79 ideas
| 7893 | Our life is the creation of our mind [Anon (Dham)] |
| Full Idea: What we are today comes from our thoughts of yesterday, and our present thoughts build our life of tomorrow: our life is the creation of our mind. | |
| From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §1.1) | |
| A reaction: I may adopt this as a second epigraph for the database. This idea records the subjective view, which now comes up against evolutionary psychology. Maybe philosophy is opposed to science, because it is committed to exploring the subjective view? |
| 17892 | For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: I uphold the belief that for clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (works [1930]), quoted by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability 1.5 | |
| A reaction: [written in 1961] This contradicts the implication normally taken from his much earlier Incompleteness Theorems. |
| 10041 | Impredicative Definitions refer to the totality to which the object itself belongs [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: Impredicative Definitions are definitions of an object by reference to the totality to which the object itself (and perhaps also things definable only in terms of that object) belong. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], n 13) |
| 21752 | Prior to Gödel we thought truth in mathematics consisted in provability [Gödel, by Quine] |
| Full Idea: Gödel's proof wrought an abrupt turn in the philosophy of mathematics. We had supposed that truth, in mathematics, consisted in provability. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Willard Quine - Forward to Gödel's Unpublished | |
| A reaction: This explains the crisis in the early 1930s, which Tarski's theory appeared to solve. |
| 17751 | Gödel proved the completeness of first order predicate logic in 1930 [Gödel, by Walicki] |
| Full Idea: Gödel proved the completeness of first order predicate logic in his doctoral dissertation of 1930. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (Completeness of Axioms of Logic [1930]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History E.2.2 |
| 8679 | We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: We have something like perception of the objects of set theory, shown by the axioms forcing themselves on us as being true. I don't see why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception (i.e. mathematical intuition) than in sense perception. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], p.483), quoted by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 2.4 | |
| A reaction: A famous strong expression of realism about the existence of sets. It is remarkable how the ingredients of mathematics spread themselves before the mind like a landscape, inviting journeys - but I think that just shows how minds cope with abstractions. |
| 17835 | Gödel show that the incompleteness of set theory was a necessity [Gödel, by Hallett,M] |
| Full Idea: Gödel's incompleteness results of 1931 show that all axiom systems precise enough to satisfy Hilbert's conception are necessarily incomplete. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Michael Hallett - Introduction to Zermelo's 1930 paper p.1215 | |
| A reaction: [Hallett italicises 'necessarily'] Hilbert axioms have to be recursive - that is, everything in the system must track back to them. |
| 9942 | Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam] |
| Full Idea: Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L (which implies the axiom of choice and the generalized continuum hypothesis). This established the full independence of the continuum hypothesis from the other axioms. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by Hilary Putnam - Mathematics without Foundations | |
| A reaction: Gödel initially wanted to make V = L an axiom, but the changed his mind. Maddy has lots to say on the subject. |
| 21716 | In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B] |
| Full Idea: In the superior realist and simple theory of types, the place of the axiom of reducibility is not taken by the axiom of classes, Zermelo's Aussonderungsaxiom. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.140-1) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 6.1 n3 | |
| A reaction: This is Zermelo's Axiom of Separation, but that too is not an axiom of standard ZFC. |
| 9188 | Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett] |
| Full Idea: Gödel proved the completeness of standard formalizations of first-order logic, including Frege's original one. However, an implication of his famous theorem on the incompleteness of arithmetic is that second-order logic is incomplete. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (works [1930]) by Michael Dummett - The Philosophy of Mathematics 3.1 | |
| A reaction: This must mean that it is impossible to characterise arithmetic fully in terms of first-order logic. In which case we can only characterize the features of abstract reality in general if we employ an incomplete system. We're doomed. |
| 10035 | Mathematical Logic is a non-numerical branch of mathematics, and the supreme science [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: 'Mathematical Logic' is a precise and complete formulation of formal logic, and is both a section of mathematics covering classes, relations, symbols etc, and also a science prior to all others, with ideas and principles underlying all sciences. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.447) | |
