92 ideas
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: So-called ostensive definitions need not literally involve ostension, e.g. pointing, but they must involve genuine reference of some sort (in this case reference to a sample of water). | |
From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 4.11.2) |
14684 | A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: A world w' is accessible to a consistent world w if and only if w' is possible in w. Being 'inaccessible to' or 'possible relative to' a consistent world is simply being possible according to that world, nothing more and nothing less. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
A reaction: More illuminating than just saying that w can 'see' w'. Accessibility is internal to worIds. It gives some connection to why we spend time examining modal logic. There is no more important metaphysical notion than what is possible according to actuality. |
14669 | For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Insofar as modal logic is concerned exclusively with the logic of metaphysical modality, ..T may well be the one and only (strongest) correct system of (first-order) propositional logic. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro) | |
A reaction: This contrasts sharply with the orthodox view, that S5 (or at the very least S4) is the correct system for metaphysics. |
14667 | System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Even the conventionally accepted system B, which is weaker than S5 and independent of S4, has not been adequately justified as a fallacy-free system of reasoning about what might have been. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro) |
14668 | In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: The characteristic of B has the form φ⊃□◊φ. ...Even if these axioms are necessarily true, it seems logically possible for p to be true while the proposition that p is necessarily possible is at the same time false. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro) |
14692 | System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Friends of B modal logic commit themselves to the loaded claim that it is logically true that the property of possibly being realized (or being a way things might have been) is an essential property of the world. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], V) | |
A reaction: I think this 'loaded' formulation captures quite nicely the dispositional view I favour, that the possibilities of the actual world are built into the actual world, and define its nature just as much as the 'categorial' facts do. |
14671 | What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: We can say of a wooden table that it would have been possible for it to have originated from some different matter, even though it is not actually possible. So what is necessary fails to be necessarily necessary, and S4 modal logic is fallacious. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
Full Idea: Salmon argues that S4 and therefore S5 are invalid for metaphysical modality. | |
From: report of Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 238-40) by Timothy Williamson - Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic 4 | |
A reaction: [He gives references for Salmon, and for his own reply] Salmon's view seems to be opposed my most modern logicians (such as Ian Rumfitt). |
14686 | S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: When we ignore accessibility altogether, we have finally zeroed in on S5 modal logic. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) |
14691 | S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Believers in S5 as a correct system of propositional reasoning about what might have been must claim that it is an essential property of any way things might have been that things might have been that way. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], V) | |
A reaction: Salmon is working in a view where you are probably safe to substitute 'necessary' for 'essential' without loss of meaning. |
14693 | The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Counterpart-theoretic modal semantics allows for the retention of S5 modal propositional logic, at a considerable cost. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], V n18) | |
A reaction: See the other ideas in this paper by Salmon for his general attack on S5 as the appropriate system for metaphysical necessity. He favours the very modest System T. |
14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical modal logic concerns metaphysical (or alethic) necessity and metaphysical (alethic) possibility, or necessity and possibility tout court - as opposed to such other types of modality as physical necessity, epistemic necessity etc. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro n2) |
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Archimedes gave a sort of definition of 'straight line' when he said it is the shortest line between two points. | |
From: report of Archimedes (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Gottfried Leibniz - New Essays on Human Understanding 4.13 | |
A reaction: Commentators observe that this reduces the purity of the original Euclidean axioms, because it involves distance and measurement, which are absent from the purest geometry. |
14742 | It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Insofar as identity seems vague, it is provably mistaken. If it is vague whether x and y are identical (as in the Ship of Theseus), then x,y is definitely not the same as x,x, since the first pair is indeterminate and the second pair isn't. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence: seven appendices [2005], App I) | |
