87 ideas
7893 | Our life is the creation of our mind [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: What we are today comes from our thoughts of yesterday, and our present thoughts build our life of tomorrow: our life is the creation of our mind. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §1.1) | |
A reaction: I may adopt this as a second epigraph for the database. This idea records the subjective view, which now comes up against evolutionary psychology. Maybe philosophy is opposed to science, because it is committed to exploring the subjective view? |
19023 | Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Slippery slope arguments are not intended as demonstrative arguments, but rather as a challenge to show where a boundary is, and to show that the boundary is not arbitrary. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 5.3.3) | |
A reaction: [extracted from details of its context] You could respond by saying that a slippery slope levels off, rather than hitting a wall or plunging to perdition. |
23000 | Vicious regresses force you to another level; non-vicious imply another level [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: A regress is vicious if the problem at level n can only be solved at level n+1; it is non-vicious if it can be solved at n, but the solution forces another level n+1, where the problem can be reformulated. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 2.3.2) | |
A reaction: So in a vicious regress you chase the apparent solution, but never attain it. In the non-vicious you solve it, but then find you have a new problem. I think. |
19033 | Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Deontic modality can be divided into sentence-modifying 'ought-to-be' modals, and predicate-modifying 'ought-to-do' modals. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.9.2) | |
A reaction: [She cites Brennan 1993] These two seem to correspond to what is 'good' (ought to be), and what is 'right' (ought to do). Since I like that distinction, I also like this one. |
19032 | S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Wedgwood (2007:220) argues that S5 is undesirable because it excludes that necessary truths may have contingent grounds. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.4 n5) | |
A reaction: Cameron defends the possibility of necessity grounded in contingency, against Blackburn's denial of it. It's interesting that we choose the logic on the basis of the metaphysics. Shouldn't there be internal reasons for a logic's correctness? |
19036 | The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Subscribers to the Barcan formula must either be committed to the existence of mere possibilia (such as possible unicorns), or deny many unactualised possibilities of existence. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.5) | |
A reaction: It increasingly strikes me that the implications of the Barcan formula are ridiculous. Williamson is its champion, but I'm blowed if I can see why. What could a possible unicorn be like? Without them, must we say unicorns are impossible? |
23024 | A traveller takes a copy of a picture into the past, gives it the artist, who then creates the original! [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Suppose an art critic travels back in time with a copy of an artist's masterpiece, gives the artist the copy, and the artist copies it. The copy of the copy turns out to be the original mastepiece. The artwork seems to come from nowhere. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 8.6) | |
A reaction: Lovely thought. Is the example possible (even with time travel)? How would the critic possess the copy before making the time journey? What if the critic decided not to travel back in time? Can a picture exist if no one has imagined it first? |
19034 | The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts [Vetter] |
Full Idea: We can think of the world as a 'whole' that has everything as its parts, like raisins in a cake, or we can think of the world as a 'container', which is disjoint from everything there is, like a bottle containing water. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Space and time seem to have a special role here, and it is hard to think of any other candidates for being the 'container'. I think I will apply my 'what's it made of' test to ontology, and opt for the world as a 'whole'. |
23008 | Grounding is intended as a relation that fits dependences between things [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Grounding is a posit introduced by metaphysicians in an attempt to devise a relation that can accommodate dependence between things in the world. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.6) | |
A reaction: Grounding is a recent concept which seems to have lots of enemies, but I assume you can only reject it if you reject the concept of dependence - yet that seems a fairly obvious fact to me. My favoured metaphysical relation is 'determination'. |
19015 | Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational') [Vetter] |
Full Idea: 'Relational' grounding is between entities, best expressed by the two-place predicate 'x grounds y'. 'Operational' grounding is between sentences, best expressed by the two-place sentence operator read as 'because of' or 'in virtue of'. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.6) |
19012 | The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Humean supervenience excludes modality - the whole modal package - from the supervenience base. The Humean world is, at root, thoroughly non-modal. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This sums up my problem with David Lewis with perfect clarity. He is just excessively empirical. Hume himself also excluded modality from the basic impressions. Locke allows powerful essences (even if they are well hidden). |
19024 | A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The crucial feature of the determinates / determinables relation is that to possess the determinable property, an object must possess exactly one of the determinate properties. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 5.7.2) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a determinable being a function, and the determinate being its output. If 'scarlet' is a determinate of the determinables 'red' or 'coloured', it is not obvious that there is only one possible shade of scarlet. This schema oversimplifies. |
