609 ideas
21584 | A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell] |
Full Idea: Both in thought and in feeling, to realize the unimportance of time is the gate of wisdom. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 6) | |
A reaction: A very rationalist and un-Heraclitean view of wisdom. This picture may give wisdom a bad name, if wise people are (at a minimum) at least expected to give good advice about real life. |
11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.5 |
5361 | Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell] |
Full Idea: Whoever wishes to become a philosopher must learn not to be frightened by absurdities. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: He says this jokingly, but it is obviously true. Philosophy requires extreme imagination, and it also requires taking seriously possibilities that are dismissed by others. It would be a catastrophe if we all dismissed the truth as self-evidently false. |
5368 | Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell] |
Full Idea: Philosophy should show us the hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs, ..and show that they do not clash, but form a harmonious system. There is no reason to reject an instinctive belief, except that it clashes with others. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This is open to the standard objections to the coherence theory of truth (as explained by Russell!), but I like this view of philosophy. Somewhere behind it is the rationalist dream that the final set of totally consistent beliefs will have to be true. |
23025 | Philosophers should be more inductive, and test results by their conclusions, not their self-evidence [Russell] |
Full Idea: The progress of philosophy seems to demand that, like science, it should learn to practise induction, to test its premisses by the conclusions to which they lead, and not merely by their apparent self-evidence. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Explanations in reply to Mr Bradley [1899], nr end) | |
A reaction: [from Twitter] Love this. It is 'one person's modus ponens is another person's modus tollens'. I think all philosophical conclusions, without exception, should be reached by evaluating the final result fully, and not just following a line of argument. |
17641 | Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell] |
Full Idea: Any new discovery as to mathematical method and principles is likely to upset a great deal of otherwise plausible philosophising, as well as to suggest a new philosophy which will be solid in proportion as its foundations in mathematics are securely laid. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.283) | |
A reaction: This is a manifesto for modern analytic philosophy. I'm not convinced, especially if a fictionalist view of maths is plausible. What Russell wants is rigour, but there are other ways of getting that. Currently I favour artificial intelligence. |
21572 | Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell] |
Full Idea: Explicit controversy is almost always fruitless in philosophy, owing to the fact that no two philosophers ever understand one another. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 1) | |
A reaction: Contemporaries don't even seem to read one another very much, especially these days, when there are thousands of professional philosophers. (If you are a professional, have you read all the works written by your colleagues and friends?) |
5432 | Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell] |
Full Idea: It would seem that knowledge concerning the universe as a whole is not to be obtained by metaphysics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: Although Russell is strongly attracted to rationalism and platonism, this remark puts him firmly in the camp of Hume, and makes him godfather to the logical positivists. I regard metaphysics as extremely speculative attempts at explanation. |
21571 | Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell] |
Full Idea: The great systems of the past serve a very useful purpose, and are abundantly worthy of study. But something different is required if philosophy is to become a science, and to aim at results independent of the tastes of the philosophers who advocate them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], Pref) | |
A reaction: An interesting product of this move in philosophy is (about sixty years later) the work of David Lewis, who set out to be precise and scientific, and ended up creating a very personal system. Why not a collaborative system? |
21574 | Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell] |
Full Idea: Hegel's confusion of the 'is' of predication with the 'is' of identity ...is an example of how, for want of care at the start, vast and imposing systems of philosophy are built upon stupid and trivial confusions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 2 n1) | |
A reaction: [He explains the confusion in more detail in the note] Russell cites an English translation, and I am wondering how this occurs in the German. Plato has been accused of similar elementary blunders about properties. Russell treats Berkeley similarly. |
21587 | Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell] |
Full Idea: The desire for unadulterated truth is often obscured, in professional philosophers, by love of system: the one little fact which will not come inside the philosophical edifice has to be pushed and tortured until it seems to consent. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 8) | |
A reaction: Bit of hypocrisy here. Russell was continually trying to find a system, grounded in physics and logic. Presumably his shifting views are indications of integrity, because he changes the system rather than the facts. |
21582 | Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell] |
Full Idea: Physicists, ignorant and contemptuous of philosophy, have been content to assume their particles, points and instants in practice, while contending, with ironical politeness, that their concepts laid no claim to metaphysical validity. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 4) | |
A reaction: Presumably physicists are allowed to wave their hands and utter the word 'instrumentalism', and then get on with the job. They just have to ensure they never speculate about what is being measured. |
6095 | The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that the business of metaphysics is to describe the world. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §III) | |
A reaction: At least he believed in metaphysics. Presumably he intends to describe the world in terms of its categories, rather than cataloguing every blade of grass. |
14122 | Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth [Russell] |
Full Idea: Though analysis gives us the truth, and nothing but the truth, yet it can never give us the whole truth | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §138) |
6118 | Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell] |
Full Idea: The business of philosophy, as I conceive it, is essentially that of logical analysis, followed by logical synthesis. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.162) | |
A reaction: I am uneasy about Russell's hopes for the contribution that logic could make, but I totally agree that analysis is the route to wisdom, and I take Aristotle as my role model of an analytical philosopher, rather than the modern philosophers of logic. |
6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
Full Idea: I remain firmly persuaded, in spite of some modern tendencies to the contrary, that only by analysing is progress possible, …for example, by analysing physics and perception, the problem of mind and matter can be completely solved. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: I don't share his confidence in the second part of this, but I subscribe to the maxim that 'analsis is the path to wisdom'. It is a very western view, and lots of people (mostly of a mystical disposition) hate it, but I see no better path. |
6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
Full Idea: It seems to me evident that, as in the case of impure water, analysis gives new knowledge without destroying any of the previously existing knowledge. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: I agree. On the whole, opponents of analysis are sentimental mystics who are reluctant to think carefully about life. I'm not sure what careful and concentrated thought is capable of, apart from analysis. |
21552 | Common speech is vague; its vocabulary and syntax must be modified, for precision [Russell] |
Full Idea: I am persuaded that common speech is full of vagueness and inaccuracy, and that any attempt to be precise and accurate requires modification of common speech both as regards vocabulary and as regards syntax. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mr Strawson on Referring [1957], p.123) | |
A reaction: It is interesting that he cites the syntax of ordinary language, as well as the vocabulary. The implication is that vagueness can also be a feature of syntax (and hence his pursuit of logical form), which is not normally mentioned |
14109 | The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell] |
Full Idea: The study of grammar, in my opinion, is capable of throwing far more light on philosophical questions than is commonly supposed by philosophers. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §046) | |
A reaction: This is a dangerous tendency, which has led to some daft linguistic philosophy, but Russell himself was never guilty of losing the correct perspective on the matter. |
7529 | All philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions [Russell] |
Full Idea: That all sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions is a truth too evident, perhaps, to demand a proof. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Leibniz [1900], p.8), quoted by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 483. The obvious response to Russell is that it must actually begin with a decision about which propositions are worth analysing - and that ain't easy. I like analysis, but philosophy is also a vision of truth. |
14456 | 'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity [Russell] |
Full Idea: The is of 'Socrates is human' expresses the relation of subject and predicate; the is of 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity. It is a disgrace to the human race that it employs the same word 'is' for these entirely different ideas. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) | |
A reaction: Does the second one express identity? It sounds more like membership to me. 'Socrates is the guy with the hemlock' is more like identity. |
21546 | We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell] |
Full Idea: Whoever is afraid of symbols can hardly hope to acquire exact ideas where it is necessary to distinguish 1) the variable in itself as opposed to its value, 2) any value of the variable, 3) all values, 4) some value. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.84) | |
A reaction: Not the best example, perhaps, of the need for precision, but a nice illustration of the new attitude Russell brought into philosophy. |
21573 | When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell] |
Full Idea: Every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 2) | |
A reaction: [All Lecture 2 discusses 'logical'] I think Bertie was getting carried away here. In his life's corpus he barely acknowledges the existence of ethics, or political philosophy, or aesthetics. He never even engages with 'objects' the way Aristotle does. |
6116 | A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell] |
Full Idea: We are trying to create a perfectly logical language to prevent inferences from the nature of language to the nature of the world, which are fallacious because they depend upon the logical defects of language. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.159) | |
A reaction: Wittgenstein seems to have rebelled against this idea, so that one strand of his later philosophy leads to 'ordinary language' philosophy, which is exactly what Russell is criticising. Wittgenstein seems to have seen 'logical language' as an oxymoron. |
14165 | Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is said that analysis is falsification, that the complex is not equivalent to the sum of its constituents and is changed when analysed into these. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §439) | |
A reaction: Not quite Moore's Paradox of Analysis, but close. Russell is articulating the view we now call 'holism' - that the whole is more than the sum of its parts - which I can never quite believe. |
5434 | Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell] |
Full Idea: Philosophical knowledge does not differ essentially from scientific knowledge; there is no special source of wisdom which is open to philosophy but not to science. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: I agree. I take Plato's Theory of Forms, for example, to be a scientific theory, for which no one can devise an empirical test (just like string theory). Personally I consider philosophy to be the senior partner, and regard scientists as servants. |
6117 | Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell] |
Full Idea: We would be wise to build our philosophy upon science, because the risk of error in philosophy is pretty sure to be greater than in science. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.160) | |
A reaction: If you do very little, it reduces the 'risk of error'. I agree that philosophers should start from the facts, and be responsive to new facts, and that science is excellent at discovering facts. But I don't think cognitive science is the new epistemology. |
8378 | Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are too apt to take their views on science from each other, not from science. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.178) | |
A reaction: This wasn't true of Russell, but it is certainly true of me. I rely on philosophical researchers to find the interesting bits of science for me (like blindsight). Memo to myself: read more science. |
17638 | If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell] |
Full Idea: Two obvious propositions of which one can be deduced from the other both become more certain than either in isolation; thus in a complicated deductive system, many parts of which are obvious, the total probability may become all but absolute certainty. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.279) | |
A reaction: Thagard picked this remark out, in support of his work on coherence. |
5396 | Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell] |
Full Idea: For no very good reason, three principles have been singled out by tradition under the name of 'Laws of Thought': the laws of identity ('what is, is'), contradiction ('never be and not be'), and excluded middle ('always be or not be'). | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: 'For no very good reason' seems a bit unfair, probably to medieval logicians, who deserve more respect. Russell suggests that the concept of implication deserves to be on the list. Presumably optimism about thinking is a presupposition of thought. |
5405 | The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell] |
Full Idea: The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought' ..because it is a belief about things, not only about thoughts. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: The principle is a commitment about things, but it is inconceivable that any experience, no matter how weird, could ever contradict it. It would be better to assume that we had gone insane, than that a contradiction had occurred in the world. |
17632 | Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell] |
Full Idea: The law of contradiction must have been originally discovered by generalising from instances, though, once discovered, it was found to be quite as indubitable as the instances. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.274) |
6106 | Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell] |
Full Idea: You diminish the risk of error with every diminution of entities and premisses. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VIII) | |
A reaction: If there are actually lots of entities, you would increase error if you reduced them too much. Ockham's Razor seems more to do with the limited capacity of the human mind than with the simplicity or complexity of reality. See Idea 4456. |
14426 | A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell] |
Full Idea: The definition of a class or collection which enumerates is called a definition by 'extension', and one which mentions a defining property is called a definition by 'intension'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], II) | |
A reaction: In ordinary usage we take intensional definitions for granted, so it is interesting to realise that you might define 'tiger' by just enumerating all the tigers. But all past tigers? All future tigers? All possible tigers which never exist? |
21560 | Any linguistic expression may lack meaning when taken out of context [Russell] |
Full Idea: Any sentence, a single word, or a single component phrase, may often be quite devoid of meaning when separated from its context. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Substitutional Classes and Relations [1906], p.165) | |
A reaction: Contextualism is now extremely fashionable, in philosophy of language and in epistemology. Here Russell is looking for a contextual way to define classes [so says Lackey, the editor]. |
21551 | Empirical words need ostensive definition, which makes them egocentric [Russell] |
Full Idea: The meanings of all empirical words depend ultimately upon ostensive definitions, ostensive definitions depend upon experience, and that experience is egocentric. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mr Strawson on Referring [1957], p.122) | |
A reaction: He seems to imply that this makes them partly subjective, but I don't see why an objective consensus can't be reached when making an ostensive definition. We just need to clearly agree what 'that' refers to. |
14115 | Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell] |
Full Idea: A definition as an analysis of an idea into its constituents is inconvenient and, I think, useless; it overlooks the fact that wholes are not, as a rule, determinate when their constituents are given. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §108) | |
A reaction: The influence of Leibniz seems rather strong here, since he was obsessed with explaining what creates true unities. |
14159 | In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell] |
Full Idea: The statement that a class is to be represented by a symbol is a definition in mathematics, and says nothing about mathematical entities. Any formula can be stated in terms of primitive ideas, so the definitions are superfluous. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §412) | |
A reaction: [compressed wording] I'm not sure that everyone would agree with this (e.g. Kit Fine), as certain types of numbers seem to be introduced by stipulative definitions. |
14148 | Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell] |
Full Idea: In the objectionable kind of infinite regress, some propositions join to constitute the meaning of some proposition, but one of them is similarly compounded, and so ad infinitum. This comes from circular definitions, where the term defined reappears. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §329) |
18002 | As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables [Russell] |
Full Idea: Every proposition function …has, in addition to its range of truth, a range of significance, i.e. a range within which x must lie if φ(x) is to be a proposition at all, whether true or false. This is the first point of the theory of types. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], App B:523), quoted by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.2 | |
A reaction: Magidor quotes this as the origin of the idea of a 'category mistake'. It is the basis of the formal theory of types, but is highly influential in philosophy generally, especially as a criterion for ruling many propositions as 'meaningless'. |
21561 | 'The number one is bald' or 'the number one is fond of cream cheese' are meaningless [Russell] |
Full Idea: 'The number one is bald' or 'the number one is fond of cream cheese' are, I maintain, not merely silly remarks, but totally devoid of meaning. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Substitutional Classes and Relations [1906], p.166) | |
A reaction: He connects this to paradoxes in set theory, such as the assertion that 'the class of human beings is a human being' (which is the fallacy of composition). |
8468 | The sentence 'procrastination drinks quadruplicity' is meaningless, rather than false [Russell, by Orenstein] |
Full Idea: Russell proposed (in his theory of types) that sentences like 'The number two is fond of cream cheese' or 'Procrastination drinks quadruplicity' should be regarded as not false but meaningless. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the origin of the notion of a 'category mistake', which Ryle made famous. The problem is always poetry, where abstractions can be reified, or personified, and meaning can be squeezed out of almost anything. |
6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
Full Idea: 'Socrates and killing are two' would be an illegitimate sentence according to the doctrine of types. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: This nicely shows how Ryle's notion of a 'category mistake', although it is a commonsense observation of bogus reasoning, arises out of Russell's logical analysis of sets. Of course, the theory of types has its critics. |
5420 | Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell] |
Full Idea: Although truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs, they are properties dependent upon the relations of the beliefs to other things, not upon any internal quality of the beliefs. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Beliefs can have an intrinsic property of subjective certainty, but Russell is right that that is not enough. So is truth a property or a relation? |
6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
Full Idea: Truth and falsehood both belong primarily to beliefs, and only derivatively to propositions and sentences. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure why a proposition which is date/place stamped ('it is raining, here and now') could not be considered a truth, even if no one believed it. Is not the proposition 'squares have four sides' true? |
5419 | Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell] |
Full Idea: Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements, so a world of mere matter would contain no truth or falsehood. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Can it be beliefs AND statements? What about propositions? All that matters here is to establish that truth is a feature of certain mental states. This makes possible my slogan that "the brain is a truth-machine". Out there are the 'facts'. |
14102 | What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions' [Russell] |
Full Idea: I hold that what is true or false is not in general mental, and requiring a name for the true or false as such, this name can scarcely be other than 'propositions'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is the Fregean and logicians' dream that that there is some fixed eternal realm of the true and the false. I think true and false concern the mental. We can talk about the 'facts' which are independent of minds, but not the 'truth'. |
5784 | In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell] |
Full Idea: We call a belief true when it is belief in a true proposition, ..but it is to propositions that the primary formal meanings of 'truth' and 'falsehood' apply. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV) | |
A reaction: I think this is wrong. A proposition such as 'it is raining' would need a date-and-time stamp to be a candidate for truth, and an indexical statement such as 'I am ill' would need to be asserted by a person. Of course, books can contain unread truths. |
5417 | A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell] |
Full Idea: A good theory of truth must be such as to admit of its opposite, falsehood. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) |
16477 | Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell] |
Full Idea: When you do what a logician would call 'asserting not-p', you are saying 'p is false'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: This is presumably classical logic. If we could label p as 'undetermined' (a third truth value), then 'not-p' might equally mean 'undetermined'. |
5777 | The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell] |
Full Idea: I take it as evident that the truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], p.285) | |
A reaction: A nice bold commitment to a controversial idea. The traditional objection is to ask how you are going to formulate the 'facts' except in terms of more beliefs, so you ending up comparing beliefs. Facts are a metaphysical commitment, not an acquaintance. |
6090 | Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell] |
Full Idea: A fact is the kind of thing that makes a proposition true or false, …and it is the sort of thing that is expressed by a whole sentence, not by a single name like 'Socrates'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §I) | |
A reaction: It is important to note a point here which I consider vital - that Russell keeps the idea of a fact quite distinct from the language in which it is expressed. Facts are a 'sort of thing', of the kind which are now referred to as 'truth-makers'. |
21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
Full Idea: It seems that when a proposition is false, something does not subsist which would subsist if the proposition were true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.76) | |
A reaction: This looks to me like a commitment by Russell to the truthmaker principle. The negations of false propositions are made true by some failure of existence in the world. |
18348 | Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami] |
Full Idea: In 1918 Russell held that beside atomic truths, also general and negative truths have truth-makers. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Adolph Rami - Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making note 04 |
6343 | For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell] |
Full Idea: Given Russell's notion of a proposition, as an arrangement of objects and properties, it is hard to see how there could be any difference at all between such a proposition and the fact corresponding to it, since they each involve the same arrangement. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood [1910]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Ch.7.35 | |
A reaction: This seems a little unfair, given that Russell (in 1912) uses the notion now referred to as 'congruence', so that the correspondence is not in the objects and properties, but in how they are 'ordered', which may differ between proposition and fact. |
7395 | Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell] |
