79 ideas
15586 | When philosophy makes itself intelligible, it commits suicide [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: When philosophy makes itself intelligible, it commits suicide. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Contributions of Philosophy (On Appropriation) [1938], §259), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Contributions' | |
A reaction: Polt describes this remark as 'theatrical', but it seems to speak for itself! |
15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs' |
15582 | Perhaps the aim of philosophy is to abolish sham problems [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Perhaps it is precisely the task of philosophical investigation ultimately to deprive many problems of their sham existence. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (History of the Concept of Time [1925], p.162), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§43-44 | |
A reaction: Polt notes how very Wittgensteinian this remark is. I take this to be a very minor task of philosophy. The main task is to address the real problems. It's amazing how many people love this sort of remark. I wonder why? |
22223 | Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
Full Idea: Being-in-the-world is a phenomenon of 'care' with a tripartite structure: a) projection towards its possibilities, b) thrownness among those possibilities, so Dasein is not free, and c) fallenness among worldly possibilities, to neglect of its own. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227 | |
A reaction: Sounds a bit Californian to me. Just living among the world's possibilities is evidently a bad thing, because you could be concentrating on yourself and your own development instead? |
22158 | Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: 'Phenomenology' can be formulated as 'To the things themselves!' It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings, and to conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated. It is opposed to traditiona' pseudo-problems. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro II.07) | |
A reaction: It sounds as if we are invited to look at the world the way a dog might look at it. I am not at all clear what it to be gained from this approach. |
15574 | 'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: Heidegger concludes that 'logos' essentially means 'making something manifest'. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 56/33) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§7 | |
A reaction: It would at least seem to involve revealing the truth of something, though truth doesn't seem to be central to Heidegger's thought. 'Logos' is often translated as 'an account', as well as a 'reason', so Heidegger may be right. |
21953 | For Heidegger there is 'ontic' truth or 'uncoveredness', as in "he is a true friend" [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
Full Idea: We say things like 'he is a true friend'. Heidegger calls this kind of truth 'ontic truth' or the 'uncoveredness' of entities. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (On the Essence of Truth [1935]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 7 | |
A reaction: [In his later essays] The example is very bad for showing a clear alternative meaning of 'true'. I presume it can only be explained in essentialist terms - an entity is 'true' if its appearance and behaviour conforms to its essence. |
15569 | Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: Heidegger is a relentless enemy of ahistorical, absolutist concepts of truth. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 1 | |
A reaction: I presume that if truth is not absolute then it must be relative, but Polt is a little coy about saying so. For me, anyone who says truth is relative doesn't understand the concept, and is talking about something else. |
10482 | The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos] |
Full Idea: The logic of ZF Set Theory is classical first-order predicate logic with identity. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.121) | |
A reaction: This logic seems to be unable to deal with very large cardinals, precisely those that are implied by set theory, so there is some sort of major problem hovering here. Boolos is fairly neutral. |
10492 | A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Maybe the axioms of extensionality and the pair set axiom 'force themselves on us' (Gödel's phrase), but I am not convinced about the axioms of infinity, union, power or replacement. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.130) | |
A reaction: Boolos is perfectly happy with basic set theory, but rather dubious when very large cardinals come into the picture. |
18192 | Do the Replacement Axioms exceed the iterative conception of sets? [Boolos, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: For Boolos, the Replacement Axioms go beyond the iterative conception. | |
From: report of George Boolos (The iterative conception of Set [1971]) by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.3 |
7785 | The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos] |
Full Idea: We should abandon the idea that the use of plural forms commits us to the existence of sets/classes… Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. There are not two sorts of things in the world, individuals and collections. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]), quoted by Henry Laycock - Object | |
A reaction: The problem of quantifying over sets is notoriously difficult. Try http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/object/index.html. |
10485 | Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos] |
Full Idea: The naïve view of set theory (that any zero or more things form a set) is natural, but inconsistent: the things that do not belong to themselves are some things that do not form a set. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.127) | |
A reaction: As clear a summary of Russell's Paradox as you could ever hope for. |
10484 | The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos] |
Full Idea: According to the iterative conception, every set is formed at some stage. There is a relation among stages, 'earlier than', which is transitive. A set is formed at a stage if and only if its members are all formed before that stage. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.126) | |
