66 ideas
13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Archimedes gave a sort of definition of 'straight line' when he said it is the shortest line between two points. | |
From: report of Archimedes (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Gottfried Leibniz - New Essays on Human Understanding 4.13 | |
A reaction: Commentators observe that this reduces the purity of the original Euclidean axioms, because it involves distance and measurement, which are absent from the purest geometry. |
20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: In evolutionary explanations you may explain a population trait in terms of what it is for the sake of an individual, or explain it in terms of what it was for the sake of in earlier generations, but never in terms of what the trait is for the sake of. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 2 'Functions') | |
A reaction: So my ears are for the sake of my ability to hear, but that does not explain why I have ears. Should we say there is 'impersonal teleology' here, but no 'personal teleology'? Interesting. |
20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Not all explanation is causal. Explaining the beauty of a painting is not explaining why something happened. or why a move in chess is illegal, or why the square root of two is not a rational number. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Argument') | |
A reaction: It is surely plausible that the illegality of the chess move is caused (or 'determined', as I prefer to say) by the laws created for chess. The painting example seems right, though; what determined its configuration (think Pollock!) does not explain it. |
4363 | The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being? [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: An excellent reason for keeping the word 'person' out of ethics is that it is usually so thinly defined that it cannot generate any sense of 'good person'. If a person is just a self-conscious being, what would count as a good or bad one? | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.9 n20) | |
A reaction: A nice point. Locke's concept of a person (rational self-conscious being) lacks depth and individuality, and Hitler fulfils the criteria as well as any saint. But if Hitler wasn't a 'bad person', what was he bad at being? |
20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The philosophy of action is concerned with the nature of agency: what it is to be a full-blown agent, and what it is to realise one's agency in acting deliberately on things. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 1 'Being') | |
A reaction: 'Full-blown' invites the question of whether there could be a higher level of agency, beyond the capacity of human beings. Perhaps AI should design a theoretical machine that taps into those higher levels, if we can conceive of them. Meta-coherence! |
20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: My conclusion is that wherever you can identify causal processes that are sensitive to the recommendations of systems of justification, there you have found agency. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 9b 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: [the last paragraph of his book] Justification seems an awfully grand notion for a bee pollinating a flower, and I don't see human action as profoundly different. A reason might be a bad justification, but it might not even aspire to be a justification. |
20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: If psychological states and action results cannot be identified independently of one another, then it does not make sense to describe one as causing the other. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: This summarises a widely cited unease about the causal theory of action. Any account in action theory will need to separate out some components and explain their interrelation. Otherwise actions are primitives, and we can walk away. |
20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Are actions identical with bodily movements? Or are they identical with sequences of things starting inside the agent's mind with their intentions, going through their body movements and finishing with the external results being achieved? | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 9 'What is action') | |
A reaction: If bodily movements are crucial, this presumably eliminates speech acts. Speech or writing may involve some movement, but the movement is almost irrelevant to the nature of the action. Telepathy would do equally well. |
20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: When we do one action 'by' doing another, either the first action causes the process of the second, or the first action is part of the process of the second | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 9 'What is by') | |
A reaction: Stout says the second view is preferable, because pressing a switch does not cause my action of turning on the light (though it does cause the light to come on). |
20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: I do not do an event; I do an action; so actions are not events. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Are actions') | |
A reaction: Sounds conclusive, but it places a lot of weight on the concepts of 'I' and 'do', which leaves room for some discussion. This point is opposed to the causal theory of action, because causation concerns events. |
20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: You do not ride a bicycle just by moving your body in a certain way. You have to be on the bicycle to move in the right sort of way | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 9 'Are body') | |
A reaction: My favourite philosophical ideas are simple and conclusive. He also observes that walking involves the ground being walked on. In complex actions 'feedback' with the environment is involved. |
20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The rationalistic approach to agency says that what characterises intentional action is that it is subject to justification. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 2 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: [Anscombe is the chief articulator of this view] This seems to incorporate action into an entirely intellectual and even moral framework. |
20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The causal theory of action asserts that what characterises intentional action is the agent's intentions, or perhaps their beliefs and desires, causing their behaviour in the appropriate way. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 1 'Outline') | |
