27 ideas
5988 | Anaximander produced the first philosophy book (and maybe the first book) [Anaximander, by Bodnár] |
Full Idea: Anaximander was the first to produce a philosophical book (later conventionally titled 'On Nature'), if not the first to produce a book at all. | |
From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by István Bodnár - Anaximander | |
A reaction: Wow! Presumably there were Egyptian 'books', but this still sounds like a stupendous claim to fame. |
6222 | If a decision is in accord with right reason, everyone can agree with it [Cumberland] |
Full Idea: No decision can be in accord with right reason unless all can agree on it. | |
From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.V.XLVI) | |
A reaction: Personally I think anyone who disagrees with this should get out of philosophy (and into sociology, fantasy fiction, ironic game-playing, crime…). Of course 'can' agree is not the same as 'will' agree. You must have faith that good reasons are persuasive. |
1496 | The earth is stationary, because it is in the centre, and has no more reason to move one way than another [Anaximander, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Something which is established in the centre and has equality in relation to the extremes has no more reason to move up than it has down or to the sides (so the earth is stationary) | |
From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], A26) by Aristotle - On the Heavens 295b11 |
4568 | If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If 'the Queen of England' is not a referring expression when there is no queen, nor can it be one when there is a queen - since the meaning of the expression is the same in either case. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.1) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced. Does this mean that since I can point with my finger at nothing, I therefore do not indicate anything when there is an object at which I am pointing. Sounds silly to me. |
14874 | Anaximander saw the contradiction in the world - that its own qualities destroy it [Anaximander, by Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Anaximander discovers the contradictory character of our world: it perishes from its own qualities. | |
From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 19 [239] | |
A reaction: A lovely gloss on Anaximander, though I am not sure that I understand what Nietzsche means. |
4574 | If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If our most basic concepts, like time, space, substance or causality, are not shared by some peoples, it puts paid to the cherished ideal of philosophers to discover a set of concepts or categories which any rational human must employ in his thinking. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a place where a priori philosophy (Aristotle,Kant,Hegel) meets empirical research (Whorf). However, interpreting the research is so fraught with problems it drives you back to the a priori… |
4573 | If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If it is claimed that linguistic differences significantly correlate with cultural differences, it must therefore be possible to identify the linguistic differences independently from the cultural ones. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.1) | |
A reaction: This is a basic objection to any extreme relativist version of the S-P hypothesis. They are part of the conspiracy to overemphasise language in philosophy, and they are wrong. |
4575 | A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: It would be absurd to say the Hopi lack the concept of time because they lack tensed verbs, ..but how do we find out what a man's concepts are except in terms of his language? | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably we should look at animals, where concepts must be inferred in order to explain behaviour. I don't see why introspection (scientifically wicked) should not also be employed to detect our own non-verbal concepts. How are new words invented? |
4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.3) | |
A reaction: Yet another telling objection to behaviourism. When I look at broccoli I may have a disposition to be sick, but that isn't part of the concept of broccoli. |
4564 | I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: It is not meaningless for me to postulate the potential for humans to sense in a manner which is at present unimaginable and indescribable. There is no reason to believe me, but I might be right. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §3.1) | |
A reaction: The key counterexample to verificationist theories of meaning is wild speculations, which are clearly meaningful, though frequently far beyond any likely human experience. Logical positivists are allergic to imagination. |
4565 | The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: It seems that the positivists must admit that there is at least one statement which is meaningful, but which is neither verifiable nor analytic - namely, the statement of the principle of verification itself. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §3.1) | |
A reaction: Some people think this objection is decisive, but I think any theory must be permitted a few metatheoretic assertions or axioms which are beyond discussion. Ayer thought the VP might be treated as analytic. Everyone has to start somewhere. |
4562 | Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.4) | |
A reaction: Personally I find examples like this decisive against the 'use' theory of meaning. Maybe the defence is that the theory works for sentences, and individual words (like passwords) are peripheral. |
4563 | 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: The sentence 'How now brown cow?' has its use in elocutions classes, yet this aspect of its use tells us nothing about its meaning. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.4) | |
A reaction: Indeed, and also there are weird sentence of which we can assemble a meaning, but cannot think of any conceivable use ('rats swim in purple marmalade'). |
4571 | Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.2) | |
A reaction: Sounds right. If the basic scenario is picking someone out in a crowd, your listener may think they know which person you are talking about, with a high degree of probability. |
4566 | Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Any thesis about reference is also going to be a thesis about what there is in existence to refer to. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4) | |
