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19514
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Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose]
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Full Idea:
The great rival to contextualism is classical 'invariantism' - invariantism about the truth-conditions [for knowing], combined with variable standards for warranted assertability.
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From:
Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.12)
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A reaction:
That is, I take it, that we might want to assert that someone 'knows' something, when the truth is that they don't. That is, either you know or you don't, but we can bend the rules as to whether we say you know. I take this view to be false.
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19511
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If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose]
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Full Idea:
Maybe contextualism isn't a theory about knowledge at all, but about knowledge attributions. As such, it is not a piece of epistemology at all, but of philosophy of language.
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From:
Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.7)
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A reaction:
DeRose takes this view to be wrong. At the very least this will have to include self-attributions, by the supposed knower, because I might say 'I know that p', meaning 'but only in this rather low-standard context'.
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16236
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Maybe our persistence conditions concern bodies, rather than persons [Olson, by Hawley]
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Full Idea:
Instead of attributing person-like persistence conditions to bodies, we could attribute body-like persistence conditions to persons, …so human persons are identical with human organisms.
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From:
report of Eric T. Olson (The Human Animal [1997]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.10
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A reaction:
In the case of pre-birth and advanced senility, Olson thinks we could have the body without the person, so person is a 'phase sortal' of bodies. A good theory, which seems to answer a lot of questions. 'Person' may be an abstraction.
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6669
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For 'animalism', I exist before I became a person, and can continue after it, so I am not a person [Olson, by Lowe]
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Full Idea:
According to 'animalism', I existed before I was a person and I may well go one existing for some time after I cease to be a person; hence, I am not essentially a person, but a human organism.
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From:
report of Eric T. Olson (The Human Animal [1997]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.10
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A reaction:
There is a very real sense in which an extremely senile person has 'ceased to exist' (e.g. as the person I used to love). On the whole, though, I think that Olson is right, and yet 'person' is an important concept. Neither concept is all-or-nothing.
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8147
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We have an apparent and a true self; only the second one exists, and we must seek to know it [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
There are two selves, the apparent self, and the real Self. Of these it is the real Self (Atman), and he alone, who must be felt as truly existing. To the man who has felt him as truly existing he reveals his innermost nature.
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Katha')
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A reaction:
A central Hindu doctrine against which Buddhism rebelled, by denying the self altogether. I prefer the Hindu view. A desire to abandon the self just seems to be a desire for death. Knowledge of our essential self is more interesting. But see Idea 2932!
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8155
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Without speech we cannot know right/wrong, true/false, good/bad, or pleasant/unpleasant [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
If there were no speech, neither right nor wrong would be known, neither the true nor the false, neither the good nor the bad, neither the pleasant nor the unpleasant.
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Chandogya')
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A reaction:
This could stand as the epigraph for the whole of modern philosophy of language. However, the text goes on to say that mind is higher than speech. The test question is the mental capabilities of animals. Do they 'know' pleasure, or truth?
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8153
|
By knowing one piece of clay or gold, you know all of clay or gold [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
By knowing one lump of clay, all things made of clay are known; by knowing a nugget of gold, all things made of gold are known.
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Chandogya')
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A reaction:
I can't think of a better basic definition of a natural kind. There is an inductive assumption, of course, which hits trouble when you meet fool's gold, or two different sorts of jade. But the concept of a natural kind is no more than this.
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8154
|
Originally there must have been just Existence, which could not come from non-existence [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
In the beginning there was Existence, One only, without a second. Some say that in the beginning there was non-existence only, and that out of that the universe was born. But how could such a thing be? How could existence be born of non-existence?
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Chandogya')
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A reaction:
A very rare instance of an argument in the Upanishads, arising out of a disagreement. The monotheistic religions have preferred to make God the eternal element, presumably because that raises his status, but is also explains the start as a decision.
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8148
|
Brahma, supreme god and protector of the universe, arose from the ocean of existence [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
Out of the infinite ocean of existence arose Brahma, first-born and foremost among the gods. From him sprang the universe, and he became its protector.
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Mundaka')
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A reaction:
Brahma does not have eternal (or necessary) existence. Could Brahma cease to exist? I suppose we cannot ask what caused the appearance of Brahma? Is it part of a plan, or just luck, or some sort of necessity?
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8152
|
Earth, food, fire, sun are all forms of Brahman [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
Earth, food, fire, sun - all these that you worship - are forms of Brahman.
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Chandogya')
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A reaction:
In 'Taittiriya' food is named as the "chief of all things". Pantheism seems to arise from a desire that one's god should have every conceivable good, so in addition to power and knowledge, your god must keep you warm and healthy.
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8156
|
The gods are not worshipped for their own sake, but for the sake of the Self [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
It is not for the sake of the gods, my beloved, that the gods are worshipped, but for the sake of the Self (Atman).
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Brihadaranyaka')
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A reaction:
There is an uneasy selfish streak in all religions, which conflicts with their exhorations to altruism, and to the love of the gods. It also occurs in the exhortation of Socrates to be virtuous. 'Pure' altruism seems only to arise in the 18th century.
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8157
|
A man with desires is continually reborn, until his desires are stilled [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
A man acts according to desires; after death he reaps the harvest of his deeds, and returns again to the world of action. Thus he who has desires continues subject to rebirth, but he in who desire is stilled suffers no rebirth.
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Brihadaranyaka')
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A reaction:
I greatly prefer the Stoic idea (Idea 3066) that we should live according to nature, to this perverse longing to completely destroy our own nature and become something we are not. Play the cards you are dealt, which include desires.
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8150
|
The immortal Self and the sad individual self are like two golden birds perched on one tree [Anon (Upan)]
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Full Idea:
Like two birds of golden plumage, the individual self and the immortal Self perch on the branches of the same tree. The individual self, deluded by forgetfulness of his identity with the divine self, bewildered by his ego, grieves and is sad.
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From:
Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Mundaka')
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A reaction:
Hinduism gives a much clearer and bolder picture of the soul than Christianity does. I don't see much consolation in the immortality of the wonderful Self, if my individual self is doomed to misery and extinction. Which one is me?
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