Full Idea: If truth is congruence between a complex belief and a complex relation between objects in the world, this may work for Othello's belief about Desdemona, but it doesn't seem to work for the simple belief that an object exists. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) by Jack Joslin - talk | |
A reaction: Though Russell has an interesting and persuasive theory, this seems like a big problem. To have a complex belief about a complex of objects, you must first have beliefs about the objects (and that can't be acquaintance, because error is possible). |
5428 | Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell] |
Full Idea: A belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, and is false when there is no corresponding fact. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Russell tries to explain a 'fact' as a complex unity of constituents with a certain order among them. There is an obvious problem that some of the 'orders' in the world are imposed on it by the mind. But we don't invent 'D's love for C'. |
5783 | Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell] |
Full Idea: The correspondence of proposition and fact grows increasingly complicated as we pass to more complicated types of propositions: existence-propositions, general propositions, disjunctive and hypothetical propositions, and so on. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV) | |
A reaction: An important point. Truth must not just work for 'it is raining', but also for maths, logic, tautologies, laws etc. This is why so many modern philosophers have retreated to deflationary and minimal accounts of truth, which will cover all cases. |
5421 | The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell] |
Full Idea: The coherence theory of truth says falsehood is a failure to cohere in the body of our beliefs, and that it is the essence of a truth to form part of the completely rounded system which is The Truth. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: One could embrace the idea of coherence without accepting the extravagant ninenteenth century Idealists' dream of an ultimate complete Truth (or Absolute). The theory needs a decent account of coherence to get off the ground. |
5424 | Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell] |
Full Idea: Coherence cannot be accepted as the meaning of truth, though it is often a most important test of truth after a certain amount of truth has become known. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: The coherence theory is in fact a confusion of epistemology and ontology. Compare Idea 1364, where Reid charges Locke with confusing the test for personal identity with the thing itself. I wonder if refusal to accept essences causes this problem? |
5422 | More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is no reason to suppose that only one coherent body of beliefs is possible. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Presumably this possibility would not be accepted for the ultimate ideal body of beliefs, but it seems undeniable that limited humanity will be stuck with several coherent possibilities. Coherence, though, is within our grasp, unlike correspondence. |
5423 | If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell] |
Full Idea: If the law of contradiction itself were subjected to the test of coherence, we should find that, if we choose to suppose it false, nothing will any longer be incoherent with anything else. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Russell is in error in treating coherence as if it was merely non-contradiction. If I see you as four feet tall today and six feet tall tomorrow, that is incoherent (to me) but not an actual contradiction. All accounts of truth need presuppositions. |
14454 | An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell] |
Full Idea: We say that an argument a 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XV) | |
A reaction: We end up with Tarski defining truth in terms of satisfaction, so we shouldn't get too excited about what he achieved (any more than he got excited). |
14176 | "The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell] |
Full Idea: "The death of Caesar is true" is not, I think, the same proposition as "Caesar died". | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §478) | |
A reaction: I suspect that it was this remark which provoked Ramsey into rebellion, because he couldn't see the difference. Nowadays we must talk first of conversational implicature, and then of language and metalanguage. |
5401 | The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell] |
Full Idea: We would do better to go straight from the evidence that some men have died to the mortality of Socrates, than to go via 'all men are mortal', for the probability that Socrates is mortal is greater than the probability that all men are mortal. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: Russell claims that deduction should stick to a priori truth, and induction is best for the real world. Interesting. To show that something is a member of a set (e.g. planets) you need an awful lot of knowledge of the set. |
14453 | The Darapti syllogism is fallacious: All M is S, all M is P, so some S is P' - but if there is no M? [Russell] |
Full Idea: Some moods of the syllogism are fallacious, e.g. 'Darapti': 'All M is S, all M is P, therefore some S is P', which fails if there is no M. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XV) | |
A reaction: This critique rests on the fact that the existential quantifier entails some existence, but the universal quantifier does not. |
16484 | There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell] |
Full Idea: Propositions about 'some' arise, in practice, in four ways: as generalisations of disjunctions; when an instance suggests compatibility of terms we thought incompatible; as steps to a generalisation; and in cases of imperfect memory. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: Modern logicians seem to have no interest in the question Russell is investigating here, but I love his attempt, however vague the result, to connect logic to real experience and thought. |
14113 | The null class is a fiction [Russell] |
Full Idea: The null class is a fiction. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §079) | |
A reaction: This does not commit him to regarding all classes as fictions - though he seems to have eventually come to believe that. The null class seems to have a role something like 'Once upon a time...' in story-telling. You can then tell truth or fiction. |
6103 | Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell] |
Full Idea: With the ordinary view of classes you would say that a class that has only one member was the same as that one member; that will land you in terrible difficulties, because in that case that one member is a member of that class, namely, itself. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VII) | |
A reaction: The problem (I think) is that classes (sets) were defined by Frege as being identical with their members (their extension). With hindsight this may have been a mistake. The question is always 'why is that particular a member of that set?' |
14427 | We can enumerate finite classes, but an intensional definition is needed for infinite classes [Russell] |
Full Idea: We know a great deal about a class without enumerating its members …so definition by extension is not necessary to knowledge about a class ..but enumeration of infinite classes is impossible for finite beings, so definition must be by intension. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], II) | |
A reaction: Presumably mathematical induction (which keeps apply the rule to extend the class) will count as an intension here. |
14428 | Members define a unique class, whereas defining characteristics are numerous [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is only one class having a given set of members, whereas there are always many different characteristics by which a given class may be defined. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], II) |
14447 | Infinity says 'for any inductive cardinal, there is a class having that many terms' [Russell] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Infinity may be enunciated as 'If n be any inductive cardinal number, there is at least one class of individuals having n terms'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XIII) | |
A reaction: So for every possible there exists a set of terms for it. Notice that they are 'terms', not 'objects'. We must decide whether we are allowed terms which don't refer to real objects. |
14440 | We may assume that there are infinite collections, as there is no logical reason against them [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is no logical reason against infinite collections, and we are therefore justified, in logic, in investigating the hypothesis that there are such collections. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], VIII) |
14443 | The British parliament has one representative selected from each constituency [Russell] |
Full Idea: We have a class of representatives, who make up our Parliament, one being selected out of each constituency. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XII) | |
A reaction: You can rely on Russell for the clearest illustrations of these abstract ideas. He calls the Axiom of Choice the 'Multiplicative' Axiom. |
14445 | Choice shows that if any two cardinals are not equal, one must be the greater [Russell] |
Full Idea: The [Axiom of Choice] is also equivalent to the assumption that of any two cardinals which are not equal, one must be the greater. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XII) | |
A reaction: It is illuminating for the uninitiated to learn that this result can't be taken for granted (with infinite cardinals). |
14444 | Choice is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered [Russell] |
Full Idea: Zermelo has shown that [the Axiom of Choice] is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered, i.e. can be arranged in a series in which every sub-class has a first term (except, of course, the null class). | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XII) | |
A reaction: Russell calls Choice the 'Multiplicative' Axiom. |
14446 | We can pick all the right or left boots, but socks need Choice to insure the representative class [Russell] |
Full Idea: Among boots we distinguish left and right, so we can choose all the right or left boots; with socks no such principle suggests itself, and we cannot be sure, without the [Axiom of Choice], that there is a class consisting of one sock from each pair. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XII) | |
A reaction: A deservedly famous illustration of a rather tricky part of set theory. |
18130 | Axiom of Reducibility: there is always a function of the lowest possible order in a given level [Russell, by Bostock] |
Full Idea: Russell's Axiom of Reducibility states that to any propositional function of any order in a given level, there corresponds another which is of the lowest possible order in the level. There corresponds what he calls a 'predicative' function of that level. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Substitutional Classes and Relations [1906]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 8.2 |
14459 | Reducibility: a family of functions is equivalent to a single type of function [Russell] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Reducibility says 'There is a type of a-functions such that, given any a-function, it is formally equivalent to some function of the type in question'. ..It involves all that is really essential in the theory of classes. But is it true? | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVII) | |
A reaction: I take this to say that in the theory of types, it is possible to reduce each level of type down to one type. |
21563 | The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell] |
Full Idea: The contention of the 'no classes' theory is that all significant propositions concerning classes can be regarded as propositions about all or some of their members. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.200) | |
A reaction: Apparently this theory has not found favour with later generations of theorists. I see it in terms of Russell trying to get ontology down to the minimum, in the spirit of Goodman and Quine. |
14461 | Propositions about classes can be reduced to propositions about their defining functions [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is right (in its main lines) to say that there is a reduction of propositions nominally about classes to propositions about their defining functions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVII) | |
A reaction: The defining functions will involve the theory of types, in order to avoid the paradoxes of naïve set theory. This is Russell's strategy for rejecting the existence of sets. |
15894 | Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor [Russell, by Lavine] |
Full Idea: Russell was the inventor of the naïve set theory so often attributed to Cantor. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite I |
14126 | Order rests on 'between' and 'separation' [Russell] |
Full Idea: The two sources of order are 'between' and 'separation'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §204) |
14127 | Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations [Russell] |
Full Idea: All order depends upon transitive asymmetrical relations. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §208) |
8469 | Russell's proposal was that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions [Russell, by Orenstein] |
Full Idea: Russell's solution (in the theory of types) consists of restricting the principle that every predicate has a set as its extension so that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3 | |
A reaction: There might be a chicken-and-egg problem here. How do you decide the members of a set (apart from ostensively) without deciding the predicate(s) that combine them? |
11064 | Classes can be reduced to propositional functions [Russell, by Hanna] |
Full Idea: Russell held that classes can be reduced to propositional functions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 2.4 | |
A reaction: The exact nature of a propositional function is disputed amongst Russell scholars (though it is roughly an open sentence of the form 'x is red'). |
7548 | Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell] |
Full Idea: Classes or series of particulars, collected together on account of some property which makes it convenient to be able to speak of them as wholes, are what I call logical constructions or symbolic fictions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.125) | |
A reaction: When does a construction become 'logical' instead of arbitrary? What is it about a property that makes it 'convenient'? At this point Russell seems to have built his ontology on classes, and the edifice was crumbling, thanks to Wittgenstein. |
8745 | Classes are logical fictions, and are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world [Russell] |
Full Idea: The symbols for classes are mere conveniences, not representing objects called 'classes'. Classes are in fact logical fictions; they cannot be regarded as part of the ultimate furniture of the world. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], Ch.18), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.2 | |
A reaction: I agree. For 'logical fictions' read 'abstractions'. To equate abstractions with fictions is to underline the fact that they are a human creation. They are either that or platonic objects - there is no middle way. |
6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
Full Idea: My original use of classes was gradually more and more replaced by properties, and in the end disappeared except as a symbolic convenience. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: I wish I knew what properties are. On the whole, though, I agree with this, because it is more naturalistic. We may place things in classes because of their properties, and this means there are natural classes, but classes can't have a life of their own. |
14121 | The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable [Russell] |
Full Idea: The relation of whole and part is, it would seem, an indefinable and ultimate relation, or rather several relations, often confounded, of which one at least is indefinable. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §135) | |
A reaction: This is before anyone had produced a mathematical account of mereology (qv). |
6110 | Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is doubtful whether the subject-predicate logic, with the substance-attribute metaphysic, would have been invented by people speaking a non-Aryan language. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.151) | |
A reaction: This is not far off the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis (e.g. Idea 3917), which Russell would never accept. I presume that Russell would see true logic as running deeper, and the 'Aryan' approach as just one possible way to describe it. |
21588 | Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell] |
Full Idea: Logic gives the method of research in philosophy, just as mathematics gives the method in physics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 8) | |
A reaction: I'm struck by how rarely philosophers actually prove anything. Mostly they just use the language of logic as a tool for disambiguation. Only a tiny handful of philosophers can actually create sustained and novel proofs. |
6107 | It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell] |
Full Idea: I hold that logic is what is fundamental in philosophy, and that schools should be characterised rather by their logic than by their metaphysics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.143) | |
A reaction: Personally I disagree. Russell seems to have been most interested in the logical form underlying language, but that seems to be because he was interested in the ontological implications of what we say, which is metaphysics. |
14452 | All the propositions of logic are completely general [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is part of the definition of logic that all its propositions are completely general. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XV) |
16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
Full Idea: The non-mental world can be completely described without the use of any logical word, …but when it comes to the mental world, there are facts which cannot be mentioned without the use of logical words. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: He adds that logical words are not needed for physics, but are needed for psychology. I love Russell's interest in the psychology of logic (in defiance of the anti-psychologism of Frege). See also the ideas of Robert Hanna. |
21495 | Theoretical and practical politics are both concerned with the best lives for individuals [Russell] |
Full Idea: Political ideals must be based upon ideals for the individual life. The aim of politics should be to make the lives of individuals as good as possible. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Political Ideals [1917], 1) | |
A reaction: Russell floats between socialism and anarchism, but this foundational remark is classic liberalism. |
14462 | In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical [Russell] |
Full Idea: Logic has become more mathematical, and mathematics has become more logical. The consequence is that it has now become wholly impossible to draw a line between the two; in fact, the two are one. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVIII) | |
A reaction: This appears to be true even if you reject logicism about mathematics. Logicism is sometimes rejected because it always ends up with a sneaky ontological commitment, but maybe mathematics shares exactly the same commitment. |
5395 | Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell] |
Full Idea: All demonstrations involve the principle that 'anything implied by a true proposition is true', or 'whatever follows from a true proposition is true'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: This is modus ponens, a broad principle of rationality, rather than of strict logicality, because it covers practical inferences and vague propositions. Presumably truth is a prior concept to implication, and therefore more metaphysically basic. |
14106 | Implication cannot be defined [Russell] |
Full Idea: A definition of implication is quite impossible. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §016) |
14108 | It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell] |
Full Idea: It would be a vicious circle to define material implication as meaning that if one proposition is true, then another is true, for 'if' and 'then' already involve implication. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §037) | |
A reaction: Hence the preference for defining it by the truth table, or as 'not-p or q'. |
14464 | Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell] |
Full Idea: Logical propositions are such as can be known a priori, without study of the actual world. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVIII) | |
A reaction: This remark constrasts strikingly with Idea 12444, which connects logic to the actual world. Is it therefore a priori synthetic? |
14167 | The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell] |
Full Idea: The only classes appear to be things, predicates and relations. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §440) | |
A reaction: This is the first-order logic view of reality, which has begun to look incredibly impoverished in modern times. Processes certainly demand a hearing, as do modal facts. |
10057 | Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell] |
Full Idea: No proposition of logic can assert 'existence' except under a hypothesis. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVIII) | |
A reaction: I am prepared to accept this view fairly dogmatically, though Musgrave shows some of the difficulties of the if-thenist view (depending on which 'order' of logic is being used). |
22329 | Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock] |
Full Idea: In 1911 Russell held that the propositions of logic are supremely general truths about the most pervasive traits of reality, to which we have access by abstraction from non-logical propositions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic [1911]) by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 2.4 | |
A reaction: Glock says the rival views were Mill's inductions, psychologism, and Frege's platonism. Wittgenstein converted Russell to a fifth view, that logic is empty tautologies. I remain resolutely attached to Russell's abstraction view. |
12444 | Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell] |
Full Idea: Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) | |
A reaction: I love this idea and am very sympathetic to it. The rival view seems to be that logic is purely conventional, perhaps defined by truth tables etc. It is hard to see how a connective like 'tonk' could be self-evidently silly if it wasn't 'unnatural'. |
10053 | Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true [Russell] |
Full Idea: We must only assert of various geometries that the axioms imply the propositions, not that the axioms are true and therefore that the propositions are true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Foundations of Geometry [1897], Intro vii), quoted by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §4 | |
A reaction: Clearly the truth of the axioms can remain a separate issue from whether they actually imply the theorems. The truth of the axioms might be as much a metaphysical as an empirical question. Musgrave sees this as the birth of if-thenism. |
21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
Full Idea: The law of excluded middle may be stated in the form: If p is denied, not-p must be asserted; this form is too psychological to be ultimate, but the point is that it is significant and not a mere tautology. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.41) | |
A reaction: 'Psychology' is, of course, taboo, post-Frege, though I think it is interesting. Stated in this form the law looks more false than usual. I can be quite clear than p is unacceptable, but unclear about its contrary. |
18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's account of names and definite descriptions was concerned to preserve the law of excluded middle, according to which every sentence is either true or false (but it is not obvious that the law ought to be preserved). | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
A reaction: That is the strongest form of excluded middle, but things work better if every sentence is either 'true' or 'not true', leaving it open whether 'not true' actually means 'false'. |
2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
Full Idea: Without the law of excluded middle, we could not ask the questions that give rise to discoveries. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], c.p.88) |
7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: On Russell's view 'Elizabeth II = Queen of England' is only superficially an identity-statement; really it is a predication, and attributes a complex relational property to Elizabeth. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
A reaction: The original example is 'Scott = author of Waverley'. Why can't such statements be identities, in which the reference of one half of the identity is not yet known? 'The murderer is violent' and 'Smith is violent' suggests 'Smith is the murderer'. |
6092 | In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell] |
Full Idea: In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and no more for every simple object. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §II) | |
A reaction: In other words, there would be no universals, only names? All that matters is that a language can successfully refer (unambiguously) to anything it wishes to. There must be better ways than Russell's lexical explosion. |
6101 | Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell] |
Full Idea: Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VI) | |
A reaction: A very nice paradoxical assertion, which captures the problem of finding the logical form for negative existential statements. Presumably the proposition refers to the mythical founder of Rome, though. He is not, I suppose, rigidly designated. |
6115 | Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell] |
Full Idea: The fact that we do not experience simples is one obstacle to the actual creation of a correct logical language, and vagueness is another. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.159) | |
A reaction: The dream of creating a perfect logical language looks doomed from the start, but it is a very interesting project to try to pinpoint why it is unlikely to be possible. I say a perfect language cuts nature exactly at the joints, so find the joints. |
7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
Full Idea: The metaphysics of Leibniz was explicitly based upon the doctrine that every proposition attributes a predicate to a subject and (what seemed to him almost the same thing) that every fact consists of a substance having a property. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: I think it is realised now that although predicates tend to attribute properties to things, they are far from being the same thing. See Idea 4587, for example. Russell gives us an interesting foot in the door of Leibniz's complex system. |