| A reaction: He cites Leibniz as the ancestor. In this database it is referred to as 'theory of logic', as 'mathematical' seems to be simply misleading. The principles of the subject are standardly applied to mathematical themes. |
| 10042 | Reference to a totality need not refer to a conjunction of all its elements [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: One may, on good grounds, deny that reference to a totality necessarily implies reference to all single elements of it or, in other words, that 'all' means the same as an infinite logical conjunction. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.455) |
| 10620 | Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: At that time (c.1930) a concept of objective mathematical truth as opposed to demonstrability was viewed with greatest suspicion and widely rejected as meaningless. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (works [1930]), quoted by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 28.2 | |
| A reaction: [quoted from a letter] This is the time of Ramsey's redundancy account, and before Tarski's famous paper of 1933. It is also the high point of Formalism, associated with Hilbert. |
| 17886 | The limitations of axiomatisation were revealed by the incompleteness theorems [Gödel, by Koellner] |
| Full Idea: The inherent limitations of the axiomatic method were first brought to light by the incompleteness theorems. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability 1.1 |
| 10071 | Second Incompleteness: nice theories can't prove their own consistency [Gödel, by Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: Second Incompleteness Theorem: roughly, nice theories that include enough basic arithmetic can't prove their own consistency. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 1.5 | |
| A reaction: On the face of it, this sounds less surprising than the First Theorem. Philosophers have often noticed that it seems unlikely that you could use reason to prove reason, as when Descartes just relies on 'clear and distinct ideas'. |
| 19123 | If soundness can't be proved internally, 'reflection principles' can be added to assert soundness [Gödel, by Halbach/Leigh] |
| Full Idea: Gödel showed PA cannot be proved consistent from with PA. But 'reflection principles' can be added, which are axioms partially expressing the soundness of PA, by asserting what is provable. A Global Reflection Principle asserts full soundness. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. - Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) 1.2 | |
| A reaction: The authors point out that this needs a truth predicate within the language, so disquotational truth won't do, and there is a motivation for an axiomatic theory of truth. |
| 17883 | Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner] |
| Full Idea: Gödel was quick to point out that his original incompleteness theorems did not produce instances of absolute undecidability and hence did not undermine Hilbert's conviction that for every precise mathematical question there is a discoverable answer. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (works [1930]) by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability Intro | |
| A reaction: The normal simplistic view among philosophes is that Gödel did indeed decisively refute the optimistic claims of Hilbert. Roughly, whether Hilbert is right depends on which axioms of set theory you adopt. |
| 10621 | Gödel's First Theorem sabotages logicism, and the Second sabotages Hilbert's Programme [Smith,P on Gödel] |
| Full Idea: Where Gödel's First Theorem sabotages logicist ambitions, the Second Theorem sabotages Hilbert's Programme. | |
| From: comment on Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 36 | |
| A reaction: Neo-logicism (Crispin Wright etc.) has a strategy for evading the First Theorem. |
| 17888 | The undecidable sentence can be decided at a 'higher' level in the system [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: My undecidable arithmetical sentence ...is not at all absolutely undecidable; rather, one can always pass to 'higher' systems in which the sentence in question is decidable. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]), quoted by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability 1.1 | |
| A reaction: [a 1931 MS] He says the reals are 'higher' than the naturals, and the axioms of set theory are higher still. The addition of a truth predicate is part of what makes the sentence become decidable. |
| 10038 | A logical system needs a syntactical survey of all possible expressions [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: In order to be sure that new expression can be translated into expressions not containing them, it is necessary to have a survey of all possible expressions, and this can be furnished only by syntactical considerations. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.448) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] |
| 18062 | Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: The set-theoretical paradoxes are hardly any more troublesome for mathematics than deceptions of the senses are for physics. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], p.271), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 03.4 |
| 10132 | There can be no single consistent theory from which all mathematical truths can be derived [Gödel, by George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: Gödel's far-reaching work on the nature of logic and formal systems reveals that there can be no single consistent theory from which all mathematical truths can be derived. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.8 |
