9 ideas
12801 | Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley] |
Full Idea: Coherentists try to provide an explication of epistemic rationality in terms of a set of deductive and probabilistic relations among beliefs and properties such as simplicity, conservativeness, and explanatory power. | |
From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.317) | |
A reaction: I have always like the coherentist view of justification, and now I see that this has led me to the question of explanation, which in turn has led me to essentialism. It's all coming together. Watch this space. 'Explanatory' is the key to everything! |
19708 | Rational internal belief is conviction that a proposition enhances a belief system [Foley, by Vahid] |
Full Idea: In Foley's subjective internalist account it is egocentrically rational for an agent to believe a proposition only if he would think on deep reflection that believing it is conducive to having an accurate and comprehensive belief system. | |
From: report of Richard Foley (The Theory of Epistemic Rationality [1987], 2.1 B) by Hamid Vahid - Externalism/Internalism | |
A reaction: I like this idea, because it indicates the link between internalism and coherence about justification. I don't think you can be an externalist coherence theorist for justification. [Reminder: Paul Thagard is the best writer on coherence]. |
12800 | Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley] |
Full Idea: Externalists are principally interested in understanding what knowledge is, ..while internalists, by contrast, are principally interested in explicating a sense of justification ..from one's own perspective. | |
From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.314) | |
A reaction: I find this very helpful, since I have a strong bias towards internalism (with a social dimension), and I see now that it is because I am more interested in what a (good) justification is than what some entity in reality called 'knowledge' consists of. |
12802 | We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley] |
Full Idea: It is rare for pragmatic considerations to influence the rationality of our beliefs in the crass, direct way that Pascal's Wager envisions. Instead, they determine the direction and shape of our investigative and deliberative projects and practices. | |
From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.320) | |
A reaction: [See Idea 6684 for Pascal's Wager] Foley is evidently a full-blown pragmatist (which is bad), but this is nicely put. We can't deny the importance of the amount of effort put into an enquiry. Maybe it is an epistemic duty, rather than a means to an end. |
12803 | Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley] |
Full Idea: One justifiably believes a proposition if one has an epistemically rational belief that one's procedures with respect to it have been acceptable, given practical limitations, and one's goals. | |
From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.322) | |
A reaction: I quite like this, except that it is too individualistic. My goals, and my standards of acceptability decree whether I know? I don't see the relevance of goals; only a pragmatist would mention such a thing. Standards of acceptability are social. |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
5126 | A carelessly thrown brick is condemned much more if it hits someone [Smith,A, by Harman] |
Full Idea: Adam Smith wrote about the influence of fortune on moral judgements, giving nice examples. Someone carelessly throws a brick over a wall. His companion may complain even if no harm is done. But if the brick hits someone much greater condemnation ensues. | |
From: report of Adam Smith (The Theory of Moral Sentiments [1759]) by Gilbert Harman - Moral Philosophy meets social psychology 10.7.1.2 | |
A reaction: This appears to be the earliest observation of the phenomenon of moral luck, though Plato (Idea 269) endorsed the view that the luck of outcome should be taken into account in moral judgements. |
20991 | People prepare our dinner from their own self-interest, not from humanity [Smith,A] |
Full Idea: It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love. | |
From: Adam Smith (The Wealth of Nations [1776], p.26-7), quoted by Amartya Sen - The Idea of Justice 08 'Narrowing' | |
A reaction: Sen passionately pleads that this not be taken out of context. It is about the motivation for the relationship of exchange, and not about morality in general, which also includes trust etc. The subsequent lines in Smith show this. |
20680 | Selfish profit-seeking increases collective wealth, so greed is good, and egoism is altruism [Smith,A, by Harari] |
Full Idea: Smith's claim that the selfish human urge to increase private profits is the basis for collective wealth is one of the most revolutionary ideas in human history. …Greed is good …and egoism is altruism. | |
From: report of Adam Smith (The Wealth of Nations [1776]) by Yuval Noah Harari - Sapiens: brief history of humankind 16 'Growing' | |
A reaction: The central confrontation of political philosophy still seems to be Adam Smith v Karl Marx. Why can't there be altruistic non-greedy profit-seeking? Not 'I want profits' but 'we want profits'. Altruistic capitalists aim to create jobs. |