23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
Full Idea: 'Logical constants', which might seem to be entities occurring in logical propositions, are really concerned with pure form, and are not actually constituents of the propositions in the verbal expressions of which their names occur. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX) | |
A reaction: This seems to entirely deny the existence of logical constants, and yet he says that they are named. Russell was obviously under pressure here from Wittgenstein. |
23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
Full Idea: Such words as or, not, all, some, plainly involve logical notions; since we use these intelligently, we must be acquainted with the logical objects involved. But their isolation is difficult, and I do not know what the logical objects really are. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX) | |
A reaction: See Idea 23476, from the previous page. Russell is struggling. Wittgenstein was telling him that the constants are rules (shown in truth tables), rather than objects. |
21586 | The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell] |
Full Idea: Such words as 'or' and 'not' are not names of definite objects, but are words that require a context in order to have a meaning. All of them are formal. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 7) | |
A reaction: [He cites Wittgenstein's 1922 Tractatus in a footnote - presumably in a later edition than 1914] This is the most famous idea which Russell acquired from Wittgenstein. It was yet another step in his scaling down of ontology. |
21597 | Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson] |
Full Idea: Russell says the best chance of avoiding vagueness are the logical connectives. ...But the vagueness of 'true' and 'false' infects the logical connectives too. All words are vague. Russell concludes that all language is vague. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923]) by Timothy Williamson - Vagueness 2.4 | |
A reaction: This relies on the logical connectives being defined semantically, in terms of T and F, but that is standard. Presumably the formal uninterpreted syntax is not vague. |
14105 | There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell] |
Full Idea: The number of logical constants is not great: it appears, in fact, to be eight or nine. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §012) | |
A reaction: There is, of course, lots of scope for interdefinability. No one is going to disagree greatly with his claim, so it is an interesting fact, which invites some sort of (non-platonic) explanation. |
18722 | Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell explained ¬p by saying that ¬p is true if p is false and false if p is true. But this is not an explanation of negation, for it might apply to propositions other than the negative. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Ludwig Wittgenstein - Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) B XI.3 | |
A reaction: Presumably he is thinking of 'the light is on' and 'the light is off'. A very astute criticism, which seems to be correct. What would Russell say? Perhaps we add that negation is an 'operation' which achieves flipping of the truth-value? |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
Full Idea: Imagine a person who knew everything that can be stated without using the word 'not' or some equivalent; would such a person know the whole course of nature, or would he not? | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Human Knowledge: its scope and limits [1948], 9) | |
A reaction: Nowadays we might express Russell's thought as 'Does God need the word 'not'?'. Russell's thesis is that such words concern psychology, and not physics. God would need 'not' to describe how human minds work. |
16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
Full Idea: Psychologically, 'or' corresponds to a state of hesitation. A dog waits at a fork in the road, to see which way you are going. For crumbs on a windowsill, birds behave in a manner we would express by 'shall I be brave, or go hungry?'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: I love two facts here - first, that Russell wants to link the connective to the psychology of experience, and second, that a great logician wants to connect his logic to the minds of animals. |
16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
Full Idea: When we assert 'p or q' we are in a state which is derivative from two previous states, and we express this state, not something about the world. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: His example: at a junction this road or that road goes to Oxford, but the world only contains the roads, not some state of 'this or that road'. He doesn't deny that in one sense 'p or q' tells you something about the world. |
16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
Full Idea: It might be contended that, in describing what happens when a man believes 'p or q', the 'or' that we must use is not the same as the 'or' of logic. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the general verdict on Russell's enquiries in this chapter, but I love any attempt, however lacking in rigour etc., to connect formal logic to how we think, and thence to the world. |
16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
Full Idea: A disjunction is the verbal expression of indecision, or, if a question, of the desire to reach a decision. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: Russell is fishing here for Grice's conversational implicature. If you want to assert a simple proposition, you don't introduce it into an irrelevant disjunction, because that would have a particular expressive purpose. |
16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
Full Idea: Another situation in which a disjunction may arise is practice is imperfect memory. 'Either Brown or Jones told me that'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) |
14104 | Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell] |
Full Idea: A constant is something absolutely definite, concerning which there is no ambiguity whatever. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §006) |
14114 | Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell] |
Full Idea: A variable is not any term simply, but any term as entering into a propositional function. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §093) | |
A reaction: So we should think of variables entirely by their role, rather than as having a semantics of their own (pace Kit Fine? - though see Russell §106, p.107). |
5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
Full Idea: I take the notion of the variable as fundamental. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.42) | |
A reaction: A key idea of twentieth century philosophy, derived from Frege and handed on to Quine. A universal term, such as 'horse', is a variable, for which any particular horse can be its value. You can calculate using x, and generalise about horses. |
21566 | 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell] |
Full Idea: By a 'propositional function' I mean something which contains a variable x, and expresses a proposition as soon as a value is assigned to x. That is to say, it differs from a proposition solely by the fact that it is ambiguous. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910], p.216) | |
A reaction: This is Frege's notion of a 'concept', as an assertion of a predicate which still lacks a subject. |
6102 | You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell] |
Full Idea: If you understand English you would understand the phrase 'the author of Waverley' if you had not heard it before, whereas you would not understand the meaning of 'Scott', because to know the meaning of a name is to know who it is applied to. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VI) | |
A reaction: Actually, you would find 'Waverley' a bit baffling too. Would you understand "he was the author of his own destruction"? You can understand "Homer was the author of this" without knowing quite who 'Homer' applies to. All very tricky. |
10423 | There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
Full Idea: A logically proper name must be semantically simple, have just one referent, be understood by the user, be scopeless, is not a definite description, and rigidly designates. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], 24th pg) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference Intro | |
A reaction: Famously, Russell's hopes of achieving this logically desirable end got narrower and narrower, and ended with 'this' or 'that'. Maybe pure language can't do the job. |
14458 | Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell] |
Full Idea: When we ask whether Homer existed, we are using the word 'Homer' as an abbreviated description. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) | |
A reaction: It is hard to disagree with Russell over this rather unusual example. It doesn't seem so plausible when Ottiline refers to 'Bertie'. |
4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
Full Idea: Russell (and Frege) thought that Mill was wrong about names: really a proper name, properly used, simply was a definite description abbreviated or disguised. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity lectures Lecture 1 | |
A reaction: It is tempting to oversimplify this issue, one way or the other, but essentially one has to agree with Kripke that naming does not inherently involve description, but is a 'baptism', without initial content. Connotations and descriptions accrue to a name. |
18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
Full Idea: Russell's view of names, understood as a definite description, which is understood as a quantificational phrase, is not to contribute an object to propositions, but to contribute a complex of properties. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
A reaction: This seems to contradict the role of constants in first-logic, which are the paradigm names, picking out an object in the domain. Kripke says names and definite descriptions have different modal profiles. |
7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's proposal that a natural name is an abbreviated description invites four objections: not all speakers can produce descriptions; the description could be false; no one description seems special; and descriptions usually contain names. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 8.74 | |
A reaction: The best reply on behalf of Russell is probably to concede all of these points, but deny that any of them are fatal. Most replies will probably say that they are possible true descriptions, rather than actual limited, confused or false ones. |
5386 | Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell] |
Full Idea: Common words, even proper names, are usually really descriptions; that is, the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the proper name by a description. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This is open to challenge, and the modern idea is that they are more like baptisms, but it all comes down to the debate about internal and external content. Russell would appear to be voicing the internalist theory of names. |
7744 | Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh] |
Full Idea: Having proposed that descriptions should be treated in quantificational terms, Russell then went on to introduce the subsidiary injunction that proper names should be treated as descriptions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 2.18 | |
A reaction: McCulloch says Russell 'has a lot to answer for' here. It became a hot topic with Kripke. Personally I find Lewis's notion of counterparts the most promising line of enquiry. |
10450 | Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach] |
Full Idea: Russell clearly anticipated Donnellan when he said proper names can also be used as descriptions, adding that 'there is nothing in the phraseology to show whether they are being used in this way or as names'. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], p.175) by Kent Bach - What Does It Take to Refer? 22.2 L1 | |
A reaction: This seems also to anticipate Strawson's flexible and pragmatic approach to these things, which I am beginning to think is correct. |
14457 | Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
Full Idea: We can even say that, in all such knowledge as can be expressed in words, with the exception of 'this' and 'that' and a few other words of which the meaning varies on different occasions - no names occur, but what seem like names are really descriptions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) | |
A reaction: I like the caveat about what is expressed in words. Russell is very good at keeping non-verbal thought in the picture. This is his famous final reduction of names to simple demonstratives. |
18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
Full Idea: Russell proposed that names do not express a Fregean sense, ...but are disguised definite descriptions, of the form 'the F'. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
A reaction: Of course, Russell then has a famous theory about definite descriptions, which turns them into quantifications. |
15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
Full Idea: Russell defined a logically proper name to be one the meaning of which is its referent. However, his internalist epistemology led him to deny that the words we ordinarily call names are logically proper. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Scott Soames - Philosophy of Language 1.25 |
10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
Full Idea: For Russell, a logically proper name introduces its referent into the proposition, whereas a description introduces a certain quantificational structure, not its denotation. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Kent Bach - What Does It Take to Refer? 22.2 L0 | |
A reaction: I have very strong resistance to the idea that the actual referent could ever become part of a proposition. I am not, and never have been, part of a proposition! Russell depended on narrow 'acquaintance', which meant that few things qualified. |
6410 | The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Russell argued that the only 'logically proper' names are those which denote particular entities with which one can be acquainted. The best examples are 'this' and 'that'; other apparent names turn out, when analysed, to be definite descriptions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Acquaintance [1914]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This view is firm countered by the causal theory of reference, proposed by Kripke and others, in which not only people like Aristotle are 'baptised' with a name, but also natural kinds such as water. It is hard to disagree with Kripke on this. |
2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
Full Idea: Russell's theory used quantification to eliminate singular terms, which could be meaningful without denoting anything. He reparsed such sentences so they appeared as predicates instead of names. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.J. Ayer - The Central Questions of Philosophy IX.A.2 |
7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: Though someone just beginning to learn English might take it as one, "nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
A reaction: If someone replies to "nobody's there" with "show him to me!", presumably it IS a singular term - just one that doesn't work very well. If you want to get on in life, treat it as a quantifier; if you just want to have fun... |
10426 | A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell] |
Full Idea: A name has got to name something or it is not a name. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], 66th pg), quoted by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be stipulative, since most people would say that a list of potential names for a baby counted as names. It may be wrong. There are fictional names, or mistakes. |
18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's account implies that all sentences composed of an empty name and a predicate are false, including 'Pegasus was a mythical creature'. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4 | |
A reaction: Russell insists that such sentences contain a concealed existence claim, which they clearly don't. |
6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
Full Idea: Unlike descriptions, names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: This interests Russell because of its ontological implications. If we reduce language to names, we can have a pure ontology of 'objects'. We need a system for saying whether a description names something - which is his theory of definite descriptions. |
7311 | The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
Full Idea: In all knowledge that can be expressed in words - with the exception of "this" and "that", and a few other such words - no genuine proper names occur, but what seem like genuine proper names are really descriptions | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) | |
A reaction: This is the terminus of Russell's train of thought about descriptions. Suppose you point to something non-existent, like a ghost in a misty churchyard? You'd be back to the original problem of naming a non-existent! |
14455 | 'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell] |
Full Idea: In 'I met a unicorn' the four words together make a significant proposition, and the word 'unicorn' is significant, …but the two words 'a unicorn' do not form a group having a meaning of its own. It is an indefinite description describing nothing. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI) |
6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
Full Idea: The main objections to Russell's theory of descriptions are to say that definite descriptions sometime are referring expressions, and disputing the claim that definite descriptions embody both uniqueness and existence claims. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: The first one seems particularly correct, as you can successfully refer with a false description. See Colin McGinn (Idea 6067) for criticism of the existence claim made by the so-called 'existential' quantifier. |
10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
Full Idea: Russell's reasons for saying that definite descriptions are not referring expressions are: some definite descriptions have no referent, and they cannot be referring when used in negative existential truths, or in informative identity sentences. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.5 | |
A reaction: The idea is that by 'parity of form', if they aren't referring in these situations, they aren't really referring in others. Sainsbury notes that if there are two different forms of definite description (referential and attributive) these arguments fail. |
5385 | The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell] |
Full Idea: A phrase of the form 'a so-and-so' I shall call an 'ambiguous' description, and a phrase of the form 'the so-and-so' (in the singular) I shall call a 'definite' description. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This leaves the problem of those definite descriptions which succeed in referring ('the present Prime Minister'), those which haven't succeeded yet ('the person who will get the most votes'), and those which won't refer ('the present King of France'). |
1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
Full Idea: When a statement of being or non-being is analysed by Russell's theory of descriptions it ceases to contain any expression which even purports to name the alleged entity, so the being of such an entity is no longer presupposed. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Willard Quine - On What There Is p.6 |
7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: Russell showed that his theory of definite descriptions affords solutions to each of four vexing logical problems: the Problems of Apparent Reference to Non-existents and Negative existentials, Frege's Puzzle about Identity, and Substitutivity. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language 2.Over | |
A reaction: You must seek elsewhere for the explanations of the four problems, but this gives some indication of why Russell's theory was famous, and was felt to be a breakthrough in explaining logical forms. |
21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
Full Idea: With the devices of the Theory of Descriptions at hand, it was no longer necessary to take 'the' as indefinable, and it was possible to diminish greatly the number of entities to which a logical system is ontologically committed. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.13 | |
A reaction: Illuminating, because it shows that ontology is what drove Russell at this time, and really they were all searching for Quine's 'desert landscapes', which minimalise commitment. |
6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the notions of predicate logic - specifically, 'some', 'every', and 'same as'. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Ch.2.7 | |
A reaction: This helpfully clarifies Russell's project - to find the logical form of every sentence, expressed in terms which are strictly defined and consistent. This huge project now looks rather too optimistic. Artificial Intelligence would love to complete it. |
6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's analysis of 'the baby is crying' seems to imply that this can only be true if there is just one baby in the world; ..to dispose of the objection, it seems necessary to appeal implicitly or explicitly to a 'domain of discourse'. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This objection leads to ordinary language philosophy, and the 'pragmatics' of language. It is standard in modern predicate logic to specify the domain over which an expression is quantified. |
7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
Full Idea: Russell proposed that descriptions be treated along with the quantifiers, which departs from Frege, who treated descriptions as proper names. ...the problem was that names invoke objects, and there is no object in failed descriptions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 2.16 | |
A reaction: Maybe we just allow intentional objects (such as unicorns) into our ontology? Producing a parsimonious ontology seems to be the main motivation of most philosophy of language. Or maybe names are just not committed to actual existence? |
7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
Full Idea: Russell attempted to avoid Meinong's strategy (of saying 'The present King of France' refers to a 'non-existent object') by denying that definite descriptions are proper names. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.7 | |
A reaction: Russell claimed that there was a covert existence claim built into a definite description. What about descriptions in known counterfactual situations ('Queen of the Fairies')? |
12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
Full Idea: Since Russell did not want to introduce non-existent objects, or declare many sentences meaningless, he prevented the problem from getting started, by denying that 'the present King of France is bald' is really a subject-predicate sentence. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Graeme Forbes - The Metaphysics of Modality 4.1 |
4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Russell's theory says that sentences which apparently serve to refer to particulars are really assertions about properties. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4.1 | |
A reaction: Right. Which is why particulars get marginalised in Russell, and universals take centre stage. I can't help suspecting that talk of de re/de dicto reference handles this problem better. |
11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's theory makes an exciting distinction between logical and grammatical form, but any theory which says that every positive statement, without distinction, about objects which don't exist is false, has to be wrong. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.5 |
21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
Full Idea: Some logicians charge that the theory of descriptions as it stands is formally inadequate because it lacks explicit conventions for the scope of quantifiers, and that when these conventions are added the theory becomes unduly complex. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.97 | |
A reaction: [Especially in modal contexts, apparently] I suppose if the main point is to spell out the existence commitments of the description, then that has to include quantification, for full generality. |
12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes claimed that the behaviour of definite non-count descriptions shows Russell's Theory of Descriptions itself to be false. ....but it isn't a general theory of descriptions, but precisely a theory of singular descriptions. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Henry Laycock - Words without Objects 3.1 |
7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
Full Idea: Denoting phrases are central to mathematics, especially in Russell's 'logicist' theory, in which they are crucial to identifying classes ('the class of all mortal beings', 'the class of natural numbers'). | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.6 | |
A reaction: This explains the motivation for Russell's theory of definite descriptions, since he thinks reference is achieved by description. Russell nearly achieved an extremely complete philosophical system. |
11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions has as an immediate consequence the doctrine that molecular sentences containing definite descriptions are syntactically ambiguous as regards the scope of the definite description. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David Kaplan - How to Russell a Frege-Church I | |
A reaction: Presumably this is a virtue of Russell's account, and an advert for analytic philosophy, because it reveals an ambiguity which was there all the time. |
14137 | 'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell] |
Full Idea: The word 'any' is preferable to the word 'all' where infinite classes are concerned. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §284) | |
A reaction: The reason must be that it is hard to quantify over 'all' of the infinite members, but it is easier to say what is true of any one of them. |
6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
Full Idea: Nowadays Russell's position is routinely put by saying that existence is what is expressed by the existential quantifier and only by that. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.2 | |
A reaction: We must keep separate how you express existence, and what it is. Quantifiers seem only to be a style of expressing existence; they don't offer any insight into what existence actually is, or what we mean by 'exist'. McGinn dislikes quantifiers. |
18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