A reaction: The agent's intentions are either sui generis (see Bratman), or reducible to beliefs and desires (as in Hume). The classic problem for the causal theory is said to be 'deviant causal chains'. |
20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: In the vast majority of actions you need to look outwards to work out what you should do. An exam invigilator should consult the clock to design when to end the exam, not her state of mind. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 3 'The belief-') | |
A reaction: Stout defends externalist intentions. I remain unconvinced. It is no good looking at a clock if you don't form a belief about what it says, and the belief is obviously closer than the clock to the action. Intellectual virtue requires checking the facts. |
20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Should we try to understand what it is to have an intention in terms of what it is to act intentionally, or should we try to understand what it is to have an intention independently of what it is to act intentionally? | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Acting') | |
A reaction: Since you can have an intention to act, and yet fail to act, it seems possible to isolate intentions, but not to say a lot about them. Intention may be different prior to actions, and during actions. Early Davidson offered the derived view. |
20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Intentions are unlike desires. You can simultaneously desire two things that you know are incompatible. But when you form intentions you are embarking on a course of action, and there is a much stronger requirement of consistency. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Relationship') | |
A reaction: I'm not sure why anyone would identify intentions with desires. I would quite like to visit Japan, but have no current intention of doing so. I assume that the belief-plus-desire theory doesn't deny that an uninteresting intention is also needed. |
20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: One way to incorporate this [normative] feature of intentions would be to treat them like internal promises. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 8 'Intention') | |
A reaction: Interesting. The concept of a promise is obviously closely linked to an intention. If you tell your companion exactly where you intend your golf ball to land, you can thereby be held accountable, in a manner resembling a promise (but not a promise). |
20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: It is plausible that we find something characteristic of intentional agency when we look inward to the mental precursors of actions, and also when we look outward, to the sensitivity of action to what the environment gives us reasons to do. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 1 'How') | |
A reaction: This is Stout staking a claim for his partly externalist view of agency. I warm less and less to the various forms of externalism. How often does the environment 'give us reasons' to do things? How can we act, without internalising those reasons? |
20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The intentional action of including the word 'big' in a sentence does not require a prior intention to say it. What is required is that you say it with the intention of saying it. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Relationship') | |
A reaction: This seems right, but makes it a lot harder to say what an intention is, and to separate it out for inspection. You can't speak a good English sentence while withdrawing the intention involved. |
20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Bratman has to construe what we think of as shared intentions as not literally involving shared intentions, but as involving interrelating of individual intentions. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: Stout rejects this, for an account based on adaptability of behaviour. To me, naturalism and sparse ontology favour Bratman (1984) . I like my idea that shared intentions are conditional individual intentions. If the group refuses, I drop the intention. |
20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: When one person says to another 'please pass the salt', and the other engages with this utterance and understands it, they share the intention that this request is passed from the first person to the second. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Shared') | |
A reaction: Simple and intriguing. We form an intention, and then ask someone else to take over our intention. When the second person takes over the intention, I give up the intention to acquire the salt, because it is on its way. It's political. |
20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: It is unnatural to describe an individual as intending that the group do something together. ...What could possibly express my intention that we move the piano upstairs? | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Shared') | |
A reaction: Two possible answers: it makes sense if I have great authority within the group. 'I'm going to move the piano - you take that end'. Or, such expressions are implicitly conditional - 'I intend to move the piano (if you will also intend it)'. |
20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: An individual intention is a goal to which an individual's behaviour adapts. A shared intention is a goal to which a group of people's behaviour collectively adapts. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Shared') | |
A reaction: This is part of Stout's externalist approach to actions. One would have thought that an intention was a state of mind, not a goal in the world. The individual's goal can be psychological, but a group's goal has to be an abstraction. |
20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: If volitionism identifies the action with an act of will, this has the unpalatable consequence (for a Cartesian dualist) that walking does not happen in the material world. It would be the same act of walking if you had no legs, or no body at all. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 1 'Volitionism') | |
A reaction: Is this attacking a caricature version of volitionism? Descartes would hardly subscribe to the view that no legs are needed for walking. If my legs spasmodically move without an act of will, we typically deny that this is an action. |
20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Most philosophers are uneasy with understanding the causal aspect of actions in terms of an 'agent' making something happen. They prefer to think of some event in the agent, or state of the agent, making something happen. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 4 'The causal') | |