| 10046 | The generalized Continuum Hypothesis asserts a discontinuity in cardinal numbers [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: The generalized Continuum Hypothesis says that there exists no cardinal number between the power of any arbitrary set and the power of the set of its subsets. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.464) |
| 10868 | The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg] |
| Full Idea: Gödel proved that the Continuum Hypothesis was not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by Brian Clegg - Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable Ch.15 |
| 13517 | If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD] |
| Full Idea: Gödel proved that (if set theory is consistent) we cannot refute the continuum hypothesis, and Cohen proved that (if set theory is consistent) we cannot prove it either. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 10 |
| 17885 | Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner] |
| Full Idea: Eventually Gödel ...expressed the hope that there might be a generalised completeness theorem according to which there are no absolutely undecidable sentences. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (works [1930]) by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability Intro | |
| A reaction: This comes as a bit of a shock to those who associate him with the inherent undecidability of reality. |
| 10614 | The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: The concept of truth of sentences in a language cannot be defined in the language. This is the true reason for the existence of undecidable propositions in the formal systems containing arithmetic. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (works [1930]), quoted by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 21.6 | |
| A reaction: [from a letter by Gödel] So they key to Incompleteness is Tarski's observations about truth. Highly significant, as I take it. |
| 3198 | Gödel showed that arithmetic is either incomplete or inconsistent [Gödel, by Rey] |
| Full Idea: Gödel's theorem states that either arithmetic is incomplete, or it is inconsistent. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 8.7 |
| 10072 | First Incompleteness: arithmetic must always be incomplete [Gödel, by Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: First Incompleteness Theorem: any properly axiomatised and consistent theory of basic arithmetic must remain incomplete, whatever our efforts to complete it by throwing further axioms into the mix. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 1.2 | |
| A reaction: This is because it is always possible to formulate a well-formed sentence which is not provable within the theory. |
| 9590 | Arithmetical truth cannot be fully and formally derived from axioms and inference rules [Gödel, by Nagel/Newman] |
| Full Idea: The vast continent of arithmetical truth cannot be brought into systematic order by laying down a fixed set of axioms and rules of inference from which every true mathematical statement can be formally derived. For some this was a shocking revelation. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by E Nagel / JR Newman - Gödel's Proof VII.C | |
| A reaction: Good news for philosophy, I'd say. The truth cannot be worked out by mechanical procedures, so it needs the subtle and intuitive intelligence of your proper philosopher (Parmenides is the role model) to actually understand reality. |
| 11069 | Gödel's Second says that semantic consequence outruns provability [Gödel, by Hanna] |
| Full Idea: Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem says that true unprovable sentences are clearly semantic consequences of the axioms in the sense that they are necessarily true if the axioms are true. So semantic consequence outruns provability. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 5.3 |
| 10118 | First Incompleteness: a decent consistent system is syntactically incomplete [Gödel, by George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: First Incompleteness Theorem: If S is a sufficiently powerful formal system, then if S is consistent then S is syntactically incomplete. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Gödel found a single sentence, effectively saying 'I am unprovable in S', which is neither provable nor refutable in S. |
| 10122 | Second Incompleteness: a decent consistent system can't prove its own consistency [Gödel, by George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: Second Incompleteness Theorem: If S is a sufficiently powerful formal system, then if S is consistent then S cannot prove its own consistency | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: This seems much less surprising than the First Theorem (though it derives from it). It was always kind of obvious that you couldn't use reason to prove that reason works (see, for example, the Cartesian Circle). |
| 10611 | There is a sentence which a theory can show is true iff it is unprovable [Gödel, by Smith,P] |
| Full Idea: The original Gödel construction gives us a sentence that a theory shows is true if and only if it satisfies the condition of being unprovable-in-that-theory. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Peter Smith - Intro to Gödel's Theorems 20.5 |
| 10867 | 'This system can't prove this statement' makes it unprovable either way [Gödel, by Clegg] |