Full Idea: A touchstone by which logical propositions may be distinguished from all others is that they result from a process of generalisation which has been carried to its utmost limits. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], p.129), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 'What' |
17629 | Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell] |
Full Idea: Premises which are ultimate in one investigation may cease to be so in another. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.273) |
17630 | The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell] |
Full Idea: In mathematics, except in the earliest parts, the propositions from which a given proposition is deduced generally give the reason why we believe the given proposition. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.273) |
17640 | Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell] |
Full Idea: The premises [of a science] ...are pretty certain to lead to a number of new results which could not otherwise have been known. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.282) | |
A reaction: I identify this as the 'fruitfulness' that results when the essence of something is discovered. |
6109 | Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell] |
Full Idea: Some of the premisses (of my logicist theory) are much less obvious than some of their consequences, and are believed chiefly because of their consequences. This will be found to be always the case when a science is arranged as a deductive system. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.145) | |
A reaction: We shouldn't assume the model of self-evident axioms leading to surprising conclusions, which is something like the standard model for rationalist foundationalists. Russell nicely points out that the situation could be just the opposite |
7557 | To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell] |
Full Idea: Presumably Zeno appealed to the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts; so if Achilles were to overtake the tortoise, he would have been in more places than the tortoise, which he can't be; but the conclusion is absurd, so reject the axiom. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.89) | |
A reaction: The point is that the axiom is normally acceptable (a statue contains more particles than the arm of the statue), but it breaks down when discussing infinity (Idea 7556). Modern theories of infinity are needed to solve Zeno's Paradoxes. |
14149 | The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell] |
Full Idea: When the Achilles Paradox is translated into arithmetical language, it is seen to be concerned with the one-one correlation of two infinite classes. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §321) | |
A reaction: Dedekind's view of infinity (Idea 9826) shows why this results in a horrible tangle. |
21585 | The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell] |
Full Idea: The idea that an infinite number of instants make up an infinitely long time is not true, and therefore the conclusion that Achilles will never overtake the tortoise does not follow. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 6) | |
A reaction: Aristotle spotted this, but didn't express it as clearly as Russell. |
21565 | Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell] |
Full Idea: In Richard's puzzle, we use the notion of 'definition', and this, oddly enough, is not definable, and is indeed not a definite notion at all. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.209) | |
A reaction: The background for this claim is his type theory, which renders certain forms of circular reference meaningless. |
15895 | Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine] |
Full Idea: Burali-Forti didn't discover any paradoxes, though his work suggested a paradox to Russell. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite I |
13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Graham Priest - The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference §2 |
10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's paradox showed that we cannot consistently assume what is sometimes called the 'naïve comprehension principle', namely that every property is collectivizing. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 03.6 |
6407 | The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: The class of teaspoons isn't a teaspoon, so isn't a member of itself; but the class of non-teaspoons is a member of itself. The class of all classes which are not members of themselves is a member of itself if it isn't a member of itself! Paradox. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: A very compressed version of Russell's famous paradox, often known as the 'barber' paradox. Russell developed his Theory of Types in an attempt to counter the paradox. Frege's response was to despair of his own theory. |
21564 | Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell] |
Full Idea: The 'vicious-circle principle' says 'whatever involves an apparent variable must not be among the possible values of that variable', or (less exactly) 'whatever involves ALL must not be one of ALL which it involves. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On 'Insolubilia' and their solution [1906], p.204) | |
A reaction: He offers this as a parallel to his 'no classes' principle. That referred to classes, but this refers to propositions, and specifically the Liar Paradox (which he calls the 'Epimenedes'). |
21567 | 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell] |
Full Idea: Such a proposition as 'all the judgements made by Epimenedes are true' will only be prima facie capable of truth if all his judgements are of the same order. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910], p.227) | |
A reaction: This is an attempt to use his theory of types to solve the Liar. Tarski's invocation of a meta-language is clearly in the same territory. |
16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
Full Idea: A predicate is 'heterological' when it cannot be predicated of itself; thus 'long' is heterological because it is not a long word, but 'short' is homological. So is 'heterological' heterological? Either answer leads to a contradiction. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: [Grelling's Paradox] Yes: 'heterological' is heterological because it isn't heterological; No: it isn't, because it is. Russell says we therefore need a hierarchy of languages (types), and the word 'word' is outside the system. |
10059 | In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth [Russell] |
Full Idea: Mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.76) | |
A reaction: A famous remark, though Musgrave is rather disparaging about Russell's underlying reasoning here. |
14152 | In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses [Russell] |
Full Idea: The approach to practical geometry of the idealists, and especially of Kant, was that we must be certain of the premisses on their own account. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §353) |
14154 | Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space [Russell] |
Full Idea: Geometry no longer throws any direct light on the nature of actual space. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §353) | |
A reaction: This was 1903. Minkowski then contributed a geometry of space which was used in Einstein's General Theory. It looks to me as if geometry reveals the possibilities for actual space. |
14151 | Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists [Russell] |
Full Idea: As a branch of pure mathematics, geometry is strictly deductive, indifferent to the choice of its premises, and to the question of whether there strictly exist such entities. It just deals with series of more than one dimension. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §352) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the culmination of the seventeenth century reduction of geometry to algebra. Russell admits that there is also the 'study of actual space'. |
14153 | In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience [Russell] |
Full Idea: The approach to practical geometry of the empiricists, notably Mill, was to show that no other set of premisses would give results consistent with experience. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §353) | |
A reaction: The modern phrase might be that geometry just needs to be 'empirically adequate'. The empiricists are faced with the possibility of more than one successful set of premisses, and the idealist don't know how to demonstrate truth. |
14155 | Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective) [Russell, by PG] |
Full Idea: Two points will define the line that joins them ('descriptive' geometry), the distance between them ('metrical' geometry), and the whole of the extended line ('projective' geometry). | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §362) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: [a summary of Russell's §362] Projective Geometry clearly has the highest generality, and the modern view seems to make it the master subject of geometry. |
14442 | If straight lines were like ratios they might intersect at a 'gap', and have no point in common [Russell] |
Full Idea: We wish to say that when two straight lines cross each other they have a point in common, but if the series of points on a line were similar to the series of ratios, the two lines might cross in a 'gap' and have no point in common. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], X) | |
A reaction: You can make a Dedekind Cut in the line of ratios (the rationals), so there must be gaps. I love this idea. We take for granted intersection at a point, but physical lines may not coincide. That abstract lines might fail also is lovely! |
18254 | Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8 [Russell, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Russell defined the rationals as ratios of integers, and was therefore forced to treat the real number 5/8 as an object distinct from the rational 5/8. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics 21 'Frege's' |
14144 | Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes [Russell] |
Full Idea: Ordinal numbers result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §293) |
14438 | New numbers solve problems: negatives for subtraction, fractions for division, complex for equations [Russell] |
Full Idea: Every generalisation of number has presented itself as needed for some simple problem. Negative numbers are needed to make subtraction always possible; fractions to make division always possible; complex numbers to make solutions of equations possible. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], VII) | |
A reaction: Doesn't this rather suggest that we made them up? If new problems turn up, we'll invent another lot. We already have added 'surreal' numbers. |
14128 | Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is claimed that ordinals are prior to cardinals, because they form the progression which is relevant to mathematics, but they both form progressions and have the same ordinal properties. There is nothing to choose in logical priority between them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §230) | |
A reaction: We have an intuitive notion of the size of a set without number, but you can't actually start counting without number, so the ordering seems to be the key to the business, which (I would have thought) points to ordinals as prior. |
14129 | Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one [Russell] |
Full Idea: Ordinals presuppose serial and one-one relations, whereas cardinals only presuppose one-one relations. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §232) | |
A reaction: This seems to award the palm to the cardinals, for their greater logical simplicity, but I have already given the award to the ordinals in the previous idea, and I am not going back on that. |
14132 | Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic [Russell] |
Full Idea: The properties of number must be capable of proof without appeal to the general properties of progressions, since cardinals can be independently defined, and must be seen in a progression before theories of progression are applied to them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §243) | |
A reaction: Russell says there is no logical priority between ordinals and cardinals, but it is simpler to start an account with cardinals. |
13510 | Could a number just be something which occurs in a progression? [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Russell toyed with the idea that there is nothing to being a natural number beyond occurring in a progression | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], p.8) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 5 | |
A reaction: How could you define a progression, without a prior access to numbers? - Arrange all the objects in the universe in ascending order of mass. Use scales to make the selection. Hence a finite progression, with no numbers! |
14141 | Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction [Russell] |
Full Idea: The ordinal numbers are defined by some relation to mathematical induction. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §290) |
14142 | Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance [Russell] |
Full Idea: The finite ordinals may be conceived as types of series; ..the ordinal number may be taken as 'n terms in a row'; this is distinct from the 'nth', and logically prior to it. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §290) | |
A reaction: Worth nothing, because the popular and traditional use of 'ordinal' (as in learning a foreign language) is to mean the nth instance of something, rather than a whole series. |
14139 | Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic [Russell] |
Full Idea: Unlike the transfinite cardinals, the transfinite ordinals do not obey the commutative law, and their arithmetic is therefore quite different from elementary arithmetic. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §290) |
14145 | For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers [Russell] |
Full Idea: In his most recent article Cantor speaks of ordinals as types of order, not as numbers. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §298) | |
A reaction: Russell likes this because it supports his own view of ordinals as classes of serial relations. It has become orthodoxy to refer to heaps of things as 'numbers' when the people who introduced them may not have seen them that way. |
14146 | We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another [Russell] |
Full Idea: We do not know that of any two different cardinal numbers one must be the greater. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §300) | |
A reaction: This was 1903, and I don't know whether the situation has changed. I find this thought extremely mind-boggling, given that cardinals are supposed to answer the question 'how many?' Presumably they can't be identical either. See Burali-Forti. |
14135 | Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all) [Russell] |
Full Idea: Real numbers are not really numbers at all, but something quite different; ...a real number, so I shall contend, is nothing but a certain class of rational numbers. ...A segment of rationals is a real number. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §258) |
14436 | A series can be 'Cut' in two, where the lower class has no maximum, the upper no minimum [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is no maximum to the ratios whose square is less than 2, and no minimum to those whose square is greater than 2. This division of a series into two classes is called a 'Dedekind Cut'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], VII) |
14439 | A complex number is simply an ordered couple of real numbers [Russell] |
Full Idea: A complex number may be regarded and defined as simply an ordered couple of real numbers | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], VII) |
14421 | Discovering that 1 is a number was difficult [Russell] |
Full Idea: The discovery that 1 is a number must have been difficult. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], I) | |
A reaction: Interesting that he calls it a 'discovery'. I am tempted to call it a 'decision'. |
14123 | Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable [Russell] |
Full Idea: Some quantities cannot be measured (such as pain), and some things which are not quantities can be measured (such as certain series). | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §150) |
14158 | Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order [Russell] |
Full Idea: Quantity, though philosophers seem to think it essential to mathematics, does not occur in pure mathematics, and does occur in many cases not amenable to mathematical treatment. The place of quantity is taken by order. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §405) | |
A reaction: He gives pain as an example of a quantity which cannot be treated mathematically. |
14120 | Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic [Russell] |
Full Idea: The process of counting gives us no indication as to what the numbers are, as to why they form a series, or as to how it is to be proved that there are n numbers from 1 to n. Hence counting is irrelevant to the foundations of arithmetic. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §129) | |
A reaction: I take it to be the first truth in the philosophy of mathematics that if there is a system of numbers which won't do the job of counting, then that system is irrelevant. Counting always comes first. |
14424 | Numbers are needed for counting, so they need a meaning, and not just formal properties [Russell] |
Full Idea: We want our numbers to be such as can be used for counting common objects, and this requires that our numbers should have a definite meaning, not merely that they should have certain formal properties. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], I) | |
A reaction: Why would just having certain formal properties be insufficient for counting? You just need an ordered series of unique items. It isn't just that we 'want' this. If you define something that we can't count with, you haven't defined numbers. |
14118 | We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is possible, without the notion of unity, to define what is meant by one-to-one. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §109) | |
A reaction: This is the trick which enables the Greek account of numbers, based on units, to be abandoned. But when you have arranged the boys and the girls one-to-one, you have not yet got a concept of number. |
14441 | The formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative, the Associative and the Distributive [Russell] |
Full Idea: The usual formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative Law [a+b=b+a and axb=bxa], the Associative Law [(a+b)+c=a+(b+c) and (axb)xc=ax(bxc)], and the Distributive Law [a(b+c)=ab+ac)]. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], IX) |
14119 | We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is not at present known whether, of two different infinite numbers, one must be greater and the other less. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §118) | |
A reaction: This must refer to cardinal numbers, as ordinal numbers have an order. The point is that the proper subset is equal to the set (according to Dedekind). |
14133 | There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal) [Russell] |
Full Idea: The theory of infinity has two forms, cardinal and ordinal, of which the former springs from the logical theory of numbers; the theory of continuity is purely ordinal. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §249) |
14420 | Infinity and continuity used to be philosophy, but are now mathematics [Russell] |
Full Idea: The nature of infinity and continuity belonged in former days to philosophy, but belongs now to mathematics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], Pref) | |
A reaction: It is hard to disagree, since mathematicians since Cantor have revealed so much about infinite numbers (through set theory), but I think it remains an open question whether philosophers have anything distinctive to contribute. |
7556 | A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number [Russell] |
Full Idea: A collection of terms is infinite if it contains as parts other collections which have as many terms as it has; that is, you can take away some terms of the collection without diminishing its number; there are as many even numbers as numbers all together. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.86) | |
A reaction: He cites Dedekind and Cantor as source for these ideas. If it won't obey the rule that subtraction makes it smaller, then it clearly isn't a number, and really it should be banned from all mathematics. |
14134 | Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole [Russell] |
Full Idea: There are two differences of infinite numbers from finite: that they do not obey mathematical induction (both cardinals and ordinals), and that the whole contains a part consisting of the same number of terms (applying only to ordinals). | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §250) |
14143 | ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers [Russell] |
Full Idea: The ordinal representing the whole series must be different from what represents a segment of itself, with no immediate predecessor, since the series has no last term. ω names the class progression, or generating relation of series of this class. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §291) | |
A reaction: He is paraphrasing Cantor's original account of ω. |
14138 | You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it [Russell] |
Full Idea: It must not be supposed that we can obtain a new transfinite cardinal by merely adding one to it, or even by adding any finite number, or aleph-0. On the contrary, such puny weapons cannot disturb the transfinite cardinals. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §288) | |
A reaction: If you add one, the original cardinal would be a subset of the new one, and infinite numbers have their subsets equal to the whole, so you have gone nowhere. You begin to wonder whether transfinite cardinals are numbers at all. |
14140 | For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals [Russell] |
Full Idea: For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals, although the cardinal number of all ordinals is the same as or less than that of all cardinals. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §290) | |
A reaction: Sort that one out, and you are beginning to get to grips with the world of the transfinite! Sounds like there are more ordinals than cardinals, and more cardinals than ordinals. |
17627 | It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is an apparent absurdity in proceeding ...through many rather recondite propositions of symbolic logic, to the 'proof' of such truisms as 2+2=4: for it is plain that the conclusion is more certain than the premises, and the supposed proof seems futile. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.272) | |
A reaction: Famously, 'Principia Mathematica' proved this fact at enormous length. I wonder if this thought led Moore to his common sense view of his own hand - the conclusion being better than the sceptical arguments? |
10052 | Geometry is united by the intuitive axioms of projective geometry [Russell, by Musgrave] |
Full Idea: Russell sought what was common to Euclidean and non-Euclidean systems, found it in the axioms of projective geometry, and took a Kantian view of them. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Foundations of Geometry [1897]) by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §4 | |
A reaction: Russell's work just preceded Hilbert's famous book. Tarski later produced some logical axioms for geometry. |
14431 | The definition of order needs a transitive relation, to leap over infinite intermediate terms [Russell] |
Full Idea: Order must be defined by means of a transitive relation, since only such a relation is able to leap over an infinite number of intermediate terms. ...Without it we would not be able to define the order of magnitude among fractions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], IV) |
14124 | Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater [Russell] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Archimedes asserts that, given any two magnitudes of a kind, some finite multiple of the lesser exceeds the greater. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §168 n*) |
7530 | Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class' [Russell, by Monk] |
Full Idea: What Russell tried to show [at this time] was that Peano's Postulates (based on 'zero', 'number' and 'successor') could in turn be dispensed with, and the whole edifice built upon nothing more than the notion of 'class'. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4 | |
A reaction: (See Idea 5897 for Peano) Presumably you can't afford to lose the notion of 'successor' in the account. If you build any theory on the idea of classes, you are still required to explain why a particular is a member of that class, and not another. |
18246 | Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions [Shapiro on Russell] |
Full Idea: Dedekind's demonstrations nowhere - not even where he comes to cardinals - involve any property distinguishing numbers from other progressions. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], p.249) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 5.4 | |
A reaction: Shapiro notes that his sounds like Frege's Julius Caesar problem, of ensuring that your definition really does capture a number. Russell is objecting to mathematical structuralism. |
14422 | Any founded, non-repeating series all reachable in steps will satisfy Peano's axioms [Russell] |
Full Idea: Given any series which is endless, contains no repetitions, has a beginning, and has no terms that cannot be reached from the beginning in a finite number of steps, we have a set of terms verifying Peano's axioms. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], I) |
14423 | '0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by Peano's axioms [Russell] |
Full Idea: That '0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by means of Peano's five axioms, but must be independently understood. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], I) |
14147 | Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite [Russell] |
Full Idea: The transfinite was obtained by denying mathematical induction. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §310) | |
A reaction: This refers to the work of Dedekind and Cantor. This raises the question (about which thinkers have ceased to care, it seems), of whether it is rational to deny mathematical induction. |
14125 | Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction [Russell] |
Full Idea: Finite numbers obey the law of mathematical induction: infinite numbers do not. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §183) |
14116 | Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and + [Russell] |
Full Idea: It used to be common to define numbers by means of 1, with 2 being 1+1 and so on. But this method was only applicable to finite numbers, made a tiresome different between 1 and the other numbers, and left + unexplained. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §109) | |