A reaction: He gives examples of the early stages, and says the conception is supposed to 'justify' Zermelo set theory. It is also supposed to make the axioms 'natural', rather than just being selected for convenience. And it is consistent. |
13547 | Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter] |
Full Idea: Weak Limitation of Size: If there are no more Fs than Gs and the Gs form a collection, then Fs form a collection. Strong Limitation of Size: A property F fails to be collectivising iff there are as many Fs as there are objects. | |
From: report of George Boolos (Iteration Again [1989]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 13.5 |
10699 | Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Is there, in addition to the 200 Cheerios in a bowl, also a set of them all? And what about the vast number of subsets of Cheerios? It is haywire to think that when you have some Cheerios you are eating a set. What you are doing is: eating the Cheerios. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.72) | |
A reaction: In my case Boolos is preaching to the converted. I am particularly bewildered by someone (i.e. Quine) who believes that innumerable sets exist while 'having a taste for desert landscapes' in their ontology. |
14249 | Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley] |
Full Idea: Boolos's conception of plural logic is as a reinterpretation of second-order logic. | |
From: report of George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975]) by Oliver,A/Smiley,T - What are Sets and What are they For? n5 | |
A reaction: Oliver and Smiley don't accept this view, and champion plural reference differently (as, I think, some kind of metalinguistic device?). |
10225 | Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Boolos has proposed an alternative understanding of monadic, second-order logic, in terms of plural quantifiers, which many philosophers have found attractive. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 3.5 |
10830 | Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos] |
Full Idea: The metatheory of second-order logic is hopelessly set-theoretic, and the notion of second-order validity possesses many if not all of the epistemic debilities of the notion of set-theoretic truth. | |
From: George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975], p.45) | |
A reaction: Epistemic problems arise when a logic is incomplete, because some of the so-called truths cannot be proved, and hence may be unreachable. This idea indicates Boolos's motivation for developing a theory of plural quantification. |
10736 | Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
Full Idea: In an indisputable technical result, Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can be used to interpret monadic second-order logic. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], Intro) by Øystein Linnebo - Plural Quantification Exposed Intro |
10780 | Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Boolos discovered that any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], §1) by Øystein Linnebo - Plural Quantification Exposed p.74 |
10829 | A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos] |
Full Idea: One may be of the opinion that no sentence ought to be considered as a truth of logic if, no matter how it is interpreted, it asserts that there are sets of certain sorts. | |
From: George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975], p.44) | |
A reaction: My intuition is that in no way should any proper logic assert the existence of anything at all. Presumably interpretations can assert the existence of numbers or sets, but we should be able to identify something which is 'pure' logic. Natural deduction? |
15571 | The idea of an atemporal realm of validity is as implausible as medieval theology [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The whole idea of an atemporal realm of validity is an invention that is no less doubtful than medieval speculation about angels. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Basic Problems of Phenomenology [1927], p.215), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 2 'Theory' | |
A reaction: This seems to be flatly opposed to the view of Frege, and shows why continental philosophy has largely eschewed a study of logic. It is hard for a philosopher to pursue logic extensively without commitment to the Fregean Third Realm. |
10697 | Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Indispensable to cross-reference, lacking distinctive content, and pervading thought and discourse, 'identity' is without question a logical concept. Adding it to predicate calculus significantly increases the number and variety of inferences possible. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.54) | |
A reaction: It is not at all clear to me that identity is a logical concept. Is 'existence' a logical concept? It seems to fit all of Boolos's criteria? I say that all he really means is that it is basic to thought, but I'm not sure it drives the reasoning process. |
10832 | '∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos] |
Full Idea: One may say that '∀x x=x' means 'everything is identical to itself', but one must realise that one's answer has a determinate sense only if the reference (range) of 'everything' is fixed. | |
From: George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975], p.46) | |
A reaction: This is the problem now discussed in the recent book 'Absolute Generality', of whether one can quantify without specifying a fixed or limited domain. |
13671 | Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Boolos proposes that second-order quantifiers be regarded as 'plural quantifiers' are in ordinary language, and has developed a semantics along those lines. In this way they introduce no new ontology. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by Stewart Shapiro - Foundations without Foundationalism 7 n32 | |
A reaction: This presumably has to treat simple predicates and relations as simply groups of objects, rather than having platonic existence, or something. |
10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Standard second-order existential quantifiers pick out a class or a property, but Boolos suggests that they be understood as a plural quantifier, like 'there are objects' or 'there are people'. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.4 | |
A reaction: This idea has potential application to mathematics, and Lewis (1991, 1993) 'invokes it to develop an eliminative structuralism' (Shapiro). |