| Full Idea: An approximation of Gödel's Theorem imagines a statement 'This system of mathematics can't prove this statement true'. If the system proves the statement, then it can't prove it. If the statement can't prove the statement, clearly it still can't prove it. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Brian Clegg - Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable Ch.15 | |
| A reaction: Gödel's contribution to this simple idea seems to be a demonstration that formal arithmetic is capable of expressing such a statement. |
| 10039 | Some arithmetical problems require assumptions which transcend arithmetic [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: It has turned out that the solution of certain arithmetical problems requires the use of assumptions essentially transcending arithmetic. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.449) | |
| A reaction: A nice statement of the famous result, from the great man himself, in the plainest possible English. |
| 10043 | Mathematical objects are as essential as physical objects are for perception [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: Classes and concepts may be conceived of as real objects, ..and are as necessary to obtain a satisfactory system of mathematics as physical bodies are necessary for a satisfactory theory of our sense perceptions, with neither case being about 'data'. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.456) | |
| A reaction: Note that while he thinks real objects are essential for mathematics, be may not be claiming the same thing for our knowledge of logic. If logic contains no objects, then how could mathematics be reduced to it, as in logicism? |
| 10271 | Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: Evidently the 'given' underlying mathematics is closely related to the abstract elements contained in our empirical ideas. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], Suppl) | |
| A reaction: Yes! The great modern mathematical platonist says something with which I can agree. He goes on to hint at a platonic view of the structure of the empirical world, but we'll let that pass. |
| 10045 | Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.464) | |
| A reaction: The issue is at what point in building an account of the foundations of mathematics (if there be such, see Putnam) these impure definitions should be ruled out. |
| 8747 | Realists are happy with impredicative definitions, which describe entities in terms of other existing entities [Gödel, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Gödel defended impredicative definitions on grounds of ontological realism. From that perspective, an impredicative definition is a description of an existing entity with reference to other existing entities. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.3 | |
| A reaction: This is why constructivists must be absolutely precise about definition, where realists only have to do their best. Compare building a car with painting a landscape. |
| 7898 | The world is just the illusion of an appearance [Anon (Dham)] |
| Full Idea: When a man considers this world as a bubble of froth, and as the illusion of an appearance, then the king of death has no power over him. | |
| From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §13.170) | |
| A reaction: Strictly, of course, this says you can 'consider' things this way. Perhaps we could substitute 'pretends', but the world's great religions don't go in for that sort of thing. Berkeley would be shocked to learn he was approaching Buddhism. |
| 4363 | The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being? [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: An excellent reason for keeping the word 'person' out of ethics is that it is usually so thinly defined that it cannot generate any sense of 'good person'. If a person is just a self-conscious being, what would count as a good or bad one? | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.9 n20) | |
| A reaction: A nice point. Locke's concept of a person (rational self-conscious being) lacks depth and individuality, and Hitler fulfils the criteria as well as any saint. But if Hitler wasn't a 'bad person', what was he bad at being? |
| 3192 | Basic logic can be done by syntax, with no semantics [Gödel, by Rey] |
| Full Idea: Gödel in his completeness theorem for first-order logic showed that a certain set of syntactically specifiable rules was adequate to capture all first-order valid arguments. No semantics (e.g. reference, truth, validity) was necessary. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (On Formally Undecidable Propositions [1931]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 8.2 | |
| A reaction: This implies that a logic machine is possible, but we shouldn't raise our hopes for proper rationality. Validity can be shown for purely algebraic arguments, but rationality requires truth as well as validity, and that needs propositions and semantics. |
| 4355 | There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: There seem to be cases of 'inverse akrasia', in which the course of action actually followed is superior to the course of action recommended by the agent's best judgement. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: This must occur, as when an assassin lets his victim off, and then regrets the deed. It strengthens the case against Socrates, and in favour of their being two parts of the soul which compete to motivate our actions. |