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Essence is, as it were, necessity rooted in things, ...but how about possibility rooted in things? ...Having the potential to Φ, unlike being essentially Φ, does not entail being actually Φ. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §2) | |
A reaction: To me this invites the question 'what is it about the entity which endows it with its rooted possibilities?' A thing has possibilities because it has a certain nature (at a given time). |
19021 | I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter] |
Full Idea: I do not have the ability to play the violin. Nor does my desk. Unlike my desk, however, I possess the ability to learn to play the violin - the ability, that is, to acquire the ability to play the violin. I have an 'iterated ability' to play the violin. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 4.6) | |
A reaction: An important idea, though the examples are more likely to come from human behaviour than from the non-human physical world. |
19016 | We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....' [Vetter] |
Full Idea: We should think in terms of dispositions in terms of the manifestation alone - not as a disposition to ...if..., but as a disposition to ..., full stop. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.7) | |
A reaction: This way of individuating dispositions seems plausible. Some dispositions only have one trigger, but others have many. All sorts of things are inclined to trigger a human smile, but we are just disposed to smile. Some people smile at disasters. |
19017 | Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Nomological dispositions such as electric charge seem different from ordinary dispositions. A particle's being electrically charged is not just a possibility of exerting a certain force. Rather, the particle has to exert a force in certain circumstances. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 2.7) | |
A reaction: I can only pull when there is something to pull, but a magnet seems to have a 'field' of attraction which is pullish in character. Does it detect something to pull (like a monad)? Can there be a force which has no object? |
19014 | How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Spatiotemporal relations are a prime example of properties that are difficult to understand in dispositional terms. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.6) | |
A reaction: [Vetter refers to A.Bird 2007 Ch.8 for an attempt] One approach would be to question whether they are 'properties'. I don't think of relations as properties, even if they are predicates. Is space a property of something? |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
Full Idea: I can understand the notion of real definition as applying to (some) abstact entities, but I have no idea how to apply it to a concrete object such as Socrates or myself. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: She is objecting to Kit Fine's account of essence, which is meant to be clearer than the normal account of essences based on necessities. Aristotle implies that definitions get fuzzy when you reach the level of the individual. |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The modal account was meant, I take it, to make the notion of essence less mysterious by basing it on the supposedly better understood notion of necessity. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §1) |
23018 | How does a changing object retain identity or have incompatible properties over time? [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The problems of temporary intrinsics are reconciling the indiscernibility of identicals with change in an object over time, and the problem of something have incompatible properties over time (such as tired and not-tired). | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 7.3.1) | |
A reaction: Loosely speaking, I would offer some sort of essentialism as the answer to these problems. People are not essentially sitting down, or tired. Or we can relativise properties to times t1 and t2. |
19030 | Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Not every feature of an individual's origin is plausibly considered necessary, so we can distinguish two questions: 'why origin, rather than development?', and 'why these particular features of origin?'. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.2) | |
A reaction: [she cites P. Mackie 1998] The point is that exactly where someone was born doesn't seem vital. If it is nothing more than that every contingent object must have an origin, that is not very exciting. |
19040 | We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The plausibility of the necessity of origin is a symptom of our general tendency to think of possibility in terms of the 'branching model' - that unactualised possibilities must branch off from actuality, at some point. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.9) | |
A reaction: [she cites P. Mackie 1998] It is hard to see how we could flatly deny some possibilities which had absolutely no connection with actuality, and were probably quite unimaginable for us. |
19008 | The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Necessity and possibility had a revival with the development of modal logic, treating them as special cases of the existential and universal quantifiers, ranging over an infinity of possible worlds. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.1) | |
A reaction: The problem seems to be that possible worlds offer a very useful and interesting 'model' of modality, but say nothing at all about its nature. Any more than a weather map will show you what weather is. |
19029 | It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Necessities mark the limits of the potentialities that objects have. More precisely, it is necessary that p just in case nothing has, or had, or will have a potentiality to be such that not-p. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.2) | |
