13 ideas
| 20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: Some people claim that modal sentences do not express truths or falsehoods. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: I can only imagine this coming from a narrow hardline empiricist. It seems to me obvious that we make true or false statements about what is possible or impossible. |
| 20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: If one can only know a priori that a proposition is necessary, then one can know only a priori that a proposition is contingent. The evidence relevant to determining the latter is the same as that relevant to determining the former. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems a telling point, but I suppose it is obvious. If you see that the cat is on the mat, nothing in the situation tells you whether this is contingent or necessary. We assume it is contingent, but that may be an a priori assumption. |
| 20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: There are three suggested epistemic conditions on a priori knowledge: the first regards the source of justification, the second regards the defeasibility of justification, and the third appeals to the strength of justification. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] He says these are all inspired by Kant. The non-epistemic suggested condition involve necessity or analyticity. The source would have to be entirely mental; the defeasibly could not be experiential; the strength would be certainty. |
| 20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: The leading claim of proponents of the a priori is that sources of justification are of two significantly different types: experiential and nonexperiential. Initially this difference is marked at the phenomenological level. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 5) | |
| A reaction: He cites Plantinga and Bealer for the phenomenological starting point (that some knowledge just seems rationally obvious, certain, and perhaps necessary). |
| 20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: There is reason to view non-epistemic analyses of a priori knowledge (in terms of necessity or analyticity) with suspicion. The a priori concerns justification. Analysis by necessity or analyticity concerns the proposition rather than the justification. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] The fact that the a priori is entirely a mode of justification, rather than a type of truth, is the modern view, influenced by Kripke. Given that assumption, this is a good objection. |
| 3913 | Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: Some maintain that experiments in imagination are the source of a priori justification. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A priori/A posteriori [1992], p.1) | |
| A reaction: What else could assessments of possibility and necessity be based on except imagination? |
| 20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: A justified belief that a proposition is not true is an 'overriding' defeater, ...and the belief that a justification is inadequate or defective is an 'undermining' defeater. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], n 40) | |
| A reaction: Sounds more like a sliding scale than a binary option. Quite useful, though. |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
| From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
| 7257 | All modern social systems seem to be conspiracies of the rich [More,T] |
| Full Idea: When I consider any social system that prevails in the modern world, I can't see it as anything but a conspiracy of the rich to advance their own interests under the pretext of organizing society. | |
| From: Thomas More (Utopia [1516], Bk 2) | |
| A reaction: I'm afraid this is my own view of most conservative politics. I don't deny that there is a good case to be made for the conservative view (by Burke and Scruton, for example), but the rich will always latch onto its coat-tails. Cf. Idea 122. |
| 7254 | If you try to get elected, you should be permanently barred from seeking office [More,T] |
| Full Idea: In Utopia, anyone who deliberately tries to get himself elected to a public office is permanently disqualified from holding one. | |
| From: Thomas More (Utopia [1516], Bk 2) | |
| A reaction: This echoes a thought found in Plato (Idea 2149). I've always liked this idea. Why can't we have elections were a group of the best people are invited to stand? Well, yes, it would lead to corruption... Still, the best should be pushed to the front. |
| 7255 | Only Utopians fail to see glory in warfare [More,T] |
| Full Idea: Utopians are practically the only people on earth who fail to see anything glorious in war. | |
| From: Thomas More (Utopia [1516], Bk 2) | |
| A reaction: A refreshing thought for such an early date. Whatever dubious behaviour is nowadays attributed to Thomas More, you have to admire someone who writes this during the reign of Henry VIII. |
| 7253 | In Utopia, legal euthanasia is considered honourable [More,T] |
| Full Idea: In Utopia, officially sanctioned euthanasia is regarded as an honourable death. | |
| From: Thomas More (Utopia [1516], Bk 2) | |
| A reaction: A bit surprising coming from a writer who is now a Catholic martyr and saint. |
| 7256 | In Utopia, the Supreme Being is identical with Nature [More,T] |
| Full Idea: Everyone in Utopia agrees that the Supreme Being (which they call Mythras) is identical with Nature. | |
| From: Thomas More (Utopia [1516], Bk 2) | |
| A reaction: This sounds remarkably like full-blown Spinozean pantheism, though it should be interpreted with caution. It certainly seems to show that pantheism was a possibility in the minds of late medieval religious thinkers. |