6 ideas
| 10467 | Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John] |
| Full Idea: 'Qualitons' or 'relatons' (quality and relation tropes) are held to belong to the same individual if they are all 'compresent' with one another. | |
| From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], §4) | |
| A reaction: There is a perennial problem with bundles - how to distinguish accidental compresence (like people in a lift) from united compresence (like people who make a family). |
| 10464 | A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John] |
| Full Idea: A trope is an instance or bit (not an exemplification) of a property or a relation. Bill Clinton's eloquence is not his participating in the universal eloquence, or the peculiar quality of his eloquence, but his bit, and his alone, of eloquence. | |
| From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], Intro) | |
| A reaction: If we have identified something as a 'bit' of something, we can ask whether that bit is atomic, or divisible into something else, and we can ask what are the qualities and properties and powers of this bit, we seems to defeat the object. |
| 10465 | Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John] |
| Full Idea: A major attraction of tropism has been its promise of parsimony; some adherents (such as Campbell) go so far as to proclaim a one-category ontology. | |
| From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], §2) | |
| A reaction: This seems to go against the folk idiom which suggests that it is things which have properties, rather than properties ruling to roost. Maybe if one identified tropes with processes, the theory could be brought more into line with modern physics? |
| 10466 | Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes [Bacon,John] |
| Full Idea: Meinongian tropism has the advantage that possible worlds might be thought of as sets of 'qualitons' and 'relatons' (quality and relational tropes). | |
| From: John Bacon (Tropes [2008], §3) | |
| A reaction: You are still left with 'possible' to explain, and I'm not sure that anything is explain here. If the actual world is sets of tropes, then possible worlds would also have to be, I suppose. |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
| From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
| 15194 | Time, as it appears in standard modern science, is bad verificationist metaphysics [Smith,Q, by Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: Smith argues that the theories of time which appear in the Special and General Theories of Relativity and in orthodox quantum mechanics are false metaphysical theories, based on verificationist assumptions. | |
| From: report of Quentin Smith (Absolute Simultaneity and Infinity of Time [1998]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' 4 | |
| A reaction: I wouldn't have to confidence to stand up to the panoply of modern scientists, but I am glad Quentin Smith is having a go. I love Shoemaker's three worlds example, which defies all physics. |