A reaction: [See Vetter's other ideas for her potentiality account of modality] If we wish to build a naturalistic account of modality (and if you don't want that then your untethered metaphysics will drift away in logical space) then this is the way to go. |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
Full Idea: We support the views of metaphysical modality on which metaphysical necessity is an even more deeply empirical matter than Kripke has argued. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], p.2) | |
A reaction: [co-author E. Viebahn] This seems to pinpoint the spirit of scientific essentialism. She cites Bird and Shoemaker. If it is empirical, doesn't that make it a matter of epistemology, and hence further from absolute necessity? |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The apparatus of possible worlds affords greater expressive power than mere talk of possibility and necessity. In particular, possible worlds talk allows us to introduce degrees of possibility. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: A nice feature, but I'm not sure that either the proportion of possible worlds or the closeness of possible worlds captures what we actually mean by a certain degree of possibility. There is 'accidental closeness', or absence of contingency. See Vetter. |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
Full Idea: We should look at the claim that possibility is constituted by potentiality. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: A problem that comes to mind is possibilities arising from coincidence. The whole of reality must be described, to capture all the possibilities for a particular thing. So potentialities of what? Nice thought, though. |
19028 | Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location [Vetter] |
Full Idea: When we speak of possibility, we speak of potentiality in abstraction from its possessor; a possibility is a potentiality somewhere or other in the world, no matter where. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.1) | |
A reaction: I note that, as so often, this is psychological abstraction, which is usually sneered at by modern philosophers (e.g. Geach), and yet is employed all the time. This is Vetter's key thesis, which I like. |
19010 | All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Potentiality is, metaphorically speaking, possibility anchored in individual objects; I claim that all possibility is thus anchored in some individual object(s) or other. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This will be fine for specific physical possibilities, but may become tricky for possibilities that are increasingly abstract, or universal, or idealised. I agree with the general approach. Anchor modality in reality (which is physical!). |
19013 | Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer [Vetter] |
Full Idea: We should think of possibility as potentiality in abstraction from its bearer. So 'it is possible that p' is defined as 'something has an iterated potentiality for it to be the case that p'. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.4) | |
A reaction: If possibilities are abstractions from potentialities, I am inclined the treat potentialities as abstractions from dispositions, and dispositions (and properties) as abstractions from powers. Powers are not abstractions - they are the reality. |
23705 | A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities [Vetter, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
Full Idea: Although not all potentialities are dispositions, Vetter claims that all dispositions are potentialities which are had to a sufficiently high degree. | |
From: report of Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015]) by Friend/Kimpton-Nye - Dispositions and Powers 2.4.2 | |
A reaction: This sounds plausible. A potentiality could be faint or negligible, but once it is a serious possibility it becomes a 'disposition'. ...I suppose. But if the meteor is probably going to hit my house, it doesn't mean it has a disposition to do so. |
19009 | Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it [Vetter] |
Full Idea: This book is a plea for recognising potentiality as an explanans in the metaphysics of modality, rather than as something in need of explanation or reduction. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Something has to do the explaining, and it is obviously much better to have some aspect of the real world do the job, rather than remote abstractions such as laws, possible worlds or Forms. Personally I like the potentiality of 'powers'. |
19027 | Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The logic for potentiality corresponds to modal system T, the minimum for metaphysics. The S4 axiom ◊◊φ → ◊φ says iterated potentialities collapse, and the S5 ◊φ → □◊φ says potentialities can't be lost. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 5.9) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems persuasive. I nice example of modern analytic metaphysics, that you have to find a logic that suits your theory. N.Salmon defends system T for all of metaphysics, though most people favour S5. |
19031 | There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'. [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Potentialities are 'potentialities to ....', while possibilities are 'possibilities that ....'. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 6.4) | |
A reaction: This feels a bit like a stipulation, rather than a precise description of normal usage. That said, it is quite a nice distinction. It sounds as if an event follows a potentiality, and a state of affairs follows a possibility. Active and passive? |
19025 | Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions' [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Potentialities may get exercised despite having a degree that is too low for them to qualify as dispositions. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 5.7.4) | |
