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: I love the idea of 'cognitive management'. Since belief is fairly involuntary, I subject myself to the newspapers, books, TV and conversation which will create the style of beliefs to which I aspire. Why? |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
Full Idea: A creature that knows what makes its thoughts true and what would cause it to have them, could therefore cause itself to have true thoughts. …This would explain why experimentation is so close to the heart of our cognitive style. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
Full Idea: You can put yourself into a situation where you may be caused to believe that P. Putting a question to someone who is in the know is one species of this behaviour, and putting a question to Nature (an experiment) is another. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
Full Idea: To be in the audience for an experiment you have to believe what the experimenter believes about what the outcome would mean, but not necessarily what the outcome will be. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Experimentation is an occasional and more or less self-conscious exercise in what informal thinking does all the time without thinking about it. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Theories function as links in the causal chains that run from environmental outcomes to the beliefs that they cause the inquirer to have. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
21473 | All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The fundament upon which all our knowledge and learning rests is the inexplicable. It is to this that every explanation, through few or many intermediary stages, leads. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], I:1) | |
A reaction: This is obviously true, and the only question is whether it is a necessary or a contingent truth. |
21917 | The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
Full Idea: There are four forms of explanation, depending on their topic. Causes explain objects. Grounding explains concepts, Points and moments explain mathematics. Motives explain ethics. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], §43 p.214) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3 | |
A reaction: [My compression of Lewis's summary. I'm particularly pleased with this. I have done Schopenhauer a huge favour, should anyone ever visit this website]. The quirky account of mathematics derives from Kant. I greatly admire this whole idea. |
2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Empirical approaches to cognition say the human mind is a blank slate at birth; experiences write on the slate, and association extracts and extrapolates trends from the record of experience. The mind is an image of statistical regularities of the world. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: The 'blank slate' is an exaggeration. The mind at least has the tools to make associations. He tries to make it sound implausible, but the word 'extrapolates' contains a wealth of possibilities that could build into a plausible theory. |
2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Like hands, you don't have to know how the mind evolved to make a pretty shrewd guess at what it's for; for example, that it's to think with. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: I like this. This is one of the basic facts of philosophy of mind, and it frequently gets lost in the fog. It is obvious that the components of the mind (say, experience and intentionality) will be better understood if their function is remembered. |
12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Mental states have causal powers. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.2.3) | |
A reaction: I quote this because it gives you the link between a general account of causal powers as basic to reality, and an active account of what the mind is. It has to be a key link in a decent modern unified account of the world. See Idea 12638. |
2994 | In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor] |
Full Idea: In the Representation Theory of Mind, programs (the 'laws of thought') may be explicitly represented, but data structures (the 'contents of thought') have to be. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 25) | |
A reaction: Presumably this is because content is where mental events actually meet up with the reality being considered. It may be an abstract procedure, but if it doesn't plug into reality then it isn't thought, but merely activity, like that of the liver. |
2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
Full Idea: I hold that psychological laws are intentional, that semantics is purely informational, and that thinking is computation (and that it is possible to hold all of these assumptions at once). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: When he puts it baldly like that, it doesn't sound terribly persuasive. Thinking is 'computation'? Raw experience is irrelevant? What is it 'like' to spot an interesting connection between two propositions or concepts? It's not like adding 7 and 5. |
4166 | A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: A consciousness without an object is no consciousness. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp) | |
A reaction: This hints at Hume's observations about the self. Certainly totally vacant consciousness seems inconceivable, but is that a necessary or a contingent truth? |
2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
Full Idea: I think it is likely that we are the only creatures that can think about the contents of our thoughts. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: I think this is a major idea. If you ask me the traditional question - what is the essential difference between us and other animals? - this is my answer (not language, or reason). We are the metathinkers. |
21369 | We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: We often do not know what we desire or fear. For years we can have a desire without admitting it to ourselves ....because the intellect is not to know anything about it, since the good opinion we have of ourselves would inevitably suffer thereby. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 210), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 5 'Will' | |
A reaction: The idea of unconscious thought crept up well before Freud. It is in La Rochefoucauld, and important in Nietzsche. Neuroscience seems to give it a strong priority over the conscious mind, which is a revolutionary idea. |
21478 | Half our thinking is unconscious, and we reach conclusions while unaware of premises [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: One might almost believe that half our thinking takes place unconsciously.. Usually we arrive at a conclusion without having clearly thought about the premises which lead to it. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], III:40) | |
A reaction: Schopenhauer was a major pioneer of this crucial idea. I'm beginning to think it is much greater than a half. |
15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
Full Idea: Fodor asks the stirring and basic question 'How does anything get outside itself?' | |
From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by C.B. Martin - The Mind in Nature 03.6 | |
A reaction: Is this one of those misconceived questions, like major issues concerning 'what's it like to be?' In what sense am I outside myself? Is a mind any more mysterious than a shadow? |
2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Intentional Realism is the idea that our intentional mental states causally explain our behaviour; so holistic semantics (which says no two people have the same intentional states, or share generalisations) is irrealistic about intentional mental states. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: ...presumably because two people CAN have the same behaviour. The key question would be whether the intentional states have to be conscious. |
2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
Full Idea: For Fodor the intentionality of the propositional-attitude vocabulary of our folk psychology is the outward expression of the inward intentionality of the language of the brain. | |
From: comment on Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by William Lyons - Approaches to Intentionality p.39 | |
A reaction: I would be very cautious about this. Folk psychology works, so it must have a genuine basis in how brains work, but it breaks down in unusual situations, and might even be a total (successful) fiction. |
7326 | Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue of ultimate and irreducible things, with the likes of spin, charm and charge. But aboutness won't be on the list; intentionality simply doesn't go that deep. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], 4 Intro) | |
A reaction: I totally agree with this, which I take to be a warning to John Searle against including something called 'intrinsic intentionality' into his ontology. Intentionality 'emerges' out of certain complex brain activity. |
3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If there is to be an intentional science, there must be semantically evaluable things which have causal powers, and there must be laws relating beliefs and desires to one another, and to actions. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.293) | |
A reaction: The semantics and causation sound fair enough, but the prospect of finding laws looks bleak (though, contrary to Davidson, I don't see why they can't exist). |
3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It may be that intentional states are relations to mental symbols, and mental processes are implemented by causal relations among these symbols. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.296) | |
A reaction: It is hard to see how something could have causal powers just by being a symbol. The theory needs something else to drive the causation. |
15494 | We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It's not clear what the point would be of an explanation of the intentionality of attitudes which presupposes objects that are intentional intrinsically. Why not just say that the attitudes are? | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], Ch.3) |
12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The ways in which different kinds of thing are similar to one another aren't, in general, similar to one another. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.5.4) | |
A reaction: Nice, but I think one would say that they lack similarity at the level of primary thought, but have obvious similarity (as concept-connectors) at the level of meta-thought. |
2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If there is a community of computers living in my head, there had also better be somebody who is in charge; and, by God, it had better be me. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: Dennett quotes this as a quaintly old-fashioned view. I agree quite strongly with Fodor, for reasons that Dennett should like - evolutionary ones. A mind is a useless tool without central co-ordination. What makes my long-term plans? It isn't anarchy! |
4191 | What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: What we know in ourselves is never what knows, but what wills, the will. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.VII) | |
A reaction: An interesting slant on Hume's scepticism about personal identity. Hume was hunting for a thing-which-experiences. If he had sought his will, he might have spotted it. |