A reaction: There is a bit of a regress if you ask what caused the event or state of affairs. It is tempting to stop the buck at the whole agent, or else carry the reduction on down to neurons, physics and the outside world. |
20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Once you lose the agent from an account of action it stops being an account of action at all. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 4 'Agent') | |
A reaction: [he refers to Richard Taylor 1966] This could be correct without implying that agents offer a unique mode of causation. The concept of 'agent' is reducible. |
4355 | There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: There seem to be cases of 'inverse akrasia', in which the course of action actually followed is superior to the course of action recommended by the agent's best judgement. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: This must occur, as when an assassin lets his victim off, and then regrets the deed. It strengthens the case against Socrates, and in favour of their being two parts of the soul which compete to motivate our actions. |
20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Weakness of will is a threat to the outward-looking approach to agency. It seems you can hold one thing to be the thing to do, and at the same time do something else. Many regard this as a decisive reason to follow a more inward-looking approach. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 8 'Weakness') | |
A reaction: It hadn't struck me before that weakness of will is a tool for developing an accurate account of what is involved in normal agency. Some facts that guide action are internal to the agent, such as greed for sugary cakes. |
20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Instead of assuming that your motivation depends on your emotional state, we might say that your emotional state depends on how you are motivated to act. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 3 'Emotions') | |
A reaction: [He says this move is made by Kant, Thomas Nagel and McDowell] Stout favours the view that it is external facts which mainly give rise to actions, and presumably these facts are intrinsically motivating, prior to any emotions. I don't disagree. |
20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: If wanting something most were the same as having the most powerful feelings about it, then as an ascetic (rejecting what you most powerfully desire), your wanting most to eat a bun would be your reason for not eating the bun. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 3 'The belief-') | |
A reaction: This sounds like reason overruling desire, but the asceticism can always be characterised as a meta-desire. |
4325 | Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient? [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: In contemporary philosophy of action, there is a fervid debate about whether any intentional action must be prompted in part by desire, or whether it is possible to be moved to action by a belief alone. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Intro) | |
A reaction: I want a cool belief to be sufficient to produce an action, because it will permit at least a Kantian dimension to ethics, and make judgement central, and marginalise emotivism, which is the spawn of Satan. |
4351 | It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: I personally believe that philosophy is the best route yet devised to the achievement of virtue, but it is clearly not essential. All the philosophers I meet are remarkably virtuous, but that may be a chicken/egg thing. |
20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: Beliefs, desires and intentions are states of mind rather than events, but events are the only things that figure in causal relations. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Do beliefs') | |
A reaction: This is exactly why we have the concept of 'the will' - because it is a mental state to which we attribute active causal powers. We then have to explain how this 'will' is related to the other mental states (which presume motivate or drive it?). |
20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The idea running through the work of Aristotle, Kant, Anscombe and Davidson is that explanation of action involves justifying that action or making it rationally intelligible. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Psychological') | |
A reaction: Stout goes on to say that instead you could give the 'rationalisation' of the action, which is psychological facts which explain the action, without justifying it. The earlier view may seem a little optimistic and intellectualist. |
20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: It is widely accepted that to get involved in the causal process of acting an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 5 'Psychological') | |
A reaction: This doesn't say whether the 'psychological states' have to be fully conscious. That seems unlikely, given the speed with which we perform some sequences of actions, such as when driving a car, or playing a musical instrument. |
20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: For action to be properly yours it must be you who is the causal originator of the action, rather than some state or event within you. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 4 'Agent') | |
A reaction: [He invokes Chisholm 1966] The idea here is that we require not only 'agent causation', but that the concept of agent must include free will. It seems right we ought to know whether or not an action is 'mine'. Nothing too fancy is needed for this! |
20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: In a relativistic notion of justification, in a particular system, there is a reason for a vandal to smash public property, even though, using an absolute conception of justification, there is no reason for him to do so. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 3 'The difference') | |
A reaction: I suppose Kantians would say that the aim of morality is to make your personal (relative) justification coincide with what seems to be the absolute justification. |
4329 | After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: When one moral requirement has overriden another in a dilemma, there is still a 'remainder', so that regret, or the recognition of some new requirement, are still appropriate. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This is a powerful point on behalf of virtue ethics. There is a correct way to feel about the application of rules and calculations. Judges sleep well at night, but virtuous people may not. |