A reaction: The key reason why her book is called 'Potentialities', rather than 'Dispositions'. She still wants to offer a naturalistic picture which ties potentialities to individual objects, but I am wondering whether potentialities are too abstract for the job. |
19022 | Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing) [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Water has no potentiality to break. But water has a potentiality to be frozen and turn into ice, which does have a potentiality to break. So water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 4.6) | |
A reaction: Thus potentially has an 'iterated' character to it, and an appropriate modal logic for it will have to allow for those iterations. She suggests a version of System T modal logic. |
19019 | Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Potentiality can now be recognised as the common genus of dispositions and such related properties as abilities. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 4.1) | |
A reaction: This is the reason why Vetter defends a metaphysics of modality based on potentialities, rather than on narrower concepts such as dispositions, powers or essences. She can evade the problems which those narrower concepts raise. |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Some of what metaphysicians take to be metaphysically possible turns out to be only epistemically possible. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: A nice clear expression of the increasingly common view that conceivability may be a limited way to grasp possibility. |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The closeness of possible worlds should be determined by similarity in the intrinsic constitution of whatever object it is whose potentialities are at issue. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: Nice thought. This seems to be the essentialist approach to possible worlds, but it makes the natures of the objects more fundamental than the framework of the worlds. She demurs because there are also extrinsic potentialities. |
19011 | If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: If possible worlds are sets of propositions, we need some way to distinguish those sets of propositions that do from those that do not correspond to genuine possibilities. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.2) | |
A reaction: The idea of a 'genuine' possibility does not seem to play a role in the conceptual scheme of those who treat possibility entirely in terms of possible worlds. If possibility is primitive, or is a set of worlds, there can be no criterion for 'genuine'. |
19037 | Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Is it not possible that there be objects with (natural) properties that no actual thing ever had the potentiality to have, to produce, or constitute? (Call such properties 'super-alien properties'). | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.5) | |
A reaction: This is a problem for her potentiality account of possibility. Her solution is (roughly) to either deny the super-aliens, or have chains of iterated possibility which take this case back to actuality. That sounds OK to me. |
7898 | The world is just the illusion of an appearance [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: When a man considers this world as a bubble of froth, and as the illusion of an appearance, then the king of death has no power over him. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §13.170) | |
A reaction: Strictly, of course, this says you can 'consider' things this way. Perhaps we could substitute 'pretends', but the world's great religions don't go in for that sort of thing. Berkeley would be shocked to learn he was approaching Buddhism. |
19018 | Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Patterns of behaviour may be explained by circumstances external to the individual, but dispositional explanations, based on the instrinsic make-up of individuals are typically more reliable and stable. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 3.5) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is very nice support for the view I have been defending. She doesn't deal in essences, and prefers 'potentialities' (as broader) to 'dispositions'. The point is to explain events by the natures of the ingredients. |
19020 | Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Grounding is a kind of explanation - and specifically, the kind of metaphysical explanation that metaphysicians are after. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 4.5) | |
A reaction: Depending on how you interpret 'grounding', it is plausible that it is the sort of explanation that physicists and economists are after as well. If the aim is to understand the structure of everything, the target is to know what grounds what. |
7894 | Hate is conquered by love [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: Hate is not conquered by hate: hate is conquered by love. This is the law eternal. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §1.5) | |
A reaction: [N.B. This thought was not invented by Jesus] The challenge to this view might be the tit-for-tat strategy of game theory, which says that hate is actually conquered by a combination of hate and love, judiciously applied. |
7899 | Even divine pleasure will not satisfy the wise, as it is insatiable, and leads to pain [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: Since a shower of gold coins could not satisfy craving desires and the end of all pleasure is pain, how could a wise man find satisfaction even in the pleasures of the gods? | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §14.186) | |
A reaction: I'm never sure how so many ancient thinkers arrived at this implausible view. They seem to think that no one knows when to stop, and that every drink leads to hangover. What is actually wrong with moderate sensible pleasure? |
7896 | The foolish gradually fill with evil, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: The falling of drops of water will in time fill a water-jar. Even so the foolish man becomes full of evil, although he gather it little by little. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §9.121) | |
