29 ideas
| 6319 | Wise people choose inaction and silence [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: The sage keeps to the deed that consists in taking no action and practises the teaching that uses no words. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.II.6) | |
| A reaction: Notice that this is an active 'deed', and a positive 'practice'. He is not just recommending indifference and lethargy. Personally I don't find the advice very appealing, but it might be good if you live in 'interesting times'. |
| 6325 | One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LVI.128) | |
| A reaction: A famous remark, which my western mind finds simply perplexing. It strikes me as wicked selfishness to keep your wisdom to yourself, and not try to persuade others to follow it. We are all in this together, I say. |
| 6321 | Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.XX.47) | |
| A reaction: Personally I think all human beings are deeply perplexed when they actually address their situation, but most people never spend more than a few minutes a year worrying about it. |
| 12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |
| Full Idea: I assume a form of truthmaking theory, ..which is a many-many relation, unlike, say correspondence, so that one entity can make multiple truths true and one truth can have multiple truthmakers. | |
| From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §1) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like common sense, once you think about it. One tree makes many things true, and one statement about trees is made true by many trees. |
| 14375 | If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs] |
| Full Idea: If a relation holds between two properties as a result of their intrinsic natures, then it appears the relation between the properties is not needed to do the structuring of reality; the properties themselves suffice to fix the structure. | |
| From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.1) | |
| A reaction: [the first bit quotes Jubien 2007] He cites a group of scientific essentialists as spokesmen for this view. Sounds right to me. No on seems able to pin down what a relation is - which may be because there is no such entity. |
| 14378 | Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs] |
| Full Idea: Scientific practice seems aimed precisely at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist. | |
| From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.3) | |
| A reaction: Good. Friends of powers should look at this nice paper by Jacobs. There is a good degree of support for this view from pronouncements of modern scientists. If scientists don't support it, they should. Otherwise they are trapped in the superficial. |
| 12467 | Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs] |
| Full Idea: The source of powers is not the laws of nature; it is the powerful nature of the ordinary properties of concrete particulars. | |
| From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2) | |
| A reaction: This pithily summarises my own view. People who think the powers of the world derive from the laws either have an implicit religious framework, or they are giving no thought at all to the ontological status of the laws. |
| 14377 | Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs] |
| Full Idea: To be possible is just to be one of the many manifestations of some power, and to be impossible is to be a manifestation of no power. | |
| From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2.1) | |
| A reaction: [This remark occurs in a discussion of theistic Aristotelianism] I like this. If we say that something is possible, the correct question is to ask what power could bring it about. |
| 14376 | States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs] |
| Full Idea: A non-actual state of affairs in possible if there actually was a substance capable of initiating a causal chain, perhaps non-deterministic, that could lead to the state of affairs that we claim is possible. | |
| From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2) | |
| A reaction: [He is quoting A.R. Pruss 2002] That seems exactly right. Of course the initial substance(s) might create a further substance, such as a transuranic element, which then produces the state of affairs. I favour this strongly actualist view. |
| 14379 | Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs] |
| Full Idea: A counterfactual is an invitation to consider what the properties picked out by the antecedent are powers for (where Lewis 1973 took it to be an invitation to consider what goes on in a selected possible world). | |
| From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.4.3) | |
| A reaction: A beautifully simple proposal from Jacobs, with which I agree. This seems to be an expansion of the Ramsey test for conditionals, where you consider the antecedent being true, and see what follows. What, we ask Ramsey, would make it follow? |
| 14372 | Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs] |
| Full Idea: Possible worlds are just not the sorts of things that could ground modality; they are not suitable truthmakers. | |
| From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3) | |
| A reaction: Are possible world theorists actually claiming that the worlds 'ground' modality? Maybe Lewis is, since all those concrete worlds had better do some hard work, but for the ersatzist they just provide a kind of formal semantics, leaving ontology to others. |
| 12466 | All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs] |
| Full Idea: Properties and the relations between them introduce modal connections in the actual world. ..This is a strong form of actualism, since all of modality is part of the fundamental fabric of the actual world. | |
| From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4) | |
| A reaction: This is the view of modality which I find most congenial, with the notion of 'powers' giving us the conceptual framework on which to build an account. |
| 14371 | We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs] |
| Full Idea: Together with a definition of possibility and necessity in terms of counterfactuals, the powers semantics of counterfactuals generates a semantics for modality that appeals to causal powers and not possible worlds. | |
| From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §1) | |
| A reaction: Wonderful. Just what the doctor ordered. The only caveat is that if we say that reality is built up from fundamental powers, then might those powers change their character without losing their identity (e.g. gravity getting weaker)? |
| 12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |
| Full Idea: Lewis's concrete worlds give a better account of modality (than fictional worlds). When I learn that a man like me drives a truck, I gain evidence for the fact that I can drive a truck. | |
| From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3) | |
| A reaction: Cf. Idea 12464. Jacobs still rightly rejects this as an account of possibility, since the possibility that I might drive a truck must be rooted in me, not in some other person who drives a truck, even if that person is very like me. |
| 12464 | If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs] |