A reaction: [compressed; Gareth Evans 1978 made a similar point] This strikes me as begging the question in the Ship case, since we are shoehorning the new ship into either the slot for x or the slot for y, but that was what we couldn’t decide. No rough identity? |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: The metaphysical doctrine of essentialism says that certain properties of things are properties that those things could not fail to have, except by not existing. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 3.8.2) | |
A reaction: A bad account of essentialism, and a long way from Aristotle. It arises from the logicians' tendency to fix objects entirely in terms of a 'flat' list of predicates (called 'properties'!), which ignore structure, constitution, history etc. |
14678 | Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: By admitting possible worlds of unlimited variation and recombination, I simply abandon true metaphysical essentialism. By my lights, any property is attached to anything in some possible world or other. I am a closet radical anti-essentialist. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], II) | |
A reaction: Salmon includes impossible worlds within his scheme of understanding. It strikes me that this is metaphysical system which tells us nothing about how things are: it is sort of 'logical idealist'. Later he talks of 'we essentialists'. |
14680 | Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Just as nomological possibility is a special kind of metaphysical possibility, so metaphysical possibility is a special kind of logical possibility. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view of how the three types of necessity are nested. He gives a possible counterexample in footnote 7. |
14690 | In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: The S5 theorist's miscontrual of English (in the meaning of 'possibly possible') makes nested modality unseen, but it does not make nested modality vanish. Inaccessible worlds are still worlds. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) |
14677 | Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: It is held that it is the hallmark of metaphysical necessity is that it is completely unrestricted, the limiting case of restricted necessity, with no restrictions whatever. A proposition is necessary only if it is true in absolutely every world whatever. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], II) | |
A reaction: This is the standard picture which leads to the claim that S5 modal logic is appropriate for metaphysical necessity, because there are no restrictions on accessibility. Salmon raises objections to this conventional view. |
14679 | Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Though there is a way things logically could be according to which I am a credit card account, there is no way things metaphysically might be according to which I am a credit card account. This illustrates the restricted nature of metaphysical modality. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
A reaction: His drift is that metaphyical modality is restricted, but expressing it in S5 modal logic (where all worlds see one another) makes it unrestricted, so S5 logic is wrong for metaphysics. I'm impressed by his arguments. |
14688 | Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: If one confines one's sights to genuinely possible worlds, disavowing the impossible worlds, then metaphysical modality emerges as the limiting case - the 'unrestricted' modality that takes account of 'every' world - and S5 emerges as its proper logic. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
A reaction: He observes that this makes metaphysical modality 'restricted' simply because you have restricted what 'all worlds' means. Could there be non-maximal worlds? Are logical and metaphysical modality coextensive? I think I like the S5 view. |
14685 | Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: A mythology gave us the idea that metaphysical necessity is truth in every world whatsoever, without restriction. But the notion of metaphysical modality comes first, and, like every notion of modality, it is restricted. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) |
14681 | Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: With its freedom from the constraint of metaphysical possibility, logical necessity may be construed as accommodating all the axioms and rules of S5. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
A reaction: He goes on to raise problems for this simple thought. The big question: what are the limits of what is actually possible? Compare: what are the limits of what is imaginable? what are the limits of what is meaningfully sayable? |
14676 | Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Intransitive relations are introduced into modal semantics for the purposes of interpreting various 'real' or restricted types of modalities, such as nomological necessity. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], II) | |
A reaction: The point here is that the (so-called) 'laws of nature' are held to change from world to world, so necessity in one could peter out in some more remote world, rather than being carried over everywhere. A very Humean view of such things. |
14689 | Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: The real meanings of the simple modal terms 'necessary' and 'possible' are not the same as the concepts of actual necessity and actual possibility, necessity and possibility according to the actual world. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
A reaction: If you were an 'actualist' (who denies everything except the actual world) then you are unlikely to agree with this. In unrestricted possible worlds, being true in one world makes it possible in all worlds. So actual necessity is possible everywhere. |
14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Total ways things cannot be are also 'worlds', or maximal ways for things to be. They are impossible worlds. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) | |