A reaction: This coincides closely with Aristotle's view of moral education. Maybe a wise man can maintain one small vice. Not all slopes are slippery. |
7897 | The wise gradually fill with good, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: The falling of drops of water will in time fill a water-jar. Even so the wise man becomes full of good, although he gather it little by little. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §9.122) | |
A reaction: Again, this is like Aristotle's proposal of how to educate people in virtue. In my experience, there is no guarantee that small acts of politeness and charity will eventually guarantee goodness of character. Thought is also needed. |
7895 | Don't befriend fools; either find superior friends, or travel alone [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: If on the great journey of life a man cannot find one who is better or at least as good as himself, let him joyfully travel alone: a fool cannot help him on his journey. | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §5.61) | |
A reaction: This is a slightly disturbing aspect of Buddhism, possibly leading to contradiction. It urges friendship and love, but the finest people will have virtually no friends, and solitude is presented as a finer state than friendship. |
23011 | Modern accounts of causation involve either processes or counterfactuals [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The two major contemporary theories of causation are process theories and counterfactual theories. …Process theories treat it as something to be discovered. …Counterfactual theories ignore processes, and treat it in terms of truth and falsity. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 6.1) | |
A reaction: I take the counterfactual theory to be a specialised branch of the project of analytic metaphysics, which seeks the logical form of causation sentences, using possible worlds semantics. In the real word its processes or nothing. |
23013 | The main process theory of causation says it is transference of mass, energy, momentum or charge [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: According to contemporary process theories of causation it consists of the transference of a 'mark', which is always some conserved quantity. Candidates (from science) are mass, energy, momentum and electric charge. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 6.2.2) | |
A reaction: Given my commitment to physicalism, this is my preferred theory of causation. It began with the suggestion of energy-transfer, but has broadened into the present idea. It is an updated version of the Newton view, as the meeting of objects. |
23014 | If causes are processes, what is causation by omission? (Distinguish legal from scientific causes?) [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Process theories of causation face a serious problem, such as killing a plant by failing to water it - a cause by omission. …Defenders of the theory propose two concepts of causation: one for legal and one for scientific contexts. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 6.2.3) | |
A reaction: Not much of a problem, I think. Clearly the scientific concept has priority. The plant died of dehydration, resulting from the consumption and evaporation of the available water. The human causes of that situation are legion. |
23015 | The counterfactual theory of causation handles the problem no matter what causes actually are [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The chief advantage of the counterfactual theory of causation is that it is flexible enough to handle causation no matter what in the world underlies the causal facts in question. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 6.3) | |
A reaction: It has this advantage because it makes no attempt to explain causation, but merely gives an accurate map of the truth and falsity of causal statements. It describes how we think about causation. |
23016 | Counterfactual theories struggle with pre-emption by a causal back-up system [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Counterfactual theories of causation have difficulty accommodating pre-emption, which involves the existence of causal back-up systems that undermine counterfactual dependence. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 6.5) | |
A reaction: E.g. If your stone hadn't broken the window first, my stone would have broken it instead. So in the nearest world the withholding of your stone doesn't save the window. |
19039 | The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The Armstrong/Tooley/Dretske view, which takes laws to be substantial but grounded in a relation of nomic necessitation external to the properties themselves, is not an attractive option for the dispositionalist. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.8) | |
A reaction: The point is that the dispositionalist sees laws as grounded in the properties. I prefer her other option, of dispositionalism plus a 'shallow' view of laws (which she attributes to Mumford). The laws are as Lewis says, but powers explain them. |
19038 | Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Even on the dispositional essentialist view the world might have been governed by different laws, if those laws involved different properties. What is excluded is the possibility of different laws involving the same properties as our actual laws. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.8) | |
A reaction: Important. Critics of dispositional essentialism accuse it of promoting the idea that the laws of nature are necessary, a claim for which we obviously have no evidence. I prefer to say they are necessary given that 'stuff', rather than those properties. |
17993 | Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The laws of a domain are the fundamental, general explanatory relationships between kinds, quantities, and qualities of that domain, that supervene upon the essential natures of those things. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Dispositional Essentialism and the Laws of Nature [2012], 9.3) | |
