20 ideas
| 20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
| Full Idea: Despair over metaphysics will not change until it has shaken off the incubus of a perverted epistemology, which has left thought in a hopeless tangle - until common-sense critical realism is made the starting point for investigating reality. | |
| From: Stephen S. Colvin (The Common-Sense View of Reality [1902], p.144) | |
| A reaction: It seems to me that this is what has happened to analytic metaphysics since Kripke. Careful discussions about the nature of an object, or a category, or a property, are relying on unquestioned robust realism. Quite right too. |
| 13007 | Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Archimedes gave a sort of definition of 'straight line' when he said it is the shortest line between two points. | |
| From: report of Archimedes (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Gottfried Leibniz - New Essays on Human Understanding 4.13 | |
| A reaction: Commentators observe that this reduces the purity of the original Euclidean axioms, because it involves distance and measurement, which are absent from the purest geometry. |
| 20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
| Full Idea: Were there no inflexible reality outside of the individual, opposing and limiting it, knowledge of the self and the non-self would never develop. | |
| From: Stephen S. Colvin (The Common-Sense View of Reality [1902], p.140) | |
| A reaction: Presumably opponents would have to say that such 'knowledge' is an illusion. This is in no way a conclusive argument, but I approach the problem of realism in quest of the best explanation, and this idea is important evidence. |
| 20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
| Full Idea: It is the determination of the external world from the practical standpoint, from the standpoint of interest, that may be defined as the common-sense view of reality. | |
| From: Stephen S. Colvin (The Common-Sense View of Reality [1902], p.141) | |
| A reaction: Probably more appropriately named the 'pragmatic' view of reality. Relying on what is 'practical' seems to offer some objectivity, but relying on 'interest' rather less so. Can I be an anti-realist when life goes badly, and a realist when it goes well? |
| 20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
| Full Idea: Arguments for the absolute unknowability or non-existence of an external object only works by assuming that another external object, an individual, is known completely in so far as that individual expresses a judgement about an external object. | |
| From: Stephen S. Colvin (The Common-Sense View of Reality [1902], p.145) | |
| A reaction: Anti-realism is a decay that eats into everything. You can't doubt all the externals without doubting all the internals as well. |
| 20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
| Full Idea: If objects are doubted because the same object appears differently at different times and circumstances, in order that this judgement shall have weight it must be assumed that the object under question is the same in its different presentations. | |
| From: Stephen S. Colvin (The Common-Sense View of Reality [1902], p.145) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Scepticism could eat into the underlying object as well. Is the underlying object a 'substrate'? If so, what's that? Is the object just a bundle of a properties? If so, there is no underlying object. |
| 20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine [that all we can know is the relations between subject and object] is in its essence self-contradictory, since our very idea of thing implies that it is something in relation either actually or potentially. | |
| From: Stephen S. Colvin (The Common-Sense View of Reality [1902], p.150) | |
| A reaction: Ladyman and Ross try to defend an account of reality based entirely on relations. I'm with Colvin on this one. All accounts of reality based either on pure relations or pure functions have a huge hole in their theory. |
| 23529 | Conduct is not isolated from its effect on the moral code [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: We must not view conduct in isolation from its effect on the moral code. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Moderate') | |
| A reaction: The moral code may be excessively conservative, but there is no denying this point. Extreme individualistic libertarians must recognise that 'no man is an island'. |
| 23530 | The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: For Mill and De Tocqueville the greatest of the dangers was not that in fact the majority might use their power to oppress a minority, but that, with the spread of democratic ideas, it might come to be thought unobjectionable that they should do so. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], III 'Populism') | |
| A reaction: This was vivid in the 2016 Brexit referendum, which was 52-48 in favour of leaving. There were lots voices saying 'you lost, get over it'. It should be a basic (if neglected) principle that the winners of elections now represent the whole population. |
| 23522 | In an organised society all actions have some effect on other people [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: In an organised society it is impossible to identify classes of actions which harm no one, or no one but the individual who does them. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Enforcement') | |
| A reaction: This is attributed to 'some critics' of Mill. I agree with this. The idea that actions performed behind close doors never come to influence social life is an illusion, held by people whose quest for freedom is selfish. |
