33 ideas
5311 | If observation goes up a level, we expect the laws of the lower level to remain in force [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: When the observer shifts his attention from one level of organisation to the next, as from physics to chemistry, he expects to find obedience to all the laws of the levels below. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to state a necessary condition of reduction, but not a sufficient one. Wilson points out that new phenomena emerge at higher levels. This principle is similar to Hume's argument against miracles. You don't easily overthrow basic laws. |
5312 | A child first sees objects as distinct, and later as members of groups [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: From a single-minded effort to move objects a child's activity grows into a detached reflection on the movements themselves. The objects are first perceived as distinct entities, and then as members of groups to be classified. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This does not, of course, prove anything about the philosophical problems of universals, but it does seem to pinpoint the stage in human development when 'universals' are perceived. The basis seems to be groups or sets, but how do we spot those? |
11897 | A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: One view of a principle of individuation is what is called a 'criterion of identity', determining answers to questions about identity and distinctness at a time and over time - a principle of distinction and persistence. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Since the term 'Prime Minister' might do this job, presumably there could be a de dicto as well as a de re version of individuation. The distinctness consists of chairing cabinet meetings, rather than being of a particular sex. |
11898 | Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: A second view of the principle of individuation includes criteria of distinction and persistence, but also determines the counterfactual possibilities for a thing. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 8.5) | |
A reaction: It would be a pretty comprehensive individuation which defined all the counterfactual truths about a thing, as well as its actual truths. This is where powers come in. We need to know a thing's powers, but not how they cash out counterfactually. |
11883 | A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Socrates can be assigned a haecceity: an essential property of 'being Socrates' which (unlike the property of 'being identical with Socrates') may be regarded as what 'makes' its possessor Socrates in a non-trivial sense, but is simple and unanalysable. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 2.2) | |
A reaction: I don't accept that there is any such property as 'being Socrates' (or even 'being identical with Socrates'), except as empty locutions or logical devices. A haecceity seems to be the 'ultimate subject of predication', with no predicates of its own. |
11889 | Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: The argument for unshareable properties (the Reduplication Argument) suggests the danger of reduplication of Berkeley; the argument for incompatible properties (Multiple Occupancy) says Berkeley and Hume could be in the same possible object. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 2.8) | |
A reaction: These are her arguments in favour of essential properties being necessarily incompatible between objects. Whatever the answer, it must allow essences for indistinguishables like electrons. 'Incompatible' points towards a haecceity. |
11877 | An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: By essentialism about individuals I simply mean the view that individual things have essential properties, where an essential property of an object is a property that the object could not have existed without. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This presumably means I could exist without a large part of my reason and consciousness, but could not exist without one of my heart valves. This seems to miss the real point of essence. I couldn't exist without oxygen - not one of my properties. |
11882 | No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Individual essences are essential properties that are unique to them alone. ...If a set of properties is an individual essence of A, then A has the properties essentially, and no other actual or possible object actually or possibly has them. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 2.1/2) | |
A reaction: I'm unconvinced about this. Tigers have an essence, but individual tigers have individual essences over and above their tigerish qualities, yet the perfect identity of two tigers still seems to be possible. |
11886 | There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: If all objects had individual essences, there would be no numerical difference without an essential difference. But if there aren't individual essences, there could be two things sharing all essential properties, differing only in accidental properties. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 2.5) | |
A reaction: Depends how you define individual essence. Why can't two electrons have the same individual essence. To postulate a 'kind essence' which bestows the properties on each electron is to get things the wrong way round. |
11909 | Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: There is a disanalogy between 'necessarily water=H2O' and 'necessarily Hesperus=Phosphorus'. The second just needs the necessity of identity, but the first needs 'x is a water sample' and 'x is an H2O' sample to coincide in all possible worlds. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 10.1.) | |