4330 | Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: With respect to resolvable dilemmas, the deontologist's strategy is to argue that the 'conflict' between the two rules which has generated the dilemma is merely apparent. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This assumes that the rules can't conflict (because they come for God, or pure reason), but we might say that there are correct rules which do conflict. Morality isn't physics, or tennis. |
4340 | You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Doing what is, say, dishonest solely in the context of a tragic dilemma does not entail being dishonest, possessing that vice. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3 n8) | |
A reaction: This seems right, although it mustn't be thought that the dishonesty is thereby excused. Virtuous people find being dishonest very painful. |
4341 | Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: The actions a virtuous agent is forced to in tragic dilemmas fail to be good actions because the doing of them, no matter how unwillingly or involuntarily, mars or ruins a good life. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Of course, only virtuous people have their lives ruined by such things. For the cold or the wicked it is just water off a duck's back. |
20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: The real signficance of the doctrine of double effect can be public relations. You can put a better spin on an action by describing a death as an unfortunate collateral consequence, rather than as a goal of the action | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Doctrine') | |
A reaction: The problem is that it the principle is usually invoked in situations where it is not clear where some bad effect is intended, and it is very easy to lie in such situations. In football, we can never quite decide whether a dangerous tackle was intended. |
4358 | Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Some critics say virtue is not necessary for eudaimonia (since the wicked sometimes flourish), and others say it is not sufficient (because virtuous behaviour sometimes ruins a life). | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: Both criticisms seem wrong (the wicked don't 'flourish', and complete virtue never ruins lives, except in tragic dilemmas). But it is hard to prove them wrong. |
4337 | Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Adolescents tend to be much more gormless about consequences than they are about ideals. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2 n12) | |
A reaction: Very accurate, I'm afraid. But this cuts both ways. They seem to need education not in virtue, but simply in consequences. |
4324 | Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: The trouble with 'flourishing' as a translation of 'eudaimonia' is that animals and even plants can flourish, but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Intro) | |
A reaction: 'Flourishing' still seems better than 'happy', which is centrally used now to refer to a state of mind, not a situation. 'Well being' seems good, and plants are usually permitted that. |
4359 | When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: If you think about bringing up children to prepare them for life, rather than converting the wicked or convincing the moral sceptic, isn't virtue the most reliable bet? | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: A very convincing idea. They haven't the imagination to grasp consequences properly, or sufficient abstract thought to grasp principles, or the political cunning to negotiate contracts, but they can grasp ideals of what a good person is like. |
20195 | Eudaimonia first; virtue is a trait which promotes it; right acts are what virtues produce [Hursthouse, by Zagzebski] |
Full Idea: Hursthouse defines a virtue as a trait humans need to flourish or live well, ...so 'eudaimonia' is conceptually foundational, the concept of virtue is then derived, and the concept of a right act is derived from that. | |
From: report of Rosalind Hursthouse (Virtue Theory and Abortion [1992], p.226) by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind II.1 | |
A reaction: Zagzebski is mapping different types of virtue theory. The purest theories say that virtue is intrinsically good. The others seem to be instrumental, in varying degrees. Zagzebski makes good motivations prior. |
4336 | Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Any codification ranking the virtues, like any codification ranking the rules, is bound to come up against cases where we will want to change the rankings. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This seems right, and yet it feels like a slippery slope. Am I supposed to be virtuous and wise, but have no principles? Infinite flexibility can lead straight to wickedness. Even the wise need something to hang on to. |
4334 | Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: One criticism of virtue ethics is that it lamentably fails to come up with a priority ranking of the virtues. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: However, one might refer to man's essential function, or characteristic function, and one might derive the virtues of a good citizen from the nature of a good society. |
4361 | Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: A good social animal is well fitted for 1) individual survival, 2) continuance of its species, 3) characteristic freedom from pain and enjoyment, and 4) good characteristic functioning of its social group. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: This feels right, but brings out the characteristic conservativism of virtue theory. A squirrel which can recite Shakespeare turns out to be immoral. |
4349 | Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Virtue must surely be compatible with a fair amount of inarticulacy about one's reasons for action. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: Virtuous people may be unclear, but we are entitled to hope for clarification from moral philosophers. The least we can hope for is some distinction between virtue and vice. |
4352 | Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful' [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Acting virtuously, in the way the virtuous agent acts, namely from virtue, is sufficient for being 'morally motivated' or acting 'from a sense of duty'. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Fine, but it invites the question of WHY virtue is motivating, just as one can ask this of maximum happiness, or duty, or even satisfaction of selfish desires. |
