Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Archimedes, C.J. Thomae and Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G

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8 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative Conception and the Limitation of Size Conception.
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: There are set theories that countenance exceptions to the Principle of Separation in exchange for a universal set.
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: The possibility of unrestricted quantification does not immediately presuppose the existence of an all-inclusive domain. One could deny an all-inclusive domain but grant that some quantifications are sometimes unrestricted.
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1)
     A reaction: Thus you can quantify over anything you like, but only from what is available. Eat what you like (in this restaurant).
Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: There are doubts about whether absolute generality is possible, if there are certain concepts which are indefinitely extensible, lacking definite extensions, and yielding an ever more inclusive hierarchy. Sets and ordinals are paradigm cases.
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.1)
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: If one thought of second-order quantification as quantification over first-level Fregean concepts [note: one under which only objects fall], talk of domains might be regimented as talk of first-level concepts, which are not objects.
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.2.2)
     A reaction: That is (I take it), don't quantify over objects, but quantify over concepts, but only those under which known objects fall. One might thus achieve naïve comprehension without paradoxes. Sound like fun.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Archimedes gave a sort of definition of 'straight line' when he said it is the shortest line between two points.
     From: report of Archimedes (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Gottfried Leibniz - New Essays on Human Understanding 4.13
     A reaction: Commentators observe that this reduces the purity of the original Euclidean axioms, because it involves distance and measurement, which are absent from the purest geometry.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Thomae's idea of abstract from peculiarities gives a general concept, and leaves the peculiarities [Frege on Thomae]
     Full Idea: When Thomae says "abstract from the peculiarities of the individual members of a set of items", or "disregard those characteristics which serve to distinguish them", we get a general concept under which they fall. The things keep their characteristics.
     From: comment on C.J. Thomae (works [1869], §34) by Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) §34
     A reaction: Interesting. You don't have to leave out their distinctive fur in order to count cats. But you have to focus on some aspect of them, because they aren't 'three meats'.
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
     Full Idea: We generally take an assertion's domain of discourse to be implicitly restricted by context. [Note: the standard approach is that this restriction is a semantic phenomenon, but Kent Bach (2000) argues that it is a pragmatic phenomenon]
     From: Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G (Introduction to 'Absolute Generality' [2006], 1.1)
     A reaction: I think Kent Bach is very very right about this. Follow any conversation, and ask what the domain is at any moment. The reference of a word like 'they' can drift across things, with no semantics to guide us, but only clues from context and common sense.