A reaction: I see the point, but we must not put the cart before the horse. I may have an intuition that something exists, but not know how to refer to it (because of my small vocabulary). |
4572 | If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If predicates are names of entities, then subject/predicate sentences are pairs of names, since subjects are names (or referring expressions). But a pair of names is not a sentence at all, it is a mere list. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.4) | |
A reaction: If that is meant to demolish universals it is too quick. Concatenating names is not the same as listing them. A relationship is asserted. There is a (mysterious) Platonic 'partaking' between form and particular. Perhaps. |
4576 | An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: The definition of analytic truth which has, I believe, the most chance of success is one in terms of synonymy; ..an analytic truth is one which can be transformed into a logical truth once synonyms are replaced by synonyms. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §7.1) | |
A reaction: Sounds promising, though there is Quine's notorious problem of circularity in all these concepts. If synonymy is conventional, then so is analyticity. I personally feel that the circle can be broken. |
6217 | Natural law is supplied to the human mind by reality and human nature [Cumberland] |
Full Idea: Some truths of natural law, concerning guides to moral good and evil, and duties not laid down by civil law and government, are necessarily supplied ot the human mind by the nature of things and of men. | |
From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.I) | |
A reaction: I agree that some moral truths have the power of self-evidence. If you say they are built into the mind, we now ask what did the building, and evolution is the only answer, and hence we distance ourselves from the truths, seeing them as strategies. |
6221 | If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible [Cumberland] |
Full Idea: If there be posited different ultimate ends, whose causes are opposed to each other, then there will be truly good actions likewise opposed to each other, which is impossible. | |
From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.V.XVI) | |
A reaction: A very interesting argument for there being one good rather than many, and an argument which I don't recall in any surviving Greek text. A response might be to distinguish between what is 'right' and what is 'good'. See David Ross. |
6218 | The happiness of individuals is linked to the happiness of everyone (which is individuals taken together) [Cumberland] |
Full Idea: The happiness of each person cannot be separated from the happiness of all, because the whole is no different from the parts taken together. | |
From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.VI) | |
A reaction: Sounds suspiciously like the fallacy of composition (Idea 6219). An objection to utilitarianism is its assumption that a group of people have a 'total happiness' that is different from their individual states. Still, Cumberland is on to utilitarianism. |
6220 | The happiness of all contains the happiness of each, and promotes it [Cumberland] |
Full Idea: The common happiness of all contains the greatest happiness for each, and most effectively promotes it. …There is no path leading anyone to his own happiness, other than the path which leads all to the common happiness. | |
From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.VI) | |
A reaction: I take this as a revolutionary idea, which leads to utilitarianism. It is doing what seemed to the Greeks unthinkable, which is combining hedonism with altruism. There is no proof for it, but it is a wonderful clarion call for building a civil society. |
6216 | Natural law is immutable truth giving moral truths and duties independent of society [Cumberland] |
Full Idea: Natural law is certain propositions of immutable truth, which guide voluntary actions about the choice of good and avoidance of evil, and which impose an obligation to act, even without regard to civil laws, and ignoring compacts of governments. | |
From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.I) | |
A reaction: Not a popular view, but I am sympathetic. If you are in a foreign country and find a person lying in pain, there is a terrible moral deficiency in anyone who just ignores such a thing. No legislation can take away a person's right of self-defence. |
13222 | The Boundless cannot exist on its own, and must have something contrary to it [Aristotle on Anaximander] |
Full Idea: Those thinkers are in error who postulate ...a single matter, for this cannot exist without some 'perceptible contrariety': this Boundless, which they identify with the 'original real', must be either light or heavy, either hot or cold. | |
From: comment on Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 329a10 | |
A reaction: A dubious objection, I would say. If there has to be a contrasting cold thing to any hot thing, what happens when the cold thing is removed? |
404 | Things begin and end in the Unlimited, and are balanced over time according to justice [Anaximander] |
Full Idea: The non-limited is the original material of existing things; their source is also that to which they return after destruction, according to necessity; they give justice and make reparation to each other for injustice, according to the arrangement of Time. | |
From: Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], B1), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 24.13- | |
A reaction: Simplicius is quoting Theophrastus |
405 | The essential nature, whatever it is, of the non-limited is everlasting and ageless [Anaximander] |
Full Idea: The essential nature, whatever it is, of the non-limited is everlasting and ageless. | |
From: Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], B2), quoted by (who?) - where? |
1495 | Anaximander introduced the idea that the first principle and element of things was the Boundless [Anaximander, by Simplicius] |
Full Idea: Anaximander said that the first principle and element of existing things was the boundless; it was he who originally introduced this name for the first principle. | |
From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], A09) by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 9.24.14- | |
A reaction: Simplicius is quoting Theophrastus |
1746 | The parts of all things are susceptible to change, but the whole is unchangeable [Anaximander, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The parts of all things are susceptible to change, but the whole is unchangeable. | |
From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.An.2 |