4353 | If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally? [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: If you are inclined to think that 'moral motivation', acting because you think it is right, must be an all-or-nothing matter, its presence determined by the agent's mind at the moment of acting, do, please, remember children. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: I agree about the vital importance of remembering children when discussing morality. However, Kantians might legitimately claim that when a child is simply trained to behave well, it has not yet reached the age of true morality. |
4346 | The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is a critique of Hume, and of utlitarianism. It pushes us either to the concept of duty, or the concept of virtue (independent of right feeling). |
4339 | According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: According to virtue ethics, in a given situation two different agents may do what is right, what gets a tick of approval, despite the fact that each fails to do what the other did. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: You could certainly have great respect for two entirely different decisions about a medical dilemma, if they both showed integrity and good will, even if one had worse consequences than the other. |
4354 | Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: I am prepare to stick my neck out and say that extreme Nazis or racists (say) have poisoned characters to such an extent that none of their character traits could ever count as a virtue. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Hard to justify, but it is hard to respect a mass murderer because they seem to love their dog or the beauty of music or flowers. They can't possibly appreciate the Platonic Form of love or beauty? |
4364 | Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: It may well be that being particularly well endowed with respect to some virtues inevitably involves being not very well endowed in others. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: Maybe, but this sound a bit like an excuse. Newton wasn't very nice, but Einstein was. I can't believe in a finite reservoir of virtue. |
4356 | We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: That we have some intuitive belief in the unity of the virtues is shown by our reaction to stories of a person who has shown an exceptional virtue, but also done something morally repellent. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: A nice observation, but not enough to establish the unity of virtue. People tend to love all virtue, but it is not obviously impossible to love selected virtues and despise others (e.g. love courage, and despise charity). |
4327 | Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Though it is sometimes said that deontologists 'take no account of consequences', this is manifestly false, for many actions we deliberate about only fall under rules or principles when we bring in their predicted consequences. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: An important defence of deontology, which otherwise is vulnerable to the 'well-meaning fool' problem. It is no good having a good will, but refusing to think about consequences. |
4335 | 'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: If morality is strongly 'codifiable', it should consist of rules which provide a decision procedure, and it should be equally applicable by the virtuous and the non-virtuous, without recourse to wisdom. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: A key idea. Religions want obedience, and Kant wants morality to be impersonal, and most people want morality which simple uneducated people can follow. And yet how can wisdom ever be irrelevant? |
4328 | Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: There are some forms of utilitarianism which aim to be entirely 'value-free' or empirical, such as those which define happiness in terms of the satisfaction of actual desires or preferences, regardless of their content. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This point makes it clear that preference utilitarianism is a doomed enterprise. For a start I can prefer not to be a utilitarian. You can only maximise something if you value if. Are preferences valuable? |
4343 | We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Utilitarianism says there is nothing intrinsically wrong with lying, but examples of bare-faced lying to increase happiness drive us to deontology; but then examples where telling the truth has appalling consequences drive us back to utilitarianism again. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of why virtue theory suddenly seemed appealing. Deontology can cope, though, by seeing other duties when the consequences are dreadful. |
4338 | Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Deontologists characteristically maintain that utilitarians have made out a particular hard case to be too simple. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Utilitarianism certainly seems to ignore the anguish of hard dilemmas, but that is supposed to be its appeal. If you think for too long, every dilemma begins to seem hopeless. |
4365 | We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Our characteristic way of going on, which distinguishes us from all the other species of animals, is a rational way, which is any way we can rightly see as good, as something we have reason to do. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch10) | |
A reaction: Some people more than others, and none of us all the time. Romantics see rationality as a restraint on the authentic emotional and animal life. 'Be a good animal'. However, I agree. |
20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |
Full Idea: In the Aristotelian approach to causation (unlike the Humean approach, involving separate events), A might cause B by being an input into some process (realisation of potentiality) that results in B. | |
From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 9 'Trying') | |
A reaction: Stout relies quite heavily on this view for his account of human action. I like processes, so am sympathetic to this view. If there are two separate events, it is not surprising that Hume could find nothing to bridge the gap between them. |
4350 | If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith? [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: If people perform virtuous actions simply because they are commanded by God, would they cease to perform such actions if they lost their faith in God? | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: To be consistent, the answer might be 'yes', but that invites the response that only intrinsically evil people need to be Christians. The rest of us can be good without it. |