10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Abandon the idea that use of plural forms must always be understood to commit one to the existence of sets of those things to which the corresponding singular forms apply. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.66) | |
A reaction: It seems to be an open question whether plural quantification is first- or second-order, but it looks as if it is a rewriting of the first-order. |
7806 | Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Boolos virtually patented the new device of plural quantification. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by José A. Benardete - Logic and Ontology | |
A reaction: This would be 'there are some things such that...' |
10834 | Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos] |
Full Idea: A weak completeness theorem shows that a sentence is provable whenever it is valid; a strong theorem, that a sentence is provable from a set of sentences whenever it is a logical consequence of the set. | |
From: George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975], p.52) | |
A reaction: So the weak version says |- φ → |= φ, and the strong versions says Γ |- φ → Γ |= φ. Presumably it is stronger if it can specify the source of the inference. |
13841 | Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking] |
Full Idea: Boolos asks why on earth compactness, whatever its virtues, should be definitive of logic itself. | |
From: report of George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975]) by Ian Hacking - What is Logic? §13 |
10491 | Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos] |
Full Idea: The existence of infinitely many natural numbers seems to me no more troubling than that of infinitely many computer programs or sentences of English. There is, for example, no longest sentence, since any number of 'very's can be inserted. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.129) | |
A reaction: If you really resisted an infinity of natural numbers, presumably you would also resist an actual infinity of 'very's. The fact that it is unclear what could ever stop a process doesn't guarantee that the process is actually endless. |
10483 | Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos] |
Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge nothing in mathematics or science requires the existence of very high orders of infinity. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.122) | |
A reaction: He is referring to particular high orders of infinity implied by set theory. Personally I want to wield Ockham's Razor. Is being implied by set theory a sufficient reason to accept such outrageous entities into our ontology? |
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Archimedes gave a sort of definition of 'straight line' when he said it is the shortest line between two points. | |
From: report of Archimedes (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Gottfried Leibniz - New Essays on Human Understanding 4.13 | |
A reaction: Commentators observe that this reduces the purity of the original Euclidean axioms, because it involves distance and measurement, which are absent from the purest geometry. |
10833 | Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos] |
Full Idea: The notions of infinity and countability can be characterized by second-order sentences, though not by first-order sentences (as compactness and Skolem-Löwenheim theorems show), .. as well as well-ordering, progression, ancestral and identity. | |
From: George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975], p.48) |
10490 | Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos] |
Full Idea: It is no surprise that we should be able to reason mathematically about many of the things we experience, for they are already 'abstract'. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.129) | |
A reaction: He has just given a list of exemplary abstract objects (Idea 10489), but I think there is a more interesting idea here - that our experience of actual physical objects is to some extent abstract, as soon as it is conceptualised. |
21897 | Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May] |
Full Idea: Continental philosophers, following Heidegger, see in the attempt to reduce the question of being to that of beings a symptom of an age that is too ready to accept the terms in which science conceives the world. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 1.04 | |
A reaction: Interesting. I take the idea that this is a failing of the modern age to be ridiculous, since I take it to be the key metaphysical move made by Aristotle. Neverthless, Aristotle is closely in tune with modern science. For 'beings', read 'objects'. |
15573 | For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: We are Dasein - the entity who possesses - as constitutive for its understanding of existence - an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 34/13), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§4 | |
A reaction: This seems to connect to the emerging 'externalist' view of mind that comes with the external view of content coming from Purnam's Twin Earth idea. |
9273 | Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray] |
Full Idea: Heidegger turns to 'Being' for the same reason that Christians turn to God - to affirm the unique place of humans in the world. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.4 | |
A reaction: This is the first remark I have encountered that makes sense of Heidegger's Being to me! It places Heidegger as a modernist philosopher, trying to grapple with the decline of religion. I'll stick with Bertrand Russell on that. |
22157 | Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], Intro I.04) | |
A reaction: How do you distinguish the Being of normal humans from the Being of someone in a deep coma, who has no existential issues? Has that Dasein ceased to be? Why does angst create a new mode of Being, but flying doesn't? |
8137 | Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The formal existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole is: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6 41) | |
A reaction: If you find that thought really illuminating, you are probably on the wrong website. However, the thought that we exist 'ahead of ourselves' might be a fruitful line for existentialists to explore. |
21951 | In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: This being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of being of 'the others', in such a way, indeed, that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.164), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 5 | |
