8 ideas
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Archimedes gave a sort of definition of 'straight line' when he said it is the shortest line between two points. | |
From: report of Archimedes (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Gottfried Leibniz - New Essays on Human Understanding 4.13 | |
A reaction: Commentators observe that this reduces the purity of the original Euclidean axioms, because it involves distance and measurement, which are absent from the purest geometry. |
13795 | Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder] |
Full Idea: The very being, the identity, of any property consists at least in part in its contrasting as it does with its own proper contraries. | |
From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 2.4) | |
A reaction: See Elder for the details of this, but the idea that properties can only be individuated contextually sounds promising. |
13798 | Maybe we should give up the statue [Elder] |
Full Idea: Some contemporary metaphysicians infer that one of the objects must go, namely, the statue. | |
From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 7.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Zimmerman 1995] This looks like a recipe for creating a vast gulf between philosophers and the rest of the population. If it is right, it makes the true ontology completely useless in understanding our daily lives. |
13797 | The loss of an essential property means the end of an existence [Elder] |
Full Idea: The loss of any essential property must amount to the end of an existence. | |
From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 3) | |
A reaction: This is orthodoxy for essentialists, and I presume that Aristotle would agree, but I have a problem with the essence of a great athlete, who then grows old. Must we say that they lose their identity-as-an-athlete? |
13794 | Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder] |
Full Idea: Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages. | |
From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Elder proposes this as his test for the essentialness of a property - his Test of Flanking Uniformities. A nice idea. |
13796 | Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder] |
Full Idea: The properties of any essential nature are bound together....[122] so any case in which one of our envisioned familiar objects loses one of its essential properties will be a case in which it loses several. | |
From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 3) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a fairly good generalisation rather than a necessary truth. Is there a natural selection for properties, so that only the properties which are able to bind to others to form teams are able to survive and flourish? |
8836 | Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet] |
Full Idea: The infinitist view of justification holds that every justification must be inferential: no other kind of justification is possible. | |
From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.141) | |
A reaction: This is the key question in discussing whether justification is foundational. I'm not sure whether 'inference' is the best word when something is evidence for something else. I am inclined to think that only propositions can be reasons. |
8837 | Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet] |
Full Idea: Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion. And so it cannot be that, if there actually occurs justification, it is all inferential. | |
From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.148) | |
A reaction: The idea that justification must have an 'origin' seems to beg the question. I take Klein's inifinitism to be a version of coherence, where the accumulation of good reasons adds up to justification. It is not purely inferential. |