32 ideas
8623 | Proof reveals the interdependence of truths, as well as showing their certainty [Euclid, by Frege] |
Full Idea: Euclid gives proofs of many things which anyone would concede to him without question. ...The aim of proof is not merely to place the truth of a proposition beyond doubt, but also to afford us insight into the dependence of truths upon one another. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) §02 | |
A reaction: This connects nicely with Shoemaker's view of analysis (Idea 8559), which I will adopt as my general view. I've always thought of philosophy as the aspiration to wisdom through the cartography of concepts. |
13907 | If you pick an arbitrary triangle, things proved of it are true of all triangles [Euclid, by Lemmon] |
Full Idea: Euclid begins proofs about all triangles with 'let ABC be a triangle', but ABC is not a proper name. It names an arbitrarily selected triangle, and if that has a property, then we can conclude that all triangles have the property. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by E.J. Lemmon - Beginning Logic 3.2 | |
A reaction: Lemmon adds the proviso that there must be no hidden assumptions about the triangle we have selected. You must generalise the properties too. Pick a triangle, any triangle, say one with three angles of 60 degrees; now generalise from it. |
6297 | Euclid's geometry is synthetic, but Descartes produced an analytic version of it [Euclid, by Resnik] |
Full Idea: Euclid's geometry is a synthetic geometry; Descartes supplied an analytic version of Euclid's geometry, and we now have analytic versions of the early non-Euclidean geometries. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Michael D. Resnik - Maths as a Science of Patterns One.4 | |
A reaction: I take it that the original Euclidean axioms were observations about the nature of space, but Descartes turned them into a set of pure interlocking definitions which could still function if space ceased to exist. |
9603 | An assumption that there is a largest prime leads to a contradiction [Euclid, by Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Assume a largest prime, then multiply the primes together and add one. The new number isn't prime, because we assumed a largest prime; but it can't be divided by a prime, because the remainder is one. So only a larger prime could divide it. Contradiction. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Not only a very elegant mathematical argument, but a model for how much modern logic proceeds, by assuming that the proposition is false, and then deducing a contradiction from it. |
9894 | A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one [Euclid] |
Full Idea: A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one. | |
From: Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE], 7 Def 1) | |
A reaction: See Frege's 'Grundlagen' §29-44 for a sustained critique of this. Frege is good, but there must be something right about the Euclid idea. If I count stone, paper and scissors as three, each must first qualify to be counted as one. Psychology creeps in. |
8738 | Postulate 2 says a line can be extended continuously [Euclid, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Euclid's Postulate 2 says the geometer can 'produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line'. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 4.2 | |
A reaction: The point being that this takes infinity for granted, especially if you start counting how many points there are on the line. The Einstein idea that it might eventually come round and hit you on the back of the head would have charmed Euclid. |
10302 | Euclid says we can 'join' two points, but Hilbert says the straight line 'exists' [Euclid, by Bernays] |
Full Idea: Euclid postulates: One can join two points by a straight line; Hilbert states the axiom: Given any two points, there exists a straight line on which both are situated. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Paul Bernays - On Platonism in Mathematics p.259 |
22278 | Euclid relied on obvious properties in diagrams, as well as on his axioms [Potter on Euclid] |
Full Idea: Euclid's axioms were insufficient to derive all the theorems of geometry: at various points in his proofs he appealed to properties that are obvious from the diagrams but do not follow from the stated axioms. | |
From: comment on Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 03 'aim' | |
A reaction: I suppose if the axioms of a system are based on self-evidence, this would licence an appeal to self-evidence elsewhere in the system. Only pedants insist on writing down what is obvious to everyone! |
8673 | Euclid's parallel postulate defines unique non-intersecting parallel lines [Euclid, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Euclid's fifth 'parallel' postulate says if there is an infinite straight line and a point, then there is only one straight line through the point which won't intersect the first line. This axiom is independent of Euclid's first four (agreed) axioms. | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 2.2 | |
A reaction: This postulate was challenged in the nineteenth century, which was a major landmark in the development of modern relativist views of knowledge. |
10250 | Euclid needs a principle of continuity, saying some lines must intersect [Shapiro on Euclid] |
Full Idea: Euclid gives no principle of continuity, which would sanction an inference that if a line goes from the outside of a circle to the inside of circle, then it must intersect the circle at some point. | |
From: comment on Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.1 n2 | |