| 4325 | Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient? [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: In contemporary philosophy of action, there is a fervid debate about whether any intentional action must be prompted in part by desire, or whether it is possible to be moved to action by a belief alone. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I want a cool belief to be sufficient to produce an action, because it will permit at least a Kantian dimension to ethics, and make judgement central, and marginalise emotivism, which is the spawn of Satan. |
| 4351 | It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: I personally believe that philosophy is the best route yet devised to the achievement of virtue, but it is clearly not essential. All the philosophers I meet are remarkably virtuous, but that may be a chicken/egg thing. |
| 4340 | You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Doing what is, say, dishonest solely in the context of a tragic dilemma does not entail being dishonest, possessing that vice. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3 n8) | |
| A reaction: This seems right, although it mustn't be thought that the dishonesty is thereby excused. Virtuous people find being dishonest very painful. |
| 4329 | After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: When one moral requirement has overriden another in a dilemma, there is still a 'remainder', so that regret, or the recognition of some new requirement, are still appropriate. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This is a powerful point on behalf of virtue ethics. There is a correct way to feel about the application of rules and calculations. Judges sleep well at night, but virtuous people may not. |
| 4330 | Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: With respect to resolvable dilemmas, the deontologist's strategy is to argue that the 'conflict' between the two rules which has generated the dilemma is merely apparent. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This assumes that the rules can't conflict (because they come for God, or pure reason), but we might say that there are correct rules which do conflict. Morality isn't physics, or tennis. |
| 4341 | Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: The actions a virtuous agent is forced to in tragic dilemmas fail to be good actions because the doing of them, no matter how unwillingly or involuntarily, mars or ruins a good life. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Of course, only virtuous people have their lives ruined by such things. For the cold or the wicked it is just water off a duck's back. |
| 7894 | Hate is conquered by love [Anon (Dham)] |
| Full Idea: Hate is not conquered by hate: hate is conquered by love. This is the law eternal. | |
| From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §1.5) | |
| A reaction: [N.B. This thought was not invented by Jesus] The challenge to this view might be the tit-for-tat strategy of game theory, which says that hate is actually conquered by a combination of hate and love, judiciously applied. |
| 4358 | Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Some critics say virtue is not necessary for eudaimonia (since the wicked sometimes flourish), and others say it is not sufficient (because virtuous behaviour sometimes ruins a life). | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: Both criticisms seem wrong (the wicked don't 'flourish', and complete virtue never ruins lives, except in tragic dilemmas). But it is hard to prove them wrong. |
| 4337 | Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Adolescents tend to be much more gormless about consequences than they are about ideals. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2 n12) | |
| A reaction: Very accurate, I'm afraid. But this cuts both ways. They seem to need education not in virtue, but simply in consequences. |
| 4324 | Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: The trouble with 'flourishing' as a translation of 'eudaimonia' is that animals and even plants can flourish, but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Intro) | |
| A reaction: 'Flourishing' still seems better than 'happy', which is centrally used now to refer to a state of mind, not a situation. 'Well being' seems good, and plants are usually permitted that. |
| 7899 | Even divine pleasure will not satisfy the wise, as it is insatiable, and leads to pain [Anon (Dham)] |
| Full Idea: Since a shower of gold coins could not satisfy craving desires and the end of all pleasure is pain, how could a wise man find satisfaction even in the pleasures of the gods? | |
| From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §14.186) | |
| A reaction: I'm never sure how so many ancient thinkers arrived at this implausible view. They seem to think that no one knows when to stop, and that every drink leads to hangover. What is actually wrong with moderate sensible pleasure? |
| 4359 | When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: If you think about bringing up children to prepare them for life, rather than converting the wicked or convincing the moral sceptic, isn't virtue the most reliable bet? | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: A very convincing idea. They haven't the imagination to grasp consequences properly, or sufficient abstract thought to grasp principles, or the political cunning to negotiate contracts, but they can grasp ideals of what a good person is like. |
| 20195 | Eudaimonia first; virtue is a trait which promotes it; right acts are what virtues produce [Hursthouse, by Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Hursthouse defines a virtue as a trait humans need to flourish or live well, ...so 'eudaimonia' is conceptually foundational, the concept of virtue is then derived, and the concept of a right act is derived from that. | |