A reaction: This unorthodox view doesn't sound too plausible to me. To think of a circular square as a 'way things could be' sounds pretty empty, and mere playing with words. The number 7 could be the Emperor of China? |
14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Every argument I am aware of against impossible worlds confuses ways for things to be with ways things might have been, or worse, confuses ways things cannot be with ways for things to be that cannot exist - or worse yet, commits both errors. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
A reaction: He is claiming that 'ways for things to be' allows impossible worlds, whereas 'ways things might have been' appears not to. (I think! Read the paragraph yourself!) |
14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: If one ignores impossible worlds, then ways things might have been are the only ways for things to be that are left. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
A reaction: Impossible worlds are included in 'ways for things to be', but excluded from 'ways things might have been'. I struggle with a circle being square as a 'way for circles to be'. I suppose being the greatest philosopher is a way for me to be. |
14683 | Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: On my conception, the notions of metaphysical necessity and possibility are not defined or analyzed in terms of the apparatus of possible worlds. The order of analysis is just the reverse: possible worlds rely on the notion of what might have been. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
A reaction: This view seems to be becoming the new orthodoxy, and I certainly agree with it. I have no idea how you can begin to talk about possible worlds if you don't already have some idea of what 'possible' means. |
14672 | Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: I conceive of possible worlds as certain sorts of maximal abstract entities according to which certain things (facts, states of affairs) obtain and certain other things do not obtain. They are total ways things might have been. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) |
14675 | Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: As far as I can tell, worlds need not be logically consistent. The only restriction on worlds is that they must be (in some sense) 'maximal' ways for things to be. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) | |
A reaction: The normal idea of a maximal model is that it must contain either p or ¬p, and not both, so I don't think I understand this thought, but I pass it on. |
14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: It is not a good idea to think of possible worlds as sets of propositions, and at the same time to think of propositions as sets of possible worlds. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I n3) | |
A reaction: Salmon favours thinking of worlds as sets of propositions, and hence rejects the account of propositions as sets of worlds. He favours the 'Russellian' view of propositions, which seem to me to be the same as 'facts'. |
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Reference via sense solves Frege's four puzzles, of the informativeness of identity statements, the failure of substitutivity in attitude contexts, of negative existentials, and the truth-value of statements using nondenoting singular terms. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 1.1.1) | |
A reaction: These must then be compared with Kripke's three puzzles about referring via sense, and the whole debate is then spread before us. |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: The paradigm of a nondescriptional, directly referential, singular term is an individual variable. …The denotation of a variable… is semantically determined directly by the assignment of values. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 1.1.2) | |
A reaction: This cuts both ways. Maybe we are muddling ordinary reference with the simplicities of logical assignments, or maybe we make logical assignments because that is the natural way our linguistic thinking works. |
18885 | Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: Kripke and Putnam made unsubstantiated claims, indeed false claims, to the effect that the theory of direct reference has nontrivial essentialist import. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence: seven appendices [2005], Pref to Exp Ed) | |
A reaction: Kripke made very few claims, and is probably innocent of the charge. Most people agree with Salmon that you can't derive metaphysics from a theory of reference. |
19956 | True goodness is political, and consists of love of and submission to the laws [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The good man is he whose goodness is not Christian, but rather political, in the sense I have given. Such a man loves the laws of his land and is moved to act by them. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], Intro) | |
A reaction: I take this to have a lot in common with Aristotle, whose simple slogan for virtue I take to as 'be a good citizen'. |
19961 | Primitive people would be too vulnerable and timid to attack anyone, so peace would reign [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: A being concerned only with preservation would be very timid. In such a state every man would feel himself an inferior; he could scarcely imagine himself an equal. No one would seek to attack anyone else; peace would be the first law of nature. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
A reaction: Exactly the idea that Rousseau took up, and they both attack Hobbes for describing a more advanced stage of society, instead of focusing on the original state. A solitary individual would be crazy to launch attacks on other individuals. |