A reaction: Hm. How small can the domain be? Can it embrace the multiverse? Supervenience is a rather weak relationship. How about 'are necessitated/entailed by'? Are the relationships supposed to do the explaining? I would have thought the natures did that. |
23009 | There is no second 'law' of thermodynamics; it just reflects probabilities of certain microstates [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: According to contemporary statistical mechanics the second law of thermodynamics is not really a law at all, but merely reflects to probabilities of certain microstates, conditional on local boundary conditions having certain properties. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.6.1) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of how metaphysicians have been seduced by the 'laws' of nature into falsely inferring all sorts of natural necessities. Entropy is normally assumed to be totally inevitable, because of some natural force. It's just a pattern. |
23002 | In relativity space and time depend on one's motion, but spacetime gives an invariant metric [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: While spatial and temporal distances in relativity depend on one's relative state of motion, spatiotemporal distances within Minkowski spacetime do not. It therefore provides an invariant metric for describing the distances between things. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 4.2) | |
A reaction: I doubt whether this solves all the worries which philosophers have, about relativity giving an account of time which contradicts our concept of time in every other area of our understanding. |
19026 | If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Any defender of the symmetry of time will have to provide some explanation of the obstinate appearance that the future is very different from the past. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 5.8) | |
A reaction: Presumably you have to say that it is all there, but only one end of the time spectrum is revealed to us, namely the past. But how do we get this uniquely lopsided view? Being an ominiscient god is more obvious than being a lopsided human. |
22988 | The block universe theory says entities of all times exist, and time is the B-series [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The standard block universe theory combines EntityEverywhenism with the B-theory of time. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.4) | |
A reaction: This is also known as 'eternalism'. These authors emphasise that there is an ontological commitment to the objects of past and future in eternalism, as well as the B-series view of the moments of time. |
22991 | How can we know this is the present moment, if other times are real? [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: According to the spotlight and growing block views, there is a single objectively present moment, and also other objectively existing moments. But then how do persons in those different moments know which one is present? | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.6) | |
A reaction: [compressed example] This sceptical thought leads either towards Presentism (we know we are present because that's all there is), or Eternalism (there is no present moment, so no problem). A good objection to spotlight and growing block. |
22992 | If we are actually in the past then we shouldn't experience time passing [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: If the past really exists, and we are in it, rather than in the present, then we should rationally conclude that we are not experiencing the passage of time. …But then we have no basis for arguing that time is dynamic. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.6) | |
A reaction: [compressed] It is certainly difficult to conceive how past times and entities could be real in every way, except that the experience of time passing has been removed. But if past people experience passing, they must believe they are present… |
19041 | Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Presentists usually deal with the lack of cross-temporal relations by the construction of a surrogate, by way of paraphrasing the objectionable relation ascriptions. 'I admire Socrates' becomes 'I admire the Socrates properties'. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.9) | |
A reaction: [compressed. The cites Markosian 2004:63] Why can't I just say 'I admire Socrates, who no longer exists'? The present includes tensed facts, and memories and evidence-based theories. Admiring is not a direct relation between objects. |
22994 | Erzatz Presentism allows the existence of other times, with only the present 'actualised' [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The 'erzatz presentism' view is that either the past and present exist, or all times exist, but only the present is 'actualised'. Standard Presentism says no times exist other than the present. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.7.2) | |
A reaction: Ersatz presentism is obviously a close relative of the moving spotlight and growing block views. No account seems possible of the distinction between 'exists' and 'actualised' (other than the former being a mere abstract concept). |
22998 | How do presentists explain relations between things existing at different times? [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: A chief challenge facing presentism is how to give an account of cross-temporal relations, which link things that exist with things that do not. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 2.2) | |
A reaction: The problem of whether to keep a dubious death-bed promise is a bit of a puzzle for all of us, whatever our metaphysical view of time. None of us deny the reality of our great-great-grandparents. |
23017 | Presentism needs endurantism, because other theories imply most of the object doesn't exist [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Presentism is more naturally paired with endurantism, since if we pair it with perdurantism or transdurantism we have to say that most of any persisting object does not exist, and while that is not incoherent it is not very attractive. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 7.2.2) | |
