Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Benjamin Constant, Walter Burley and Berit Brogaard

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6 ideas

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
16698 Days exist, and yet they seem to be made up of parts which don't exist [Burley]
     Full Idea: I grant that a successive being is composed out of non-beings, as is clear of a day, which is composed of non-entities. Some part of this day is past and some future, and yet this day is.
     From: Walter Burley (Commentary on 'Physics' [1325], III text 11,f.65rb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
     A reaction: The dilemma of Aristotle over time infected the scholastic attempt to give an account of successive entities. A day is a wonderfully elusive entity for a metaphysician.
16690 Unlike permanent things, successive things cannot exist all at once [Burley]
     Full Idea: This is the difference between permanent and successive things: that a permanent thing exists all at once, or at least can exist all at once, whereas it is incompatible with a successive thing to exist all at once.
     From: Walter Burley (Commentary on 'Physics' [1325], III txt 11,f.65rb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.1
     A reaction: Permanent things sound like what are now called 'three-dimensional' objects, but scholastic 'entia successiva' are not the same as spacetime 'worms' or collections of temporal stages.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
16719 The primary qualities are mixed to cause secondary qualities [Burley]
     Full Idea: Secondary qualities are caused by a mixture of primary qualities.
     From: Walter Burley (De formis [1330], pars post p.65), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2
     A reaction: Like paint. He probably has in mind hot, cold, wet and dry as the primary qualities.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
18424 If two people can have phenomenally identical experiences, they can't involve the self [Brogaard]
     Full Idea: It is plausible that you and I can have perceptual experiences with the same phenomenology of two trees at different distances from us (perhaps at different times). ..So our perceptual experiences cannot contain you or me in the content of representation.
     From: Berit Brogaard (Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth [2009], p.223), quoted by Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh - The Inessential Indexical 08.2
     A reaction: If you accept the example, which seems reasonable, then that pretty conclusively shows that perception is not inherently indexical.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
22595 Liberty is the triumph of the individual, over both despotic government and enslaving majorities [Constant]
     Full Idea: Lliberty is the triumph of the individual, as much over a government which seeks to rule by despotic methods, as over the masses who seek to render the minority the slave of the majority.
     From: Benjamin Constant (Principles of Politics [1806]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 4
     A reaction: [No page given] Dunt describes Constant's book as the first really systematic account of liberalism. Very important to have rights against the majority, as well as against government.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
22597 Minority rights are everyone's rights, because we all have turns in the minority [Constant]
     Full Idea: To defend the rights of minorities is to defend the rights of all. Everyone in turn finds himself in the minority.
     From: Benjamin Constant (Principles of Politics [1806]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 4
     A reaction: Very conformist people, who are often the most oppressive, are rarely in the minority, and are unlikely to be impressed by this idea.