55 ideas
| 5988 | Anaximander produced the first philosophy book (and maybe the first book) [Anaximander, by Bodnár] |
| Full Idea: Anaximander was the first to produce a philosophical book (later conventionally titled 'On Nature'), if not the first to produce a book at all. | |
| From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by István Bodnár - Anaximander | |
| A reaction: Wow! Presumably there were Egyptian 'books', but this still sounds like a stupendous claim to fame. |
| 22611 | Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics is capable of critical scrutiny of the way the empirical sciences make sense of their own theories, and can provide them with very useful feedback. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1.9) | |
| A reaction: I agree with this, but I don't think it is the main job of metaphysics, which has its own agenda, using science as some of its raw material. |
| 1496 | The earth is stationary, because it is in the centre, and has no more reason to move one way than another [Anaximander, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Something which is established in the centre and has equality in relation to the extremes has no more reason to move up than it has down or to the sides (so the earth is stationary) | |
| From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], A26) by Aristotle - On the Heavens 295b11 |
| 22609 | Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: First-order predicate logic was accepted so easily by the philosophical community …because philosophy was already geared toward a neo-Humean view of both science and philosophy as primarily descriptive rather than explanatory. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1.8) | |
| A reaction: The point, I think, is that explanatory thinking needs second-order logic, where the properties (or powers) are players in the game, and not just adjuncts of the catalogue of objects. I find this idea mind-expanding. (That's a good thing). |
| 17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
| Full Idea: If we count the concept 'coin in this box', we could regard coin as the 'unit', while taking 'in this box' to limit the scope. Counting coins in two boxes would be not a difference in unit (kind of object), but in scope. | |
| From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting') | |
| A reaction: This is a very nice alternative to the Fregean view of counting, depending totally on the concept, and rests more on a natural concept of object. I prefer Ayers. Compare 'count coins till I tell you to stop'. |
| 17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
| Full Idea: If we accepted that counting objects always presupposes some sortal, it is surely clear that the class of objects to be counted could be designated by two sortals rather than one. | |
| From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii) | |
| A reaction: His nice example is an object which is both 'a single piece of wool' and a 'sweater', which had better not be counted twice. Wiggins struggles to argue that there is always one 'substance sortal' which predominates. |
| 14874 | Anaximander saw the contradiction in the world - that its own qualities destroy it [Anaximander, by Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Anaximander discovers the contradictory character of our world: it perishes from its own qualities. | |
| From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 19 [239] | |
| A reaction: A lovely gloss on Anaximander, though I am not sure that I understand what Nietzsche means. |
| 22629 | Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Process philosophy is considered to include ideas of process as basically physical (Whitehead 1929), as basically organic (Bergson 1910), and as basically psychological (James 1890). | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 7.4) | |
| A reaction: I take Whitehead to be the only serious contender here. |
| 17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
| Full Idea: In order to know which event has been ostensively identified by a speaker, the auditor must know the limits intended by the speaker. ...Events do not have natural boundaries. | |
| From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
| A reaction: He distinguishes events thus from natural objects, where the world, to a large extent, offers us the boundaries. Nice point. |
| 22633 | Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: The indirect realist regards the manifest image with scepticism and contrasts it to the scientific image. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 8.13) | |
| A reaction: This is why indirect realism is the best view for a realist who largely accepts the authority of science, Philosophers can wallow in the manifest image all they like (and most of them seem to love it), but truth is in the scientific image. |
| 22606 | Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Neo-Humean metaphysics holds the view that there are no substantial connections between anything in this world. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1) | |
| A reaction: A very illuminating comment. This exactly fits Lewis's great 'mosaic' of facts. The challenge is to say what 'substantial' relations there might be, but I'm quite happy to have a go at that. |
| 22631 | Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: It is said that that properties divide into two mutually exclusive types—non-dispositional qualities (sometimes called 'categorical properties’) vs. non-qualitative dispositions—of which the qualities are more fundamental than dispositions. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 8) | |
| A reaction: It is standardly understood that the qualitative categorical properties are more fundamental. Fans of powers (such as Ingthorsson and myself) either favour the dispositional properties, or reject the distinction. |
| 22632 | Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Is the negative charge of an electron a quality or power? It is clear that physics describes the nature of charge only in terms of what its bearer can do. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 8.06) | |
| A reaction: The point is that an electron has properties, even though it has no observable qualities. Ingthorsson says the scientific concept of qualities is entirely about what something can do, and ot how it is perceived. |
| 22627 | Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Compound objects are to be considered processes, if by ‘process’ we mean any entity for which change is essential for its continued existence. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 7) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem to matter much, except to challenge those who say that reality consists of processes, and therefore not of substances. |
