10502
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We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
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Full Idea:
I can start with a triangle, and rise by degrees to all straight-lined figures and to extension itself. The lower degree will include the higher degree. Since the higher degree is less determinate, it can represent more things.
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From:
Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
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A reaction:
[compressed] This attempts to explain the generalising ability of abstraction cited in Idea 10501. If you take a complex object and eliminate features one by one, it can only 'represent' more particulars; it could hardly represent fewer.
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8875
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Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B]
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Full Idea:
Given that sense experiential states do provide reasons for empirical beliefs, they must have conceptual content, ...where a mental state with conceptual content is one where the content is of a possible judgement by the subject.
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From:
Bill Brewer (Perceptual experience has conceptual content [2005], I)
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A reaction:
This is, I believe, wrong. Even complex observations, like a pool of blood, only become reasons when they have been interpreted. Otherwise they are just the raw ingredients of evidence. How could an uninterpreted red patch be a 'reason'?
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16784
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Forms make things distinct and explain the properties, by pure form, or arrangement of parts [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
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Full Idea:
The form is what renders a thing such and distinguishes it from others, whether it is a being really distinct from the matter, according to the Schools, or whether it is only the arrangement of the parts. By this form one must explain its properties.
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From:
Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], III.18 p240), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 27.6
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A reaction:
If we ask 'what explains the properties of this thing' it is hard to avoid coming up with something that might be called the 'form'. Note that they allow either substantial or corpuscularian forms. It is hard to disagree with the idea.
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10501
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A triangle diagram is about all triangles, if some features are ignored [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
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Full Idea:
If I draw an equilateral triangle on a piece of paper, ..I shall have an idea of only a single triangle. But if I ignore all the particular circumstances and focus on the three equal lines, I will be able to represent all equilateral triangles.
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From:
Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
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A reaction:
[compressed] They observed that we grasp composites through their parts, and now that we can grasp generalisations through particulars, both achieved by the psychological act of abstraction, thus showing its epistemological power.
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