A reaction: Am I alone in hankering after the old approach? The idea of a 'unit' is what connected numbers to the patterns of the world. Russell's approach invites unneeded platonism. + is just 'and', and infinities are fictional extrapolations. Sounds fine to me. |
14117 | Numbers are properties of classes [Russell] |
Full Idea: Numbers are to be regarded as properties of classes. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §109) | |
A reaction: If properties are then defined extensionally as classes, you end up with numbers as classes of classes. |
14425 | A number is something which characterises collections of the same size [Russell] |
Full Idea: The number 3 is something which all trios have in common, and which distinguishes them from other collections. A number is something that characterises certain collections, namely, those that have that number. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], II) | |
A reaction: This is a verbal summary of the Fregean view of numbers, which marks the arrival of set theory as the way arithmetic will in future be characterised. The question is whether set theory captures all aspects of numbers. Does it give a tool for counting? |
14434 | What matters is the logical interrelation of mathematical terms, not their intrinsic nature [Russell] |
Full Idea: What matters in mathematics is not the intrinsic nature of our terms, but the logical nature of their interrelations. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], VI) | |
A reaction: If they have an instrinsic nature, that would matter far more, because that would dictate the interrelations. Structuralism seems to require that they don't actually have any intrinsic nature. |
9977 | Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is impossible that the ordinals should be, as Dedekind suggests, nothing but the terms of such relations as constitute a progression. If they are anything at all, they must be intrinsically something. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §242) | |
A reaction: This is the obvious platonist response to the incipient doctrine of structuralism. We have a chicken-and-egg problem. Bricks need intrinsic properties to make a structure. A structure isomorphic to numbers is not thereby the numbers. |
14162 | Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: Mathematics is throughout indifferent to the question whether its entities exist. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §434) | |
A reaction: There is an 'if-thenist' attitude in this book, since he is trying to reduce mathematics to logic. Total indifference leaves the problem of why mathematics is applicable to the real world. |
17628 | Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell] |
Full Idea: When 2 + 2 =4 was first discovered, it was probably inferred from the case of sheep and other concrete cases. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.272) |
5399 | Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell] |
Full Idea: If induction was the source of our mathematical knowledge, we should proceed differently. In fact, a certain number of instances make us think of two abstractly, and we then see the general principle, and further instances become unnecessary. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: In practice, of course, we stop checking whether the sun has come up yet again this morning. Russell's point is better expressed as: if contradictory evidence were observed, we would believe the arithmetic and doubt the experience. |
14465 | Maybe numbers are adjectives, since 'ten men' grammatically resembles 'white men' [Russell] |
Full Idea: 'Ten men' is grammatically the same form as 'white men', so that 10 might be thought to be an adjective qualifying 'men'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVIII) | |
A reaction: The immediate problem, as Frege spotted, is that such expressions can be rephrased to remove the adjective (by saying 'the number of men is ten'). |
13414 | For Russell, numbers are sets of equivalent sets [Russell, by Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: Russell's own stand was that numbers are really only sets of equivalent sets. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919]) by Paul Benacerraf - Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD) p.168 | |
A reaction: Benacerraf is launching a nice attack on this view, based on our inability to grasp huge numbers on this basis, or to see their natural order. |
14103 | Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q' [Russell] |
Full Idea: Pure mathematics is the class of all propositions of the form 'p implies q', where p and q are propositions containing one or more variables, the same in the two propositions, and neither p nor q contains any constants except logical constants. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §001) | |
A reaction: Linnebo calls Russell's view here 'deductive structuralism'. Russell gives (§5) as an example that Euclid is just whatever is deduced from his axioms. |
6108 | Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell] |
Full Idea: I think that no one will dispute that from certain ideas and axioms of formal logic, but with the help of the logic of relations, all pure mathematics can be deduced. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.145) | |
A reaction: It has been said for a long time that Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems of 1930 disproved this claim, though recently there have been defenders of logicism. Beginning with 'certain ideas' sounds like begging the question. |
6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
Full Idea: The primary aim of our 'Principia Mathematica' was to show that all pure mathematics follows from purely logical premisses and uses only concepts definable in logical terms. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: This spells out the main programme of logicism, by its great hero, Russell. The big question now is whether Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems have succeeded in disproving logicism. |
21555 | For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x [Russell] |
Full Idea: In his 1903 theory of types he distinguished between individuals, ranges of individuals, ranges of ranges of individuals, and so on. Each level was a type, and it was stipulated that for 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one type higher than x. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], App) | |
A reaction: Russell was dissatisfied because this theory could not deal with Cantor's Paradox. Is this the first time in modern philosophy that someone has offered a criterion for whether a proposition is 'meaningful'? |
18003 | In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless [Russell, by Magidor] |
Full Idea: Russell argues that in a statement of the form 'x is a u' (and correspondingly, 'x is a not-u'), 'x must be of different types', and hence that ''x is an x' must in general be meaningless'. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], App B:524) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.2 | |
A reaction: " 'Word' is a word " comes to mind, but this would be the sort of ascent to a metalanguage (to distinguish the types) which Tarski exploited. It is the simple point that a classification can't be the same as a member of the classification. |
10418 | Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous [Swoyer on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's reaction to his paradox (by creating his theory of types) seems extreme, because many cases of self-exemplification are innocuous. The property of being a property is itself a property. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties 7.5 | |
A reaction: Perhaps it is not enough that 'many cases' are innocuous. We are starting from philosophy of mathematics, where precision is essentially. General views about properties come later. |
10047 | Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms [Russell, by Musgrave] |
Full Idea: Unfortunately, Russell's new logic, as well as preventing the deduction of paradoxes, also prevented the deduction of mathematics, so he supplemented it with additional axioms, of Infinity, of Choice, and of Reducibility. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §2 | |
A reaction: The first axiom seems to be an empirical hypothesis, and the second has turned out to be independent of logic and set theory. |
23478 | Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed [Morris,M on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's theory of types avoided the paradoxes, but it had the result that features common to different levels of the hierarchy become uncapturable (since any attempt to capture them would involve a predicate which disobeyed the hierarchy restrictions). | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 2H |
23457 | Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's theory of types meant that features common to different levels of the hierarchy became uncapturable (since any attempt to capture them would involve a predicate which disobeyed the hierarchy restrictions). | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910]) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 2H | |
A reaction: I'm not clear whether this is the main reason why type theory was abandoned. Ramsey was an important critic. |
21556 | Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey] |
Full Idea: In Russell's mature 1910 theory of types classes are defined in terms of propositional functions, and functions themselves are regimented by a ramified theory of types mitigated by the axiom of reducibility. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.133 |
21718 | Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: A defence of the ramified theory of types comes in seeing it as a system of intensional logic which includes the 'no class' account of sets, and indeed the whole development of mathematics, as just a part. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 6.1 | |
A reaction: So Linsky's basic project is to save logicism, by resting on intensional logic (rather than extensional logic and set theory). I'm not aware that Linsky has acquired followers for this. Maybe Crispin Wright has commented? |
21570 | Numbers are just verbal conveniences, which can be analysed away [Russell] |
Full Idea: Numbers are nothing but a verbal convenience, and disappear when the propositions that seem to contain them are fully written out. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Is Mathematics purely Linguistic? [1952], p.301) | |
A reaction: This is the culmination of the process which began with his 1905 theory of definite descriptions. The intervening step was Wittgenstein's purely formal account of the logical connectives. |
6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
Full Idea: The Formalists, led by Hilbert, maintain that arithmetic symbols are merely marks on paper, devoid of meaning, and that arithmetic consists of certain arbitrary rules, like the rules of chess, by which these marks can be manipulated. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: I just don't believe that maths is arbitrary, and this view pushes me into the arms of the empiricists, who say maths is far more likely to arise from experience than from arbitrary convention. The key to maths is patterns. |
6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
Full Idea: Formalism is perfectly adequate for doing sums, but not for the application of number, such as the simple statement 'there are three men in this room', so it must be regarded as an unsatisfactory evasion. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a powerful and simple objection. The foundation of arithmetic is that there are three men in the room, not that one plus two is three. Three men and three ties make a pattern, which we call 'three'. |
6104 | Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell] |
Full Idea: Numbers are classes of classes, and classes are logical fictions, so that numbers are, as it were, fictions at two removes, fictions of fictions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VIII) | |
A reaction: This summarises the findings of Russell and Whitehead's researches into logicism. Gödel may have proved that project impossible, but there is now debate about that. Personally I think of numbers as names of patterns. |
6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
Full Idea: The nerve of the Intuitionist theory, led by Brouwer, is the denial of the law of excluded middle; it holds that a proposition can only be accounted true or false when there is some method of ascertaining which of these it is. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: He cites 'there are three successive sevens in the expansion of pi' as a case in point. This seems to me an example of the verificationism and anti-realism which is typical of that period. It strikes me as nonsense, but Russell takes it seriously. |
21559 | We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell] |
Full Idea: We need rules for deciding what norms are predicative and what are not, unless we adopt the view (which has much to recommend it) that no norms are predicative. ...[146] A predative propositional function is one which determines a class. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types [1905], p.141) | |
A reaction: He is referring to his 'no class' theory, which he favoured at that time. |
18126 | A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative [Russell, by Bostock] |
Full Idea: The idea is that the same set may well have different canonical specifications, i.e. there may be different ways of stating its membership conditions, and so long as one of these is predicative all is well. If none are, the supposed set does not exist. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 8.1 |
18128 | Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them [Russell, by Bostock] |
Full Idea: It is a conceptualist approach that Russell is relying on. ...The view is that some abstract objects ...exist only because they are definable. It is the definition that would (if permitted) somehow bring them into existence. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 8.1 | |
A reaction: I'm suddenly thinking that predicativism is rather interesting. Being of an anti-platonist persuasion about abstract 'objects', I take some story about how we generate them to be needed. Psychological abstraction seems right, but a bit vague. |
18124 | Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Vicious Circle Principle says, roughly, that whatever involves, or presupposes, or is only definable in terms of, all of a collection cannot itself be one of the collection. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908], p.63,75) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 8.1 | |
A reaction: This is Bostock's paraphrase of Russell, because Russell never quite puts it clearly. The response is the requirement to be 'predicative'. Bostock emphasises that it mainly concerns definitions. The Principle 'always leads to hierarchies'. |
21568 | A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell] |
Full Idea: We will define a function of one variable as 'predicative' when it is of the next order above that of its arguments, i.e. of the lowest order compatible with its having an argument. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910], p.237) | |
A reaction: 'Predicative' just means it produces a set. This is Russell's strict restriction on which functions are predicative. |
21558 | 'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell] |
Full Idea: Norms (containing one variable) which do not define classes I propose to call 'non-predicative'; those which do define classes I shall call 'predicative'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types [1905], p.141) |
14449 | There is always something psychological about inference [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is always unavoidably something psychological about inference. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XIV) | |
A reaction: Glad to find Russell saying that. Only pure Fregeans dream of a logic that rises totally above the minds that think it. See Robert Hanna on the subject. |
14463 | Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named [Russell] |
Full Idea: Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVIII) | |
A reaction: This is the motivation behind Russell's theory of definite descriptions, and epitomises the approach to ontology through language. Sounds wrong to me! |
11010 | Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought [Russell] |
Full Idea: Being is that which belongs to every conceivable, to every possible object of thought. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]), quoted by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I take Russell's (or anyone's) attempt to distinguish two different senses of the word 'being' or 'exist' to be an umitigated metaphysical disaster. |
14161 | Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell] |
Full Idea: Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimeras and four-dimensional space all have being, for if they were not entities of a kind, we could not make propositions about them. Existence, on the contrary, is the prerogative of some only amongst the beings. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §427) | |
A reaction: This is the analytic philosophy account of being (a long way from Heidegger). Contemporary philosophy seems to be full of confusions on this, with many writers claiming existence for things which should only be awarded 'being' status. |
14173 | What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell] |
Full Idea: It would seem that whatever exists at any part of time has causal relations. This is not a distinguishing characteristic of what exists, since we have seen that two non-existent terms may be cause and effect. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §449) | |
A reaction: Presumably he means that the non-existence of something (such as a safety rail) might the cause of an event. This is a problem for Alexander's Principle, in Idea 3534. I think we could redescribe his problem cases, to save Alexander. |
6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: In his 'Analysis of Matter' (1927), Russell sought to analyse the chief concepts of physics, such as force and matter, in terms of events. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: My immediate reaction is that this is not very promising, simply because we can always ask why a particular event occurred, and this seems to point to a deeper level in the analysis. See Idea 4779, for example. |
16045 | General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K] |
Full Idea: Russell noted that you cannot arrive at general facts by inference from numerous particular facts, ..but general facts logically supervene on particular ones. So the general facts supervene, but are not entailed. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Relations of Universals and Particulars [1911]) by Karen Bennett - Supervenience §3.2 | |
A reaction: The belief that the general facts supervene on the particular ones then seems to be more a matter of faith than of fact. Or maybe it is analytic, depending on what we understand by 'general'. Universal, or generalised? |
10968 | Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read] |
Full Idea: Russell preceded Wittgenstein in deciding that the reduction of all propositions to atomic propositions could not be achieved. The problem cases were negative propositions, general propositions, and belief propositions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.1 |
21684 | Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell] |
Full Idea: Perhaps one atomic fact may sometimes be capable of being inferred from another, though I do not believe this to be the case; but in any case it cannot be inferred from premises no one of which is an atomic fact. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], p.48) | |
A reaction: I prefer Russell's caution to Wittgenstein's dogmatism. I presume utterly simple facts give you nothing to work with. Hegel thought that you could infer new concepts from given concepts. |
21708 | Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: Russell's new logical atomist ontology was of particulars, universals and facts, replacing the ontology of 'platonic atomism' consisting just of propositions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 1 | |
A reaction: Linsky cites Peter Hylton as saying that the earlier view was never replaced. The earlier view required propositions to be 'unified'. I surmise that the formula 'Fa' combines a universal and a particular, to form an atomic fact. [...but Idea 6111!] |
19051 | Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine] |
Full Idea: In 1918 Russell does not admit facts as fundamental; atomic facts are atomic as facts go, but they are compound objects. The atoms of Russell's logical atomism are not atomic facts but sense data. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Willard Quine - Russell's Ontological Development p.83 | |
A reaction: By about 1921 Russell had totally given up sense-data, because he had been reading behaviourist psychology. |
6089 | Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell] |
Full Idea: I call my doctrine logical atomism because, as the last residue of analysis, I wish to arrive at logical atoms and not physical atoms; some of them will be particulars, and others will be predicates and relations and so on. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §I) | |
A reaction: However we judge it, logical atomism is a vital landmark in the history of 'analytical' philosophy, because it lays out the ideal for our assessment. It is fashionable to denigrate analysis, but I think it is simply the nearest to wisdom we will ever get. |
6100 | Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell] |
Full Idea: When you have enumerated all the atomic facts in the world, it is a further fact about the world that those are all the atomic facts there are about the world. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §V) | |
A reaction: There is obviously a potential regress of facts about facts here. This looks like one of the reasons why the original logical atomism had a short shelf-life. Personally I see this as an argument in favour of rationalism, in the way Bonjour argues for it. |
6105 | Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell] |
Full Idea: Logical atomism is the view that you can get down in theory, if not in practice, to ultimate simples, out of which the world is built, and that those simples have a kind of reality not belonging to anything else. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VIII) | |
A reaction: This dream is to empiricists what the Absolute is to rationalists - a bit silly, but an embodiment of the motivating dream. |
6113 | To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell] |
Full Idea: The way to mean a fact is to assert it; the way to mean a simple is to name it. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.156) | |
A reaction: Thus logical atomism is a linguistic programme, of reducing our language to a foundation of pure names. The recent thought of McDowell and others is aimed at undermining any possibility of a 'simple' in perception. The myth of 'The Given'. |
6114 | 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell] |
Full Idea: When I speak of 'simples' I am speaking of something not experienced as such, but known only inferentially as the limits of analysis. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.158) | |
A reaction: He claims that the simples are 'known', so he does not mean purely theoretical entities. They have something like the status of quarks in physics, whose existence is inferred from experience. |
21722 | Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell] |
Full Idea: Whenever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.161), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7 | |
A reaction: In 1919 he said that the alternative, of 'postulating' new entities, has 'all the advantages of theft over honest toil' [IMP p.71]. This is Russell's commitment to 'constructing' everything, even his concept of matter. Arithmetic as PA is postulation. |
21681 | Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced [Russell] |
Full Idea: Given all true atomic propositions, together with the fact that they are all, every other true proposition can theoretically be deduced by logical methods. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Intro to 2nd ed of Principia Mathematica [1925], p.xv) | |
A reaction: This is evidently his strongest statement of the ideal underlying logical atomism. The atoms were initially sense-date, but then became atomic propositions saying an object has a property. |
6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
Full Idea: In the years 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This is interesting (about Russell) because he only labelled it as 'logical atomism' in about 1912, and only wrote about it as such in 1918. It is helpful to understand that the theory of definite descriptions was part of his logical atomism. |
6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
Full Idea: I have come to think that, although many things can be known to be complex, nothing can be known to be simple. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: This appears to be a rejection of his logical atomism. It goes with a general rebellion against foundationalist epistemology, because the empiricists foundations (e.g. Hume's impressions) seem devoid of all content. |
6472 | Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell] |
Full Idea: Continuity is not a sufficient criterion of material identity; it is sufficient in many cases, such as rocks and tables, where the appearances change slowly, but in others, such as the parts of an approximately homogeneous fluid, it fails us utterly. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI) | |
A reaction: It might be debatable to what extent the 'parts' of a homogeneous fluid have identity. How many 'parts' are there in a glass of water? This seems, now, a problem for internalists; externalists can define the identity by the unseen molecules. |
21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
Full Idea: If two people can perceive the same object, as the possibility of any common world requires, then the object of an external perception is not in the mind of the percipient. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.33) | |
A reaction: This is merely an assertion of the realist view, rather than an argument. I take representative realism to tell a perfectly good story that permits two subjective representations of the same object. |
5370 | Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell] |
Full Idea: The space of science is neutral as between touch and sight; thus it cannot be either the space of touch or the space of sight. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: I find this persuasive, although it is hardly a knock-down argument. It is a very simple problem for anti-realists, that if you say reality IS sensations (à la Berkeley), then you have conflicting sensations of what seems to be one reality. |