19962 | Men do not desire to subjugate one another; domination is a complex and advanced idea [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: It is unreasonable to impute to men, as Hobbes does, the desire to subjugate one another. The idea of sovereignty [l'empire] and domination is so complex and depends on so many other ideas, that it could not be the first to occur to men. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) |
19963 | People are drawn into society by needs, shared fears, pleasure, and knowledge [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: To his sense of weakness, man would soon add his needs. Encouraged by indications that their fear was shared, men would soon come together. They would feel the pleasure (and sexual attraction) of their own species. Knowledge then draws them into society. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
A reaction: He doesn't make the point about 'knowledge' very clear. |
20008 | People are guided by a multitude of influences, from which the spirit of a nation emerges [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Men are ruled by many causes: climate, religion, laws, maxims of government, examples drawn from the pasts, customs, manners. Out of them is formed the general spirit of a nation. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.04) | |
A reaction: This is one step away from Rousseau's general will, which is an attempt to give precise expression to this 'spirit of a nation'. |
19993 | In small republics citizens identify with the public good, and abuses are fewer [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a small republic, the public good is more keenly felt, better known, closer to every citizen; abuses are spread less widely, and consequently, are less tolerated. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.16) | |
A reaction: This idea of very small republics now seems outdated, but this idea still applies. Small states like the Baltic States (or Scotland?) have a better chance of the citizens identifying with the whole community. |
19992 | In a large republic there is too much wealth for individuals to manage it [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a large republic, there are large fortunes, and therefore but little moderation in the minds of men. its resources are too considerable to be entrusted to a citizen. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.16) |
20005 | The rich would never submit to a lottery deciding which part of their society should be slaves [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: I do not believe that anyone of [that small part of a nation that is rich and voluptuous] would submit to a lottery determining which part of the nation would be free, and which slave. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.09) | |
A reaction: Wonderful! This is exactly Rawls's 'initial position' and 'veil of ignorance'. It is used here to deconstruct implausible arguments in favour of slavery. |
19995 | All states aim at preservation, and then have distinctive individual purposes [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Although all states share the same general objective, to preserve themselves, each has its own particular purpose (such as aggrandisement, war, religion, commerce, tranquillity, navigation, liberty, pleasures of the ruler, glory, individual independence). | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.05) | |
A reaction: [he gives examples for each of the list in brackets] I'm trying to think of the distinctive purpose of the UK, and can't get beyond sport, music gigs and comedy shows. |
19964 | The natural power of a father suggests rule by one person, but that authority can be spread [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Some have thought that because nature has established the power of the parent, the most natural government is that of a single person. But the example of paternal power proves nothing. The inheritance by a father's brothers would support rule by the many. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.03) | |
A reaction: [last bit compressed] Locke pointed out that the mother has similar entitlement, and he and Rousseau agree in rejecting this idea. |
19986 | Monarchies can act more quickly, because one person is in charge [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Monarchical government has the great advantage that, since public business is guided by a single person, the executive power can operate more speedily. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.10) | |
A reaction: Liberal democracies are particularly hopeless at quick action, because so many views have to be heard. |
19972 | The nobility are an indispensable part of a monarchy [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a sense, nobility is one part of the essence of monarchy, whose fundamenta maxim is: 'without a monarchy, no nobility; without a nobility, no monarchy'. There are, of course, despots, but they are something else. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
A reaction: Hence the worst vice associated with a monarchy is patronage, even when the monarch is weak and 'constitutional'. |
19974 | Monarchs must not just have links to the people; they need a body which maintains the laws [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a monarchy, it is not enough to have intermediary ranks; there must also be a body that is a depositary of laws. They must announce the laws when they are made, and recall them to the public's attention when they are forgotten. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
A reaction: This is the crucial difference between a monarch and a despot, because the monarch must be subservient to the law. |