A reaction: He seems to be describing the psychology of someone who joins a small crowd which gradually increases in size. I take this relation to others to be the basic existential dilemma, of retaining individual authenticity within a community. |
20745 | 'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: When we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein' we are expressing not its 'what' (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but its being. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.297), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 2 'Phenomenology' | |
A reaction: Presumably analytic discussions of persons try to be too objective. Heidegger is trying to capture the thought at the heart of Kierkegaard's existentialism. Objectivity and subjectivity are never in conflict. Is there really a different mode of existence? |
8134 | The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Heidegger borrows a common German word 'dasein', meaning 'being' or 'existence', to refer both to 'the manner of Being which... man... possesses', and to the creature which possesses it. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.32) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This just strikes me as an elementary ontological mistake. Because something has startling properties it doesn't follow that we have a different type of Being. Magnets don't have a different type of being from ordinary iron. |
8135 | 'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: We each of us not only have Dasein (our kind of Being), but we can lay claim to it. Also the Dasein of a thing 'is an issue for it' - we care about the kinds of creatures we can make ourselves into. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.67) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Heidegger says other more puzzling things about Dasein. The second half of the idea is what makes Heidegger an existentialist, and an inspiration for Sartre. |
21948 | Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Dasein is an entity which, in its very being, comports itself understandingly towards that being. ...Mineness belongs to an existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.78), quoted by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1 | |
A reaction: He might eventually persuade me that Dasein is so different from mere material being that it deserves a category of its own. But a reductive account of mind is also a reductive account of being. |
15584 | I say the manifestation of Being needs humans, and humans only exist as reflected in Being [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The fundamental thought of my thinking is precisely that Being, or the manifestation of Being, needs human beings and that, vice versa, human beings are only human beings if they are standing in the manifestation of Being. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Martin Heidegger in conversation [1969], p.82), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs' | |
A reaction: I don't think I understand the second half of this, but I sense some sort of intuition that the consciousness of humans 'enlarges' Being, or bestows an identity on it, or some such thing. |
7680 | Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Ontology is possible only as phenomenology. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.31), quoted by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Jacquette argues against this claim. The idea seems to be the ultimate extension of Kant, and it is not a big move to say that the only real phenomenology we can discuss is our semantics. Wrong, wrong, wrong. |
22161 | Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in themselves' are defined ontologico-categorially. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15) | |
A reaction: I assume this is a direct reference to the problem idealists had with the thing-in-itself. It seems that the reality of a thing consists of the strengthened relationship it has with Dasein, which sounds fairly idealist to me. |
10700 | First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Ontological commitment is carried by first-order quantifiers; a second-order quantifier needn't be taken to be a first-order quantifier in disguise, having special items, collections, as its range. They are two ways of referring to the same things. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.72) | |
A reaction: If second-order quantifiers are just a way of referring, then we can see first-order quantifiers that way too, so we could deny 'objects'. |
10488 | It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos] |
Full Idea: It's a kind of lunacy to think that sound scientific philosophy demands that we think that we see ink-tracks but not words, i.e. word-types. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.128) | |
A reaction: This seems to link him with Armstrong's mockery of 'ostrich nominalism'. There seems to be some ambiguity with the word 'see' in this disagreement. When we look at very ancient scratches on stones, why don't we always 'see' if it is words? |
10487 | I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos] |
Full Idea: I am rather a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence. Smaller numbers, sets and functions don't offend my sense of reality. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.128) | |
A reaction: The great Boolos is rather hard to disagree with, but I disagree. Logicians love abstract objects, indeed they would almost be out of a job without them. It seems to me they smuggle them into our ontology by redefining either 'object' or 'exists'. |
10489 | We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos] |
Full Idea: We twentieth century city dwellers deal with abstract objects all the time, such as bank balances, radio programs, software, newspaper articles, poems, mistakes, triangles. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.129) | |
A reaction: I find this claim to be totally question-begging, and typical of a logician. The word 'object' gets horribly stretched in these discussions. We can create concepts which have all the logical properties of objects. Maybe they just 'subsist'? |