7545 | Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell] |
Full Idea: I believe that common sense is right in regarding what we see as physical and (in one of several possible senses) outside the mind, but is probably wrong in supposing that it continues to exist when we are no longer looking at it. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.123) | |
A reaction: This remark (in 1915) is a bit startling from a philosopher well known for his robustly realist stance. Just one of his phases! It seems very counterintuitive - that objects really exist externally, but only when viewed. Schrödinger's Cat? |
14429 | Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell] |
Full Idea: Classes may be regarded as logical fictions, manufactured out of defining characteristics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], II n1) | |
A reaction: I agree with this. The idea that in addition to the members there is a further object, the set containing them, is absurd. Sets are a tool for thinking about the world. |
21709 | You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell] |
Full Idea: Facts are the sort of things that are asserted or denied by propositions, and are not properly entities at all in the same sense in which their constituents are. That is shown by the fact that you cannot name them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], p.235), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 2.2 | |
A reaction: [ref to Papers vol.8] It is customary to specify a proposition by its capacity for T and F. So is a fact just 'a truth'? This contains the Fregean idea that things are only real if they can be picked out. I think of facts as independent of minds. |
6111 | As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell] |
Full Idea: Since any proposition can be put into a form with a subject and a predicate, united by a copula, it is natural to infer that every fact consists in the possession of a quality by a substance, which seems to me a mistake. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.152) | |
A reaction: This disagrees with McGinn on facts (Idea 6075). I approve of this warning from Russell, which is a recognition that we can't just infer our metaphysics from our language. I think of this as the 'Frege Fallacy', which ensnared Quine and others. |
6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
Full Idea: Facts, as I am using the word, consist always of relations between parts of a whole or qualities of single things; facts, in a word, are whatever there is except what (if anything) is completely simple. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: This is the view that goes with Russell's 'logical atomism', where the 'completely simple' is used to build up the 'facts'. If World War One was a fact, was it a 'relation' or a 'quality'. Must events then be defined in terms of those two? |
18376 | Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Russell argues for atomic facts, and also for existential facts, negative facts and general facts. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 05.1 | |
A reaction: Armstrong says he overdoes it. I would even add disjunctive facts, which Russell rejects. 'Rain or snow will ruin the cricket match'. Rain can make that true, but it is a disjunctive fact about the match. |
5418 | In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell] |
Full Idea: If we imagine a world of mere matter, there would be no room for falsehood, and although it would contain what may be called 'facts', it would not contain any truths. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Only a realist will buy a concept of mind-independent 'facts', but I am with Russell all the way here. We should not say "the truth is out there", but "the facts are out there". Facts are the target of thought, and truth is a relationship to the facts. |
22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
Full Idea: On Russell's pre-war conception it is obvious that a complex cannot be negative. If a complex were true, what would make it false would be its non-existence, not the existence of some other complex. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 41 'Neg' | |
A reaction: It might be false because it doesn't exist, but also 'made' false by a rival complex (such as Desdemona loving Othello). |
22316 | A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell] |
Full Idea: It must not be supposed that a negative fact contains a constituent corresponding to the word 'not'. It contains no more constituents than a positive fact of the correlative positive form. The differenece between the two forms is ultimate and irreducible. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], VIII.279), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 41 'Neg' | |
A reaction: ['Harvard Lectures'] The audience disliked this. How does one fact exclude the other fact? Potter asks whether absence is a fact, and whether an absence can be a truthmaker. |
5465 | Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis] |
Full Idea: Russell and Wittgenstein sought to reduce everything to singular facts or states of affairs, and Armstrong and Keith Campbell have more recently advocated ontologies of tropes or elementary states of affairs. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.3 n 11 | |
A reaction: A very interesting historical link. Logical atomism strikes me as a key landmark in the history of philosophy, and not an eccentric cul-de-sac. It is always worth trying to get your ontology down to minimal small units, to see what happens. |
9051 | Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: Russell takes it that logic assumes precision, and since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic at all. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923]) by R Keefe / P Smith - Intro: Theories of Vagueness §1 | |
A reaction: I find this view congenial. It seems to me that the necessary prelude to logic is to do everything you can to eliminate ambiguity and vagueness from the sentences at issue. We want the proposition, or logical form. If there isn't one, forget it? |
9054 | Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell] |
Full Idea: Vagueness and precision alike are characteristics which can only belong to a representation, of which language is an example. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923], p.62) | |
A reaction: Russell was the first to tackle the question of vagueness, and he may have got it right. If we are unable to decide which set an object belongs in (red or orange) that is a problem for our conceptual/linguistic scheme. The object still has a colour! |
6060 | 'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell] |
Full Idea: When you take any propositional function and assert of it that it is possible, that it is sometimes true, that gives you the fundamental meaning of 'existence'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]), quoted by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Functions depend on variables, so this leads to Quine's slogan "to be is to be the value of a variable". Assertions of non-existence are an obvious problem, but Russell thought of all that. All of this makes existence too dependent on language. |
18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions allows us to avoid being ontologically committed to objects simply by virtue of using descriptions which seemingly denote them. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Bernard Linsky - Quantification and Descriptions 1.1.2 | |
A reaction: This I take to be why Russell's theory is a famous landmark. I personally take ontological commitment to be independent of what we specifically say. Others, like Quine, prefer to trim what we say until the commitments seem sound. |
14163 | Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points [Russell] |
Full Idea: Among terms which appear to exist, there are, we may say, four great classes: 1) instants, 2) points, 3) terms which occupy instants but not points, 4) terms which occupy both points and instants. Analysis cannot explain 'occupy'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §437) | |
A reaction: This is a massively reductive scientific approach to categorising existence. Note that it homes in on 'terms', which seems a rather linguistic approach, although Russell is cautious about such things. |
7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
Full Idea: The real Platonic entities left standing after the Theory of Descriptions were propositions (not classes or numbers), and their constituents did not include denoting concepts or classes, but only individuals (Socrates) and universals (mortality). | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.6 | |
A reaction: Propositions look like being the problem here. If we identify them with facts, it is not clear how many facts there are in the universe, independent of human thought. Indeed, how many universals are there? Nay, how many individuals? See Idea 7534. |
21341 | Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil] |
Full Idea: Relations were regarded with suspicion, until philosophers working in logic and mathematics advanced reasons to doubt that we could provide anything like an adequate description of the world without developing a relational vocabulary. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], Ch.26) by John Heil - Relations | |
A reaction: [Heil cites Russell as the only reference] A little warning light, that philosophers describing the world managed to do without real relations, and it was only for the abstraction of logic and maths that they became essential. |
21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
Full Idea: It may be doubted whether relations can be adequately characterised by anything except the fact that they relate. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.27) | |
A reaction: We can characterise a rope that ties things together. If I say 'stand to his left', do I assume the existence of one of the relata and the relation, but without the second relata? How about 'you two stand over there, with him on the left'? |
21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
Full Idea: In some sense which it would be very desirable to define, a relational proposition seems to be 'about' its terms, in a way in which it is not about the relation. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.53) | |
A reaction: Identifying how best to specify what a proposition is actually 'about' is a very illuminating mode of enquiry. You can't define 'underneath' without invoking a pair of objects to illustrate it. A proposition can still focus on the relation. |
21562 | There is no complexity without relations, so no propositions, and no truth [Russell] |
Full Idea: Relations in intension are of the utmost importance to philosophy and philosophical logic, since they are essential to complexity, and thence to propositions, and thence to the possibility of truth and falsehood. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Substitutional Classes and Relations [1906], p.174) | |
A reaction: Should we able to specify the whole of reality, if we have available to us objects, properties and relations? There remains indeterminate 'stuff', when it does not compose objects. There are relations between pure ideas. |
5371 | Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell] |
Full Idea: We can know the properties of the relations required to preserve the correspondence between sense-data and reality, but we cannot know the nature of the terms between which the relations hold. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: Thus Russell always puts great emphasis on relations in his metaphysics. I would say that he is right, and that what he calls the 'nature of the terms' are essences, and that these are knowable, by inference and explanation. |
5407 | That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell] |
Full Idea: Nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London, but this involves the universal 'north of', so we must admit that relations are not dependent upon thought, but belong to the independent world which thought apprehends. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: We cannot deny that Edinburgh being north of London is independent of our minds, but we might deny that 'north of' is a universal. 'North' is clearly a human convention, but 'nearer a pole' isn't. Distances exist in space, rather than as relations. |
21576 | With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell] |
Full Idea: When we come to asymmetrical relations, such as before and after, greater and less etc., the attempt to reduce them to properties becomes obviously impossible. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 2) | |
A reaction: The traditional Aristotelian reduction to properties is attributed by Russell to logic based on subject-predicate. As an example he cites being greater than as depending on more than the mere magnitudes of the entities. Direction of the relation. |
14430 | If a relation is symmetrical and transitive, it has to be reflexive [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is obvious that a relation which is symmetrical and transitive must be reflexive throughout its domain. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], II) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 13543! The relation will return to its originator via its neighbours, rather than being directly reflexive? |
10586 | 'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness [Russell] |
Full Idea: The property of a relation which insures that it holds between a term and itself is called by Peano 'reflexiveness', and he has shown, contrary to what was previously believed, that this property cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §209) | |
A reaction: So we might say 'this is a sentence' has a reflexive relation, and 'this is a wasp' does not. While there are plenty of examples of mental properties with this property, I'm not sure that it makes much sense of a physical object. Indexicality... |
14432 | 'Asymmetry' is incompatible with its converse; a is husband of b, so b can't be husband of a [Russell] |
Full Idea: The relation of 'asymmetry' is incompatible with the converse. …The relation 'husband' is asymmetrical, so that if a is the husband of b, b cannot be the husband of a. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], V) | |
A reaction: This is to be contrasted with 'non-symmetrical', where there just happens to be no symmetry. |
10585 | Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality [Russell] |
Full Idea: Relations which are both symmetrical and transitive are formally of the nature of equality. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §209) | |
A reaction: This is the key to the whole equivalence approach to abstraction and Frege's definition of numbers. Establish equality conditions is the nearest you can get to saying what such things are. Personally I think we can say more, by revisiting older views. |
9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 6.1 | |
A reaction: This is the principle stumbling block to any attempt to explain properties purely in terms of sets. I would say that Russell proved there couldn't be a set for each predicate. You can't glibly equate proper properties with predicates. |
21575 | When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell] |
Full Idea: When a group of objects have the similarity we are inclined to attribute to possession of a common quality, the membership of the group will serve all the purposes of the supposed common quality ...which need not be assumed to exist. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 2) | |
A reaction: This is the earliest account I have found of properties being treated as sets of objects. It more or less coincides with the invention of set theory. I am reminded of Idea 9208. What is the bazzing property? It's what those three things have in common. |
6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's view makes it impossible to attribute existence to properties, and this would have to be declared ill-formed and meaningless. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a powerful criticism, used to support McGinn's view that existence cannot be analysed, using quantifiers or anything else. |
14327 | Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other [Russell, by Mumford] |
Full Idea: The trope theorist cannot explain how a number of tropes resemble each other. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Relations of Universals and Particulars [1911]) by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 07.6 | |
A reaction: [My 13,000th Idea: 31/10/11] Every theory is left with something it cannot explain. Is it likely that we could come up with an explanation of resemblance? It seems like a combination of identity in the physics, and identity in the brain mechanisms. |
5383 | Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell] |
Full Idea: Every complete sentence must contain at least one word which stands for a universal, since all verbs have a meaning which is universal. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Not all meaningful statements are sentences. One could try a programme of eliminating from discourse all words which imply universals. Daily physical life would survive all right, but universities would close down. |
4428 | Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell] |
Full Idea: In general, adjectives and nouns express properties of things, whereas prepositions and verbs express relations between things, so neglect of the latter led to the belief that every proposition attributes properties rather than relations. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: A simple point on which Russell was very keen to insist, and which seems right. It invites the question whether there are further universals, beyond properties and relations. |
5406 | Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell] |
Full Idea: The monism of Spinoza and Bradley, and the monadism of Leibniz, result, in my opinion, from an undue attention to one sort of universals, namely the sort represented by adjectives and substantives rather than by verbs and prepositions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: The 'linguistic turn' of 20th century philosophy, which should be treated with caution, but I agree that if we are going to accept universals, we need a wide vision of what categories they might fall into. I would prefer an ontology without 'relations'. |
4479 | All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux] |
Full Idea: Russell denies that universals have any location at all. ..He is generalising from the case of "is north of", which does not exist any more in Edinburgh than in London. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) by Michael J. Loux - Metaphysics: contemporary introduction p.55 | |
A reaction: Russell may claim that the relation "is north of" is natural, but I suspect that it is a convention, mapped onto a physical situation. Reifying relations invite charges of a regress (as Bradley noted). |
4427 | Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell] |
Full Idea: No sentence can be made up without at least one word which denotes a universal. ..Thus all truths involve universals, and all knowledge of truths involves acquaintance with universals. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Sounds right, and is a beautifully neat way of showing the connection between metaphysics and life. |
21710 | We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does' [Russell] |
Full Idea: We are aware of the universal 'yellow'; this universal is the subject in such judgements as 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description-1 [1911], 154), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 2.3 | |
A reaction: This still seems one of the strongest examples in support of universals. You could hardly be talking about yellow tropes in such instances (even if the world does contain yellow tropes). |
4030 | Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver] |
Full Idea: Russell's positive argument for universals is that they explain how we can have a priori knowledge, which 'deals exclusively with the relations of universals'. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §3 | |
A reaction: Unfortunately we can invent the universals, and then delude ourselves that we have a priori knowledge |
5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
Full Idea: We think of things existing when they are in time (though possibly at all times), but universals do not exist in this sense, so we shall say that they 'subsist' or 'have being'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Russell picked up the word 'subsist' from medieval philosophy. This idea brings the full Platonic metaphysics with it, which is tricky, to say the least. But what can you do? Admitting the content of thought brings baggage with it. |
5408 | If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell] |
Full Idea: If whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. What many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a powerful argument in favour of thinking of universals as in some sense real - but in what sense? The crux is that Russell shows that we must find a place in our ontology for the content of thoughts, as well as of thoughts. |
4441 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell] |
Full Idea: To be a universal, a resemblance must hold between many pairs of white things. We can't say there is a different resemblance between each pair, since the resemblances must resemble each other, so we are forced to admit that resemblance is a universal. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Apparently this objection is much discussed and controversial. It looks like a threat to any theory of universals (involving 'sets', or 'concepts', or 'predicates'). We seem to need 'basic' and 'derivative' universals. Cf Idea 7956. |
6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
Full Idea: Those who dislike universals have thought that they could be merely words; the trouble with this view is that a word itself is a universal. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: Russell gradually lost his faith in most things, but never in universals. I find it unconvincing that we might dismiss nominalism so easily. I'm not sure why the application of the word 'cat' could not just be conventional. |
4429 | If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell] |
Full Idea: If we come to regard an 'idea' like whiteness as an act of thought, then we come to think of whiteness as mental, but in doing so we rob it of its essential quality of universality. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Presumably we need an ontological commitment to the existence of universals, which is very Platonic. Fatherhood might be a better example, since whiteness is a quale. |
14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
Full Idea: The physical object, as inferred from perception, is a group of events arranged about a centre. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927], 23) | |
A reaction: At least I like the active aspect of this definition. You then have to explain what an event is, without mentioning objects. You'd better no mention properties either, since they will probably depend on the dreaded objects. |
6473 | Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell] |
Full Idea: We may lay down the following definition: Physical things are those series of appearances whose matter obeys the laws of physics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI) | |
A reaction: We will then have to define the laws of physic without making any reference to 'physical things'. There is an obvious suspicion of circularity somewhere here. I find it very odd to define objects just in terms of their appearances. |
7781 | I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell] |
Full Idea: Whatever may be an object of thought, or occur in a true or false proposition, or be counted as one, I call a term. This is the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary, which I use synonymously with unit, individual, entity (being one, and existing). | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §047) | |
A reaction: The claim of existence begs many questions, such as whether the non-existence of the Loch Ness Monster is an 'object' of thought. |
21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
Full Idea: When, after hearing the notes of a melody, I perceive the melody, the notes are not presented as still existing. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.31) | |
A reaction: This is a good example, supporting Meinong's idea that we focus on 'intentional objects', rather than actual objects. |
21531 | Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell] |
Full Idea: Meinong's theory says that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true, while Russell's says that this assertion is false. The average man, if he knows his mythology, would probably agree with Meinong. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.19 | |
A reaction: It seems obvious that some disambiguation is needed here. Assenting to that assertion would be blatantly contextual. No one backs Pegasus at a race track. |
18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell says one won't find the present King of France on the list of bald things, nor on the list of things that are not bald. It would seem that this gives rise to a violation of the law of excluded middle. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Bernard Linsky - Quantification and Descriptions 2 | |
A reaction: It's a bit hard to accuse the poor old King of violating a law when he doesn't exist. |
21545 | I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell] |
Full Idea: I should prefer to say that there is no such object as 'the round square'. The difficulties of excluding such objects can, I think, be avoided by the theory of denoting. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.81) | |
A reaction: The 'theory of denoting' is his brand new theory of definite descriptions, which makes implicit claims of existence explicit, so that they can be judged. Why can't we just say that a round square can be an intentional object, but not a real object? |
21547 | On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: To my contention that, on his principles, 'the existent round square' exists, Meinong replies that it is existent but does not exist. I must confess that I see no difference between existing and being existent, and I have no more to say on this head. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Uber die Stellung...' [1907], p.93) | |
A reaction: Russell is obviously invoking the famously dubious ontological argument for God's existence. Normally impossible objects are rejected because of contradictions, but there might also be category mistakes. 'The slow square'. |
14166 | Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is sufficient to observe that all unities are propositions or propositional concepts, and that consequently nothing that exists is a unity. If, therefore, it is maintained that things are unities, we must reply that no things exist. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §439) | |