A reaction: (I think perdurance is time slices, and transdurance is the complete time worm). My preferred combination is this one: all that exists is the complete objects at the present moment. It also needs strong commitment to the truth of tensed verbs. |
23023 | How can presentists move to the next future moment, if that doesn't exist? [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: If Presentism is true, how do we manage to travel from this moment to the next moment, a moment that is, at present, a future and hence non-existent moment? | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 8.3.1) | |
A reaction: The reply would have to be that the metaphor of 'travel' is inappropriate for the movement through time. Travel needs a succession of existing places. The advancement of time is nothing like that. Nice question, though. |
22995 | Most of the sciences depend on the concept of time [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Without time it is hard to make sense of historical research, evolutionary biology, psychology, chemistry, biology, cosmology, social science, archaeology, practical reason, evidence, human agency and causation. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.8) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I do find it extraordinary that relativistic physicists cheerfully embrace an eternalist theory of time which seems to render nearly all of the other sciences meaningless. |
22993 | For abstractionists past times might still exist, althought their objects don't [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: If past moments are seen as abstract (rather than concrete) it doesn't follow that because past objects no longer exist that therefore past times do not exist. The abstractionist needs to say which times are concretely realised. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.7.2) | |
A reaction: Abstractionists see times as representations of change, rather than as substances. |
23001 | The error theory of time's passage says it is either a misdescription or a false inference [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: According to the cognitive error theory of the passage of time, …it is either our misdescription of our temporal phenomenology, or some mechanism of our brain infers that the phenomenology is caused by time actually passing. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 3.3.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I think I have some sympathy with the misdescription view. If you imaginatively gradually remove all the changing events in your experience, that doesn't end with a raw experience of pure time, because there is no such thing. |
22999 | It is meaningless to measure the rate of time using time itself, and without a rate there is no flow [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: It seems we are forced to measure the rate of time's passing against itself. But that's just not a meaningful rate. So time has no rate. So it doesn't flow. So there is no such thing as temporal passage. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 2.3.1) | |
A reaction: It is suggested that you can exchange dollars one for one, so time might move at one second per second. But you can't exchange your own dollars with yourself at one-for-one. That is meaningless. Time is NOT a substance which flows. |
22986 | The C-series rejects A and B, and just sees times as order by betweenness, without direction [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The C-series sees times not as directed, but as unchanging, and ordered in terms of the betweenness relation. The C-theory also asserts that the A-series and B-series do not exist. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This is McTaggart's idea. Compare this with A-series ordering by past, present and future, and B-series ordering by earlier-than, later-than and simultaneous. The main point is that A and B have a direction, but C does not. |
22996 | The A-series has to treat being past, present or future as properties [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: One of the limitations of the A-series is that temporal passage then presupposes the existence of properties of being present, being past and being future. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Metaphysicians happily talk about 'properties' all the time, and most of them never grasp how ambiguous and obscure that concept is. The idea that my recent scratching of my chin first acquired the 'present' property and then lost it is incoherent. |
23007 | The B-series can have a direction, as long as it does not arise from temporal flow [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The view that time has a direction is entirely consistent with the B-theory of time, as long as time's having a direction is not a matter of it having temporal flow. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.5) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how you could account for an intrinsic direction to time if it is not because of the 'flow'. The B-series seems to invite a reductive account of time's direction (e.g. to entropy). |
23003 | Static theories cannot account for time's obvious asymmetry, so time must be dynamic [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: One argument for the dynamic theory of time is that time is, obviously, asymmetric, and as static theories can't account for this asymmetry, we ought to posit temporal passage to explain it. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5) | |
A reaction: The B-series view (unlike the C-series) asserts that there is an order from past to future, but it offers no explanation of that fact. Physicists love to tell you the order could be in either direction, But why an 'order' at all? |
23004 | The direction of time is either primitive, or reducible to something else [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Primitivism is the view that time has a direction, and that its having that direction is intrinsic to time itself. Reductionism is the view that time has a direction, but its having that direction is reducible to something else. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.3.1) | |