A reaction: This comment is mainly aimed at Kripke, who bases his essentialism on identities, rather than at Putnam. |
11899 | Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Accounts of sortal essentialism do not give a satisfactory explanation of why any sortals should be essential sortals, or a satisfactory account of why some sortals should be essential while others are not. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 8.6) | |
A reaction: A theory is not wrong, just because it cannot give a 'satisfactory explanation' of every aspect of the subject. We might, though, ask why the theory isn't doing well in this area. |
11906 | The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Kripke and Putnam chose for their typical essence of kinds, sets of properties that could be thought of as explanatorily basic. ..But the modal implications of their views go well beyond this. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 10.1) | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11905. The modal implications are that the explanatory essence is also necessary to the identity of the thing under discussion, such as H2O. So do basic explanations carry across into all possible worlds? |
11894 | Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: I suggest 'tenacity of origin' rather than 'necessity of origin'. ..The most that we need is that Caesar's having something similar to his actual origin in certain respects (e.g. his actual parents) is normally kept fixed in counterfactual speculation. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 6.9) | |
A reaction: I find necessity or essentially of origin very unconvincing, so I rather like this. Origin is just a particularly stable way to establish our reference to something. An elusive spy may have little more than date and place of birth to fix them. |
11887 | Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities'. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 2.7) | |
A reaction: [She gives an argument for this, based on Forbes] I certainly favour the notion of individual essences over the notion of bare identities. We must distinguish identity in reality from identity in concept. Identities are points in conceptual space. |
11890 | De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: Anyone who wishes to avoid both bare identities and individual essences, without abandoning de re modality entirely, must adopt counterpart theory. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 4.1) | |
A reaction: This at least means that Lewis's proposal has an important place in the discussion, forcing us to think more clearly about the identities involved when we talk of possibilities. Mackie herself votes for bare indentities. |
11892 | Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: A may be a counterpart of B according to one counterpart relation (similarity of origin, say), but not according to another (similarity of later history). | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Hm. Would two very diverse things have to be counterparts because they were kept in the same cupboard in different worlds? Can the counterpart relationship diverge or converge over time? Yes, I presume. |
11893 | Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: I take the 'overlap requirement' for Julius Caesar to be that, when considering how he might have been different, you have to take him as he actually was at some time in his existence, and consider possibilities consistent with that. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 6.5) | |
A reaction: This is quite a large claim (larger than Mackie thinks?), as it seems equally applicable to properties, states of affairs and propositions, as well as to individuals. Possibility that has no contact at all with actuality is beyond our comprehension. |
11884 | The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: The theory that things have 'haecceities' must be sharply distinguished from the theory referred to as 'haecceitism', which says there may be differences in transworld identities that do not supervene on qualitative differences. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 2.2 n7) | |
A reaction: She says later [p,43 n] that it is possible to be a haecceitist without believing in individual haecceities, if (say) the transworld identities had no basis at all. Note that if 'thisness' is 'haecceity', then 'whatness' is 'quiddity'. |
5309 | Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: How does he know this proposition which he asserts so confidently? Obvious counterexamples seem to be utterly trivial beliefs, and self-destructive beliefs. What is the evolutionary value of low self-esteem? Still, you see his point. |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
11905 | Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: One might speak of 'Lockean real essences' of a natural kind, a set of properties that is basic in the explanation of the other properties of the kind, without commitment to the essence belonging to the kind in all possible worlds. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 10.1) | |
A reaction: I think this may be the most promising account. The essence of a tiger explains what tigers are like, but tigers may evolve into domestic pets. Questions of individuation and of explaining seem to be quite separate. |
5310 | Philosophers study the consequences of ethics instead of its origins [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Philosophers examine the precepts of ethical systems with reference to their consequences and not their origins. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: He is interested in biological origins, but it strikes me that every moral theory has some account of the origins of morality, be it pure reason, or the love of pleasure, or human nature, or eternal ideas, or the will of God, or selfish desires. |