A reaction: The point, I presume, is that you end up as a nihilist about identities (like van Inwagen and Merricks) by mistakenly thinking (as Aristotle and Leibniz did) that everything that exists needs to have something called 'unity'. |
21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
Full Idea: Only those objects exist which have to particular parts of space and time the special relation of 'occupying' them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.29) | |
A reaction: He excepts space and time themselves. Clearly this doesn't advance our understanding much, but it points to a priority in our normal conceptual scheme. Is Russell assuming absolute space and time? |
14164 | The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell] |
Full Idea: The only kind of unity to which I can attach any precise sense - apart from the unity of the absolutely simple - is that of a whole composed of parts. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §439) | |
A reaction: This comes from a keen student of Leibniz, who was obsessed with unity. Russell leaves unaddressed the question of what turns some parts into a whole. |
14112 | A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell] |
Full Idea: In a class as many, the component terms, though they have some kind of unity, have less than is required for a whole. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §070) | |
A reaction: This is interesting because (among many other things), sets are used to stand for numbers, but numbers are usually reqarded as wholes. |
6465 | We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is not necessary to deny a substance or substratum underlying appearances; it is merely expedient (by the application of Occam's Razor) to abstain from asserting this unnecessary entity. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §V) | |
A reaction: Russell then goes on to struggle heroically in attempts to give accounts of 'matter' and 'objects' entirely in terms of 'sense-data'. If he failed, as many think he did, should we go back to belief in Aristotelian substance? |
6471 | The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell] |
Full Idea: The assumption of permanent substance, which technically underlies the procedure of physics, cannot of course be regarded as metaphysically legitimate. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI) | |
A reaction: It is a moot point whether physicists still thought this way after the full arrival of quantum theory in 1926. Russell raises all sorts of nice questions about the relationship between physics and philosophy here. I'm on Russell's side. |
14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
Full Idea: There may be a substance at the centre of an object, but is no reason to think so, since the group of events making up the object will produce exactly the same percepts; so the substance, if there is one, is an abstract possibility irrelevant to science. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927], 23) | |
A reaction: All empiricists (as Russell is in this passage) seem to neglect inference to the best explanation. Things can be indirectly testable, and I would say that there are genuine general entities which are too close to abstraction to ever be testable. |
14435 | The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell] |
Full Idea: The essence of individuality always eludes words and baffles description, and is for that very reason irrelevant to science. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], VI) | |
A reaction: [context needed for a full grasp of this idea] Russell seems to refer to essence as much as to individuality. The modern essentialist view is that essences are not beyond description after all. Fundamental physics is clearer now than in 1919. |
14170 | Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell] |
Full Idea: The notion of change is obscured by the doctrine of substance, by a thing's nature versus its external relations, and by subject-predicate form, so that things can be different and the same. Hence the useless distinction between essential and accidental. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §443) | |
A reaction: He goes on to object to vague unconscious usage of 'essence' by modern thinkers, but allows (teasingly) that medieval thinkers may have been precise about it. It is a fact, in common life, that things can change and be the same. Explain it! |
14107 | Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell] |
Full Idea: Two terms are identical when the second belongs to every class to which the first belongs. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §026) |
11849 | It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's definition of '=' is inadequate, because according to it we cannot say that two objects have all their properties in common. (Even if this proposition is never correct, it still has a sense). | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Ludwig Wittgenstein - Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.5302 | |
A reaction: This is what now seems to be a standard denial of the bizarre Leibniz claim that there never could be two things with identical properties, even, it seems, in principle. What would Leibniz made of two electrons? |
8375 | 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell] |
Full Idea: 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, meaning that it is true for all possible values of its argument or arguments. Thus 'If x is a man, x is mortal' is necessary, because it is true for any possible value of x. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.175) | |
A reaction: This is presumably the intermediate definition of necessity, prior to modern talk of possible worlds. Since it is a predicate about functions, it is presumably a metalinguistic concept, like the semantic concept of truth. |
6099 | Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell] |
Full Idea: Traditional philosophy discusses 'necessary', 'possible' and 'impossible' as properties of propositions, whereas in fact they are properties of propositional functions; propositions are only true or false. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §V) | |
A reaction: I am unclear how a truth could be known to be necessary if it is full of variables. 'x is human' seems to have no modality, but 'Socrates is human' could well be necessary. I like McGinn's rather adverbial account of modality. |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
Full Idea: The impossibility of seeing two colours simultaneously in a given direction feels like a logical impossibility. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Human Knowledge: its scope and limits [1948], 9) | |
A reaction: I presume all necessities feel equally necessary. If we distinguish necessities by what gives rise to them (a view I favour) then how strong they 'feel' will be irrelevant. We can see why Russell is puzzled by the phenomenon, though. |
22308 | Only the actual exists, so possibilities always reduce to actuality after full analysis [Russell] |
Full Idea: Possibility always marks insufficient analysis: when analysis is completed, only the actual can be relevant, for the simple reason that there is only the actual, and that the mere possibility is nothing. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Papers of 1913 [1913], VII.26), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 42 'Logic' | |
A reaction: Quine agreed with Russell on this. You won't get far in life if you deny possibilities. The answer is to recognise that the actual is dynamic, and not passive. |
21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
Full Idea: Contingency derives from the fact that a sentence containing a verb in the present tense - or sometimes in the past or the future - changes its meaning continually as the present changes, and stands for different propositions at different times. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.26) | |
A reaction: This immediately strikes me as a bad example of the linguistic approach to philosophy. As if we (like any animal) didn't have an apprehension prior to any language that most parts of experience are capable of change. |
12197 | Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true [Russell] |
Full Idea: In order that it be valid to infer q from p, it is only necessary that p should be true and that the proposition 'not-p or q' should be true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XIV) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt points out that this approach to logical consequences is a denial of any modal aspect, such as 'logical necessity'. Russell observes that for a good inference you must know the disjunction as a whole. Could disjunction be modal?... |
14450 | All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is no need to admit as a fundamental notion any form of implication not expressible as a truth-function. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XIV) | |
A reaction: Note that this is from a book about 'mathematical' philosophy. Nevertheless, it seems to have the form of a universal credo for Russell. He wasn't talking about conditionals here. Maybe conditionals are not implications (in isolation, that is). |
22303 | It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell] |
Full Idea: There seems to be no true proposition of which it makes sense to say that it might have been false. One might as well say that redness might have been a taste and not a colour. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §430), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 29 'Analy' | |
A reaction: Few thinkers agree with this rejection of counterfactuals. It seems to rely on Moore's idea that true propositions are facts. It also sounds deterministic. Does 'he is standing' mean he couldn't have been sitting (at t)? |
5400 | In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell] |
Full Idea: In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: Thinking of necessity in terms of possible worlds is not a new invention, but then Russell was a keen fan of Leibniz. Suppose there were no world at all, and only one truth, namely that two and two make five? (No, I can't make sense of that!) |
14460 | If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell] |
Full Idea: Saying that the axiom of reducibility is logically necessary is what would be meant by saying that it is true in all possible worlds. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVII) | |
A reaction: This striking remark is a nice bridge between Leibniz (about whom Russell wrote a book) and Kripke. |
5431 | Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell] |
Full Idea: 'Knowledge' is not a precise conception: it merges into 'probable opinion', and so a very precise definition should not be sought. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: This announcement comes as a relief, after endless attempts (mainly by American academics) to give watertight, carefully worded definitions. It seems to me undeniable that what we will accept as knowledge is partly a matter of social negotiation. |
16482 | All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell] |
Full Idea: All our knowledge about the world, in so far as it is expressed in words, is more or less general, because every sentence contains at least one word that is not a proper name, and all such words are general. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: I really like this, especially because it addresses the excessive reliance of some essentialists on sortals, categories and natural kinds, instead of focusing on the actual physical essences of individual objects. |
6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
Full Idea: It seems to me desirable in the theory of knowledge to emphasise the continuity between animal and human minds. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: I strongly agree with this, mainly because it avoids overemphasis on language in epistemology. It doesn't follow that animals know a lot, and there is a good case for saying that they don't actually 'know' anything, despite having true beliefs. |
5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
Full Idea: There are three issues about belief: 1) the content which is believed, 2) the relation of the content to its 'objective' - the fact which makes it true or false, and 3) the element which is belief, as opposed to consideration or doubt or desire. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III) | |
A reaction: The correct answers to the questions (trust me) are that propositions are the contents, the relation aimed at is truth, which is a 'metaphysical ideal' of correspondence to facts, and belief itself is an indefinable feeling. See Hume, Idea 2208. |
5426 | Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell] |
Full Idea: A belief or judgement relates a mind to several things other than itself. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Presumably we must say that if I believe that (say) 'x exists', this is relating x to the universal 'exists'. If so, Russell's point becomes a bit of a tautology. We believe propositions, which are combinations of concepts, so are multiple. |
5366 | We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell] |
Full Idea: We find a belief in an independent external world ready in ourselves as soon as we begin to reflect: it is what may be called an 'instinctive' belief. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: Somewhere Hume calls this a 'natural belief', and it is fairly central to his idea that most of our beliefs are built up fairly mechanically by associations. I am tempted to ask whether such things even count as beliefs, if they are so uncritical. |
17637 | The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell] |
Full Idea: Even where there is the highest degree of obviousness, we cannot assume that we are infallible - a sufficient conflict with other obvious propositions may lead us to abandon our belief, as in the case of a hallucination afterwards recognised as such. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.279) | |
A reaction: This approach to fallibilism seems to arise from the paradox that undermined Frege's rather obvious looking axioms. After Peirce and Russell, fallibilism has become a secure norm of modern thought. |
5359 | Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell] |
Full Idea: By showing that subjective things are the most certain, Descartes performed a great service to philosophy. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This praise comes from an empiricist, who has just said that 'sense-data' are the most certain things. I presume that animals are more certain of the world than they are of subjective things. In fact, probably on philosophers agree with Russell. |
4758 | Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell] |
Full Idea: Naïve realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naïve realism is false. Therefore naïve realism, if true, is false, therefore it is false. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], p.13) | |
A reaction: I'm inclined to agree with this, though once you have gone off and explored representation and sense data you may be driven back to naïve realism again. |
21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
Full Idea: I prefer to advocate ...that the object of a presentation is the actual external object itself, and not any part of the presentation at all. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.33) | |
A reaction: Although I am a fan of the robust realism usually favoured by Russell, I think he is wrong. I take Russell to be frightened that once you take perception to be of 'presentations' rather than things, there is a slippery slope to anti-realism. Not so. |
5377 | 'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell] |
Full Idea: We shall say we have 'acquaintance' with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Although Russell understands the difficulty of precise distinctions here, he implies that some knowledge is directly knowable, although truth only enters at the stage of judgement. Personally I would suggest that pure acquaintance is not knowledge. |
6510 | Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Russell held in 'Problems of Philosophy' that the physical world resembles the phenomenal only in abstract structure. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by Howard Robinson - Perception VII.5 | |
A reaction: Russell's problem is that he then requires full-blown and elaborate 'inferences' to get from the abstract structure to some sort of 'theory' of reality, but our experience seems much more direct, even if it isn't actually 'naïve'. |
5372 | There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is quite gratuitous to suppose that physical objects have colours. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This has always seemed to me self-evident, from the day I started to study philosophy. I cannot make sense of serious attempts to defend direct (naïve) realism. Colour is a brilliant trick of natural selection for extracting environmental information. |
21580 | Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell] |
Full Idea: Men of science condemn immediate data as 'merely subjective', while maintaining the truths of physics from those data. ...The only justification possible for this must be one which exhibits matter as a logical construction from sense-data. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 4) | |
A reaction: Since we blatantly aren't doing logic when we stare out of the window, this aspires to finding something like the 'logical form' of perception. |
6466 | Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell] |
Full Idea: The supreme maxim in scientific philosophising is this: Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VI) | |
A reaction: This seems to represent Russell's first move (in 1914) into what looks like phenomenalism. One might ask what is the difference between 'logical constructions' and 'inferred entities'. The latter appear to have unity, so I prefer them. |
6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Russell reverted to realism when he recognised that the notion of causality is problematic for phenomenalism; things in the world seem to affect one another causally in ways that are difficult to account for properly by mere reports of sense-experiences. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This is very interesting, and doesn't seem to have been enough to make A.J. Ayer eschew phenomenalism (Idea 5170). Once your metaphysics becomes realist (like Russell), your account of perception and objects has to change too. |
5373 | 'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell] |
Full Idea: We shall understand 'idealism' to be the doctrine that whatever exists, or at any rate whatever can be known to exist, must be in some sense mental. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: The interesting thing here is the phrase 'in some sense', which takes on a new light when we begin once against to take seriously ideas such as panpsychism. If the boundary between mind and brain is blurred, so is that between realism and idealism. |
5362 | It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: No logical absurdity results from the hypothesis that the world consists of myself and my thoughts and feelings and sensations, and that everything else is mere fancy. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: The only real attempt to meet this challenge is Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, which tried to show that it would be a logical impossibility to speak a language if there were no other minds. Personally, I am with Russell. |
7554 | Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell] |
Full Idea: Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp, which is sure to lead us astray if we take it as our guide. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.78) | |
A reaction: The sort of nice crisp remark you would expect from a good empiricist philosopher. Compare Idea 4948. However Russell qualifies it with the word 'often', and all philosophers eventually realise that you have to start somewhere. |
5412 | Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell] |
Full Idea: When a certain number of logical principles have been admitted as self-evident, the rest can be deduced from them; but the propositions deduced are often just as self-evident as those that were assumed without proof. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This seems an important corrective to the traditional rationalist dream, based on Euclid, that all knowledge is self-evident axioms followed by proofs of the rest. But Russell here endorses a more sensible sort of rationalism. |
5413 | Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell] |
Full Idea: Particular instances are more self-evident than general principles; for example, the law of contradiction is evident as soon as it is understood, but it is not as evident as that a particular rose cannot be both red and not red. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This seems to true about nearly all reasoning, because whenever we are faced with a general principle for assessment, we check it by testing it against a series of particular instances, and try to think of contradictory particular counterexamples. |
5415 | As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is clear from the case of memory that self-evidence has degrees, and is present in gradations ranging from absolute certainty down to an almost imperceptible faintness. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: I am beginning to see Russell as the 'father of modern rationalism'. His relaxation of notions of an all-or-nothing a priori, and of a sharp distinction between axioms and proofs, lead to a sensible rationalism which even a Humean sceptic might buy. |
5416 | If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell] |
Full Idea: If propositions can have some degree of self-evidence without being true, we must say, where there is a conflict, that the more self-evident proposition is to be retained and the less self-evident rejected. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This is a key part of Russell's 'moderate rationalism'. Presumably the rejected propositions were therefore not self-evident, and can be used as training for intuitions, by seeing why we got it wrong. Fools find absurd falsehoods self-evidently true. |
5397 | The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell] |
Full Idea: In the most important point of the controversy between empiricists and rationalist, the rationalists were right, since logical principles are known to us, but cannot be proved by experience, since all proof presupposes them | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: Russell initially presents this as the answer to 'innate ideas'. I would prefer to say, in the style of Descartes, that logic is self-evident to the natural light of reason. The debate isn't over. A Turing machine may be able to do logic. |
4430 | All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell] |
Full Idea: All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: A nice bold proposition, and remarkably Platonic for a famous empiricist. But then a priori knowledge of particulars sounds unlikely. |
5411 | We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell] |
Full Idea: The general proposition 'All products of two integers, which never have been and never will be thought of by any human being, are over 100' is undeniably true, and yet we can never give an instance of it; ..only a knowledge of the universals is required. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: A nice example which it seems to be impossible to contradict. But maybe we can explain our knowledge of it in terms of rules, instead of mentioning universals. Can a rule be stated without recourse to universals? Sounds unlikely. |
6514 | Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: The weakest version of representationalism, found in Russell, asserts that there is no resemblance to reality on the level of secondary qualities, and also that primary qualities exhibit only a structural isomorphism. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.2 | |
A reaction: This seems a plausible thing to say about, say, shape, but it is not clear how the idea works for hardness or mass. The sense of touch seems to be much more directly in contact with actual primary qualities than visions does (let alone smell or hearing). |
6415 | After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: During the decade after 'Problems of Philosophy' Russell points our repeatedly that specifications of sense-data come last in analysis, not first in experience. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This was a symptom of Russell losing faith in sense-data, and he eventually abandoned them. There is a possible position where we deny any such item as sense-data in a scientific account, but allow them in our metaphysics. |
5358 | 'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell] |
Full Idea: Let us give the name 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: This idea gradually became notorious, because it seems to create a new ontological category unnecessarily, and it creates problems, such as how the intermediary interacts with us and with things. Are sense-data totally non-conceptual? |
6417 | In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: In 'The Analysis of Mind' Russell gave up talk of 'sense-data', and ceased to distinguish between the act of sensing and what is sensed. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to lead towards the modern 'adverbial' account of sensing, where I don't sense 'data', but where qualia (such as redness) are our particular mode of directly perceiving objects, where insects might directly perceive them in a different mode. |
6474 | Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell] |
Full Idea: Undeniably, knowledge comes through seeing, but it is a mistake to regard the mere seeing itself as knowledge; if we are so to regard it, we must distinguish the seeing from what is seen; a patch of colour is one thing, and our seeing it is another. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII) | |
A reaction: This is Russell's 1921 explanation of why he adopted sense-data (but he rejects them later in this paragraph). This gives a simplistic impression of what he intended, which has three components: the object, the 'sensibile', and the sense-datum. |
6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
Full Idea: No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VII) | |
A reaction: So a loud bang has to broken down into an almost infinite number of sound sensibilia - each one presumably the size of the apperture of a small ear. This is beginning to sound a bit silly. |
6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.1 | |
A reaction: I can't say that I had ever intepreted Russell in this way, but it is a wonderfully thought-provoking idea. All the time that I thought I was looking at a table, I was just looking at my own brain, and drawing an unspoken inference that a table caused it. |
8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Rather than oppose sensory knowledge and scientific knowledge, we should identify the sensibilia that are peculiar to science. This is what Russell did when he evoked sense-data, qualities devoid of all subjectivity. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by G Deleuze / F Guattari - What is Philosophy? 2.5 | |