19976 | Ambition is good in a monarchy, because the monarch can always restrain it [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a republic ambition is pernicious, but in a monarchy it has a good effect; it gives life to that type of government. Its advantage lies in that it is not dangerous, because a monarchy can continue to restrain it. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 03.07) | |
A reaction: That is sometimes offered as a defence of the very weak British monarchy. |
19978 | In monarchies, men's actions are judged by their grand appearance, not their virtues [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In monarchies, men's actions are judged, not by whether they are good, but whether they appear attractive [belles]; not by whether they are just, but whether they appear grand; not by whether they are reasonable, but by whether they appear extraordinary. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.02) | |
A reaction: A person that comes to mind is the Duke of Buckingham under James I and Charles I. Or the Earl of Essex under Elizabeth I. |
19985 | In a monarchy, the nobility must be hereditary, to bind them together [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a monarchy, the laws must make the nobility hereditary, not to serve as the boundary between the power of the ruler and the weakness of the people, but as the tie that binds them together.... | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.09) | |
A reaction: This seems rather disingenuous. If the nobility are bound together in some tight manner, this immediately serves as a sharp boundary between them and the rest of the people. Monarchs are bound to want the strict boundary. |
19988 | A despot's agents must be given power, so they inevitably become corrupt [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: A government cannot be unjust without putting some power in the hands of its agents; it is impossible that they not profit from their position. Embezzlement is, therefore, natural to such governments. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.15) |
19977 | Despotism and honour are incompatible, because honour scorns his power, and lives by rules [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: How could a despot permit honour? Honour depends upon scorning life; the despot has power only because he can deprive men of life. How could honour tolerate the despot? Honour has fixed rules, ...but the despot has no rule. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 03.08) | |
A reaction: The old German aristocracy seem to have been utterly alienated and isolated by the Nazi regime. |
20007 | Tyranny is either real violence, or the imposition of unpopular legislation [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: There are two sorts of tyranny: that which is real and consists of the violence of government; and the tyranny of opinion, when those who govern institute things contrary to a nation's mode of thought. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.03) | |
A reaction: By this reckoning the abolition of the death penalty by the UK partliament was tyrannous, as it went against popular enthusiasm for it. Representative democracy is always in danger of drifting towards mild tyranny. |
19975 | Despots are always lazy and ignorant, so they always delegate their power to a vizier [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Anyone whom his senses inform continually that he is everything, and others nothing, is naturally lazy, voluptuous, and ignorant. Hence the establishment of a vizier, with power the same as his own, is a law fundamental to a despotic state. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.05) |
19989 | The will of a despot is an enigma, so magistrates can only follow their own will [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Under despotism, the law is nothing more than the will of the ruler. Even if the despot were wise, how could a magistrate follow a will unknown to him? He has no choice but to follow his own. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.16) |
19970 | If the nobility is numerous, the senate is the artistocracy, and the nobles are a democracy [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: When the nobility is numerous, there must be a senate to regulate those matters which the body of nobles is incapable of deciding. Thus aristocracy of a kind resides in the senate, democracy in the body of nobles, while the people is nothing. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.03) | |
A reaction: This presumes that the body of nobles elects the senate. |
19971 | Aristocracy is democratic if they resemble the people, but not if they resemble the monarch [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Aristocratic families ought to be, as much as possible, members of the people. The more an aristocracy resembles a democracy, the more perfect it is; the more it resembles a monarchy, the more imperfect. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.03) | |
A reaction: Aristocrats far from the big cities seem remarkably like the rest of the people. As soon as they approach the monarch's court, they aspire to dignity and power, and begin to spurn the citizens. |
19984 | Great inequality between aristocrats and the rest is bad - and also among aristocrats themselves [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In aristocratic state there are two main sources of disorders: excessive inequality between those who govern and those who are governed, and the same degree of inequality among the different members of the ruling group [corps]. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.08) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a very historically accurate observation, since aristocrats are always at one another's throats. But maybe junior aristocrats just need to be kept more firmly in their place. |