| 22613 | Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Most materialist ontologies of the past postulate that the world ultimately consists of smallest indivisible component parts that persist because they must; they are permanent. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: Van Inwagen is notable for this view. Ingthorsson says the theory is to explain medium-sized change, while denying that anything comes to be out of nothing. Theology may lurk in the background. Simple persistance won't explain compound persistance. |
| 17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
| Full Idea: The only explanation of the power to produce borderline examples like 'Is this hazelnut one object or two?' is the possession of the concept of an object. | |
| From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Counting') |
| 17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
| Full Idea: The recognition of the fact of continuity is logically independent of the possession of sortal concepts, whereas the formation of sortal concepts is at least psychologically dependent upon the recognition of continuity. | |
| From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be entirely correct. I might add that unity must also be recognised. |
| 17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
| Full Idea: If a speaker indicates something, then in order for others to catch his reference they must know, at some level of generality, what kind of thing is indicated. They must categorise it as event, object, or quality. Thinking about something needs that much. | |
| From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Ayers defends the view that such general categories are required, but not the much narrower sortal terms defended by Geach and Wiggins. I'm with Ayers all the way. 'What the hell is that?' |
| 17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
| Full Idea: Sortals are the terms by which we intend to classify physical objects according to the nature and origin of their unity. | |
| From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
| A reaction: This is as opposed to using sortals for the initial individuation. I take the perception of the unity to come first, so resemblance must be mentioned, though it can be an underlying (essentialist) resemblance. |
| 17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
| Full Idea: It is unnecessary to call moths 'caterpillars' or caterpillars 'moths' to see that they can be the same individual. It may be that our sortal concepts reflect our beliefs about continuity, but our beliefs about continuity need not reflect our sortals. | |
| From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vi) | |
| A reaction: Something that metamorphosed through 15 different stages could hardly required 15 different sortals before we recognised the fact. Ayers is right. |
| 17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
| Full Idea: The abstract question arises of whether the same matter could be subject to more than one principle of unity simultaneously, or unified by more than one 'form'. | |
| From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii) | |
| A reaction: He suggests that the unity of the sweater is destroyed by unravelling, and the unity of the thread by cutting. |
| 17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
| Full Idea: The statue is marble and man-shaped, but so is the piece of marble. So not only are the two objects in the same place, but two marble and man-shaped objects in the same place, so 'that marble, man-shaped object' must be ambiguous or indefinite. | |
| From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob') | |
| A reaction: It strikes me as basic that it can't be a piece of marble if you subtract its shape, and it can't be a statue if you subtract its matter. To treat a statue as an object, separately from its matter, is absurd. |
| 17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
| Full Idea: Sortals, in their primitive use, apply to the individual. | |
| From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
| A reaction: If the sortal applies to the individual, any essence must pertain to that individual, and not to the class it has been placed in. |
| 22612 | Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Endurance and perdurance are not explanations, but are merely characterisations of persistance with the constraints imposed by either an A or a B view of time. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: This is 3-D asnd 4-D objects. A simple and illuminating observation. I love reading broad brush books that make all these simple connections between what seem isolated theories in philosophy. These links are the heart of the subject. |
| 22625 | Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: There are very obvious causal aspects to the constitution and continued existence of compound entities, especially in light of the scientific image of the world. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 6) | |
| A reaction: I like this a lot. He aims to explain constitution and persistance, rather than just describing or characterising them, and causal binding seems the obvious thought. There are still intermittent and distributed objects, like a dismantled clock. |
| 22620 | If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: If causation involves production, then things must endure rather than perdure, because perdurance is incompatible with production, if creation ex nihilo is ruled out. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 4.10) | |
| A reaction: That is, objects must persist over time. Cannot an account of production be given in terms of time-sliceS (or whatever)? 3-D perdurantists obviously have an account of change. He says it also needs the A-series view of time. |
| 17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
| Full Idea: It would be impossible for anyone to have the concept of a stage who did not already possess the concept of a physical object. | |
| From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') |
| 17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
| Full Idea: Temporally extended 'parts' are still mysteriously inseparable and not subject to rearrangement: a thing cannot be cut temporally in half. | |
| From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob') | |
| A reaction: A nice warning to anyone accepting a glib analogy between spatial parts and temporal parts. |
| 17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
