Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Antisthenes (Ath), Achille Varzi and Joan Kung

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21 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Contradiction is impossible [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Antisthenes said that contradiction is impossible.
     From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by Aristotle - Topics 104b21
     A reaction: Aristotle is giving an example of a 'thesis'. It should be taken seriously if a philosopher proposes it, but dismissed as rubbish if anyone else proposes it! No context is given for the remark.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Some fools think you cannot define anything, but only say what it is like [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There is an application of that old chestnut of the cynic Antisthenes' followers (and other buffoons of that kind). Their claim was that a definition of what something is is impossible. You cannot define silver, though you can say it is like tin.
     From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1043b
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
     Full Idea: There are some proposals for non-well-founded set theory (tolerating cases of self-membership and membership circularities).
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1)
     A reaction: [He cites Aczel 1988, and Barwise and Moss 1996]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
     Full Idea: While mereology was originally offered with a nominalist viewpoint, resulting in a conception of mereology as an ontologically parsimonious alternative to set theory, there is no necessary link between analysis of parthood and nominalism.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 1)
     A reaction: He cites Lesniewski and Leonard-and-Goodman. Do you allow something called a 'whole' into your ontology, as well as the parts? He observes that while 'wholes' can be concrete, they can also be abstract, if the parts are abstract.
Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
     Full Idea: It is an open question whether there are any mereological atoms (with no proper parts), and also whether every object is ultimately made up of atoms.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 3)
     A reaction: Such a view would have to presuppose (metaphysically) that the divisibility of matter has limits. If one follows this route, then are there only 'natural' wholes, or are we 'unrestricted' in our view of how the atoms combine? I favour the natural route.
There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
     Full Idea: It is common in mereology to hold that there is something of which everything is part, but few hold that there is a 'null entity' that is part of everything.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 4.1)
     A reaction: This comes out as roughly the opposite of set theory, which cannot do without the null set, but is not keen on the set of everything.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
     Full Idea: The thesis known as 'composition is identity' is that identity is mereological composition; a fusion is just the parts counted loosely, but it is strictly a multitude and loosely a single thing.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 4.3)
     A reaction: [He cites D.Baxter 1988, in Mind] It is not clear, from this simple statement, what the difference is between multitudes that are parts of a thing, and multitudes that are not. A heavy weight seems to hang on the notion of 'composed of'.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
     Full Idea: The word 'part' can used whether it is attached, or arbitrarily demarcated, or gerrymandered, or immaterial, or unextended, or spatial, or temporal.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 1)
If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
     Full Idea: Taking reflexivity as constitutive of the meaning of 'part' amounts to regarding identity as a limit case of parthood.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1)
     A reaction: A nice thought, but it is horribly 'philosophical', and a long way from ordinary usage and common sense (which is, I'm sorry to say, a BAD thing).
'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
     Full Idea: It seems obvious that 'part' stands for a partial ordering, a reflexive ('everything is part of itself'), antisymmetic ('two things cannot be part of each other'), and transitive (a part of a part of a thing is part of that thing) relation.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1)
     A reaction: I'm never clear why the reflexive bit of the relation should be taken as 'obvious', since it seems to defy normal usage and common sense. It would be absurd to say 'I'll give you part of the cake' and hand you the whole of it. See Idea 10651.
The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
     Full Idea: With a basic parthood relation, we can formally define various mereological predicates, such as overlap, underlap, proper part, over-crossing, under-crossing, proper overlap, and proper underlap.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.2)
     A reaction: [Varzi offers some diagrams, but they need interpretation]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
     Full Idea: We might say that sameness of parts is not sufficient for identity, as some entities may differ exclusively with respect to the arrangement of the parts, as when we compare 'John loves Mary' with 'Mary loves John'.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 3.2)
     A reaction: Presumably wide dispersal should also prevent parts from fixing wholes, but there is so much vagueness here that it is tempting to go for unrestricted composition, and then work back to the common sense position.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung]
     Full Idea: If Jones ceases to be a father, or ceases to be over eight years old, he will cease to exist, yet these properties surely do not belong essentially to him.
     From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II)
     A reaction: This seems to correct, though I would doubt whether either of these count as true properties, in the causal sense I prefer. If being 'over 8' is a property, how many 'over n' or 'under m' properties does he have? One for each quantum moment?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung]
     Full Idea: It is possible that a property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another.
     From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], III)
     A reaction: Thus a love of blues music may be part of your essence, but only a minor part of me. Sounds right. Spin or charge are part of the essence of an electron, but only contingently part of a child's top.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung]
     Full Idea: Three essentialist claims are labelled 'Aristotelian': the thing would cease to exist without the property; an essential property is explanatory; and it is such that it must belong to everything to which it belongs.
     From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], Intro)
     A reaction: She says the second one is indispensable, and that it rules out the third one. My working assumption, like hers, is that the second one is the key part of the game, because Aristotle wanted to explain things.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
     Full Idea: Conceivability may well be a guide to possibility, but literary fantasy is by itself no evidence of conceivability.
     From: Achille Varzi (Mereology [2003], 2.1)
     A reaction: Very nice. People who cite 'conceivability' in this context often have a disgracefully loose usage for the word. Really, really conceivable is probably our only guide to possibility.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung]
     Full Idea: There will be demonstrated properties at the edge of the system, so to speak. They will be explained in terms of the essential properties of the basic entities and principles of the science, but will themselves not be explanatory of further properties.
     From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II)
     A reaction: This is an important line of thought which needs clarification. We can't glibly say that essences are what explain the other properties. Some properties do more than others to explain subsequent dependent properties.
Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung]
     Full Idea: It seems highly likely that some non-essential properties may explain more about the individual or about things of his kind than the peripheral properties.
     From: Joan Kung (Aristotle on Essence and Explanation [1977], II)
     A reaction: Another important issue, if one is defending the explanatory role of essences. It is not only essences which explain. A key question is whether we endorse individual essences as well as generic ones. I think we should. They explain the details.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
I would rather go mad than experience pleasure [Antisthenes (I)]
     Full Idea: I would rather go mad than experience pleasure.
     From: Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.3
     A reaction: Did he actually prefer pain? If both experiences would drive him mad, it seems like a desire for death. I cannot understand why anyone is opposed to harmless pleasures.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Antisthenes said virtue is teachable and permanent, is life's goal, and is like universal wealth [Antisthenes (I), by Long]
     Full Idea: The moral propositions of Antisthenes foreshadowed the Stoics: virtue can be taught and once acquired cannot be lost (fr.69,71); virtue is the goal of life (22); the sage is self-sufficient, since he has (by being wise) the wealth of all men (8o).
     From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 1
     A reaction: [He cites Caizzi for the fragments] The distinctive idea here is (I think) that once acquired virtue can never be lost. It sounds plausible, but I'm wondering why it should be true. Is it like riding a bicycle, or like learning to speak Russian?
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
Antisthenes says there is only one god, which is nature [Antisthenes (I), by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Antisthenes says there is only one god, which is nature.
     From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.32