19980 | If a government is to be preserved, it must first be loved [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Government is like everything else in this world: if it is to be preserved, it must first be loved. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.05) | |
A reaction: Nice one! Right now there seems to be a declining love for representative democracy, even though almost everyone endorses it. |
19996 | A government has a legislature, an international executive, and a domestic executive [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In every government there are three sorts of powers: the legislative; the executivem in regard to those matters determined by the laws of nations; and the executive, in regard to those matters determined by civil law. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) |
19997 | The judiciary must be separate from the legislature, to avoid arbitrary power [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Were the judicial power joined to the legislative, the life and liberty of the citizens would be subject to arbitrary power. For the judge would then be the legislator. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
A reaction: This is the key 'separation of powers', which seems to be a mantra for nearly all theories of the state. |
19965 | The fundamental laws of a democracy decide who can vote [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The laws fundamental to a democracy are those that establish who is eligible to vote. (p.118 No less fundamental is the method of voting itself). | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
A reaction: Tricky groups now are teenagers, convicted criminals, people with damaged brains, and citizens who live abroad. Maybe people who evade paying tax should lose the right to vote. |
19968 | It is basic to a democracy that the people themselves must name their ministers [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: A democratic people may be said to have ministers only when these have been named by the people itself. Thus it is a maxim fundamental to this type of government that the people must name its ministers. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
A reaction: In the UK we don't do this. We elect local representatives, usually of a preferred party, and then they chose the ministers, and even the leader. The people who run our country are a long way from direct democracy. |
19969 | Voting should be public, so the lower classes can be influenced by the example of notable people [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: When the people votes it should do so in public. ...For it is necessary that the lower classes be enlightened by those of higher rank, that the precipitous qualities of the lower classes be held in check by the grave example of certain notables. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
A reaction: This sounds shocking to us, but the lower classes were largely illiterate. Nowadays we have television to tell us how the notables are going to vote, and the less notables seem to be increasingly unimpressed. |
19999 | All citizens (apart from the very humble poor) should choose their representatives [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: All citizens ought to have the right to choose their representatives by election. The only exception concerns those whose condition is so base that they are considered to have no will of their own. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
A reaction: This is an amazingly liberal view of the franchise for its time (though he may not be including women), but with a rather breathtaking coda! It may be hard for us now to grasp the very humble state of an illiterate peasant. |
19967 | In a democracy the people should manage themselves, and only delegate what they can't do [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a democracy, the people, which holds the sovereign power, ought itself to do everything it can do well; that which it cannot do well must be done by its ministers. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
A reaction: This is just what you see when a group of residents manages their own building. Citizens in representative democracies become utterly lazy about running their society, so that they won't even pick up litter, or report communal problems. |
19966 | A democratic assembly must have a fixed number, to see whether everyone has spoken [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: It is essential to fix the number of citizens who can participate in assemblies. Otherwise it would be uncertain whether all the people had spoken, or only a part of it. At Sparta the number was fixed at ten thousand. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
A reaction: This looks like an immediate injustice to the citizen who came 10,001 in the rankings. 10,000 is just a smallish football crowd, so we could manage it today. We could pick the 10,000 by sortition (by lot). Most people are fairly sensible! |
19998 | If deputies represent people, they are accountable, but less so if they represent places [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: When the deputies represent the body or estate of the people, as in Holland, they ought to be accountable to their constituents. When the deputies represent boroughs, as in England, the situation is not the same. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
A reaction: Not sure how this works. Modern UK MPs are accountable to the residents of their borough. Did the Dutch actually name the citizens that a deputy represented? |
20003 | Slaves are not members of the society, so no law can forbid them to run away [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: What civil law could prevent a slave from running away? Since he is not a member of society, why should the laws of society concern him? | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.02) | |