| From: report of Rosalind Hursthouse (Virtue Theory and Abortion [1992], p.226) by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind II.1 | |
| A reaction: Zagzebski is mapping different types of virtue theory. The purest theories say that virtue is intrinsically good. The others seem to be instrumental, in varying degrees. Zagzebski makes good motivations prior. |
| 4336 | Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Any codification ranking the virtues, like any codification ranking the rules, is bound to come up against cases where we will want to change the rankings. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems right, and yet it feels like a slippery slope. Am I supposed to be virtuous and wise, but have no principles? Infinite flexibility can lead straight to wickedness. Even the wise need something to hang on to. |
| 4334 | Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: One criticism of virtue ethics is that it lamentably fails to come up with a priority ranking of the virtues. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: However, one might refer to man's essential function, or characteristic function, and one might derive the virtues of a good citizen from the nature of a good society. |
| 4361 | Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: A good social animal is well fitted for 1) individual survival, 2) continuance of its species, 3) characteristic freedom from pain and enjoyment, and 4) good characteristic functioning of its social group. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.9) | |
| A reaction: This feels right, but brings out the characteristic conservativism of virtue theory. A squirrel which can recite Shakespeare turns out to be immoral. |
| 4349 | Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Virtue must surely be compatible with a fair amount of inarticulacy about one's reasons for action. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: Virtuous people may be unclear, but we are entitled to hope for clarification from moral philosophers. The least we can hope for is some distinction between virtue and vice. |
| 4352 | Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful' [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Acting virtuously, in the way the virtuous agent acts, namely from virtue, is sufficient for being 'morally motivated' or acting 'from a sense of duty'. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: Fine, but it invites the question of WHY virtue is motivating, just as one can ask this of maximum happiness, or duty, or even satisfaction of selfish desires. |
| 4353 | If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally? [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: If you are inclined to think that 'moral motivation', acting because you think it is right, must be an all-or-nothing matter, its presence determined by the agent's mind at the moment of acting, do, please, remember children. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: I agree about the vital importance of remembering children when discussing morality. However, Kantians might legitimately claim that when a child is simply trained to behave well, it has not yet reached the age of true morality. |
| 7897 | The wise gradually fill with good, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)] |
| Full Idea: The falling of drops of water will in time fill a water-jar. Even so the wise man becomes full of good, although he gather it little by little. | |
| From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §9.122) | |
| A reaction: Again, this is like Aristotle's proposal of how to educate people in virtue. In my experience, there is no guarantee that small acts of politeness and charity will eventually guarantee goodness of character. Thought is also needed. |
| 7896 | The foolish gradually fill with evil, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)] |
| Full Idea: The falling of drops of water will in time fill a water-jar. Even so the foolish man becomes full of evil, although he gather it little by little. | |
| From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §9.121) | |
| A reaction: This coincides closely with Aristotle's view of moral education. Maybe a wise man can maintain one small vice. Not all slopes are slippery. |
| 4346 | The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This is a critique of Hume, and of utlitarianism. It pushes us either to the concept of duty, or the concept of virtue (independent of right feeling). |
| 4339 | According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: According to virtue ethics, in a given situation two different agents may do what is right, what gets a tick of approval, despite the fact that each fails to do what the other did. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: You could certainly have great respect for two entirely different decisions about a medical dilemma, if they both showed integrity and good will, even if one had worse consequences than the other. |
| 4354 | Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: I am prepare to stick my neck out and say that extreme Nazis or racists (say) have poisoned characters to such an extent that none of their character traits could ever count as a virtue. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: Hard to justify, but it is hard to respect a mass murderer because they seem to love their dog or the beauty of music or flowers. They can't possibly appreciate the Platonic Form of love or beauty? |