21367 | I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: My body is the only object of which I know not merely the one side, that of the representation, but also the other, that is called 'will'. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 125), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will' | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced that knowledge of the body through the will (and action, presumably) constitutes a different sort of knowledge. Philosophers are always trying to split the world in two (but not Nietzsche!). |
21368 | The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The identity of the subject of willing with that of knowing by virtue whereof ...the word 'I' includes and indicates both, is the knot of the world, and hence inexplicable. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], p.211-2), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 4 'Self' | |
A reaction: I'm struggling to see this as a deep mystery. If we look objectively at animals and ask 'what is their brain for?' the answer seems obvious. This may be a case of everything looking mysterious after a philosopher has stared at it for a while. |
4175 | It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: It is as perverse to desire the continuity of one's individuality which is being replaced by other individuals, as to desire the permanence of the body's substance which is always being replaced by new substance. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.54) | |
A reaction: If I let that go, what am I supposed to hang on to? Nothing? Non-existence is not an attractive condition to aspire to. |
4176 | We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Everyone regards himself a priori as free in his individual actions, and only a posteriori sees that necessarily his actions follow from the coincidence of character with motives. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.55) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure what experience shows. Necessity seems more obvious when observing other people. Samuel Johnson said experience showed freedom, not necessity. |
21477 | We don't control our own thinking [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Thoughts come not when we want but when they want. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], III:37) | |
A reaction: One of my favourite Nietzsche ideas originated in Schopenhauer! |
4170 | Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Man's action have been interpreted as free, which they are not, for every individual action follows with strict necessity from the impact of motive on character. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 023) | |
A reaction: If 'character is fate' (Heraclitus) then presumably motive must also be fate to complete the determinist picture. I shall spend the next year redesigning my motivation. |
2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The question how mental representations could be both semantic, like propositions, and causal, like rocks, trees, and neural firings, is arguably just the interaction problem all over again. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: Interesting way of presenting the problem. If you seem to be confronting the interaction problem, you have probably drifted into a bogus dualist way of thinking. Retreat, and reformulate you questions and conceptual apparatus, till the question vanishes. |
2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The Cartesian view is that the interaction problem does arise, but is unsolvable because interaction is miraculous. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: A rather unsympathetic statement of the position. Cartesians might think that God could explain to us how interaction works. Cartesians are not mysterians, I think, but they see no sign of any theory of interaction. |
2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The avoidance of epiphenomenalism requires making it plausible that intentional properties can meet sufficient conditions for causal responsibility. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.154) | |
A reaction: A wordy way of saying we either have epiphenomenalism, or the mind had better do something - and a good theory will show how. The biggest problem of the mind may not be Chalmer's Hard Question (qualia), but how thought-contents cause things. |
3001 | Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Behaviourists had trouble providing a robust construal of mental causation (and hence had no logical space for a psychology of mental processes). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 67) | |
A reaction: If they could reduce all mental events to stimulus-response, that seems to fall within the normal procedures of physical causation. There is no problem of mental causation if your ontology is entirely physical. |
2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Functionalists claim that pains and the like are higher-order, relational properties that things have in virtue of the pattern of causal interactions that they (can or do) enter into. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: The whole idea of a property being purely 'relational' strikes me as dubious (or even nonsense). "Is north of" is a relation, but it is totally derived from more basical physical geographical properties. |
2993 | Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor] |
Full Idea: For any machine that computes a function by executing an explicit algorithm, there exists a hard-wired machine that computes the same function by not executing an explicit algorithm. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 23) | |
A reaction: It is certainly vital for functionalists to understand that software can be hardwired. Presumably we should understand a hardwired alogirthm as 'implicit'? |
12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If the Representational Theory of Mind is true, then concepts are constituents of beliefs, the units of semantic evaluation, a locus of causal interactions among mental representations, and formulas in Mentalese. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.2.1) | |
A reaction: I like this aspect of the theory, but then I can't really think of a theory about how the mind works that doesn't make concepts central to it. |
3011 | Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Everybody is a functionalist, in that we all hold that mental states are individuated, at least in part, by reference to their causal powers. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p.138) | |
A reaction: I might individuate the Prime Minister by the carnation in his buttonhole. However, even a dualist must concede that we individuate mental faculties by their role within the mind. |
5498 | Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: Fodor sees behaviour as manifestations of psychological capacities, which result from the subject being a set of interconnected 'homunculi', which in turn have subcomponents, all of it arranged in a hierarchy. | |
From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.9 | |
A reaction: This may well miss out the most interesting parts of a mind (such as awareness, and personal identity), but it sounds basically right, especially when an evolutionary history is added to the system. Parts of my mind intrude into my trains of thought. |
2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
Full Idea: I argue that (contrary to the doctrine called "anomalous monism") there is no good reason to doubt that there are intentional causal laws. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.151) | |
A reaction: I certainly can't see a good argument, in Davidson or anywhere else, to demonstrate their impossibility. Give the complexity of the brain, they would be like the 'laws' for weather or geology. |
2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Compare Churchland's strategy rooted in neurological modelling with "if it's flight you want to understand, what you need to look at is feathers". | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: Sounds good, but may be a false analogy. You learn a lot about snake movement if you examine their scales. |
2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
Full Idea: Fodor holds that beliefs are brain states or processes, but picked out at a 'higher' or 'special science' level. | |
From: comment on Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by William Lyons - Approaches to Intentionality p.82 | |
A reaction: I don't think you can argue with this. Levels of physical description exist (e.g. pure physics tells you nothing about the weather), and I think 'process' is the best word for the mind (Idea 4931). |
2995 | Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Mind/brain supervenience is the best idea anyone has had so far about how mental causation is possible. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 30) | |
A reaction: I would have thought that mind brain identity was a much better idea (see Idea 3440). Supervenience seems to prove that 'mental causation' occurs, but doesn't explain it. |
2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Type physicalism is, roughly, the doctrine that psychological kinds are identical to neurological kinds. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], App A n.1) | |
A reaction: This gets my general support, leaving open the nature of 'kinds'. Presumably the identity is strict, as in 'Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus'. It seems unlikely that if you and I think the 'same' thought, that we have strictly identical brain states. |
2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
Full Idea: "Type" physicalism is supposed, by general consensus, to be stronger than "token" physicalism; stronger, that is, than the mere claim that all mental states are necessarily physically instantiated. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: Such philosopher's terminology always seems cut-and-dried, until you ask exactly what is identical to what. The word 'type' is a very broad concept. Are trees the same type of thing as roses? A thought always requires the same 'type' of brain event? |
2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
Full Idea: What Hume didn't see was that the causal and representational properties of mental symbols have somehow to be coordinated if the coherence of mental life is to be accounted for. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: Certainly the idea that it all somehow becomes magic at the point where the brain represents the world is incoherent - but it is a bit magical. How can the whole of my garden be in my brain? Weird. |
2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Churchland is pushing a version of connectionism ….in which if you think of the elements as "ideas" and call the connections between them "associations", you've got a psychology that is no great advance on David Hume. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: See Fodor's book 'Humean Variations' on how Hume should be improved. This idea strikes me as important for understanding Hume, who is very reticent about what his real views are on the mind. |
12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Connectionism has no truck with mental representations; on the one hand, only the node labels in 'neural networks' have semantic content, and, on the other, the node labels play no role in mental processes, in standard formulations. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Connectionism must have some truth in it, yet mere connections can't do the full job. The difficulty is that nothing else seems to do the 'full job' either. Fodor cites productivity, systematicity, compositionality, logical form as the problems. |