A reaction: Hm. Does this apply to children, who can't vote or stand for office? |
20000 | Slavery is entirely bad; the master abandons the virtues, and they are pointless in the slave [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: There is nothing good about the nature of slavery. The slave can achieve nothing by being virtuous. The master acquires all sorts of bad habits, and is accustomed to behaving with a total lack of moral virtues. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.01) | |
A reaction: Most slavery of that time took place in colonies, far remote from the moral judgments of the mother country. The temptations of such power over others are far too great for most masters to live virtuously. |
20006 | The demand for slavery is just the masters' demand for luxury [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The demand for slavery is the demand for luxury and voluptuousness; it has nothing to do with concern for public felicity. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.09) | |
A reaction: True monarchists and aristocratic elitists presumably think that a society should have one part which lives in great luxury. Where else are the fine arts and wonderful buildings going to come from? |
20009 | Freedom of speech and writing, within the law, is essential to preserve liberty [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: If a state is to enjoy and preserve liberty, everyone must be able to say what he thinks. In a free state, therefore, a citizen may speak and write anything not expressly forbidden by the laws. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.27) | |
A reaction: A commonplace now, but fairly bold then. I blame Freeborn John Lilburne for wild ideas like these. |
19994 | Freedom in society is ability to do what is right, and not having to do what is wrong [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a society where laws exist, liberty can consist only in being able to do what one ought to will, and in not being contrained to do what one ought not to will. ...If a citizen could do what the law prohibits, all others would have the same power. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.03) | |
A reaction: This sounds pretty quaint in 2017, but I love it. |
19981 | No one even thinks of equality in monarchies and despotism; they all want superiority [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In monarchies and despotic states, no one aspires to equality. Not even the idea occurs; everyone aspires to superiority. People of the very lowest rank only wish to rise in order to become masters of others. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.04) |
19991 | Equality is not command by everyone or no one, but command and obedience among equals [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The spirit of true equality consists, not in creating a situation in which everyone commands, or in which no one is commanded, but rather in obeying or commanding only our equals. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.03) | |
A reaction: I love this idea, but it is so easy to feel superior when you command, or to feel inferior when you are commanded. I take the solution to be the appointment of everyone in authority by those they will command (but fat chance of that). |
19990 | Democracy is corrupted by lack of equality, or by extreme equality (between rulers and ruled) [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Democracy is corrupted in two ways: when it loses the spirit of equality, and when the spirit of equality becomes extreme, that is, when everyone wishes to be the equal of those he has chosen to command him. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.02) | |
A reaction: The latter seems to be what happens when a referendum is called (as in Brexit 2016). The winners come to despise the elected representatives, if the latter disagree with the outcome. |
19982 | Some equality can be achieved by social categories, combined with taxes and poor relief [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Equality is so difficult that exactitude is not possible. It is enough to place citizens by a census within categories that reduce or fix differences. Then laws compensate for inequalities by taxes on the rich and relief given to the poor. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.05) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Placing citizens within categories (e.g. 'nobility') has long gone out of fashion. He doesn't say whether you tax the capital or the income of the rich. |
19983 | Democracies may sometimes need to restrict equality [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In some cases, equality among citizens may be denied by democracy for the utility of democracy. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.05) | |
A reaction: He cites people who make sacrifices for the public, and lower orders who are getting above themselves! The desire for equality quickly comes into conflict with other values. |
19959 | Prior to positive laws there is natural equity, of obedience, gratitude, dependence and merit [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The relations of equity precede the positive laws that establish them. It is right to conform to laws in a society; intelligent beings should be grateful for benefits; we remain dependent on those who create us; an injury merits the same in return. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.01) | |
A reaction: [the examples are compressed] A nice statement of the idea of natural law. It doesn't follow that because an injury merits retaliation, that it should be implemented (just that no one can complain if it happens). |