A reaction: The general suggestion for the second theory is that time's direction reduces to some aspect of the laws of nature. I strongly incline to the primitive view. Something's got to be primitive. |
23005 | The kaon does not seem to be time-reversal invariant, unlike the rest of nature [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The laws of nature are time-reversal invariant, with the small exception of the kaon (a type of sub-atomic particle) | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.3.2) | |
A reaction: If that fact about the kaon were very secure indeed, then that would mean the collapse of the claims about the time-invariance of the laws. Since time-invariance is still routinely asserted, I assume it is not secure. |
23006 | Maybe the past is just the direction of decreasing entropy [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: We could say that what we call the past is just the direction towards (for instance) decreasing entropy, and the direction we call the future is the direction towards increasing entropy. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.3.3) | |
A reaction: One problem is that locally entropy can sometimes go the other way, which would imply local pockets with a reversed time's arrow,. |
23010 | We could explain time's direction by causation: past is the direction of causes, future of effects [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: An option for accounting for the direction of time would be to appeal to the direction of causation …to the future is the direction towards which there are effects, and the past is the direction towards which there are causes. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.6.2) | |
A reaction: The obvious problem is that we can no longer pick out a cause by saying it 'precedes' its effect. It is not obvious what other criterion can be used to distinguish them (esp. given Hume's regularity account). |
22989 | Static time theory presents change as one property at t1, and a different property at t2 [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The static theory of time appeals to an 'at-at' notion of change, which analyses change as objects or events having one property at time t1, and a different property at t2. (The worry about this is that it describes variation, but not real change). | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.4) | |
A reaction: I suppose observing a different property at t2 is observing the result of a change, rather than the process. But then the process might be broken down into micro-gradations of properties. Maybe only results can be observed. |
23020 | If a time traveller kills his youthful grandfather, he both exists and fails to exist [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: It is surely true that if a time traveller travels back in time and succeeds in shooting his youthful grandfather then the time traveller both exists and fails to exist. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 8.2) | |
A reaction: This is the best known paradox of time travel. It is a special dramatic case of making any change to the past. If the traveller kills his neighbour's grandfather, his neighbour should vanish. Moving a speck of dust could have enduring results. |
23022 | Presentism means there no existing past for a time traveller to visit [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: A time traveller can only travel to a location if the location exists, But if Presentism is true then past locations do not exist, so time travel to the past is impossible. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 8.3.1) | |
A reaction: Might a time machine actually restore the past time which had ceased to exist? Then the problem is the information needed to achieve that. |
22987 | The past (unlike the future) is fixed, along with truths about it, by the existence of past objects [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: It is the existence of past objects that explains why the past is fixed, and why there are truths about the past, and it is the non-existence of future objects that explains why the future is malleable. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.3) | |
A reaction: The authors label this view 'EntityNowandThenism', and it comes in a section on the 'Temporal Ontology'. |
22990 | The moving spotlight says entities can have properties of being present, past or future [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: The moving spotlight theorist maintains that there are special temporal properties that entities possess, namely the properties of being present, being past and being future. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.5.3) | |
A reaction: Are these thought to be intrinsic properties of the objects, or (more plausibly) relational properties, between objects and times? Either view is weird. Does some godlike part of time scurry along, illuminating things, like a mouse under a carpet? |
22997 | The present moment is a matter of existence, not of acquiring a property [Baron/Miller] |
Full Idea: Rather than treating presentness as an acquired property …. presentism equates the metaphysical specialness of the present with existence. | |
From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 2.2) | |
A reaction: It seems like common sense to say that the recent scratching of my chin came into existence and then went out of existence (rather than that it acquired and then lost a property). |
7900 | Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks [Anon (Dham)] |
Full Idea: Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks: these three steps lead you to the gods | |
From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §17.224) | |
A reaction: I don't recall either the Old or New Testament, or the Koran, placing great emphasis on speaking the truth. The injunction to give is not so simple. Give to greedy children, to alcoholics, to criminals, to the rich, to fools, to yourself? |