22187 | Genetic behaviours that have enhanced human success include aggression, rape and xenophobia [Wilson,EO, by Okasha] |
Full Idea: Wilson claimed that many human behaviours, including aggression, rape, and xenophobia, had a genetic basis, and were adaptations favoured by natural selection because they enhanced the reproductive success of our ancestors. | |
From: report of Edmund O. Wilson (Sociobiology [1975]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 7 | |
A reaction: This led to the Sociobiology Wars, when E.O. Wilson was attacked by Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould. |
5313 | The rules of human decision-making converge and overlap in a 'human nature' [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: The rules followed in human decision-making are tight enough to produce a broad overlap in the decisions taken by all individuals, and hence a convergence powerful enough to be labelled 'human nature'. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This is a nice empirical criterion for asserting the existence of human nature, and it seems right to examine decisions, rather than more thoughtless or conformist behaviour. Existentialists dream of new possibilities, but the old ways always seem best… |
5316 | We undermine altruism by rewarding it, but we reward it to encourage it [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: By sanctifying altruism in order to reward it we make it less true, but by that means we promote its recurrence in others. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: So is my preference for not rewarding (or even noticing) altruism an anti-social tendency. The very conspicuous charity of sponsorship seems somehow inferior to the truly anonymous gift. Or super-altruism is very public, to encourage it in others? |
5318 | Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: By 'hard-core' he means suicidally self-sacrificing, rather than extensive. This seems a good thesis. It strikes me that the development of civil society is often impeded by family loyalty, such as in the case of the Mafia. |
5317 | The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: This is a key element of social contract theory. It shows why natural selection of truly altruistic traits might be beneficial to individuals, provided they are surrounded by possible recipricators. We trust those who are genuine and sincere. |
20662 | The biology of societies: kin selection, parenting, mating; status, territory, contracts [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Societies are ordered around six sociobiological principles: kin selection; parental investment; mating strategy; status; territorial expansion and defence; contractual agreement. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (Consilience [1998], 19 'Intro'), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I trust such a precise list. Personally I'm in society because I'm too frightend to drop out. So where is 'defence'? Still, I like attempts at assembling such a list. Politics needs grounding. |
5308 | The only human purpose is that created by our genetic history [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: No species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This invites the question of what that purpose is perceived to be. Some people feel an imperative to play the piano all day, so presumably genetic history has created that feeling. Presumably we can also choose a purpose, even extinction. |
11907 | Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P] |
Full Idea: One could be an essentialist about natural kinds (of tigers, or water) while holding that every actual instance or sample of a natural kind is only accidentally an instance or a sample of that kind. | |
From: Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 10.2) | |
A reaction: You wonder, then, in what the necessity of the kind consists, if it is not rooted in the instances, and presumably it could only result from a stipulative definition, and hence be conventional. |
5314 | Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and fast, biological evolution is Darwinian and slow [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and very fast, whereas biological evolution is Darwinian and usually very slow. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: An intriguing point, given how discredited Lamarckian evolution is. It links with the Dawkins idea of 'memes' - cultural ideas which spread very fast. Is biological evolution suddenly about to become Lamarckian, as culture influences biology? |
5315 | Over 99 percent of human evolution has been in the hunter-gatherer phase [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Selection pressures of hunter-gatherer existence have persisted for over 99 percent of human genetic evolution. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This seems a key point to bear in mind when assessing human nature. Hunter-gathering isn't just one tendency in our genetics; it more or less constitutes everything we are. |
5320 | It is estimated that mankind has produced 100,000 religions [Wilson,EO] |
Full Idea: Since the first recorded religion (in Iraq 60,000 years ago) it is estimated that mankind has produced in the order of one hundred thousand religions. | |
From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: If asked to guess the number, I would probably have said '200'! This staggering figure seems to argue both ways - it suggest a certain arbitrariness in the details of religions, but an extremely intense drive to have some sort of religious belief. |