19960 | Sensation gives animals natural laws, but knowledge can make them break them [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Animals have natural laws because they are united by sensation, ...but they do not invariably follow thieir natural laws; these are better observed by vegetables, which have neither knowledge nor sensation. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
A reaction: With the example of vegetables the concept of natural law is drifting into the laws of nature, and evidently Montesquie makes no sharp distinction here. |
20002 | The death penalty is permissible, because its victims enjoyed the protection of that law [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: It is permissible to put a criminal to death because the law that punishes him was made to protect him. For example, a murderer has enjoyed the benefits of the law by which he is condemned. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.02) | |
A reaction: Dubious! We could add torture, and life imprisonment for parking offences, if this argument is sufficient justification. |
20010 | If religion teaches determinism, penalties must be severe; if free will, then that is different [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: When religion teaches that human actions are predetermined, penalties imposed by law ought to be more severe, for without these measures men would behave with complete abandon. If the dogma of religion is free will, the situation is altogether different. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 24.14) | |
A reaction: Presumably persuasion and influence come into the free will picture. Calvinist Geneva was determinist, and Catholic France for free will. |
20001 | The only right victors have over captives is the protection of the former [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: War can confer only one right over captives, and that is to ensure that they no longer harm victors. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.02) | |
A reaction: He is arguing against both the killing of captives, and their enslavement. |
19973 | The clergy are essential to a monarchy, but dangerous in a republic [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The power of the clergy is as dangerous in a republic, as it is appropriate to a monarchy. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
A reaction: This makes me look at the UK in a new light, with the clergy hovering around when the monarch is crowned, and the bishops sitting by right in the House of Lords. |
19987 | Religion has the most influence in despotic states, and reinforces veneration for the ruler [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In these [despotic] states, religion has more influence than anywhere else; it is fear added to fear. The peoples of the Mohammedan empires in part derive from their religion their extraordinary veneration for their rulers. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.14) | |
A reaction: I suppose religions have submission to authority built into them. |
20011 | Religion can support the state when the law fails to do so [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Religion can support the state when the laws themselves lack the power to do so. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 24.16) | |
A reaction: A thought which didn't occur to Spinoza, but then the thought merely confirms that religion offers a rival to the rule of law. |
20004 | French slavery was accepted because it was the best method of religious conversion [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Louis XIII was made extremely uneasy by the law that enslaved all the negroes in his colonies. But when told that this was the most efficacious way of converting them, he gave his consent. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.04) | |
A reaction: That is a spectaculary bad advert for giving an established religion a leading role in society. It is relevant to the upbringing of children, as well as to slaves. |
19979 | In monarchies education ennobles people, and in despotisms it debases them [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Just as the purpose of education in monarchies is to ennoble men's hearts, so its purpose in despotic states is to debase them. In despotic states education must be servile. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.03) | |
A reaction: This is an early insight into the way that all social institutions, such as education, are largely pawns of a larger political system. |
19957 | Teaching is the best practice of the general virtue that leads us to love everyone [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: It is when we instruct others that we can best practice that general virtue which teaches us to love everyone. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], Preface) | |
A reaction: A very nice thought. One tricky issue is that some people dislike, and even resent, being taught. If we all just adored both teaching and learning, we would be in a sort of paradise, but it doesn't seem to happen. |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |
Full Idea: There seems to be nothing in the theory of direct reference to block the anti-essentialist assertion that the substance water might have been the very same entity and yet have had a different chemical structure. | |
From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence (1st edn) [1981], 6.23.1) | |
A reaction: Indeed, water could be continuously changing its inner structure, while retaining the surface appearance that gets baptised as 'water'. We make the reasonable empirical assumption, though, that structure-change implies surface-change. |
19958 | Laws are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Laws, in the broadest meaning of the term, are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.01) | |
A reaction: Montesquieu is about to discuss social laws, but this is the clearest statement I have ever met of the essentialist view of the laws of nature. |