Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Arcesilaus, Lycophron and Carl Ginet

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4 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet]
     Full Idea: The infinitist view of justification holds that every justification must be inferential: no other kind of justification is possible.
     From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.141)
     A reaction: This is the key question in discussing whether justification is foundational. I'm not sure whether 'inference' is the best word when something is evidence for something else. I am inclined to think that only propositions can be reasons.
Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet]
     Full Idea: Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion. And so it cannot be that, if there actually occurs justification, it is all inferential.
     From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.148)
     A reaction: The idea that justification must have an 'origin' seems to beg the question. I take Klein's inifinitism to be a version of coherence, where the accumulation of good reasons adds up to justification. It is not purely inferential.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Lycophron has it that knowledge is the 'cohabitation' (rather than participation or synthesis) of knowing and the soul.
     From: report of Lycophron (fragments/reports [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1045b
     A reaction: This sounds like a rather passive and inert relationship. Presumably knowing something implies the possibility of acting on it.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
A false object might give the same presentation as a true one [Arcesilaus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Arcesilaus said that no presentation proceeding from a true object is such that a presentation proceeding from a false one might not also be of the same form. This is the one argument that has held the field down to the present day.
     From: report of Arcesilaus (fragments/reports [c.275 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.24.77