| 4364 | Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: It may well be that being particularly well endowed with respect to some virtues inevitably involves being not very well endowed in others. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.9) | |
| A reaction: Maybe, but this sound a bit like an excuse. Newton wasn't very nice, but Einstein was. I can't believe in a finite reservoir of virtue. |
| 4356 | We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: That we have some intuitive belief in the unity of the virtues is shown by our reaction to stories of a person who has shown an exceptional virtue, but also done something morally repellent. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: A nice observation, but not enough to establish the unity of virtue. People tend to love all virtue, but it is not obviously impossible to love selected virtues and despise others (e.g. love courage, and despise charity). |
| 7895 | Don't befriend fools; either find superior friends, or travel alone [Anon (Dham)] |
| Full Idea: If on the great journey of life a man cannot find one who is better or at least as good as himself, let him joyfully travel alone: a fool cannot help him on his journey. | |
| From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §5.61) | |
| A reaction: This is a slightly disturbing aspect of Buddhism, possibly leading to contradiction. It urges friendship and love, but the finest people will have virtually no friends, and solitude is presented as a finer state than friendship. |
| 4327 | Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Though it is sometimes said that deontologists 'take no account of consequences', this is manifestly false, for many actions we deliberate about only fall under rules or principles when we bring in their predicted consequences. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: An important defence of deontology, which otherwise is vulnerable to the 'well-meaning fool' problem. It is no good having a good will, but refusing to think about consequences. |
| 4335 | 'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: If morality is strongly 'codifiable', it should consist of rules which provide a decision procedure, and it should be equally applicable by the virtuous and the non-virtuous, without recourse to wisdom. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: A key idea. Religions want obedience, and Kant wants morality to be impersonal, and most people want morality which simple uneducated people can follow. And yet how can wisdom ever be irrelevant? |
| 4328 | Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: There are some forms of utilitarianism which aim to be entirely 'value-free' or empirical, such as those which define happiness in terms of the satisfaction of actual desires or preferences, regardless of their content. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This point makes it clear that preference utilitarianism is a doomed enterprise. For a start I can prefer not to be a utilitarian. You can only maximise something if you value if. Are preferences valuable? |
| 4343 | We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Utilitarianism says there is nothing intrinsically wrong with lying, but examples of bare-faced lying to increase happiness drive us to deontology; but then examples where telling the truth has appalling consequences drive us back to utilitarianism again. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: A nice illustration of why virtue theory suddenly seemed appealing. Deontology can cope, though, by seeing other duties when the consequences are dreadful. |
| 4338 | Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Deontologists characteristically maintain that utilitarians have made out a particular hard case to be too simple. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Utilitarianism certainly seems to ignore the anguish of hard dilemmas, but that is supposed to be its appeal. If you think for too long, every dilemma begins to seem hopeless. |
| 4365 | We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Our characteristic way of going on, which distinguishes us from all the other species of animals, is a rational way, which is any way we can rightly see as good, as something we have reason to do. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch10) | |
| A reaction: Some people more than others, and none of us all the time. Romantics see rationality as a restraint on the authentic emotional and animal life. 'Be a good animal'. However, I agree. |
| 4350 | If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith? [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: If people perform virtuous actions simply because they are commanded by God, would they cease to perform such actions if they lost their faith in God? | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: To be consistent, the answer might be 'yes', but that invites the response that only intrinsically evil people need to be Christians. The rest of us can be good without it. |
| 7900 | Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks [Anon (Dham)] |
| Full Idea: Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks: these three steps lead you to the gods | |
| From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §17.224) | |
| A reaction: I don't recall either the Old or New Testament, or the Koran, placing great emphasis on speaking the truth. The injunction to give is not so simple. Give to greedy children, to alcoholics, to criminals, to the rich, to fools, to yourself? |