6 ideas
| 15797 | All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer] |
| Full Idea: I propose a dispositional ontology for the physical world, according to which a) every structural property is a dispositional one, b) a physical object is an ordered set of dispositions, and c) every event manifests a dispositional property of the world. | |
| From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Mumford says this is consistent with ontology as a way of describing the world, rather than being facts about the world. I like Fetzer's sketch, which sounds to have a lot in common with 'process philosophy'. |
| 15800 | All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer] |
| Full Idea: Every atomic event in the world's history is a manifestation of some dispositional property of the world and every physical object is an instantiation of some set of dispositions; hence, every structural property is dispositional in kind. | |
| From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 5) | |
| A reaction: I quite like this drastic view, but there remains the intuition that there must always be something which has the disposition. That may be because I have not yet digested the lessons of modern physics. |
| 22352 | Out of more than a hundred planets, Earth is the only one with the idea of free will [Vonnegut] |
| Full Idea: I wouldn’t have any idea what was meant by ‘free will'. I’ve visited thirty-one inhabited planets in the universe, and studied reports on one hundred more. Only on Earth is there any talk of free will. | |
| From: Kurt Vonnegut (Slaughterhouse Five [1969], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: Spoken by the ambassador from the planet Tralfamadore. Possibly the greatest put down of a philosophical idea since Diogenes responded to Plato's definition of a man. I think free will is a non-idea. It is non-sensical, and doesn't exist. |
| 19941 | Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself [Anon (Leviticus)] |
| Full Idea: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. | |
| From: Anon (Lev) (03: Book of Leviticus [c.700 BCE], 19.18) | |
| A reaction: Most Christians think Jesus originated this thought. Interestingly, this precedes Socrates, who taught a similar idea. |
| 15798 | Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer] |
| Full Idea: Kinds of things are specific arrangements of dispositions. | |
| From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 2) | |
| A reaction: A 'disposition' doesn't seem quite the right word for what is basic to the physical world, though Harré and Madden make a good case for the 'fields' of physic being understood in that way. I prefer 'power', though that doesn't solve anything. |
| 15799 | Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer] |
| Full Idea: Lawlike sentences are conceived as logically general dispositional statements attributing permanent dispositional properties to every member of a reference class. ...Their basic form is that of subjunctive generalizations. | |
| From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 3) | |
| A reaction: I much prefer talk of 'lawlike sentences' to talk of 'laws'. At least they imply that the true generalisations about nature are fairly fine-grained. Why not talk of 'generalisations' instead of 'laws'? Fetzer wants dispositions to explain everything. |