A reaction: Cantor and Dedekind began to contemplate discontinuous lines. |
14157 | Modern geometries only accept various parts of the Euclid propositions [Russell on Euclid] |
Full Idea: In descriptive geometry the first 26 propositions of Euclid hold. In projective geometry the 1st, 7th, 16th and 17th require modification (as a straight line is not a closed series). Those after 26 depend on the postulate of parallels, so aren't assumed. | |
From: comment on Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §388 |
1600 | Euclid's common notions or axioms are what we must have if we are to learn anything at all [Euclid, by Roochnik] |
Full Idea: The best known example of Euclid's 'common notions' is "If equals are subtracted from equals the remainders are equal". These can be called axioms, and are what "the man who is to learn anything whatever must have". | |
From: report of Euclid (Elements of Geometry [c.290 BCE], 72a17) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.149 |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
23110 | Human injustice is not a permanent feature of communities [Rawls] |
Full Idea: Men's propensity to injustice is not a permanent aspect of community life. | |
From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], p.245), quoted by John Kekes - Against Liberalism | |
A reaction: This attitude is dismissed by Kekes, with some justification, as naïve optimism. What could be Rawls's grounds for making such a claim? It couldn't be the facts of human history. |
15676 | Rawls defends the priority of right over good [Rawls, by Finlayson] |
Full Idea: Rawls defends the thesis of the priority of the right over the good. | |
From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.7:100 | |
A reaction: It depends whether you are talking about actions, or about states of affairs. I don't see how any state of affairs can be preferred to the good one. It may be that the highest duty of action is to do what is right, rather than to achieve what is good. |
4123 | A fair arrangement is one that parties can agree to without knowing how it will benefit them personally [Rawls, by Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Rawls's theory is an elaboration of a simple idea: a fair system of arrangements is one that the parties can agree to without knowing how it will benefit them personally. | |
From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5 | |
A reaction: The essence of modern Kantian contractualism. It is an appealing principle for building a rational world, but I hear Nietzsche turning in his grave. |
21051 | Check your rationality by thinking of your opinion pronounced by the supreme court [Rawls] |
Full Idea: To check whether we are following public reason we might ask: how would our argument strike us presented in the form of a supreme court opinion? | |
From: John Rawls (Political Liberalism [1993], p.254), quoted by Michael J. Sandel - Justice: What's the right thing to do? 10 | |
A reaction: A very nice practical implementation of Kantian universalisability. How would your opinion sound if it were written into a constitution? |
3279 | Utilitarianism inappropriately scales up the individual willingness to make sacrifices [Rawls, by Nagel] |
Full Idea: Rawls claims that utilitarianism applies to the problem of many interests a method appropriate for one individual. A single person may accept disadvantages in exchange for benefits, but in society other people get the benefits. | |
From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], p.74,104) by Thomas Nagel - Equality §7 |
22406 | The maximisation of happiness must be done fairly [Rawls, by Smart] |
Full Idea: Rawls has suggested that we should maximise the general happiness only if we do so in a fair way. | |
From: report of John Rawls (Justice as fairness: Political not Metaphysical [1958]) by J.J.C. Smart - Outline of a System of Utilitarianism 6 | |
A reaction: Rawls is usually seen as an opponent of utilitarianism, but if we allow a few supplementary rules we can improve the theory. After all, it has a meta-rule that 'everybody counts as one'. What other supplementary values can there be? Honesty? |
21137 | Rawls rejected cosmopolitanism because it doesn't respect the autonomy of 'peoples' [Rawls, by Shorten] |
Full Idea: Rawls rejected the cosmopolitan extension of his theory because he thought it failed to respect the political autonomy of 'peoples', which was his term of art for societies or political communities. | |
From: report of John Rawls (The Law of Peoples [1999], p.115-8) by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 09 | |
A reaction: Interesting that you might well start with the concept of 'a people', prior to some sort of social contract, but end up with rather alarming conflicts or indifference between rival peoples. Why should my people help in the famine next door? |
3280 | Why does the rational agreement of the 'Original Position' in Rawls make it right? [Nagel on Rawls] |
Full Idea: Why does what it is rational to agree to in Rawls' 'Original Position' determine what is right? | |
From: comment on John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by Thomas Nagel - Equality §7 |
20552 | The original position models the idea that citizens start as free and equal [Rawls, by Swift] |
Full Idea: The original position is presented by Rawls as modelling the sense in which citizens are to be understood as free and equal. | |
From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 3 'Strikes' | |
A reaction: In other words, Rawls's philosophy is not a demonstration of why we should be liberals, but a guidebook for how liberals should go about organising society. |
18636 | Choose justice principles in ignorance of your own social situation [Rawls] |
