Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Marcus Rossberg and Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama)

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14 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Henkin semantics has a second domain of predicates and relations (in upper case) [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: Henkin semantics (for second-order logic) specifies a second domain of predicates and relations for the upper case constants and variables.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3)
     A reaction: This second domain is restricted to predicates and relations which are actually instantiated in the model. Second-order logic is complete with this semantics. Cf. Idea 10756.
There are at least seven possible systems of semantics for second-order logic [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: In addition to standard and Henkin semantics for second-order logic, one might also employ substitutional or game-theoretical or topological semantics, or Boolos's plural interpretation, or even a semantics inspired by Lesniewski.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3)
     A reaction: This is helpful in seeing the full picture of what is going on in these logical systems.
Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: Second-order logic raises doubts because of its ontological commitment to the set-theoretic hierarchy, and the allegedly problematic epistemic status of the second-order consequence relation.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §1)
     A reaction: The 'epistemic' problem is whether you can know the truths, given that the logic is incomplete, and so they cannot all be proved. Rossberg defends second-order logic against the second problem. A third problem is that it may be mathematics.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: Logical consequence is intuitively taken to be a semantic notion, ...and it is therefore the formal semantics, i.e. the model theory, that captures logical consequence.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §2)
     A reaction: If you come at the issue from normal speech, this seems right, but if you start thinking about the necessity of logical consequence, that formal rules and proof-theory seem to be the foundation.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: Deductive consequence, written Γ|-S, is loosely read as 'the sentence S can be deduced from the sentences Γ', and semantic consequence Γ|=S says 'all models that make Γ true make S true as well'.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §2)
     A reaction: We might read |= as 'true in the same model as'. What is the relation, though, between the LHS and the RHS? They seem to be mutually related to some model, but not directly to one another.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
In proof-theory, logical form is shown by the logical constants [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: A proof-theorist could insist that the logical form of a sentence is exhibited by the logical constants that it contains.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §2)
     A reaction: You have to first get to the formal logical constants, rather than the natural language ones. E.g. what is the truth table for 'but'? There is also the matter of the quantifiers and the domain, and distinguishing real objects and predicates from bogus.
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: A standard model is a set of objects called the 'domain', and an interpretation function, assigning objects in the domain to names, subsets to predicate letters, subsets of the Cartesian product of the domain with itself to binary relation symbols etc.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3)
     A reaction: The model actually specifies which objects have which predicates, and which objects are in which relations. Tarski's account of truth in terms of 'satisfaction' seems to be just a description of those pre-decided facts.
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: A mathematical theory is 'categorical' if, and only if, all of its models are isomorphic. Such a theory then essentially has just one model, the standard one.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3)
     A reaction: So the term 'categorical' is gradually replacing the much-used phrase 'up to isomorphism'.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
Completeness can always be achieved by cunning model-design [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: All that should be required to get a semantics relative to which a given deductive system is complete is a sufficiently cunning model-theorist.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §5)
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
A deductive system is only incomplete with respect to a formal semantics [Rossberg]
     Full Idea: No deductive system is semantically incomplete in and of itself; rather a deductive system is incomplete with respect to a specified formal semantics.
     From: Marcus Rossberg (First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness [2004], §3)
     A reaction: This important point indicates that a system might be complete with one semantics and incomplete with another. E.g. second-order logic can be made complete by employing a 'Henkin semantics'.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing.
     From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Individuals don't exist, but are conventional names for sets of elements [Buddha]
     Full Idea: There exists no individual, it is only a conventional name given to a set of elements.
     From: Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama) (reports [c.540 BCE]), quoted by Derek Parfit - The Unimportance of Identity p.295
     A reaction: I take this to arise from an excessively spiritual concept of a human being, which faces Descartes' problem of how to individuate non-physical minds, when they have no clear boundaries. Combine dualism with a bundle theory, and you have Buddhism.
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
The Buddha believed the gods would eventually disappear, and Nirvana was much higher [Buddha, by Armstrong,K]
     Full Idea: The Buddha believed implicitly in the gods because they were part of his cultural baggage, but they were involved in the cycle of rebirth, and would eventually disappear; the ultimate reality of Nirvana was higher than the gods.
     From: report of Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama) (reports [c.540 BCE]) by Karen Armstrong - A History of God Ch.1
     A reaction: We might connect this with Plato's Euthyphro question (Ideas 336 and 337), and the relationship between piety and morality on the one hand, and the gods on the other.
Life is suffering, from which only compassion, gentleness, truth and sobriety can save us [Buddha]
     Full Idea: Buddha taught that the only release from 'dukkha' (the meaningless flux of suffering which is human life) is a life of compassion for all living beings, speaking and behaving gently, kindly and accurately, and refraining from all intoxicants.
     From: Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama) (reports [c.540 BCE], Ch.1), quoted by Karen Armstrong - A History of God Ch.1
     A reaction: Christians are inclined to give the impression that Jesus invented the idea of being nice, but it ain't so. The obvious thought is that the Buddha seems to be focusing on the individual, but this is actually a formula for a better community.