| Full Idea: Some hold that the 'covering concept' completes the incomplete concept of identity, determining the kind of sameness involved. Others strongly deny the identity itself is incomplete, and locate the covering concept within the necessary act of reference. | |
| From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], Intro) | |
| A reaction: [a bit compressed; Geach is the first view, and Quine the second; Wiggins is somewhere between the two] |
| 17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
| Full Idea: Why are covering concepts required for diachronic identities, when they must be supposed unnecessary for synchronic identities? | |
| From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Prob') |
| 22636 | Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Possible worlds ontology appears to be plentiful enough to allow every philosophical theory to be true in some world or other, and that is why I cannot consider it an ontologically serious theory. It admits everything and forbids nothing | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 9.6) | |
| A reaction: Nice. Be careful what you wish for. The theory would have to be consistent (unless we also accept impossible worlds). |
| 22638 | Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Even if possible worlds could differ in many different respects, there is no useful way to combine these different respects into one measure of overall comparative similarity. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 9.7) | |
| A reaction: [idea of Michael Moreau 2010] This is an objection to the use of 'close' possible worlds in causation theories. The idea is true in general of the concept of similarity. It makes sense of specific 'respects', but not really of two whole objects. |
| 1495 | Anaximander introduced the idea that the first principle and element of things was the Boundless [Anaximander, by Simplicius] |
| Full Idea: Anaximander said that the first principle and element of existing things was the boundless; it was he who originally introduced this name for the first principle. | |
| From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], A09) by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 9.24.14- | |
| A reaction: Simplicius is quoting Theophrastus |
| 405 | The essential nature, whatever it is, of the non-limited is everlasting and ageless [Anaximander] |
| Full Idea: The essential nature, whatever it is, of the non-limited is everlasting and ageless. | |
| From: Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], B2), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 13222 | The Boundless cannot exist on its own, and must have something contrary to it [Aristotle on Anaximander] |
| Full Idea: Those thinkers are in error who postulate ...a single matter, for this cannot exist without some 'perceptible contrariety': this Boundless, which they identify with the 'original real', must be either light or heavy, either hot or cold. | |
| From: comment on Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 329a10 | |
| A reaction: A dubious objection, I would say. If there has to be a contrasting cold thing to any hot thing, what happens when the cold thing is removed? |
| 404 | Things begin and end in the Unlimited, and are balanced over time according to justice [Anaximander] |
| Full Idea: The non-limited is the original material of existing things; their source is also that to which they return after destruction, according to necessity; they give justice and make reparation to each other for injustice, according to the arrangement of Time. | |
| From: Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], B1), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 24.13- | |
| A reaction: Simplicius is quoting Theophrastus |
| 22605 | Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Humeans attempt to describe causation without any deeper ontological commitments, while powers based accounts attempt to explain why causation occurs in the way it is described. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1) | |
| A reaction: Exactly the view I have reached. The Humean view is correct but superficial. A perfect example of my allegiance to Explanatory Empiricism. |
| 22607 | Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Time and space are significant determinants of natural phenomena, and yet are not (typically) regarded as causal determinants | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: I like the word 'determinants'. Metaphysics largely concerns what determines what. I'm struggling to think of examples of this (which he does not give). Decay takes time, but isn't determined by time. Is a light cone a determinant? |
| 22608 | Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Causal process theories state that causation needs to be understood in terms of causal processes and their interactions, in which conserved quantities are transmitted between causal processes. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: Sounds a bit circular, but the idea of transmission of something is obviously the main point. I like this idea a lot (because it is so naturalistic), but rarely find it taken seriously. Energy is usually the quantity picked out. |
| 22621 | Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: The transference model of causation only works for asymmetric interactions. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 4.11) | |
| A reaction: This is usually the transfer of energy. I liked the theory until I read this. |
| 22614 | Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: The core of agency and interventionist theories of causation is that c counts as the cause of e iff E reliably appears and disappears when you manipulate C. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: [C is the type of c; E is the type of e] James Woodward champions this view. Ingthorsson objects that the theory offers no explanation of the appearances and disappearances. You can't manipulate black holes… |
| 22639 | Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: I accept the reciprocity of interactions, and abandon the Agent vs.Patient distinction, so we can no longer talk of the contribution of each as ontologically different types of cause. In interactions, neither action nor reaction can be separated. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 10.3) | |
| A reaction: His point is that we are misled by real world happenings, where one component is usually more powerful than the other (such as ball dropped onto a pillow). Modern science endorses his view. Mumford and Anjum seem to agree, and so do I. |
| 22615 | One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Hobbes implies that a Kim-style event e1 existing at t1 cannot possibly act on an effect e2 at t2, because that effect does not exist until the Agent has worked its effect on the Patient to provoke a change, thus bringing the effect into existence. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 3.08) | |
