24 ideas
22358 | Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper] |
Full Idea: The objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested. | |
From: Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934], p.22), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 2.4 | |
A reaction: Does this mean that objectivity is the same as consensus? A bunch of subjective prejudiced fools can reach a consensus. And in the middle of that bunch there can be one person who is objecfive. Sounds wrong. |
8526 | We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes [Daly] |
Full Idea: Since C.B. Martin accepts both tropes and substances as fundamental, the claim that tropes are the only fundamental constituents is a further, independent claim. | |
From: Chris Daly (Tropes [1995], §4) | |
A reaction: A dubious mode of argument. Martin may only make the claim because he is ignorant, of facts or of language. Why are some tropes perfectly similar? Is it the result of something more fundamental? |
8527 | More than one trope (even identical ones!) can occupy the same location [Daly] |
Full Idea: More than one trope can occupy the same spatio-temporal location, and it even seems possible for a pair of exactly resembling tropes to occupy the same spatio-temporal location. | |
From: Chris Daly (Tropes [1995], §6) | |
A reaction: This may be the strongest objection to tropes. Being disc-shaped and red would occupy the same location. Aristotle's example of mixing white with white (Idea 557) would be the second case. Individuation of these 'particulars' is the problem. |
8528 | If tropes are linked by the existence of concurrence, a special relation is needed to link them all [Daly] |
Full Idea: To explain how tropes form bundles, concurrence relations are invoked. But tropes F and G and a concurrence relation C don't ensure that F stands in C to G. So trope theory needs 'instantiation' relations (special relational tropes) after all. | |
From: Chris Daly (Tropes [1995], §7) | |
A reaction: Campbell presents relations as 'second-order' items dependent on tropes (Idea 8525), but that seems unclear. Daly's argument resembles Russell's (which he likes), that some sort of universal is inescapable. It also resembles Bradley's regress (7966). |
11946 | Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper] |
Full Idea: Propensities should not be regarded as inherent in an object, such as a die or a penny, but should be regarded as inherent in a situation (of which, of course, the object was part). | |
From: Karl Popper (A World of Propensities [1993], p.14), quoted by George Molnar - Powers 6.2 | |
A reaction: Molnar argues against this claim, and I agree with him. We can see why Popper might prefer this relational view, given that powers often only become apparent in unusual relational situations. |
12177 | Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper] |
Full Idea: One might adopt the view that certain things of our own making, such as clocks, may well be said to have 'essences', viz. their 'purposes', and what makes them serve these purposes. | |
From: Karl Popper (Conjectures and Refutations [1963], 3.3 n17) | |
A reaction: This is from one of the arch-opponents of essentialism. Could we take him on a slippery slope into essences for evolved creatures, or their organs? His argument says admitting an essence for a clock prevents using it for another purpose. |
5451 | Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner] |
Full Idea: Karl Popper vehemently rejected the essentialism which underpins Plato and Aristotle, taking it to be a major obstacle to political, moral and scientific progress. | |
From: report of Karl Popper (Open Society and Its Enemies:Hegel and Marx [1945]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.179 | |
A reaction: This makes Popper sound like an existentialist, which seems unlikely. Modern essentialism would say the opposite about science - that hunting for external imposed laws is a red herring, and we should try to understand essences. |
22142 | In future, only logical limits can be placed on divine omnipotence [Anon (Par), by Boulter] |
Full Idea: The Condemnation stipulated that all portions of the ancient intellectual heritage that placed non-logical limits on divine omnipotence were no longer to be tolerated. ...Philosophers now had to entertain the wildest ideas with all seriousness. | |
From: report of Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 3 | |
A reaction: Boulter identifies this as 'the ultimate source of Hume's philosophical delirium'. Presumably the angels-on-a-pinhead stuff originated with this. It is crazy to think that the only limit on possible existence is logic. Can God make a planet of uranium? |
16716 | It is heresy to require self-evident foundational principles in order to be certain [Anon (Par)] |
Full Idea: Heresy 151: 'To have certainty regarding any conclusion, it must be founded on self-evident principles'. | |
From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], 151), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.3 | |
A reaction: The correct view is obviously to found certainty on faith and authority. It is one thing to be told that foundationalism is a poor theory, but another to be told it is a heresy, and thus a potential capital crime! |
22188 | Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper] |
Full Idea: Popper implies that we should be giving Nobel Prizes to scientists who use severe tests to show us what the world is not like! | |
From: comment on Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Geoffrey Gorham - Philosophy of Science 2 | |
A reaction: A lovely simple point. The refuters are important members of the scientific team, but not the leaders. |
18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
Full Idea: Whereas particular reality statements are in principle completely verifiable or falsifiable, things are different for general reality statements: they can indeed be conclusively falsified, they can acquire a negative truth value, but not a positive one. | |
From: Karl Popper (Two Problems of Epistemology [1932], p.256), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 18 'Laws' | |
A reaction: This sounds like a logician's approach to science, but I prefer to look at coherence, where very little is actually conclusive, and one tinkers with the theory instead. |