2991 | Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor] |
Full Idea: With Associationism there proved to be no way to get a rational mental life to emerge from the sorts of causal relations among thoughts that the 'laws of association' recognised. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 18) | |
A reaction: This might not be true if you add the concept of evolution, which has refined the associations to generate truth (which is vital for survival). |
3002 | If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Central state identity theorists had trouble providing for the nomological possibility of rational machines (and hence no space for a non-biological, e.g. computational, theory of intelligence). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 67) | |
A reaction: I surmise that a more externalist account of the physical mind might do the trick, by explaining intelligence in terms of an evolved relationship between brain and environment. |
2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If one of your reasons for doubting that believing-that-P is a physical property is that believing is multiply realizable, then you have the same reason for doubting that being an airfoil (or a mountain) counts as a physical property. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.153) | |
A reaction: This merely points out that functionalism is not incompatible with physicalism, which must be right. |
3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
Full Idea: These days most philosophers of mind suppose that most psychological properties are multiply realisable. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.298) | |
A reaction: This is just speculation. The physical part may seem very different, but turn out to be identical in the ways that matter (like a knife made of two different metals). |
12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The virtue of associative theories of thinking is that they don't require thoughts to have syntactic structure. But they can't be right, since association doesn't preserve either sense or reference (to say nothing of truth). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.3 n28) | |
A reaction: This is using the empiricist idea that knowledge is built from mechanical associations to give a complete account of what thinking is. Fodor resolutely opposes it. |
2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The question whether there are recognitional concepts is really the question what thought is for - for directing action, or for discerning truth. And Descartes was right on this: the goal of thought is to understand the world, not to sort it. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 4) |
2992 | We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor] |
Full Idea: We are on the verge of solving a great mystery about the mind: how is rationality mechanically possible? | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 20) | |
A reaction: Optimistic, given that AI has struggled to implement natural languages, mainly because common sense knowledge seems too complex to encode. Can a machine determine logical forms of sentences? |
12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Connectionist architectures provide no counterpart to the relation between a complex concept and its constituents. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.3 n29) | |
A reaction: This is the compositionality of thought, upon which Fodor is so insistent. Not that a theory of how the mind is built up from the body is quite likely to give you a theory about what thinking is. I try to keep them separate, which may be wrong. |
2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Propositional attitudes are really three-place relations, between a creature, a proposition, and a mode of presentation (which are sentences of Mentalese). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.II) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure about 'really'! Why do we need a creature? Isn't 'hoping it will rain' a propositional attitude which some creature may or may not have? Fodor wants it to be physical, but it's abstract? |
2988 | Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Commonsense belief/desire psychology explains vastly more of the facts about behaviour than any of the alternative theories available. It could hardly fail to; there are no alternative theories available. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p.x) | |
A reaction: The alternative view wouldn't expect a clear-cut theory, because it deals with the endless complexity of brain events. The charge is that Fodor and co oversimplify their account, in their desperation for a 'theory'. |
3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology is primarily intentional explanation; it's the idea that people's behaviour can be explained by reference to the contents of their beliefs and desires. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.292) | |
A reaction: Sounds good. To reject folk psychology (as reductivists tend to) is to reject the existence of significant intentional states which have causal properties |
2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Mentalism isn't gratuitous; you need it to explain rationality. Mental causation buys you behaviours that are unlike reflexes in at least three ways: they're autonomous, they're productive, and they're experimental. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: He makes his three ways sound all-or-nothing, which is (I believe) the single biggest danger when thinking about the mind. "Either you are conscious, or you are not..." |
2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Blind children are not, in general, linguistically impaired; not even in their talk about space. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: This is offered to demonstrate that spatial concepts are innate, even in the blind. But then we would expect anyone who has to move in space to develop spatial concepts from experience. |
2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The thinking involved in "figuring out" what to do is a quite different kind of mental process than the stimulus analysis that modules perform. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: My PA theory fits this perfectly. My inner assistant keeps providing information about needs, duties etc., but takes no part in my decisions. Psychology must include the Will. |
2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Probably, modular computation doesn't explain how minds are rational; it's just a sort of precursor. You work through it to get a view of how horribly hard our rationality is to understand. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: The choice is between a Self which weighs and judges the inputs, or merely decisions that automatically result from the balance of inputs. The latter seems unlikely. Vetoes are essential. |
2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Modules function to present the world to thought under descriptions that are germane to the success of behaviour. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: "Descriptions" might be a bold word to use about something so obscure, but this pinpoints the evolutionary nature of modularity theory, to which I subscribe. |
2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
Full Idea: "Who Mummy love?" is recognizably baby talk; but "love Mummy who?" is not. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: Not convincing. If she is embracing Daddy, and asking baby, she might get the answer "Daddy", after a bit of coaxing. Who knows what babies up the Amazon respond to? |
2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Modules contain lots of specialized information about the problem domains that they compute in. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: At this point we must be cautious about modularity. I doubt whether 'information' is the right word. I think 'specialized procedures' might make more sense. |
22186 | Mental modules are specialised, automatic, and isolated [Fodor, by Okasha] |
Full Idea: Fodor argues that mental modules have three important featuresL 1) they are domain-specific, 2) their operation is mandatory, 3) they are informationally encapsulated. | |
From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (The Modularity of Mind [1983]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 6 | |
A reaction: Mandatory is interesting. When I hear an English sentence I can't decide not to process it. Modules cannot be too isolated or they couldn't participate in the team. Each one needs a comms manager. |
2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The four essential properties of modules are: encapsulation (information doesn't flow, as in the persistence of illusions); inaccessibility (unreportable); domain specificity (they have private concepts); innateness (genetically preprogrammed). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: If they have no information flow, and are unreportable and private, this makes empirical testing of Fodor's hypothesis a little tricky. He must be on to something, though. |
2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It is not plausible that the mind could be made only of modules; one does sometimes manage to balance one's checkbook, and there can't be an innate, specialized intelligence for doing that. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: I agree strongly with this. My own mind strikes me as being highly modular, but as long as I am aware of the output of the modules, I can pass judgement. The judger is more than a 'module'. |
2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The best candidates for the status of mental modules are language (the first one, put there by Chomsky), commonsense biology, commonsense physics, commonsense psychology, and aspects of visual form perception. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: My favourite higher level module is my Personal Assistant, who keeps nagging me to do sundry things, only some of which I agree to. It is an innate superego, but still a servant of the Self. |
2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
Full Idea: I don't think it is true that all thought is in Mentalese. It is quite likely (e.g. in arithmetic algorithms) that Mentalese co-opts bits of natural language. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: Presumably language itself would have to be coded in mentalese. If there is some other way for thought to work, the whole mind could use it, and skip mentalese. |
2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Thinking can't just be in sequences of English words since, notoriously, thought needs to be ambiguity-free in ways that mere word sequences are not. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: I think this is a strong argument in favour of (at least) propositions. Thoughts are unambiguous, but their expression need not be. Sentences could be expanded to achieve clarity. |
3010 | Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor] |
Full Idea: A defence of the language of thought has to be an argument that believing and desiring are typically structured states. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p.136) | |
A reaction: A structure is one thing, and a language is another. Both believings and desirings can be extremely vague, to the point where the owner is unsure what is believed or desired. They can, of course, be extremely precise. |