15576 | Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: Heidegger tries to develop a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' ('wesen' as a verb). | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§25-7 |
15578 | Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: Propositions are not a good clue to the essence of understanding, because we must already understand things before we formulate propositions about them. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.31) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3 | |
A reaction: I like this, because I think the most important aspects of our thought and understanding are entirely non-verbal - even in cases where they seem to be highly specific and verbal. We don't understand ourselves at all! |
22159 | If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: One of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an 'I' or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.1.10) | |
A reaction: Descartes had thrown doubt on the informativeness of the phenomena, so presumably your phenomenologist is not interested in whether they reveal any truth. So why are unreliable phenomena of any interest? |
22160 | Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The less we stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become. ...The kind of Being which equipment possesses... we call 'readiness-to-hand' [Zuhandenheit]. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.3.15) | |
A reaction: This example would be well at home in the writings of the pragmatists. It is also an important example for existentialists. In analytic philosophy we might say the experience combines perception with direct exerience of causation. |
15580 | There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: We always take a noise as the sound of something; we always take a hue as the color of something. We simply do not experience raw, uninterpreted sense-data - these are the inventions of philosophers. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 207/163-4), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3 | |
A reaction: This is something like the modern view of sense-data as promoted by John McDowell, rather than the experiential atoms of Russell and Moore. Experience is holistic, but that doesn't mean we can't analyse it into components. |
20749 | Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The perceptual 'something' is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a 'field'. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.4), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 3 'Perceptual' | |
A reaction: Sounds like our knowledge of electrons. Nice point. Standard analytic discussions of perceiving a glass always treat it in isolation, when it is on an expensive table near a brandy bottle. Or near a hammer. |
22163 | The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof [of external things] has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. ...The kind of Being of the entity which does the proving has not been made definite enough. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.43a) | |
A reaction: The 'scandal' was a remark of Kant's. Presumably Heidegger's exploration of Dasein aims to establish the Being of the prover sufficiently to solve this problem (via phenomenology). |
21949 | Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
Full Idea: Heidegger argues that having thoughts and feelings is only possible for entity that is actually engaged in the world. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 1 | |
A reaction: This seems to be an a priori exclusion of the possibility of a brain in a vat. I guess the ancestor of this idea is Schopenhauer. |
22222 | Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
Full Idea: The world is a world shared with others, so that far from being a solipsistic ego ...Dasein finds itself already amongst others. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.226 | |
A reaction: Phenomenologists don't seem bothered about the problem of knowing other minds. If you take something for granted, it ceases to be a problem to be solved! |
8136 | If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: How do I know that other people have minds? The question is a bad one. Precisely because I encounter them at work, play and the like, it is guaranteed that they, too, are Dasein, intelligent agents. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.153-) by David E. Cooper - Heidegger Ch.3 | |
A reaction: I've seen film of someone playing peek-a-boo with a bonobo ape, so presumably they have Dasein. It might be easier for the AI community to aim at building a robot with Dasein, than one which was simply conscious. |
22164 | When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.2.13) | |
A reaction: This is the first plausible fruit of phenomenology I have been able to discover. Analysing the passive mind is not very promising, but seeing what happens when we become more proactive is revealing. |
15579 | My active existence is defined by being able to say 'I can' [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The Dasein which I myself am in each instance is defined in its Being by my being able to say of it, 'I am, that is, I can'. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (History of the Concept of Time [1925], p.298), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3 | |
A reaction: I like this emphasis on the more active aspect of the Cogito idea. The whole Enlightenment account of things has them as inert, and falling under laws and theories. The Aristotelian account makes potentiality central. |
15583 | Certainty that I will die is more basic to my existence than the Cogito [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The certainty that 'I myself am in that I will die' is the basic certainty of Dasein itself. It is a genuine statement of Dasein, while 'cogito sum' is only a semblance of such a statement. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (History of the Concept of Time [1925], p.316-7), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 4.§46-53 | |
A reaction: This just seems to be false. Children face their existence in thought long before they face their mortality. Absorption in activity can marginalise death, but not marginalise thought. |
22162 | There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: The self of everyday Dasein is the they-self [das Man-selbst], which we distinguish from the authentic self - that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.4.27) | |
