14 ideas
| 12268 | Contradiction is impossible [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Antisthenes said that contradiction is impossible. | |
| From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by Aristotle - Topics 104b21 | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is giving an example of a 'thesis'. It should be taken seriously if a philosopher proposes it, but dismissed as rubbish if anyone else proposes it! No context is given for the remark. |
| 602 | Some fools think you cannot define anything, but only say what it is like [Antisthenes (I), by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There is an application of that old chestnut of the cynic Antisthenes' followers (and other buffoons of that kind). Their claim was that a definition of what something is is impossible. You cannot define silver, though you can say it is like tin. | |
| From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1043b |
| 7319 | If we give up synonymy, we have to give up significance, meaning and sense [Grice/Strawson] |
| Full Idea: If we are to give up the notion of sentence-synonymy as senseless, we must give up the notion of sentence-significance (of a sentence having meaning) as senseless too. But then perhaps we might as well give up the notion of sense. | |
| From: P Grice / P Strawson (In Defense of a Dogma [1956]), quoted by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 4.2 | |
| A reaction: This is very prescient. Nearly all American philosophers seem to embrace Quine's view of analyticity (the philosophical equivalent of Americans putting a man on the moon?), but have they digested the implications (which Quine later largely admits)? |
| 18545 | The disinterested attitude of the judge is the hallmark of a judgement of beauty [Shaftesbury, by Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Shaftesbury explained the peculiar features of the judgement of beauty in terms of the disinterested attitude of the judge. | |
| From: report of 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Characteristics [1711]) by Roger Scruton - Beauty: a very short introduction 1 | |
| A reaction: Good. I take our vocabulary to mark a distinction between expressions of subjective preference, and expressions of what aspire to be objective facts. 'I love this' versus 'this is good or beautiful'. |
| 6237 | Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury] |
| Full Idea: Conscience is to find horribly offensive the reflection of any unjust action or behaviour; to have awe and terror of the Deity, does not, of itself, imply conscience; …thus religious conscience supposes moral or natural conscience. | |
| From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.II.I) | |
| A reaction: The reply from religion would be that the Deity has implanted natural conscience in each creature, though this seems to deny our freedom of moral judgment. Personally I am inclined to think that values are just observations of the world - such as health. |
| 6234 | If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury] |
| Full Idea: If a creature wanting reason has many good qualities and affections, it is certain that if you give this creature a reflecting faculty, it will at the same instant approve of gratitude, kindness and pity. | |
| From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.III.III) | |
| A reaction: A wonderful denunciation of the authority of reason, which must have influenced David Hume. I think, though, that the inverse of this case must be considered (if suddenly given feelings, they would fall in line with reasoning). We reason about feelings. |
| 6233 | A person isn't good if only tying their hands prevents their mischief, so the affections decide a person's morality [Shaftesbury] |
| Full Idea: We do not say that he is a good man when, having his hands tied up, he is hindered from doing the mischief he designs; …hence it is by affection merely that a creature is esteemed good or ill, natural or unnatural. | |
| From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.II.I) | |
| A reaction: Note that he more or less equates being morally 'ill' with being 'unnatural'. We tend to reserve 'unnatural' for extreme or perverse crimes. Personally I would place more emphasis on evil judgements, and less on evil feelings. |
| 6236 | People more obviously enjoy social pleasures than they do eating and drinking [Shaftesbury] |
| Full Idea: How much the social pleasures are superior to any other may be known by visible tokens and effects; the marks and signs which attend this sort of joy are more intense and clear than those which attend the satisfaction of thirst and hunger. | |
| From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.II.I) | |
| A reaction: He presumably refers to smiles and laughter, but they could be misleading as they are partly a means of social communication. You should ask people whether they would prefer a nice conversation or a good pork chop. Nice point, though. |
| 1664 | I would rather go mad than experience pleasure [Antisthenes (I)] |
| Full Idea: I would rather go mad than experience pleasure. | |
| From: Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.3 | |
| A reaction: Did he actually prefer pain? If both experiences would drive him mad, it seems like a desire for death. I cannot understand why anyone is opposed to harmless pleasures. |
| 6235 | Self-interest is not intrinsically good, but its absence is evil, as public good needs it [Shaftesbury] |
| Full Idea: Though no creature can be called good merely for possessing the self-preserving affections, it is impossible that public good can be preserved without them; so that a creature wanting in them is wanting in natural rectitude, and may be esteemed vicious. | |
| From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.I.III) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle held a similar view (Idea 92). I think maybe Shaftesbury was the last call of the Aristotelians, before being engulfed by utilitarians and Kantians. This idea is at the core of capitalism. |
| 6232 | Every creature has a right and a wrong state which guide its actions, so there must be a natural end [Shaftesbury] |
| Full Idea: We know there is a right and a wrong state of every creature; and that his right one is by nature forwarded, and by himself affectionately sought. There being therefore in every creature a certain interest or good; there must also be a natural end. | |
| From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.II.I) | |
| A reaction: This is an early modern statement of Aristotelian teleology, just at the point where it was falling out of fashion. The underlying concept is that of right function. I agree with Shaftesbury, but you can't stop someone damaging their health. |
| 21385 | Antisthenes said virtue is teachable and permanent, is life's goal, and is like universal wealth [Antisthenes (I), by Long] |
| Full Idea: The moral propositions of Antisthenes foreshadowed the Stoics: virtue can be taught and once acquired cannot be lost (fr.69,71); virtue is the goal of life (22); the sage is self-sufficient, since he has (by being wise) the wealth of all men (8o). | |
| From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 1 | |
| A reaction: [He cites Caizzi for the fragments] The distinctive idea here is (I think) that once acquired virtue can never be lost. It sounds plausible, but I'm wondering why it should be true. Is it like riding a bicycle, or like learning to speak Russian? |
| 5642 | For Shaftesbury, we must already have a conscience to be motivated to religious obedience [Shaftesbury, by Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Shaftesbury argued that no morality could be founded in religious obedience, or piety. On the contrary, a man is motivated to such obedience only because conscience tells him that the divine being is worthy of it. | |
| From: report of 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.8 | |
| A reaction: This seems to me a good argument. The only alternative is that we are brought to God by a conscience which was planted in us by God, but then how would you know you were being obedient to the right hypnotist? |
| 2631 | Antisthenes says there is only one god, which is nature [Antisthenes (I), by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Antisthenes says there is only one god, which is nature. | |
| From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.32 |