8090 | Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin] |
Full Idea: Fodor and Jackendorff argue that since the internal language of thought, or conceptual structure, has to be more or less the same for all people, of whatever language, it will surely be something like logical form. | |
From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (The Language of Thought [1975]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.8 | |
A reaction: The discovery (by, e.g., Frege and Russell) that there is something called 'logical form', which we can track down and represent in precise and fairly unambiguous symbolism, may be one of the greatest of all human discoveries. Perhaps. |
2604 | We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language [Fodor] |
Full Idea: I am denying that one can learn a language whose expressive power is greater than that of a language that one already knows. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (How there could be a private language [1975], p.389) | |
A reaction: I presume someone who had a native language of limited vocabulary could learn a new language with a vast vocabulary. I can increase my expressive power with a specialist vocabulary (e.g. legal). |
2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Mentalese doesn't need Grice's theory of natural-language meaning, or indeed any theory of natural-language meaning whatsoever. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: Presumably what is represented by mentalese is a quite separate question from whether there exists a mentalese that does some sort of representing. Sounds plausible. |
12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
Full Idea: That there are ambiguities in English is the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.5) | |
A reaction: I have always been impressed by this simple observation, which is my main reason for believing in propositions (as brain events). 'Propositions' may just be useful chunks of mentalese. |
12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
Full Idea: We think in file names. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App) | |
A reaction: This is Fodor's new view. He cites Treisman and Schmidt (1982) for raising it, and Pylyshyn (2003) for discussing it. I love it. It exactly fits my introspective view of how I think, and I think it would fit animals. It might not fit some other people! |
12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Mental representations can serve both as names for things in the world and as names of files in the memory. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App) | |
A reaction: I am laughed at for liking this idea (given the present files of ideas before you), but I think this it is very powerful. Chicken before egg. I was drawn to databases precisely because they seemed to map how the mind worked. |
3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
Full Idea: The modest mentalism of the Computational/Representational Theory of Thought (CRTT), associated with Fodor, says mental processes are computational, defined over syntactically specified entities, and these entities represent the world (are also semantic). | |
From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind Int.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to imply that if you built a machine that did all these things, it would become conscious, which sounds unlikely. Do footprints 'represent' feet, or does representation need prior consciousness? |
12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The frame problem is, precisely: How does one know that none of one's beliefs about Jupiter are germane to the current question, without having to recall and search one's beliefs about Jupiter? | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.4.4) | |
A reaction: Presumably good chess-playing computers have made some progress with this problem. The only answer, as far as I can see, is that brains have a lot in common with relational databases. The mind is structured around a relevance-pattern. |
2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
Full Idea: Fodor is concerned with producing a realist and physicalist account of 'narrow content' (i.e. wholly in-the-head content). | |
From: comment on Jerry A. Fodor (works [1986]) by William Lyons - Approaches to Intentionality p.54 | |
A reaction: The emergence of 'wide' content has rather shaken Fodor's game plan. We can say "Oh dear, I thought I was referring to H2O", so there must be at least some narrow aspect to reference. |
12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The idea that there are mental representations is the idea that there are Ideas minus the idea that Ideas are images. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Good for you, Fodor. I've always thought that the vociferous contempt with which modern philosphers refer to the old notion of 'Ideas' was grossly exaggerated. At last someone puts a clear finger on what seems to be the difficulty. |
12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If the content of a concept is its reference, we can stop worrying about Twin Earth. If there are no senses, there is no question of whether my twin and I have the same WATER concept. Our WATER concepts aren't even coextensive. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This seems like a neat solution. So do 'tap water' and 'holy water' have the same content to a Christian and non-Christian, when they co-refer to the contents of the font? |
2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
Full Idea: There isn't any XYZ, and there couldn't be any, and so we don't have to worry about it. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.I) | |
A reaction: Jadeite and Nephrite are real enough, which are virtually indistinguishable variants of jade. You just need Twin Jewellers instead of Twin Earths. We could build them, and employ twins to work there. |
3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It is hard to see how the extrinsic properties of thoughts could supervene on their intrinsic properties. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.299) | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem a big problem. Sometimes represented experiences establish the match; sometimes the match is not very good, or even wrong. |
2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
Full Idea: We need the idea of broad content to make sense of the fact that thoughts have the truth-conditions that they do. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.II) | |
A reaction: There seems to be (as Dummett points out) a potential circularity here, as you can hardly know the truth-conditions of something if you don't already know its content. |
2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
Full Idea: People who ask what the narrow content of the thought that water is wet is (for example) get what they deserve: phenomenalism, verificationism, 'procedural' semantics, or scepticism, according to temperament. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 51) | |
A reaction: The question is whether content IS narrow. We could opt for broad content because then we wouldn't have to worry about scepticism, but I doubt whether we would then sleep well at night. |
3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If the words of 'Swamp Man' (spontaneously created, with concepts) are about XYZ on Twin Earth, it is not because he's causally connected to the stuff, but because XYZ would cause his 'water' tokens (in the absence of H2O). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], App B) | |
A reaction: The sight of the Eiffel tower causes my 'France' tokens, so is my word "France" about the Eiffel Tower? What would cause my 'nothing' tokens? |
2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Functional role semantics wants to analyze the content of a belief in terms of its inferential (causal) relations; but that seems the wrong way round. The content of a belief determines its causal role. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This is one of my favourite ideas, which keeps coming to mind when considering functional accounts of mental life. The buck of explanation must, however, stop somewhere. |
3012 | Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If thoughts have their causal roles in virtue of their contents, then two thoughts with identical contents ought to be identical in their causal roles. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p.140) | |
A reaction: A pencil would presumably have the same causal role if it wrote a love poem or hate mail. But a pencil is also good for scratching your back. 'Causal role' can be a rather vacuous idea. |
2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If you know the content of a thought, you know quite a lot about what would cause you to have it. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure where this fits into the great jigsaw of the mind, but it strikes me as an acute and important observation. The truth of a thought is not essential to make you have it. Ask Othello. |
2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: I assume intentional content reduces (in some way) to information. …The content of a thought depends on its external relations; on the way that the thought is related to the world, not the way that it is related to other thoughts. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.2) | |
A reaction: Does this make Fodor a 'weak' functionalist? The 'strong' version would say a thought is merely a location in a flow diagram, but Fodor's 'mentalism' includes a further 'content' in each diagram box. |
12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
Full Idea: I don't know how concepts are acquired. Nor do you. Nor does anybody else. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.5.4) | |
A reaction: This comes in the context of quietly modifying his earlier claim that concepts weren't acquired, because they were largely innate. Presumably we are allowed to have theories of concept acquisition? I quite like abstractionism. |
21921 | Concepts are abstracted from perceptions [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
Full Idea: For Schopenhauer concepts are abstractions from perception, what he calls 'representations of representations', and are linked to the creation of language. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3 | |
A reaction: This is a traditional view which dates back to Aristotle, and which I personally think is entirely correct. These days I am in minority on that. This idea means that (contrary to Kant) perception is not conceptual. |
21475 | All of our concepts are borrowed from perceptual knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The entire property of a concept consists in nothing more than what has been begged and borrowed from perceptual knowledge, which is the true and inexhaustible source of all insight. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], I:9) | |
A reaction: Schopenhauer is usually seen as a sort of idealist, but this is a full endorsement of the empirical view of concepts, to which I largely subscribe. Note that he talks of 'knowledge', rather than of 'experience'. |
2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Experience can't explain itself; eventually, some of the concepts that explaining experience requires have to come from outside it. Eventually, some of them have to be built in. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.12) |
11143 | If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence] |