7780 | Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee] |
Full Idea: According to Popper, falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science. | |
From: report of Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Bryan Magee - Popper Ch.3 | |
A reaction: If I propose something which might be falsified in a hundred years, is it science NOW? Suppose my theory appeared to be falsifiable, but (after much effort) it turned out not to be? Suppose I just see a pattern (like quark theory) in a set of facts? |
16830 | We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper] |
Full Idea: Popper's mistake is to hold that disconfirmation and elimination work exclusively through refutation. | |
From: comment on Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Peter Lipton - Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) 05 'Explanation' | |
A reaction: The point is that we reject hypotheses even if they have not actually been refuted, on the grounds that they don't give a good explanation. I agree entirely with Lipton. |
6794 | If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper] |
Full Idea: In Popper's sense of the word 'falsify', whereby an observation statement falsifies a hypothesis only by being logically inconsistent with it, nothing can ever falsify a probabilistic or statistical hypothesis, which is therefore unscientific. | |
From: comment on Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.5 | |
A reaction: In general, no prediction can be falsified until the events occur. This seems to be Aristotle's 'sea fight' problem (Idea 1703). |
6795 | When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper] |
Full Idea: It is a feature of Popper's philosophy that when the going gets tough, induction is quietly called upon to help out. | |
From: comment on Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.5 | |
A reaction: This appears to be the central reason for the decline in Popper's reputation as the saviour of science. It would certainly seem absurd to say that you know nothing when you have lots of verification but not a glimmer of falsification. |
3856 | Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith] |
Full Idea: Popper's principles are roughly that one theory is superior to another if it has greater empirical content, if it can account for the successes of the first theory, and if it has not been falsified (unlike the first theory). | |
From: report of Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by W.H. Newton-Smith - The Rationality of Science I.6 |
7779 | There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee] |
Full Idea: According to Popper, induction is a dispensable concept, a myth. It does not exist. There is no such thing. | |
From: report of Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Bryan Magee - Popper Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This is a nice bold summary of the Popper view - that falsification is the underlying rational activity which we mistakenly think is verification by repeated observations. Put like this, Popper seems to be wrong. We obviously learn from experiences. |
3860 | Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper] |
Full Idea: If Popper follows Hume in abandoning induction, there is no way in which he can justify the claims that there is growth of scientific knowledge and that science is a rational activity. | |
From: comment on Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by W.H. Newton-Smith - The Rationality of Science III.3 |
12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
Full Idea: I contest the essentialist doctrine that science aims at ultimate explanations, one which cannot be further explained, and which is in no need of any further explanation. | |
From: Karl Popper (Conjectures and Refutations [1963], 3.3) | |
A reaction: If explanations are causal, this seems to a plea for an infinite regress of causes, which is an odd thing to espouse. Are the explanations verbal descriptions or things in the world. There can be no perfect descriptions, but there may be ultimate things. |
1866 | It is heresy to teach that history repeats every 36,000 years [Anon (Par)] |
Full Idea: It is heresy to teach that with all the heavenly bodies coming back to the same point after a period of thirty-six thousand years, the same effects as now exist will reappear. | |
From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], §92) |
12175 | Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper] |
Full Idea: The third of the Galilean doctrines of science is that the best, the truly scientific theories, describe the 'essences' or the 'essential natures' of things - the realities which lie behind the appearances. They are ultimate explanations. | |
From: Karl Popper (Conjectures and Refutations [1963], 3.3) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the seventeenth century doctrine which was undermined by Humeanism, and hence despised by Popper, but is now making a comeback, with a new account of essence and necessity. |
12179 | Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper] |
Full Idea: The essentialist view of Newton (due to Roger Cotes) ...prevented fruitful questions from being raised, such as, 'What is the cause of gravity?' or 'Can we deduce Newton's theory from a more general independent theory?' | |
From: Karl Popper (Conjectures and Refutations [1963], 3.3) | |
A reaction: This is Popper's main (and only) objection to essentialism - that it is committed to ultimate explanations, and smugly terminates science when it thinks it has found them. This does not strike me as a problem with scientific essentialism. |
1865 | It is heresy to teach that natural impossibilities cannot even be achieved by God [Anon (Par)] |
Full Idea: It is heresy to teach that what is absolutely impossible according to nature cannot be brought about by God or another agent. | |
From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], §17) |
1864 | It is heresy to teach that we can know God by his essence in this mortal life [Anon (Par)] |
Full Idea: It is heresy to teach that we can know God by his essence in this mortal life. | |
From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], §9) |