A reaction: To a novice this sounds like a requirement for increased self-consciousness during daily activity. 'Be a good animal, true to your animal self' said one of Lawrence's characters. |
20114 | Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Everyone is other, and no one is himself. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.165), quoted by Rüdiger Safranski - Nietzsche: a philosophical biography 09 | |
A reaction: Safranski describes this as the idea of 'structural self-evasion'. He detects the same idea in Nietzsche's 'Daybreak'. |
15577 | Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt] |
Full Idea: For Heidegger moods are disclosive; they show us things in a more fundamental way than theoretical propositions ever can. For example, fear reveals something as a threat. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.5.30) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§30 | |
A reaction: Most modern students of emotion seem to agree. Even though they may not have specific content, it is always possible to consider the underlying cause of the mood. |
8693 | An 'abstraction principle' says two things are identical if they are 'equivalent' in some respect [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Hume's Principle has a structure Boolos calls an 'abstraction principle'. Within the scope of two universal quantifiers, a biconditional connects an identity between two things and an equivalence relation. It says we don't care about other differences. | |
From: George Boolos (Is Hume's Principle analytic? [1997]), quoted by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.7 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the traditional principle of abstraction by ignoring some properties, but dressed up in the clothes of formal logic. Frege tries to eliminate psychology, but Boolos implies that what we 'care about' is relevant. |
20748 | We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: We do not throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something is encountered as such, the thing in question has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.190-1), quoted by George Dickie - The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude 3 'Undoing' | |
A reaction: Analytic philosophy and science have tried to dismantle experience, and Heidegger wants to put it back together. I would say there is a big difference between encountering a thing (which is a bit facty), and understanding it (which is more valuey). |
22166 | Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Because Dasein is lost in the 'they', it must first find itself. It must be 'shown' to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], II.2.54) | |
A reaction: I wish there was some criterion for knowing when you are being yourself and when you are not. |
22165 | Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualised in individualisation. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], I.6.40) | |
A reaction: Is sounds like insecurity, as a sort of trauma that shocks one into self-realisation. The idea means very little to me personally. |
21952 | Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
Full Idea: For Heidegger, as a consequence of my anxiety in the face of death, I am set free to live my life as my own rather than doing things merely because others expect me to do them. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Mark Wrathall - Heidegger: how to read 7 | |
A reaction: Contrary to Epicurus, Heidegger thinks anxiety about death is a good thing. The point is, I suppose, that we all die alone, and people who are very socially contrained need to face up to death in order to grasp their autonomy. |
22224 | Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
Full Idea: Anxiety [angst] is the disturbing sense of uncanniness by which Dasein is overtaken (thrownness) when it discovers there is nothing other than its own freedom to sustain its projects (projection), and from which Dasein constantly takes flight (falling). | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by John D. Caputo - Heidegger p.227 | |
A reaction: This seems to be Kierkegaard's idea, unamended. In my experience anxiety only comes when I am forced into making decisions by worldly situations. An 'existential crisis' is a sort of blankness appearing where a future life was supposed to be. |
20767 | Culture is now dominated by boredom, so universal it is unnoticed [Heidegger, by Aho] |
Full Idea: Heidegger came to say that the cultural mood had changed from 'anxiety' to 'boredom'. The danger is that our boredom has become so ubiquitous and all-encompassing that it is now hidden. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Contributions to Philosophy [1938]) by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 9 'Conc' | |
A reaction: I'm not sure what the danger of boredom is if it is 'hidden'. It rather depends what else is hidden with it. |
15572 | Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Dasein's Being-what-it-is (essentia) must….be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia). | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 67/42), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the origin of Sartre's famous slogan 'existence before essence'. It seems to be a rebellion against Husserl's quest for essences. |
20453 | Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: Heidegger says you must choose your hero; either you choose 'das Man', the inauthentic life, or you choose yourself - the point being that you have to choose yourself as your hero in order to be authentic. | |
From: report of Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927]) by Simon Critchley - Impossible Objects: interviews 5 | |
A reaction: If Nietzsche's 'Ecce Homo' is the model for choosing yourself as hero, I am not too sure about this idea. Needing a hero seems awfully German and romantic. Ein Heldenleben. Be your own anit-hero (like a standup comedian)? |
15581 | Dasein is always only that which it has chosen to be [Heidegger] |
Full Idea: Dasein is always only that which it has chosen to be. | |
From: Martin Heidegger (Basic Problems of Phenomenology [1927], p.278), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§39-42 | |
A reaction: I take it as significant that this is what it 'has' chosen, and not what it now 'chooses'. I might accept that my mode of existence results from past choices, but certainly not that I can choose it now. Ossified brain. |