Full Idea: Fodor argues that virtually all lexical concepts are innate, because most models of learning treat concept-learning as hypothesis testing, but that invariably employs the very concept to be learned. | |
From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (The Language of Thought [1975]) by E Margolis/S Laurence - Concepts 3.3 | |
A reaction: The obvious response is to reject the theory which gave rise to this difficulty. I take concept formation to be a fairly mechanical and barely conscious response to environment, not a process of fully rational and conscious hypothesising. |
6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Fodor has recently changed his mind about the innateness of concepts, which he formerly championed. | |
From: report of Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.7 n25 | |
A reaction: There is some sensible middle road to be charted here. We presumably do not have an innate idea of a screwdriver, but there are plenty of basic concepts in logic and perception that are plausibly thought of as innate. |
12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
Full Idea: What's learned are stereotypes. What's innate is the disposition to grasp such and such a concept (to lock to such a property) in consequence of having learned such and such a stereotype. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.5.4) | |
A reaction: This is the late Fodor much ameliorated view, after a lot of scoffing about the idea of the tin-opener being innate in all of us. There may be a suspicion of circularity here, if we ask what mental abilities are needed to form a stereotype. |
12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Nothing in any mental life could be the concept CAT unless it is satisfied by cats. If you haven't got a concept that applies to cats, that entails that you haven't got the CAT concept. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Of course, having a concept that applies to cats doesn't entail that you have the CAT concept. Quine's 'gavagai', for example. I think Fodor is right in this idea. |
12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Pragmatism about concepts really is dead, and the only alternative about concept possession is Cartesianism. That is, it's the thesis that having concept C is being able to think about Cs (as such). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.2.2) | |
A reaction: I like this. It is very hard to pick out from Fodor the bits where he is clearly right, but this seems to be one of them. I don't like the pragmatic or Wittgensteinian line that having concepts is all about abilities and uses (like sorting or inferring). |
12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
Full Idea: We think in file names, and file names are Janus-faced: one face turned towards thinking and the other face turned towards what is thought about. I do think that is rather satisfactory. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App) | |
A reaction: So do I. I do hope the philosophical community take up this idea (which they probably won't, simply because Fodor is in the late stages of his career!). |
2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Semantics, according to the informational view, is mostly about counterfactuals; what counts for the identity of my concepts is not what I do distinguish but what I could distinguish if I cared to (even using instruments and experts). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.I) | |
A reaction: We all differ in our discriminations (and awareness of expertise), so our concepts would differ, which is bad news for communication (see Idea 223). The view has some plausibility, though. |
12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
Full Idea: I argue for a very strong version of psychological atomism; one according to which what concepts you have is conceptually and metaphysically independent of what epistemic capacities you have. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This is a frontal assault on the tradition of Frege, Dummett and Peacocke. I immediately find Fodor's approach more congenial, because he wants to say what a concept IS, rather than just place it within some larger scheme of things. |
2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Virtually all modern theorists about philosophy, mind or language tend to agree that concepts are capacities, in particular concepts are epistemic capacities. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This view seems to describe concepts in functional terms, which generates my perennial question: what is it about concepts that enables them to fulfil that particular role? |
2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It's a paradigmatically Pragmatist idea that having a concept consists in being able to do something. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: If you defined a bicycle simply by what you could do with it, you wouldn't explain much. I wonder if pragmatism and functionalism come from the same intellectual stable? |
12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Cartesians think that concept individuation is prior, in order of analysis, to concept possession. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Peacocke is someone who seems to put possession first, to the point where individuation is thereby achieved. The background influence there is Wittgenstein. I think I am more with Fodor, that concepts are entities, which need to be understood. |
12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Philosophers in droves have held that Frege cases are convincing arguments that concepts have not just referents but also senses. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.2) | |
A reaction: [Frege cases are puzzles where simple reference seems to lead to confusion] I take the Fregean approach to concepts (of Dummett, Peacocke) to attempt to give an account of the sense, once the reference is decided. Idea 12629 gives Fodor's view. |
12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
Full Idea: How are we to understand the connection between the identity of a concept and its causal powers if concepts are (or have) senses? Answer: I haven't a clue. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.3) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the key to Fodor's attack on Peacocke and other Fregeans - that while they pay lip-service to the project of naturalising thought, they are actually committing us to some sort of neo-platonism, by losing the causal links. See Idea 12636. |
12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Supposing the mind to be conversant with senses can, maybe, provide for a theory of the intentionality of mental states; but it seems to shed no light at all on the nature of mental processes (i.e. of mental state transitions). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.3) | |
A reaction: I would track this back to Frege's hostility to 'psychologism'. That is, Fregeans don't care about Fodor's problem, because all their accounts (of mathematics, of logic, and of concepts) treat the subject-matter as self-contained sui generis. |
12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
Full Idea: You can think 'brown dog' without thinking 'cat', but you can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog'. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.4.3) | |
A reaction: Fodor is talking about concepts in thought, not about words. The claim is that such concepts have to be compositional, and it is hard to disagree. |
12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The definition theory says that concepts are complex structures which entail their constituents. By saying this, it guarantees both the connection between content and necessity, and the connection between concept individuation and concept possession. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: He cites Pinker as a spokesman for the definitional view. This is the view Fodor attacks, in favour of his atomistic account. He adds in a note that his view also offered to reduce conceptual truth to logical truth. |
12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Many concepts have no prototypes; and there are many complex concepts whose prototypes aren't related to the prototypes of their constituents in the way compositional explanation of productivity and systematicity requires. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: His favourite example of the latter is 'pet fish', where the prototype of 'pet' is hardly ever a fish, and the prototype of 'fish' is usually much bigger than goldfish. Fodor is arguing that concepts are atomic. |
12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
Full Idea: We needn't say that learning a stereotype is just a by-product of acquiring the concept; it could rather be a stage in concept acquisition. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.5.4) | |
A reaction: He rejects stereotypes because they don't give concepts the necessary compositionality in thought. But this idea would mean that children were incapable of compositionality until they had transcended the primitive stereotype stage. |
12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The same stereotype can give difference concepts; chickens are paradigmatic instances both of FOOD and of BARNYARD FOWL. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.5.4) | |
A reaction: And I'm guessing that lots of concepts could have two equally plausible stereotypes, even within a single mind. Stereotypes are interesting, but they don't seem to be the key to our understanding of concepts. |
12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If the theory theory has a distinctive and coherent answer to the 'What's a concept?' question on offer, it's a well-kept secret. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Not an argument, but worth recording as an attitude. I certainly agree that accounts which offer some sort of answer to 'What is a concept?' have an immediate head's start on those which don't. |
12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Pure referentialism is the kind of semantics RTM requires (reference is the only primitive mind-world semantic property). ...So the content of a concept is its reference. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to say that the meaning of a concept is (typically) a physical object, which seems to be the 'Fido'-Fido view of meaning. It seems to me to be a category mistake to say that a meaning can be a cat. |
12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Atomism must be right about the individuation of concepts because compositionality demands it. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch1) | |
A reaction: I suppose this seems right, though Fodor's own example of 'pet fish' is interesting. What is supposed to happen when you take a concept like 'pet' and put it with 'fish', given that both components shift their atomic (?) meaning in the process? |
12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
Full Idea: In the idea of learning concepts by 'abstraction', experiences of the instances provide evidence about which of the shared properties of things in a concept's extension are 'criterial' for being in the concept's extension. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.5.2 n6) | |
A reaction: Fodor is fairly sceptical of this approach, and his doubts are seen in the scare-quotes around 'criterial'. He is defending the idea that only a certain degree of innateness in the concepts can get such a procedure off the ground. |
