9 ideas
| 13737 | The empiricist says that metaphysics is meaningless, rather than false [Schlick] |
| Full Idea: The empiricist does not say to the metaphysician 'what you say is false', but 'what you say asserts nothing at all!' He does not contradict him, but says 'I don't understand you'. | |
| From: Moritz Schlick (Positivism and Realism [1934], p.107), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - On What Grounds What 1.1 | |
| A reaction: I take metaphysics to be meaningful, but at such a high level of abstraction that it is easy to drift into vague nonsense, and incredibly hard to assess what is meant, and whether it is correct. The truths of metaphysics are not recursive. |
| 3035 | Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Dialectic is when men converse by putting short questions and giving brief answers to those who question them. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.52) |
| 13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Archimedes gave a sort of definition of 'straight line' when he said it is the shortest line between two points. | |
| From: report of Archimedes (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Gottfried Leibniz - New Essays on Human Understanding 4.13 | |
| A reaction: Commentators observe that this reduces the purity of the original Euclidean axioms, because it involves distance and measurement, which are absent from the purest geometry. |
| 1816 | Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Sceptics say that every demonstration depends on things which demonstrates themselves, or on things which can't be demonstrated. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) | |
| A reaction: This refers to two parts of Agrippa's Trilemma (the third being that demonstration could go on forever). He makes the first option sound very rationalist, rather than experiential. |
| 1819 | Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Sceptics actually assert two dogmas: that nothing should be defined, and that every argument has an opposite argument. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) |
| 3064 | When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: When sceptics say that they define nothing, and that every argument has an opposite argument, they here give a positive definition, and assert a positive dogma. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.11.11) |
| 3033 | Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Induction is an argument which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally other truths which resemble them; there are two kinds, one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.23) |
| 1838 | Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Cyrenaics place pleasure wholly in motion, whereas Epicurus admits it as a condition. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 10.28) | |
| A reaction: Not a distinction we meet in modern discussions. Do events within the mind count as 'motion'? If so, these two agree. If not, I'd vote for Epicurus. |
| 1769 | Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods. | |
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 6.Men.3) |