| 23528 | The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: Recognition of individual liberty as a value involves, as a minimum, acceptance of the principle that the individual may do what he wants, even if others are distressed when the learn what it is that he does. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Private') | |
| A reaction: He notes that there could be other reasons to block the freedom, such as harm done. This idea seems to identify a key component of liberalism - that we must all tolerate actions which we dislike. |
| 21004 | Hart (against Bentham) says human rights are what motivate legal rights [Hart,HLA, by Sen] |
| Full Idea: Whereas Bentham saw rights as a 'child of law', Herbert Hart's view takes the form of seeing human rights as, in effect, 'parents of law'; they motivate specific legislations. | |
| From: report of H.L.A. Hart (The Concept of Law [1961]) by Amartya Sen - The Idea of Justice 17 'Ethics' | |
| A reaction: [He cites Hart 1955 'Are there any natural rights?'] I agree with Hart. It is clearer if the parents of law are not referred to as 'rights'. You can demand a right, but it is only a right when it is awarded to you. |
| 23523 | The principle of legality requires crimes to be precisely defined in advance of any action [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: The principle of legality requires criminal offences to be as precisely defined as possible, so that it can be known with reasonable certainty beforehand what acts are criminal and what are not. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Conspiracy') | |
| A reaction: Hart is discussing a breach of this, where moral judgements are used to condemn something which was not obviously illegal. Families and schools don't have such precise rules, but it seems needed in a vast and pluralistic society. |
| 23524 | Some private moral issues are no concern of the law [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: An official report [of 1957] on homosexuality declared that 'there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business'. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Conspiracy') | |
| A reaction: We might wonder whether these issues are actually moral, if the law is not interested in them. Are they just a matter of taste? The law doesn't enforce a preference for Mozart over Salieri. |
| 23521 | Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: Four questions: 1) Has the development of law been influenced by morals? 2) Must reference to morality enter into an adequate definition of law or legal system? 3) Is law open to moral criticism? 4) Does immorality justify legal punishment? | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Enforcement') | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Three nice questions, which are his agenda for the book. It is obvious that immoral laws can be created, and that laws can be criticised for being too concerned with morality, so there is no clear general answer to these dilemmas. |
| 23525 | Is the enforcement of morality morally justifiable? [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: The question about morality and the law is also a question of morality - of whether the enforcement of morality is morally justified. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Positive') | |
| A reaction: This is a very nice meta-moral question. What moral standards are used to justify the enforcement of moral standards? Presumably there should be no contradiction between the levels, to brutally enforce softness, or softly recommend brutality? |
| 23526 | Modern law still suppresses practices seen as immoral, and yet harmless [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: English and American law still [in1963] contain rules which suppress practices condemned as immoral by positive morality though they involve nothing that would be ordinarily thought of as harm to other persons. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Use') | |
| A reaction: He says most of the examples of this concern sexual practices. In the UK we have moved away from such laws, but many states of the USA still maintain them (or are reintroducing them, in 2023). |
| 20932 | Positive law needs secondary 'rules of recognition' for their correct application [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J] |
| Full Idea: Hart says we have secondary legal 'rules of recognition', by which primary positive law is recognised and applied in a regulated manner. | |
| From: report of H.L.A. Hart (The Concept of Law [1961]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction 6 'Rules' | |
| A reaction: The example of the authority of a particular court is given. |
| 20931 | Hart replaced positivism with the democratic requirement of the people's acceptance [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J] |
| Full Idea: Hart replaced Austin's concept of positive law as sovereign command with a more democratic ideal. In modern law-based societies the authority of law depends on the people's acceptance of a law's enduring validity. | |
| From: report of H.L.A. Hart (The Concept of Law [1961]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction 6 'Hart' | |
| A reaction: Presumably the ancestor of this view is the social contract of Hobbes and Locke. |
| 23527 | Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: Leslie Stephen argued that when the question is how severely an offender should be punished, an estimate of the degree of moral wickedness involved in the crime is always relevant. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Moral') | |
| A reaction: [Stephen 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' 1873] The degree of responsibility (after excuses etc.) is obviously also highly relevant. If vicious murder is punished more harshly, that seems to be an assessment of the character of the murderer. |