2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It is the essence of semantic externalism that there is nothing that you have to believe, there are no inferences that you have to accept, to have the concept 'elm'. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.I) | |
A reaction: [REMINDER: broad content is filed in 18.C.7, under 'Thought' rather than under language. That is because I am a philospher of thought, rather than of language. |
2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It is the causal connection between the state of the world and the contents of beliefs that the reduction of meaning to information is designed to insure. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear why characterising the contents of a belief in terms of its information has to amount to a 'reduction'. A cup of tea isn't reduced to tea. Connections imply duality. |
2998 | Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor] |
Full Idea: According to Gricean theories of meaning, the meaning of a sentence is inherited from the propositional attitudes that the sentence is conventionally used to express. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 50) | |
A reaction: Since the propositional attitudes contain propositions, this seems like a very plausible idea. If an indexical like 'I' is involved, the meaning of the sentence is not the same as its 'conventional' use. |
2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Nobody now thinks that the reduction of the meaning of English sentences to facts about the communicative intentions of English speakers - or to any facts about mental states - is likely to go through. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: Most attempts at 'reduction' of meaning seem to go rather badly. I assume it would be very difficult to characterise 'intentions' without implicit reference to meaning. |
3006 | Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The mechanisms that deliver falsehoods are somehow parasitic on the ones that deliver truths. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p.107) | |
A reaction: In the case of a sentence and its negation it is not clear which one is 'parasitic', because that can usually be reversed by paraphrasing. Historically, I very much hope that truth-speaking came first. |
2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If you know the content of a thought, you thereby know what would make the thought true. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: The truthmaker might by physically impossible, and careful thought might show it to be contradictory - but that wouldn't destroy the meaning. |
3007 | Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Verification procedures connect terms with their denotations in too many ways. Different routes to 'star' do not determine different semantic values for 'star'. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p.125) | |
A reaction: This fairly conclusively shows that meaning is not 'the method of verification' - but that wasn't a difficult target to hit. |
3004 | The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 79) | |
A reaction: Among other things. It can also arrive from a desire to remember something. A sentence can also acquire meaning compositionally (by assembling) with no use or aim. |
3000 | Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Meaning holism really is a crazy doctrine. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 60) | |
A reaction: Yes. What is not crazy is a contextualist account of utterances, and a recognition of the contextual and relational ingredient in the meanings of most of our sentences. |
2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If what you are thinking depends on all of what you believe, then nobody ever thinks the same thing twice. …That is why so many semantic holists (Quine, Putnam, Rorty, Churchland, probably Wittgenstein) end up being semantic eliminativists. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.2b) | |
A reaction: If linguistic holism is nonsense, this is easily settled. What I say about breakfast is not changed by reading some Gibbon yesterday. |
2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If learning that fish typically live in streams is part of learning "fish", typical utterances of "pet fish" (living in bowls) are counterexamples. This argument iterates (e.g "big pet fish"). So learning where they live can't be part of learning "fish". | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Using 'typical' twice is rather misleading here. Town folk can learn 'fish' as typically living in bowls. There is no one way to learn a word meaning. |
12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
Full Idea: 'Inferential-role semantics' claims that the meaning of a word (/the content of a concept) is determined by its role in inference. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.2.1.2 n14) | |
A reaction: Fodor is deeply opposed to this view. At first blush it sounds wrong to me, since there seems to be plenty of thought that can go on before inference takes place. Daydreamy speculation, for example. |
3003 | Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It's an embarrassment for attempts to construct content from functional role that quite different sorts of mental states can nevertheless share their contents. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 70) | |
A reaction: That is, presumably, one content having two different roles. Two contents with the same role is 'multiple realisability'. Pain can tell me I'm damaged, or reveal that my damaged nerves are healing. Problem? |
2996 | Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The identity of the content of mental states does not ensure the identity of their extensions. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 45) | |
A reaction: Obviously if I am thinking each day about 'my sheep', that won't change if I am unaware that one of them died this morning. …Because I didn’t have the precise number of sheep in mind. |
12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
Full Idea: I assume that there are two kinds of reference: reference to individuals and to properties. This means, from the syntactic point of view, that the vehicles of reference are exhaustively singular terms and predicates. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: The immediate possibility that comes to mind is plural quantification. See George Boolos, who confidently says that he can refer to 'some Cheerios' in his breakfast bowl, and communicate very well. He then looks to formalise such talk. |
12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The representation of 'morning star' must be different from 'evening star' because their tokens differ in their causal powers. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.3) | |
A reaction: This is Fodor trying to avoid the standard Fregean move of proposing that there are 'senses' as well as references. See Idea 12629. If these two terms have the same extension, they are the same concept? They 'seem' to have two referents. |
2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that Frege cases [knowing Jocasta but not mother] show that reference doesn't determine sense, and Twin cases [knowing water but not H2O] show that sense doesn't determine reference. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.3) | |
A reaction: How about 'references don't contain much information', and 'descriptions may not fix what they are referring to'? Simple really. |
2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Broad semantic theories generally hold that the basic semantic properties of thoughts are truth and denotation. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.2b) | |
A reaction: I think truth and denotation are the basic semantic properties, but I am dubious about whole-hearted broad semantic theories, so I seem to have gone horribly wrong somewhere. |
12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
Full Idea: English has no semantics. Learning English isn't learning a theory about what its sentences mean, it's learning how to associate its sentences with the corresponding thoughts. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This sounds remarkably close to John Locke's account of language (which I always thought was seriously underrated). Presumably we can then say that the 'thought' (or Locke's 'idea') is the meaning, which is old-fashioned real meanings. |
12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
Full Idea: All you need for inferring from John's utterance to the world is the sort of thing that a semantics (i.e. referential semantics) provides. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.5) | |
A reaction: Fodor is very good at saying nice simple things like that. But it is not enough to infer what objects are being discussed. All the hard cases must be covered (denials of existence, reference to non-existence, intentional contexts, modal claims). |
12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Semantics is about constitutive relations between representations and the world. There is, as a matter of principle, no such thing as a psychological theory of meaning. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.5) | |
A reaction: The second sentence is in capital letters, but I am still not convinced. The classic difficulty seems to be that you have to use language to pick out the things in the world that are being referred to. Of course, at some point you just see the objects. |
2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
Full Idea: You need an externalist semantics to explain why the contents of beliefs should have anything to do with how the world is. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: Since externalist semantics only emerged in the 1970s, that implies that no previous theory had any notion that language had some connection to how the world is. Eh? |
2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If there is no analytic/synthetic distinction then there are no analyses. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: There are no precise analyses. I see no reason why a holistic view of language prohibits the careful elucidation of key concepts in the system. It's just a bit fluid. |
2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If the Mentalese story about the content of thought is true, then there couldn't be a Private Language Argument. Good. That explains why there isn't one. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: Presumably Mentalese implies that all language is, in the first instance, intrinsically private. Dogs, for example, need Mentalese, since they self-evidently think. |
4169 | Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 018) | |
A reaction: The word 'act' seems to beg the question (as does 'true'!). I am no longer sure that I know what an act of will is. Hobbes says there is no such thing. |
7187 | Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Schopenhauer's interpretation of the in-itself as will was an essential step: but he didn't know how to deify the will, and remained caught in the moral, Christian ideal | |
From: comment on Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Writings from Late Notebooks 9[42] | |
A reaction: Intriguingly, this seems to suggest that Nietzsche consciously sought to replace the absence of God with the human will, which strikes me as an odd, and very nineteenth century, idea. Loss of religion bothered them a lot. |
21365 | Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Only the will is thing-in-itself. ...It appears in every blindly acting force of nature, and also in the deliberate conduct of man, and the great difference between the two concerns only the degree of the manifestation. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 110), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will' | |
