Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Augustin-Louis Cauchy, Democritus (attrib) and Richard Taylor

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34 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: In power of persuasion, reasoning is far stronger than gold.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B051), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.04.12
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Values that approach zero, becoming less than any quantity, are 'infinitesimals' [Cauchy]
     Full Idea: When the successive absolute values of a variable decrease indefinitely in such a way as to become less than any given quantity, that variable becomes what is called an 'infinitesimal'. Such a variable has zero as its limit.
     From: Augustin-Louis Cauchy (Cours d'Analyse [1821], p.19), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.4
     A reaction: The creator of the important idea of the limit still talked in terms of infinitesimals. In the next generation the limit took over completely.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
When successive variable values approach a fixed value, that is its 'limit' [Cauchy]
     Full Idea: When the values successively attributed to the same variable approach indefinitely a fixed value, eventually differing from it by as little as one could wish, that fixed value is called the 'limit' of all the others.
     From: Augustin-Louis Cauchy (Cours d'Analyse [1821], p.19), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.4
     A reaction: This seems to be a highly significan proposal, because you can now treat that limit as a number, and adds things to it. It opens the door to Cantor's infinities. Is the 'limit' just a fiction?
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Physical beauty is merely animal unless intelligence be present.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B105)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: Kant and Mill were in total agreement in trying to give content to the distinction between moral right and wrong, without recourse to any divine lawgiver.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.14)
     A reaction: A nice analysis, in tune with MacIntyre and others, who see such attempts as failures. It is hard, however, to deny the claims of rational principles, or of suffering, in our moral framework. I agree with Taylor's move back to virtue, but it ain't simple.
Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: If morality is based on wrong (meaning 'forbidden'), right ('permitted'), and obligatory ('required'), we are led to ask 'Who is it that thus permits, forbids or requires that certain things be done or not done?'
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Clear reinforcement for Nietzsche's attack on conventional morals, which Taylor sees as a relic of medieval religious attitudes. Taylor says Kant offered a non-religious version of the same authority. I agree. Back to the Greek pursuit of excellence!
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Do not say or do what is base, even when you are alone. Learn to feel shame in your own eyes much more than before others.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B244), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.31.7
     A reaction: I like this. How you think and behave when unobserved is the true test of who you are. Feeling shame at a very private failing is an interesting phenomenon.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Good breeding in cattle depends on physical health, but in men on a well-formed character.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B057), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.29.18
     A reaction: In our ultra-democratic age (supposedly) it is heresy to talk about good breeding, or some people being superior to others. But surely people should aim to improve their characters?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B073), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.5.23
     A reaction: Is it possible to love something without seeing it as beautiful? A badly crippled dog, for example. If not, that seems to reveal something about beauty.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: Pleasures can be located in a particular part of the body, and can be momentary, and come and go, but this is not the case with happiness.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.16)
     A reaction: Probably no one ever thought that pleasure and happiness were actually identical - merely that pleasure is the only cause and source of happiness. These are good objections to that hypothesis. Pleasure simply isn't 'the good'.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: The word 'eudaimonia' means literally 'having a good demon', which is apt, because it suggests some kind of supreme good fortune, of the sort which might be thought of as a bestowal.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.5)
     A reaction: Beware of etymology. This implies that eudaimonia is almost entirely beyond a person's control, but Aristotle doesn't think that. A combination of education and effort can build on some natural gifts to create a fully successful life.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: For all men, good and true are the same; but pleasant differs for different men.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B069)
     A reaction: Truth is not 'for' anyone, but there's good-in-itself, and good-for-me. Are there some pleasures we should all enjoy (such as watching our children flourish)?
We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: One should choose not every pleasure, but only that concerned with the beautiful.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B207), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.22
     A reaction: The pleasures we should prefer are those which involve the whole person, rather than the mere stimulation of one sense. Sez me.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Accept no pleasure unless it is beneficial.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B074)
     A reaction: Maybe all pleasures bestow some benefit - even if they are linked to harm. I struggle to see what is wrong with a harmless and non-beneficial pleasure, and I doubt if anyone could explain it to me.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B194), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.03.46
     A reaction: Only, of course, for those able to perceive the nobility. In what does the 'nobility' consist, other than in the morally acceptable pleasure? Hard to explain 'noble'. Just 'wow!'?
Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Moderation multiplies pleasures, and increases pleasure.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B211), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.27
     A reaction: So moderation is a sneaky trick to avoid moderation? I presume the most intense pleasures are mostly unfamiliar, and so add novelty to the mix. Apart from eating chocolate, of course.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not a man.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B070)
     A reaction: Not factually correct, since the world is full of adults who have immoderate desires (notably for money). However, there are plenty of grown ups who don't seem very adult.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The brave man is not only he who overcomes the enemy, but he who is stronger than pleasures. Some men are masters of cities, but are enslaved by women.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B214), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.07.25
     A reaction: I'm not sure if 'bravery' is the relevant virtue here.Sounds like self-control or temperance. I suspect that mastering a city is quite pleasurable, if that's your thing.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
To Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: To the Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.10)
     A reaction: A problem case might be a work of art, but one might reply that there is no obvious perfection there because there is no clear function. For artefacts and organisms the principle seems very good. But 'Is the Cosmos good?'
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Refrain from crimes not through fear but through duty [deon].
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B041), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.95
     A reaction: [not sure about the translation here]
A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: To live badly is not just to live badly, but to spend a long time dying.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B160), quoted by (who?) - where?
Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Virtue consists, not in avoiding wrong-doing, but in having no wish thereto.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B062), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.17.37
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Repentance for shameful deeds is salvation in life.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B043)
Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: More men become good through practice than by nature.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B242), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.66
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B190), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.91
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the man wronged.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B045)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Unless a point of satiety is reached, the desire for money is far more cruel than the utmost poverty, because the greater the desire, the greater the need
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B219), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.10.43
Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Small appetite makes poverty equivalent to wealth.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B284), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.33.24
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: The friendship of one intelligent man is better than that of all the unintelligent.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B098)
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: In modern moral thinking, obligation is something every responsible person is supposed to have, but it is not an obligation to the state, or society, or humanity, or even to God. It is an obligation standing by itself.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.12)
     A reaction: This nicely pinpoints how some our moral attitudes are relics of religion. Taylor wants a return to virtue, but one could respond by opting for the social contract (with very clear obligations) or Kantian 'contractualism' (answering to rational beings).
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B042), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.44.68
     A reaction: Something wrong with the translation here, if there is no Greek word for 'duty'.
If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: Once people are declared to be images of God, just by virtue of minimal humanity, they have, therefore, no greater individual excellence to aspire to, and their purpose became one of obligation, that is, obedience to God's will.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
     A reaction: An interesting and plausible historical analysis. There is a second motivation for the change, though, in Grotius's desire to develop a more legalistic morality, focusing on actions rather than character. Taylor's point is more interesting, though.
The ethics of duty requires a religious framework [Taylor,R]
     Full Idea: The ethics of duty cannot be sustained independently of a religious framework.
     From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This is a big challenge to Kant, echoing Nietzsche's jibe that Kant just wanted to be 'obedient'. The only options are either 'natural duties', or 'duties of reason'. Reason may have a pull (like pleasure), but a 'duty'? Difficult.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: Poverty in a democracy is as preferable to what is called prosperity under autocracy as freedom is to slavery.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B251), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.40.42