| A reaction: [Hobbes Elements of Phil 1656 II.IX.1] Ingthorsson says that the Hobbes view is the traditional 'standard' view, that objects (and not events) are the causal relata. A strong objection to events as the causal relata. Realists need objects. |
| 22616 | Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: It is the empiricists' refusal to deal with anything other than observable events that motivated the shift in conception of efficient causation …to influence by an event on another event (one motion on another) rather than by an object on an object. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 3.10) | |
| A reaction: I suppose events supply the necessary activity, whereas objects seem to be too passive for the job - because that's how they look. Ingthorsson persuades that objects are the correct causal relata, for those of us who believe in powers. |
| 22617 | Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: It is now accepted as a fact of modern science that unidirectional actions do not exist, and that all interactions are instead thoroughly reciprocal. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 3.10) | |
| A reaction: Ingthorsson says this undermines the standard traditional view (Hobbes etc) of Agent and Patient, with A having active powers and P having passive powers. All influences are mutual, it seems. Passive powers are active structures? |
| 22619 | Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: By abandoning the standard view that causes are ‘extrinsic motive Agents’, an idea from pre-Newtonian physics, we are free to conceive of the interaction as a whole as the cause, and the change in the compound whole of interacting things as the effect. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 4.06) | |
| A reaction: Ingthorsson persuasively presents this as the correct account, as understood by modern science. It is not cause-then-effect. It is kerfuffle, then aftermath. |
| 22635 | People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: I doubt that anyone will accept any counterfactual as true unless they believe they know the underlying causality. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 9.3) | |
| A reaction: Correct. Almost any example will support it. Compare coincidences and true causes. |
| 22634 | Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: I cannot identify any prima facie reason to think that causation can be explained in counterfactual terms, but plenty to think that causation can explain counterfactuals. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 9.1) | |
| A reaction: Love it. Treating causation as counterfactual dependency is hopelessly superficial. What is the reality that is involved? He cites the second law of motion. |
| 22637 | Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: if there are worlds where there are causal powers and/or lawful connections, then they are worlds in which the counterfactual theory of causation is false, because there causes produce the effects, regardless of any possible world. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 9.6) | |
| A reaction: A nice modern instance of turning the tables. Come to think of it, possible worlds theories are just asking for that. Are there possible worlds in which there are no other possible worlds? Or the possible worlds are inaccessible? |
| 22624 | A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Counterexamples involving prevention and/or interference have come to be roughly divided into four main categories: (i) prevention, (ii) pre-emption, (iii) finks and (iv) antidotes. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 5.3) | |
| A reaction: These are the reasons why necessity is denied in causation. i) is in the initial circumstances, ii) is another cause getting there first, iii) is a defusing action in the agent, iv) is a defusing action in the patient. No necessity if one is possible. |
| 22622 | Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Because it makes no difference to exchange the time variable t with its contrary -t, in the fundamental laws of physics, any process can be described as going either backwards or forwards in time, without violating those laws. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 4.13) | |
| A reaction: A few philosophers read a lot into this, but I don't. The inverse scenario may not breach the laws of physics, but it does involve time going backwards, which I think we can skip for now. Entropy would be interesting. Can information flow backwards? |
| 22618 | In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: While the first and second laws of motion are known to fail in the domain of very fast-moving and massive objects (i.e. where relativity deviates from classical mechanics) as well as in the quantum realm, the third law is still assumed to hold good. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 4.04) | |
| A reaction: This implies a universal status for the third law (equal and opposite reactions), which the other two lack. Ingthorsson sees this as crucial for our understanding of causation. |
| 22630 | If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: We may wonder whether the fact that physics has calculated (and for some, confirmed) the decay rate of elementary particles can be a reason to think that they cannot really be ‘elementary’ in the philosophical sense of ‘indivisible’. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 7.6) | |
| A reaction: I don't think anything can ever conclusively be labelled as 'elementary', but this idea offers a reason for doubting whether a candidate particle is so basic. Does decay imply having parts? |
| 22610 | It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson] |
| Full Idea: Contemporary philosophers are not comfortable with presentism, because it is difficult to deal with presentism in the language of first-order predicate logic. | |
| From: R.D. Ingthorsson (A Powerful Particulars View of Causation [2021], 1.8) | |
| A reaction: Presumable that logic relies on objects which endure through time, or at least have a past. Second-order logic is better able to deal with processes, which only exist in the present, but nevertheless have an integral past and future. ? |
| 1746 | The parts of all things are susceptible to change, but the whole is unchangeable [Anaximander, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: The parts of all things are susceptible to change, but the whole is unchangeable. | |
| From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.An.2 |