A reaction: If will acts 'blindly' in forces of nature, then these seems to be the same concept as Nietzsche's 'will to power'. This seems to be heading towards Heidegger's Dasein, as a central and distinctive mode of being. |
21924 | As the subject of willing I am wretched, but absorption in knowledge is bliss [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: As the subject of willing I am an exceedingly wretched being, and all our suffering consistd in willing, ...but as soon as I am absorbed in knowledge, I am blissfully happy and nothing can assail me. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], I p.137), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4 | |
A reaction: So the source of his pessimism is subjection to his own will. However, since becoming absorbed in knowledge is an easy task for a scholar, he has little to grumble about. Nietzsche mocked the great pessimist for playing the flute every day. |
4173 | If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: If, as all philosophers imagine, the intellect is our actual nature and the will is arrived at through knowledge, then only the motive from which we imagined we were acting would decide our moral worth. Imagined and true motive would be indistinguishable. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II Supp) | |
A reaction: A nice argument. If motive is morally decisive, it is certainly crucial to decide between real and imagined motive (especially since Freud). But uncontrollable motive seems morally irrelevant. |
12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |
Full Idea: You can't think a plan of action unless you can think how the world would be if the action were to succeed; and thinking the world will be such and such if all goes well is thinking the kind of thing that can be true or false. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This is part of Fodor's attack on the pragmatic view of concepts (that they should be fully understood in terms of action, rather than of thought). I take Fodor to be blatantly correct. This is counterfactual thinking. |
21363 | Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Motivation is causality seen from within. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], p.214), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 2 'Fourfold' | |
A reaction: This is more illuminating about causation than about motivation, since we can be motivated without actually doing anything. |
21372 | Aesthetics concerns how we can take pleasure in an object, with no reference to the will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The central problem of aesthetics is how satisfaction with and pleasure in an object are possible without any reference thereof to our willing. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], II:415), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic' | |
A reaction: This does seem a good distinction. We can divide pleasures into willed and unwilled. Compare thinking that some remote stranger (in a photograph) is very beautiful, with falling in love with someone. |
21370 | Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
Full Idea: Schopenhauer belongs to a tradition which equates aesthetic experience with a 'disinterested' attitude towards its object, and is often cited as one of the chief proponents of such a view. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic' | |
A reaction: 'Disinterested' is quite a nice word for one's attitude to art, though you then have to capture why you are also involved in it. |
4182 | A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The momentary silencing of all volition …is one of the principal elements in our pleasure in the beautiful. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.65) | |
A reaction: Iris Murdoch sees moral value in beauty, because it overrides selfishness. The perception of beauty is certainly something deeper than just another nice feeling. There is a cognitive element to it. |
21488 | The beautiful is a perception of Plato's Forms, which eliminates the will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: In the beautiful we always perceive the intrinsic and primary form of animate and inanimate nature, that is to say Plato's Ideas thereof. …When an aesthetic perception occurs the will completely vanishes from consciousness. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XIX:205) | |
A reaction: An essential Schopenauer idea. Iris Murdoch said something similar. |
21928 | The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
Full Idea: Exaltation of the Sublime is the struggle to maintain will-less knowing in the face of a threat to the human will. The Sublime contains an awful beauty and a delightful terror because it includes a threat to human existence. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 201-7) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 5 | |
A reaction: Can you experience the Sublime when looking down a microscope? Can a mere theory in cosmology be sublime? Can a supposed perception of the Sublime ever be incorrect? We no longer worry about these questions, it seems. |
21927 | Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
Full Idea: The emphasis on the presentation of Platonic Ideas distinguishes Schopenhauer's theory of art from standard Romantic theories, which emphasize the expression of emotion and feeling. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 5 | |
A reaction: Theories of art that neglect ideas, even if subliminally expressed, have gone badly wrong. |
4174 | Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], III 41) | |
A reaction: A bit of a shock, because it implies human vanity, but it fits the best works of art rather well. What else reveals humanity's beauty? Beautiful deeds must be recorded. |
8116 | The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Schopenhauer, by Gardner] |
Full Idea: For Schopenhauer, the point of art lies in the metaphysical liberation from selfhood that will-less aesthetic contemplation induces. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Sebastian Gardner - Aesthetics 3.6.3 | |
A reaction: I've never understood why anyone (Buddhists included) would want 'liberation from selfhood'. Certainly art can make us forget ourselves in a more objective view of things, but science can do that too. |
21380 | The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Nothing else can be stated as the aim of our existence except the knowledge that it would be better for us not to exist. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 605), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 8 'Denial' | |
A reaction: Nonsense on stilts. Nietzsche rebelled against this. If there is such 'knowledge' then it obviously has nothing to do with the aim of our existence. It is just a rejection of aims. The aim is making the best of existence, not spurning it. |
21374 | We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: We should be just as foolish to expect that our moral systems and ethics would create virtuous, noble and hold men, as that our aesthetics would produce poets, painterd and musicians. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 271), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against' | |
A reaction: Presumably the aim of ethical theory is to understand the truths about ethics. That can't do any harm, can it? In every other area of life we think that understanding leads to improvement. Unless, of course, there are no truths of ethics.... |
21378 | We clearly feel responsible for our deeds, because we are quite certain that we did them [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Another fact of consciousness ...is the wholly clear and certain feeling of responsibility for what we do, of the accountability of our actions, which rests on the unshakable certainty that we ourselves are the doers of our deeds. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Freedom of the Will [1841], p.93-4), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Freedom' | |
A reaction: The point is that we have this feeling even if we do not believe in free will. I am struck by the fact that responsibility is very obvious in our own case, even if it is not when we objectively consider other people. Even villains can feel guilty. |
21375 | Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Reasonable and vicious are quite consistent with each other, in fact, only through their union are great and far-reaching crimes possible. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.83), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against' | |
A reaction: This is opposed to Kant, who always looks wildly optimistic in his hope that high rationality entails a morally good will. Good people seem to have a fairly irrational empathy with their fellow citizens. |
21915 | To deduce morality from reason is blasphemy, because it is holy, and far above reason [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: To deduce from reason [Vernunft] the moral element in conduct is blasphemy. In this element there is expressed the better consciousness which lies far above all reason. expresses itself in conduct as holiness, and is the true salvation of the world. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], I p.47), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3 | |
A reaction: Aimed at Kant. Only Plato could inspire a non-religious person to write about morality is such terms. Maybe also the stoic ideal of beautiful deeds (given the supreme value Schopenhauer placed on the arts). |
21483 | Man is essentially a dreadful wild animal [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Man is at bottom a dreadful wild animal. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], VIII:114) | |
A reaction: As an example he cites the slave owners in the United States. |
21379 | Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Man's three fundamental ethical incentives, egoism, malice and compassion, are present in everyone in different and incredibly unequal proportions. In accordance with them, motives will operate on man and actions will ensue. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.192), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Egoism' | |
A reaction: A well chosen trio. Kant would be shocked that he has left out duty, which is supposed to rise above such feelings. |
4181 | Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.65) | |
A reaction: A nice way of stating the core of moral relativism. To me, though, it just seems a rejection of morality. Conflicting wills bring moral paralysis. Might is right. |
5649 | Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: Since for Schopenhauer will has no intrinsic end, but breaks through all its temporary fulfilments and casts them aside as irrelevant once attained, it becomes impossible to assert that there is any ultimate aim to human activity. | |
From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.13 | |
A reaction: This sums up part of the modern anti-teleological view of life, with its notion of purposes which can only arise out of consciousnesses. Such a view leaves untouched the key question, which is "What should I will?" |
4177 | Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Perhaps no one at the end of his life, if he gives the matter sober consideration and is, at the same time, frank, ever wishes to live it over again; he more readily chooses non-existence. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.59) | |
