Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Augustin-Louis Cauchy, Ullin T. Place and Alexander Baumgarten

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7 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Values that approach zero, becoming less than any quantity, are 'infinitesimals' [Cauchy]
     Full Idea: When the successive absolute values of a variable decrease indefinitely in such a way as to become less than any given quantity, that variable becomes what is called an 'infinitesimal'. Such a variable has zero as its limit.
     From: Augustin-Louis Cauchy (Cours d'Analyse [1821], p.19), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.4
     A reaction: The creator of the important idea of the limit still talked in terms of infinitesimals. In the next generation the limit took over completely.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
When successive variable values approach a fixed value, that is its 'limit' [Cauchy]
     Full Idea: When the values successively attributed to the same variable approach indefinitely a fixed value, eventually differing from it by as little as one could wish, that fixed value is called the 'limit' of all the others.
     From: Augustin-Louis Cauchy (Cours d'Analyse [1821], p.19), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.4
     A reaction: This seems to be a highly significan proposal, because you can now treat that limit as a number, and adds things to it. It opens the door to Cantor's infinities. Is the 'limit' just a fiction?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place]
     Full Idea: My thesis is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional.
     From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 1)
     A reaction: An idea with few friends, but I really like it, because it offers the prospect of a unified account of physical nature and the mind/brain. It seems reasonable to say my mind is essentially a bunch of dispositions. Mind is representations + dispositions.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Baumgarten founded aesthetics in 1750 [Baumgarten, by Tolstoy]
     Full Idea: Baumgarten founded aesthetics in the year 1750.
     From: report of Alexander Baumgarten (Aesthetica [1739]) by Leo Tolstoy - What is Art? Ch.2
     A reaction: He gave it a label, separated it off from the rest of philosophy, and made taste the main focus. The philosophy of art goes back to at least Plato's 'Republic' and 'Symposium'.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
Beauty is an order between parts, and in relation to the whole [Baumgarten, by Tolstoy]
     Full Idea: Beauty is defined by Baumgarten as a correspondence, that is, an order of parts in their mutual relations to each other and in their relation to the whole.
     From: report of Alexander Baumgarten (Aesthetica [1739]) by Leo Tolstoy - What is Art? Ch.3
     A reaction: This may be one aspect of what is beautiful, but rather more than a nice arrangement is probably needed for art. We must distinguish flower arranging from poetic drama. Some masterpieces are rather messily arranged.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Perfection comes through the senses (Beauty), through reason (Truth), and through moral will (Good) [Baumgarten, by Tolstoy]
     Full Idea: For Baumgarten, Beauty is the Perfect (the Absolute), recognised through the senses; Truth is the Perfect perceived through reason; Goodness is the Perfect reached by moral will.
     From: report of Alexander Baumgarten (Aesthetica [1739]) by Leo Tolstoy - What is Art? Ch.3
     A reaction: At last, after many years of searching, I have found the origin of that great trio of ideals: Beauty, Goodness and Truth. Tolstoy sneers at them, but a person could do a lot worse than spending their lives trying to promote them.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place]
     Full Idea: Dispositions are the substantive laws, not, as for Armstrong, of nature in general, but of the nature of individual entities whose dispositional properties they are.
     From: Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 6)
     A reaction: [He notes that Nancy Cartwright 1989 agrees with him] I like this a lot. I tend to denegrate 'laws', because of their dubious ontological status, but this restores laws to the picture, in the place where they belong, in the stuff of the world.