Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Archimedes, Correia,F/Schnieder,B and Cian Dorr

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics

17266	Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: In the heyday of modal logic, philosophers typically tried to account for any metaphysical notions in modal terms.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.4)
	A reaction: Lewisian realism about possible worlds actually gets rid of purely 'modal' terms, but I suppose they include possible worlds in their remark. Annoying for modal logicians to be told they had a 'heyday' - a nice example of the rhetoric of philosophy.

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason

17263	Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2)
	A reaction: A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational!

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry

13007	Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Archimedes gave a sort of definition of 'straight line' when he said it is the shortest line between two points.
	From: report of Archimedes (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Gottfried Leibniz - New Essays on Human Understanding 4.13
	A reaction: Commentators observe that this reduces the purity of the original Euclidean axioms, because it involves distance and measurement, which are absent from the purest geometry.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding

17270	Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: We may take existential dependence to be a relation induced by certain cases of grounding, but one may also think that facts about existential dependence are prior to corresponding ground claims, and in fact ground those claims.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.3)
	A reaction: I would vote for grounding, since dependence seems more abstract, and seems to demand explanation, whereas grounding seems more like a feature of reality, and to resist further intrinsic explanation (on the whole).

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation

17268	Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: To us it seems advisable to separate the objective notion of grounding, which belongs to the field of metaphysics, from the epistemically loaded notion of explanation.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.2)
	A reaction: Paul Audi is the defender of the opposite view. I'm with Audi. The 'epistemically loaded' pragmatic aspect is just contextual - that we have different interests in different aspects of the grounding on different occasions.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts

17267	The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: There is a disagreement on the issue of factual identity, concerning the 'granularity' of facts, the question of how fine-grained they are.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 3.3)
	A reaction: If they are very fine-grained, then no two descriptions of a supposed fact will capture the same details. If we go broadbrush, facts become fuzzy and less helpful. 'Fact' was never going to be a clear term.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta

14596	Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr]
	Full Idea: Just as there are no numbers or properties, there are no relations (like 'being heavier than' or 'betweenness'), or sets. I will provisionally use 'nominalism' for the conjunction of these four claims.
	From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 1)
	A reaction: If you are going to be a nominalist, do it properly! My starting point in metaphysics is strong sympathy with this view. Right now [Tues 22nd Nov 2011, 10:57 am GMT] I think it is correct.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism

14597	Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr]
	Full Idea: Natural Class Nominalists take as primitive the notion of a 'natural' class - a class of things that all resemble one another in some one respect and resemble nothing else in that respect.
	From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4)
	A reaction: Dorr rejects this view because he doesn't believe in 'classes'. How committed to classes do you have to be before you are permitted to talk about them? All vocabulary (such as 'resemble') seems metaphysically tainted in this area.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity

14598	Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr]
	Full Idea: If there are abstract objects, there are necessary truths about these things that cannot be reduced to truths of logic. So only the nominalist, who denies that there are any such things, can adequately respect the idea that there are no brute necessities.
	From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4)
	A reaction: This is where two plates of my personal philosophy grind horribly against one another. I love nominalism, and I love natural necessities. They meet like a ring-species in evolution. I'll just call it a 'paradox', and move on (swiftly).