A reaction: Hence Nietzsche's doctrine of 'eternal return' (Gay Science §341, idea 2936). From Schopenhauer it is just bleak pessimism, but from Nietzsche it is a wonderful challenge to live, perhaps the best ever. |
4185 | Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: If we observe an altruistic action the simplest explanation and the essential character of the person's conduct is that they make less distinction than is usually made between themselves and others. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66) | |
A reaction: Obvious, really, but Schopenhauer is talking about the will. Is the effacement of the Self desirable, apart from the benefit it might bring to other people. I don't find it appealing. |
4183 | Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: A theory of morals which motivates can only do so by working on self-love, but what springs from this latter has no moral worth. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66) | |
A reaction: I just don't believe this pessimism. Schopenhauer was an incipient social darwinist who needed a course in modern game theory. Or he just needed to be a nicer man. |
4172 | Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: We are fortunate if we keep up the game whereby desire passes into satisfaction, and satisfaction into new desire - if the pace of this is swift, it is called happiness, and if it is slow, sorrow. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 029) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the dream of the addict, as Socrates points out with his example of the leaky jar in 'Gorgias'. Should we want more desires? |
21371 | We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: So long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we never attain lasting happiness or peace. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 196), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic' | |
A reaction: I hate this idea. It obviously leads to his Buddhism, and the eastern idea that life is generally a bad idea and to be avoided. I think Nietzsche rebelled strongly against this attitude of Schopenhauer's. |
21466 | Pleasure is weaker, and pain stronger, than we expect [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: As a rule we find pleasure much less pleasurable, pain much more painful than we expected. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XII:149) | |
A reaction: Never go on holiday with Schopenhauer. This is more accurate about pain, I think. |
4184 | Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Virtue must spring from that intuitive knowledge which recognises in the individuality of others the same essence as in our own. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66) | |
A reaction: After all his pessimism, he arrives at a view similar to Hume's, that morality is built on natural empathy. But why built a moral theory on one base. Everything points us towards morality! Moral actions are more beautiful. |
21484 | A man's character can be learned from a single characteristic action [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: As a botanist can recognise the whole plant from one leaf, …so an accurate knowledge of a man's character can be arrived at from a single characteristic action. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], VIII:118) | |
A reaction: Very true. Great novelists specialise in such observations. One word can reveal a character, as well as one action. |
21481 | Buddhists wisely start with the cardinal vices [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Because of their profounder ethical and metaphysical insight, the Buddhists start not with the cardinal virtues but with cardinal vices, …which are lust, sloth, wrath and avarice (and maybe hatred). | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], VIII:110) | |
A reaction: This may be right. Our lives are affected much more by the vices of others than by their virtues, and most virtuous behaviour aims at rectifying the bad effects of other people's vices. |
21482 | The five Chinese virtues: pity, justice, politeness, wisdom, honesty [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The Chinese name five cardinal virtues: pity, justice, politeness, wisdom and honesty. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], VIII:110) | |
A reaction: I like politeness being on the list, though it seems rather superficial to be a virtue of character. Respect would be better. |
21480 | Boredom is only felt by those clever enough to need activity [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Only in the cleverest animals such as dogs and apes does the need for activity, and with that boredom, make itself felt. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], III:50) | |
A reaction: But it is much more frequently young creatures, of almost any kind, that seek constant activity, and get continually restless. The most active adults need not be the cleverest. |
21469 | Human life is a mistake, shown by boredom, which is direct awareness of the fact [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Human life must be some kind of mistake. ...Boredom is a direct proof that existence is in itself valueless, for boredom is nothing other than the sensation of the emptiness of existence. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XI:146) | |
A reaction: I think it is a good advertisement for existentialism that it makes something more out of boredom than Schopenhauer does. |
21485 | The state only exists to defend citizens, from exterior threats, and from one another [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The state is essentially no more than an institution for the protection of the whole against attacks from without, and the protection of its individual members from attacks by one another. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], IX:123) | |
A reaction: He then has a swipe at Hegel for his inflated idea of the importance of the state. Schopenhauer is close to Hobbes on this one. |
21486 | Poverty and slavery are virtually two words for the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Poverty and slavery are only two forms - on might almost say two words for - the same thing, the essence of which is that a man's energies are expended for the most part not on his own behalf but on that of others. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], IX:125) | |
A reaction: The modern world is full of people who righteously despise slavery, but think only of the poor that it serves them right. |
21487 | The freedom of the press to sell poison outweighs its usefulness [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Freedom of the press must be regarded as a permit to sell poison. …I very much fear, therefore, that the dangers of press freedom outweigh its usefulness. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], IX:127) | |
A reaction: On the whole the modern world disagrees with this view, but watching the popular press in Britain in the last twenty years has made me sympathise with Schopenhauer. |
21471 | If suicide was quick and easy, most people would have done it by now [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Perhaps there is no one alive who would not already have put an end to his life if this end were something purely negative, a sudden cessation of existence. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XIII:158) | |
A reaction: Nonsense, on the whole, but it is a nice question how many people would do it if it only took a painless instant. |
21467 | Would humanity still exist if sex wasn't both desired and pleasurable? [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: If the act of procreation were neither the outcome of a desire nor accompanied by feelings of pleasure, but a matter to be decided on the basis of purely rational considerations, is it likely the human race would still exist? | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XII:156) | |
A reaction: This is almost certainly correct in the modern world. In tougher economic circumstances people seem desperate to have children who will help them survive. |
21376 | Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: In philosophical morals animals are mere 'things', mere means to any end whatsoever. ...Shame on such a morality, that fails to recognise the eternal essence that lives in every living thing, and shines forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.96), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against' | |
A reaction: Good. I find Kant's theoretical indifference to animals very creepy (despite his kind attitude to them). And I also think the utilitarians are wrong to only value animals for their pain, as if any animal could be shredded for fun, if it felt no pain. |
4179 | The essence of nature is the will to life itself [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The essence of nature is the will to life itself. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.60) | |
A reaction: How would he have responded to Darwin? The will to life is the product, there, of a different and more remote force, such as the 'energy' of the physicist (whatever that is!). |
3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Laws are true generalisations that support counterfactuals and are confirmed by their instances. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.293) | |
A reaction: This seems correct, but it doesn't disentangle laws as mental states from laws as features of nature |
4189 | Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.IV) | |
A reaction: An off-beat philosophical view of the question. Sounds more like a consequence of time than its essential nature. |
4178 | Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Let no one think that Christianity is conducive to optimism; on the contrary, in the Gospels 'world' and 'evil' are used almost synonymously. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.59) | |
A reaction: The source of Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil'. Do any religions throw you vigorously back into the middle of life, with its conflict and creativity? |
4180 | Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: All systems of religion are the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.63) | |
A reaction: Is this a compliment? It seems to be, because at least the mysteries are identified and given an outward form. A nice thought. |
21472 | Only religion introduces serious issues to uneducated people [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Religion is the only means of introducing some notion of the high significance of life into the uncultivated heads of the masses. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XV:174) | |
A reaction: Cf Philip Larkin's poem 'Church Going'. On the whole Schopenhauer didn't actually believe that our lives had any 'high significance'. |
21468 | The Creator created the possibilities for worlds, so should have made a better one than this possible [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The Creator created not only the world, but also created possibility itself; therefore he should have created the possibility of a better world than this one. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XII:156) | |
A reaction: This is explicitly a response to Leibniz's claim that the Creator selected the best of all possible worlds from the available options. The Euthyphro Question hovers here: must the Creator accept what is possible (the platonic view), or create possibility? |