Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Joan Weiner and Tim Black

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4 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Aristotelian logic dealt with inferences about concepts, and there were also proposition inferences [Weiner]
     Full Idea: Till the nineteenth century, it was a common view that Aristotelian logic could evaluate inferences whose validity was based on relations between concepts, while propositional logic could evaluate inferences based on relations between propositions.
     From: Joan Weiner (Frege [1999], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Venn diagrams relate closely to Aristotelian syllogisms, as each concept is represented by a circle, and shows relations between sets. Arrows seem needed to represent how to go from one proposition to another. Is one static, the other dynamic?
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T]
     Full Idea: In 'modal epistemologies' a belief counts as knowledge only if there is a modal connection - a connection not only to the actual world, but also to other non-actual possible worlds - between the belief and the facts of the matter.
     From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1)
     A reaction: [Pritchard 2005 seems to be a source for this] This sounds to me a bit like Nozick's tracking or sensitivity theory. Nozick is, I suppose, diachronic (time must pass, for the tracking), where this theory is synchronic.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T]
     Full Idea: The protagonists in Gettier cases and in lottery cases fail to have knowledge because their beliefs are true simply as a matter of luck, where this means that their beliefs themselves are not appropriately connected to the facts.
     From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1)
     A reaction: The lottery problem is you correctly believe 'my ticket won't win the lottery' even though you don't seem to actually know it won't. Is the Gettier problem simply the problem of lucky knowledge? 'Luck' is a rather vague concept.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing.
     From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1