| Full Idea: Suppose somewhere deep in the rain forest is a book that includes a story about you as a truck-driver. I doubt that you would be inclined the think that that story, that book, is the reason you could have been a truck driver. | |
| From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3) | |
| A reaction: This begins to look like a totally overwhelming and obvious reason why possible worlds (especially as stories) don't give a good metaphysical account of possibility. They provide a semantic structure for modal reasoning, but that is entirely different. |
| 12469 | Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs] |
| Full Idea: If we want our semantics for modality to give us insight into the truthmakers for modality, then possible worlds semantics is inadequate. | |
| From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.4) | |
| A reaction: [See the other ideas of Jacobs (and Jubien) for this] It is an interesting question whether a semantics for a logic is meant to give us insight into how things really are, or whether it just builds nice models. Satisfaction, or truth? |
| 6323 | Pursuit of learning increases activity; the Way decreases it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: In the pursuit of learning one knows more every day; in the pursuit of the Way one does less every day. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLVII.108) | |
| A reaction: Everything in my culture has raised the status of the pursuit of learning, so that I can hardly comprehend what is proposed by the Way. I don't believe that the Way can be achieved without great learning, but one might move beyond learning. |
| 6328 | To know yet to think that one does not know is best [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: To know yet to think that one does not know is best. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXI.173) | |
| A reaction: Tricky. Self-deception doesn't sound like a virtue to me. There are epistemic virtues, and caution about one's own knowledge has to be one of them, but a totally false assessment sounds counter-productive. |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
| From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
| 6331 | Truth is not beautiful; beautiful speech is not truthful [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Truthful words are not beautiful; beautiful words are not truthful. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXXI.194) | |
| A reaction: A sharp disagreement with Keats ('Ode to a Grecian Urn'). A deep and important question, especially in relation to Plato's discussion of rhetoric (where he is very ambivalent). Great mathematics is beautiful. Truth can harsh. On the whole, I disagree. |
| 6330 | One with no use for life is wiser than one who values it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: It is just because one has no use for life that one is wiser than the man who values life. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXV.181a) | |
| A reaction: To have no use for life certainly seems to put a person into a position of superiority, especially when the 'Titanic' is sinking. However, if our lives have no value, I don't know what does. A balance must clearly be struck. |
| 6327 | Do good to him who has done you an injury [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Do good to him who has done you an injury. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXIII.148) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 6288 (Jesus). People like this really mess up the social contract theory of morality. If they are going to return good for your evil, there doesn't seem much point in helping them, given how much effort is involved. Most peculiar… |
| 23402 | The highest virtue is achieved without effort [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Those of highest virtue do not strive for virtue, and so they have it. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], 38), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 8.II.2 | |
| A reaction: Every moralist's dream is the person to whom virtue comes so naturally that no thought is required. This says they don't even notice it; Aristotle says they simply enjoying behaving virtuously. |
| 6324 | To gain in goodness, treat as good those who are good, and those who are not [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: Those who are good I treat as good; those who are not good I also treat as good; in doing so I gain in goodness. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLIX.111) | |
| A reaction: Socrates (idea 346) and Jesus (Idea 6288) had similar ideas. Who, though, is going to administer justice, and where is the idea that people 'deserve' good or ill treatment? Schoolteachers should treat all children as if they were good. |
| 6322 | There is no crime greater than having too many desires [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: There is no crime greater than having too many desires. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.XLVI.104) | |
| A reaction: It seems harsh to call this a 'crime', given that no one is likely to choose to have 'too many' desires. The crime is in deciding to stimulate desire to excess, or deciding to show no sensible restraint. |
| 6320 | The best rulers are invisible, the next admired, the next feared, and the worst are exploited [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: The best of all rulers is but a shadowy presence to his subjects; next comes the ruler they love and praise; next comes one they fear; next comes one with whom they take liberties. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], I.XVII.39) | |
| A reaction: This fits our understanding of football referees to perfection. It might apply to anyone doing a vital adminstrative job, such as compiling a school timetable. It is hard, though, to accept anonymity as a mark of success. |
| 6329 | People are hard to govern because authorities love to do things [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: It is because those in authority are too fond of action that the people are difficult to govern. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LXXV.181) | |
| A reaction: I love this. It should be on the wall of every human institution in our civilization. How the heart sinks at the prospect of a 'new initiative'. Not that I am against action; it is just important to recognise that inaction is sometimes the best option. |
| 6326 | The better known the law, the more criminals there are [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: The better known the laws and edicts, the more thieves and robbers there are. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], II.LVII.132) | |
| A reaction: Nice. I link this with my favourite moral maxim from Democritus (Idea 519). The idea is that continual emphasis on what you should not do fills the mind with evil possibilities. Moral perfection must start by taking goodness for granted. |
| 23401 | A military victory is not a thing of beauty [Laozi (Lao Tzu)] |
| Full Idea: A military victory is not a thing of beauty. | |
| From: Laozi (Lao Tzu) (Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) [c.530 BCE], 31), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 8.II.1 | |
| A reaction: Should be written on the wall of every military academy and barracks. |