Full Idea: The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. ...Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the rest of a fair agreement or bargain. | |
From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], §03) | |
A reaction: A famous idea. It tries to impose a Kantian impartiality onto the assessment of political principles. It is a beautifully simple idea, and saying that such impartiality never occurs is no objection to it. Think of a planet far far away. |
18631 | All desirable social features should be equal, unless inequality favours the disadvantaged [Rawls] |
Full Idea: All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured. | |
From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], §46) | |
A reaction: In the wholehearted capitalism of the 21st century this sounds like cloud-cuckoo land. As an 'initial position' (just as in the 'Republic') the clean slate brings out some interesting principles. Actual politics takes vested interests as axiomatic. |
21119 | Power is only legitimate if it is reasonable for free equal citizens to endorse the constitution [Rawls] |
Full Idea: Exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to reason. | |
From: John Rawls (Political Liberalism [1993], p.217), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 02 | |
A reaction: This is not the actual endorsement of Rousseau, or the tacit endorsement of Locke (by living there), but adds a Kantian appeal to a rational consensus, on which rational people should converge. Very Enlightenment. 'Hypothetical consent'. |
20538 | Utilitarians lump persons together; Rawls somewhat separates them; Nozick wholly separates them [Swift on Rawls] |
Full Idea: Rawls objects to utilitarianism because it fails to take seriously the separateness of persons (because there is no overall person to enjoy the overall happiness). But Nozick thinks Rawls does not take the separateness of persons seriously enough. | |
From: comment on John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 1 'Nozick' | |
A reaction: In this sense, Nozick seems to fit our picture of a liberal more closely than Rawls does. I think they both exaggerate the separateness of persons, based on a false concept of human nature. |
9277 | Rawls's account of justice relies on conventional fairness, avoiding all moral controversy [Gray on Rawls] |
Full Idea: Rawls's account of justice works only with widely accepted intuitions of fairness and relies at no point on controversial positions in ethics. The fruit of this modesty is a pious commentary on conventional moral beliefs. | |
From: comment on John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 3.6 | |
A reaction: Presumably this is the thought which provoked Nozick to lob his grenade on the subject. It resembles the charges of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche against Kant, that he was just dressing up conventional morality. Are 'controversial' ethics good? |
23420 | In a pluralist society we can't expect a community united around one conception of the good [Rawls] |
Full Idea: The fact of pluralism means that the hope of political community must be abandoned, if by such a community we mean a political society united in affirming a general and comprehensive conception of the good. | |
From: John Rawls (The Idea of Overlapping Consensus [1987]), quoted by Will Kymlicka - Community 'legitimacy' | |
A reaction: A moderate pluralism might be manageable, but strong, diverse and dogmatic beliefs among sub-groups probably make it impossible. |
20527 | Liberty Principle: everyone has an equal right to liberties, if compatible with others' liberties [Rawls] |
Full Idea: First Principle [Liberty]: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. | |
From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], 46) | |
A reaction: This is the result of consensus after the initial ignorant position of assessment. It is characteristic of liberalism. I'm struggling to think of a disagreement. |
21018 | The social contract has problems with future generations, national boundaries, disabilities and animals [Rawls, by Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: Rawls saw four difficulties for justice in the social contract approach: future generations; justice across national boundaries; fair treatment of people with disabilities; and moral issues involving non-human animals. | |
From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by Martha Nussbaum - Creating Capabilities 4 | |
A reaction: These are all classic examples of groups who do not have sufficient power to negotiate contracts. |
21041 | Justice concerns not natural distributions, or our born location, but what we do about them [Rawls] |
Full Idea: The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts. | |
From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], 17) | |
A reaction: Lovely quotation. There is no point in railing against the given, and that includes what is given by history, as well as what is given by nature. It comes down to intervening, in history and in nature. How much intervention will individuals tolerate? |
23583 | If an aggression is unjust, the constraints on how it is fought are much stricter [Rawls] |
Full Idea: When a country's right to war is questionable and uncertain, the constraints on the means it can use are all the more severe. | |
From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], p.379), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 14 | |
A reaction: This is Rawls opposing the idea that combatants are moral equals. The restraints are, of course, moral. In practice aggressors are usually the worst behaved. |