A reaction: An interesting observation. Russell is striking for his lack of interest in theories of arts and ethics, and his whole work focuses on understanding the scientific view. What is involved in sensibilia is a key modern issue (e.g. McDowell). |
6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
Full Idea: I regard sense-data as not mental, and as being, in fact, part of the actual subject-matter of physics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
A reaction: Russell had clearly given himself an ontological problem with the introduction of sense-data, and this is his drastic solution. In 1912 his account seems ambiguous between sense-data being mental and being physical. |
6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
Full Idea: Logically a sense-datum is an object, a particular of which the subject is aware; it does not contain the subject as a part, as for example beliefs and volitions do. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV) | |
A reaction: This very firmly rejects any notion that a sense-datum is mental. It is a left as a strange sort of object which gets as close as it is possible to get to the 'borders' of the mind, without actually becoming part of it. |
6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
Full Idea: The sense-datum is an external object of which in sensation the subject is aware; it is true that the sense-datum is in many cases in the subject's body, but the subject's body is as distinct from the subject as tables and chairs are. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV) | |
A reaction: This is probably Russell's clearest statement of the nature of sense-data, which are objects within the subjects body, but are not part of the mind. So once again we come up against the question of their ontology. Are they made of neurons? |
7549 | If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: My meaning may be made plainer by saying that if my body could remain in exactly the same state in which it is, though my mind had ceased to exist, precisely that object which I now see when I see a flash would exist, though I should not see it. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.126) | |
A reaction: Zombies, 70 years before Robert Kirk! Sense-data are physical. It is interesting to see a philosopher as committed to empiricism, anti-spiritualism and the priority of science as this, still presenting an essentially dualist picture of perception. |
7553 | Sense-data are purely physical [Russell] |
Full Idea: Sense-data are purely physical, and all that is mental in connection with them is our awareness of them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.138) | |
A reaction: Once this account of sense-data becomes fully clear, it also becomes apparent what a dualist theory it is. The mind is a cinema, I am the audience, and sense-data are the screen. There has to be a big logical gap between viewer and screen. |
6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
Full Idea: We do not know, except by means of more or less precarious inferences, whether the objects which are at one time sense-data continue to exist at times when they are not data. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II) | |
A reaction: Note that he actually refers to sense-data as 'objects'. It shows how thoroughly reified they are in his theory if they have the possibility of independent existence. This invites the question 'what are they made of?' |
6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
Full Idea: I shall give the name 'sensibilia' to those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without necessarily being data to any mind. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
A reaction: This is his response to the problem of whether sense-data can exist independently of experience, which was unclear in 1912. Presumably sensibilia are objects which are possible sources of experience, but that seems to cover most objects. |
6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
Full Idea: We cannot ask, 'Can sense-data exist without being given?' for that is like asking, 'Can husbands exist without being married?' | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
A reaction: This follows hard on Idea 6460, which introduces the idea of 'sensibilia' for things which are like sense-data, but are not 'given'. This is a new distinction in 1914, which he had not made in 1912. |
21583 | When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell] |
Full Idea: In all cases of sense-data capable of gradual change, we may find one sense-datum indistinguishable from another, and that indistinguishable from a third, while yet the first and third are quite easily distinguishable. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 5) | |
A reaction: This point is key to the sense-data theory, because it gives them independent existence, standing between reality and subjective experience. It is also the reason why they look increasingly implausible, if they may not be experienced. |
8854 | My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell] |
Full Idea: My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description-1 [1911]) by Michael Williams - Without Immediate Justification §4 | |
A reaction: This pinpoints a nice difficulty for Russell. Williams may misrepresent Russell's account of acquaintance, but that is probably because Russell is unclear, or uncertain. The problem is when Russell claims that his acquaintance gives knowledge. |
6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is some difficulty in deciding what is to be considered one sense-datum: often attention causes divisions to appear where, so far as can be discovered, there were no divisions before. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II) | |
A reaction: This was, I suspect, why Russell had dropped the idea of sense-data by 1921. He does, however, say that they are the last unit in analysis, rather than being the most basic unit of perception. In other words, they are purely theoretical. |
6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
Full Idea: One reason often alleged for the subjectivity of sense-data is that the appearance of a thing itself may change when we find it hard to suppose that the thing itself has changed - as when we shut our eyes, or screw them up to make things look double. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VIII) | |
A reaction: Russell firmly denies that they are subjective. These examples are also said to support to proposed existence of sense-data in the first place, since they show the gap between appearance and reality. |
6476 | We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell] |
Full Idea: If we are to avoid a perfectly gratuitous assumption, we must dispense with the subject as one of the actual ingredients of the world; but when we do this, the possibility of distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum vanishes. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII) | |
A reaction: This is the reason why Russell himself rejected sense-data. It is more normal, I think, to reject them simply as being superfluous. If the subject can simply perceive the sense-data, why can't they just perceive the object more directly? |
6098 | Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell] |
Full Idea: I am inclined to think that perception, as opposed to belief, does go straight to the fact and not through the proposition. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §IV.4) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a question of an intermediate stage, which is the formulation of concepts. Is full 'perception' (backed by attention and intellect) laden with concepts, which point to facts? Where are the facts in sensation without recognition? |
21577 | Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell] |
Full Idea: All empirical evidence is of particular truths. Hence, if there is any knowledge of general truths at all, there must be some knowledge of general truths which is independent of empirical evidence. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 2) | |
A reaction: Humean empiricists respond by being a sceptical of general truths. At this stage of his career Russell looks like a thoroughgoing rationalist, and he believes in the reality of universals, relations and propositions. He became more empirical later. |
7290 | If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson] |
Full Idea: If Russell rejects innate ideas, and he even thinks the laws of thought must by triggered by experiences (e.g. of a beech tree), and he doesn't embrace associations, this implies that he thinks the mind begins as a tabula rasa. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by George Thompson - talk | |
A reaction: This nice observation places Russell as (in my view) a rather old-fashioned empiricist, who ignores Hume and Kant, and is not willing to speculate about how the mind can turn acquaintances with sense-data into knowledge |
5357 | It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell] |
Full Idea: In the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be derived from them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: Is experience the 'natural' place to begin? It didn't seem to strike Descartes that way. It seems better to say that philosophy begins when we are not quite satisfied with experience, and the natural place to begin is 'dissatisfaction'. |
5382 | We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG] |
Full Idea: We have acquaintance with outer senses, with inner sense (by introspection), with memory (of outer or inner sensations), with a Self (probably), and also with universals (general ideas). | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: The spectacular odd one out in a basic empiricist theory is, of course, universals, when one expects some sort of nominalist reduction of those into sense-data. I am very sympathetic to the Russell line, though it spells big ontological trouble. |
5389 | Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell] |
Full Idea: The chief importance of knowledge by descriptions is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: The most basic question for empiricism concerns how we can know things beyond immediate experience. Russell is right, though this doesn't tell us much. We need to know the rules for valid descriptions, explanation, speculations etc. |
16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
Full Idea: So long as a man avoids words which are condensed inductions (such as 'dog'), and confines himself to words that can describe a single experience, it is possible for a single experience to show that his words are true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: One might question whether a line can be drawn between the inductive and the non-inductive in this way. I'm inclined just to say that the simpler the proposition the less room there is for error in confirming it. |
6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
Full Idea: Pragmatism holds that a belief is to be judged if it has certain effects, whereas I hold that an empirical belief is to be judged true if it has certain kinds of causes. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: I'm with Russell here, and this seems to me a convincing objection to pragmatism. The simple problem is that falsehoods can occasionally have very beneficial effects. Beliefs are made true by the facts, not by their consequences. |
21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
Full Idea: Although empiricism as a philosophy does not appear to be tenable, there is an empirical manner of investigating, which should be applied in every subject-matter | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.22) | |
A reaction: Given that early Russell loads his ontology with properties and propositions, this should come as no surprise, even if J.S. Mill was his godfather. |
5376 | I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is no reason why I should not know of the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: This sort of realist claim (which he goes on to say results from inferences from descriptions) is needed to save empiricism from the absurdities of Berkeley and (dare I say it?) Quine. The Kantian Ego is a candidate. |
16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
Full Idea: Propositions about 'some' may be proved empirically, but propositions about 'all' are difficult to know, and can't be proved unless such propositions are in the premisses. These aren't in perception, so forgo general propositions, or abandon empiricism? | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: This is obviously related to the difficulty empiricists have with induction. You could hardly persuade logicians to give up the universal quantifier, because it is needed in mathematics. Do we actually know any universal empirical truths? |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
Full Idea: If 'it is not raining' means 'the sentence "it is raining" is false', that makes it almost impossible to understand how a sentence containing the word 'not' can be found true by observation. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Human Knowledge: its scope and limits [1948], 9) | |
A reaction: Russell goes on to explore the general difficulty of deciding negative truths by observation. The same problem arises for truthmaker theory. Obviously I can observe that it isn't raining, but it seems parasitic on observing when it is raining. |
6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
Full Idea: When I began to think about theory of knowledge, I found that none of the philosophers who emphasise 'experience' tells us what they mean by the word. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: A very significant comment about empiricism. Hume does not seem very clear about what an 'impression' is. Russell's problem has been dealt with intensively by modern empiricists, who discuss 'the given', and conceptualised perception. |
5414 | Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell] |
Full Idea: An image cannot constitute a memory, because we notice that the image is in the present, whereas what is remembered is known to be in the past. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This sounds a bit glib, and maybe makes the mistake for which he criticises Berkeley, of confusing a thought and its content. The puzzle is how we know that some images represent the past, others the present, others predictions, and others fantasy. |
2792 | It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal past. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], p.159) | |
A reaction: One of the great sceptical arguments! At a stroke it undermines forever any dreams that memories are totally certain. This is an extra scepticism, which arises if you decide that current experience IS totally certain. |
5430 | A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell] |
Full Idea: A true belief cannot be called knowledge when it is deduced by a fallacious process of reasoning. If I know all Greeks are men, and Socrates was a man, I cannot know that Socrates was a Greek, even if I falsely infer it. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: Another very nice 'Gettier' example, fifty years before Gettier. There is a danger of circularity here, between knowledge, fallacy and truth. Giving them three independent definitions does not look promising. |
5429 | True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell] |
Full Idea: A true belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from a false belief (as when deducing that the late Prime Minister's name began with B, believing it was Balfour, when actually it was Bannerman). | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: Correct me if I am wrong, but isn't this the 'Gettier Problem'? It raises the central question of modern epistemology, which is what will be counted as adequate justification to make a true belief qualify as knowledge. How high do we set the bar? |
6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
Full Idea: Not all true beliefs are knowledge; the stock example to the contrary is that of a clock which has stopped by which I believe to be going and which I happen to look at when, by chance, it shows the right time. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: [in his 1948:112] Russell had spotted Gettier-type problems long before Gettier. The problem of lucky true beliefs dates back to Plato (Idea 2140). This example is also a problem for reliabilism, if the clock is usually working fine. |
5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
Full Idea: All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foundations. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Russell here allies himself with Hume, and with the empiricist version of foundationalism. 'Acquaintance' plays the role which 'impressions' played for Hume. He is eliminating any possible cognitive content from the Hume idea, implying pure sense-data. |
17639 | Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell] |
Full Idea: Although intrinsic obviousness is the basis of every science, it is never, in a fairly advanced science, the whole of our reason for believing any one proposition of the science. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.279) |
21579 | Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell] |
Full Idea: Objects of sense are called 'real' when they have the kind of connection with other objects of sense which experience has led us to regard as normal; when they fail this, they are called 'illusions'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 3) | |
A reaction: This rests rather too much on the concept of 'normal', but offers an attractive coherence account of perception. Direct perceptions are often invoked by anti-coherentists, but I think coherence is just as much needed in that realm. |
22326 | Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell] |
Full Idea: Accuracy of response to stimulus does not alone show knowledge, but must be reinforced by appropriateness, i.e. suitability of realising one's purpose. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], p.261), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 66 'Rel' | |
A reaction: The aim of 'realising one's purpose' puts a very pragmatist spin on this. The point is a good one, and seems to apply particularly to Nozick's accurate 'tracking' account of knowledge. |
5365 | Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell] |
Full Idea: Dreams are more or less suggested by what we call waking life, and are capable of being more or less accounted for on scientific principles if we assume that there really is a physical world. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This sounds a bit circular, since scientific principles depend entirely on the assumption that there is a physical world. No doubt if we assume fairies, 'fairy lore' will explain everything. 'Explanation' is the basic concept here. |
21578 | Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell] |
Full Idea: Universal scepticism, though logically irrefutable, is practically barren; it can only, therefore, give a certain flavour of hesitancy to our beliefs, and cannot be used to substitute other beliefs for them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 3) | |
A reaction: Spot on. There is no positive evidence for scepticism, so must just register it as the faintest of possibilities, like the existence of secretive fairies. |
14433 | Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them? [Russell] |
Full Idea: We know that certain scientific propositions - often expressed in mathematical symbols - are more or less true of the world, but we are very much at sea as to the interpretation to be put upon the terms which occur in these propositions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], VI) | |
A reaction: Enter essentialism, say I! Russell's remark is pretty understandable in 1919, but I don't think the situation has changed much. The problem of interpretation may be of more interest to philosophers than to physicists. |
5391 | Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell] |
Full Idea: The business of science is to find uniformities, such as the laws of motion and the law of gravitation, to which, so far as our experience extends, there are no exceptions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This seems nicely stated, based on the Humean 'regularity' view of scientific laws. When we discover such uniformities (such as the gravitational equation), we are still faced with the metaphysical question of their status. Necessity, or pattern? |
17631 | Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell] |
Full Idea: The inferring of premises from consequences is the essence of induction. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.274) | |
A reaction: So induction is just deduction in reverse? Induction is transcendental deduction? Do I deduce the premises from observing a lot of white swans? Hm. |
5394 | We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell] |
Full Idea: We can never use experience to prove the inductive principle without begging the question. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This highlights why induction is such a big problem for hard-line empiricists, who are reduced to saying that it is a 'dogma', or an unsupported 'natural belief'. And that seems right. All creatures which evolve in a stable universe will do induction. |
5390 | Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell] |
Full Idea: The man who has fed his chicken every day throughout its life at last wrings its neck instead, showing that more refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have been useful to the chicken. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: A justly famous illustration of Hume's problem of induction, that a vast amount of evidence could still support a false conclusion. If we say 'the future will be like the past', this depends on understanding what was happening in the past. |
5392 | It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell] |
Full Idea: We have experience of past futures, but not of future futures, and the question is: Will future futures resemble past futures? This question is not to be answered by an argument which starts from past futures alone. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This nicely makes the problem of induction unavoidable, for anyone who preferred not to face the problem. The simple solution is to recognise that the future may NOT resemble the past, for all we know. Actually I think it will, but what was the past like? |
12790 | Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: A generalisation is explanatory if and only if it is invariant. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: [He cites Jim Woodward 2003] I dislike the idea that generalisations and regularities explain anything at all, but this rule sounds like a bare minimum for being taken seriously in the space of explanations. |
12789 | Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: The main alternative to the dispositional theory of biological functions (which confer a survival-enhancing propensity) is the etiological theory (effects are functions if they play a role in the causal history of that very component). | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: [Bigelow/Pargetter 1987 for the first, Mitchell 2003 for the second] The second one sounds a bit circular, but on the whole a I prefer causal explanations to dispositional explanations. |
14388 | Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Nothing can count as a mechanism unless it produces some macro-level regular behaviour. To produce macro-level regular behaviour, it has to rely on micro-level regularities. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5) | |
A reaction: This is the core of Leuridan's argument that regularities are more basic than mechanisms. It doesn't follow, though, that the more basic a thing is the more explanatory work it can do. I say mechanisms explain more than low-level regularities do. |
12787 | Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: To model a mechanism one must incorporate pragmatic laws. ...As valuable as the concept of mechanism and mechanistic explanation are, they cannot replace regularities nor undermine their relevance for scientific explanation. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: [See Idea 12786 for 'pragmatic laws'] I just don't see how the observation of a regularity is any sort of explanation. I just take a regularity to be something interesting which needs to be explained. |
14384 | We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Summary: mechanisms depend on regularities, there may be regularities without mechanisms, models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, and pragmatic laws do not depend epistemologically on mechanistic models. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: See Idea 14382 for 'pragmatic' laws. I'm quite keen on mechanisms, so this is an arrow close to the heart, but at this point I say that my ultimate allegiance is to powers, not to mechanisms. |
14386 | Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on the existence of regularities. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the Humean rearguard action in favour of the regularity account of laws. Wrong, but a nice paper. This point shows why only powers (despite their vagueness!) are the only candidate for the bottom level of explanation. |
5363 | If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell] |
Full Idea: If the cat appears at one moment in one part of the room, and at another in another part, it is natural to suppose that it has moved from the one to the other, passing over a series of intermediate positions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This example seems perfect as an illustration of inference to the best explanation (now called 'abduction'), and that seems to me the absolute key to human knowledge. The cat example is what made me a devotee of Bertrand Russell. |
5367 | Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell] |
Full Idea: The belief that there are objects corresponding to our sense-data tends to simplify and systematize our account of our experiences, so there seems no good reason for rejecting it. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This hardly counts as a good argument against the logical possibility of global scepticism, but it is a nice statement of the concept of 'best explanation', which obviously requires some sort of rational criteria if it is to provide a theory of knowledge. |
14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: I see nothing metaphysically wrong in an infinite ontological regress of mechanisms and regularities. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5) | |
A reaction: This is a pretty unusual view, and I can't accept it. My revulsion at this regress is precisely the reason why I believe in powers, as the bottom level of explanation. |
5364 | It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell] |
Full Idea: When human beings speak, it is very difficult to suppose that what we hear is not the expression of a thought, as we know it would be if we emitted the same sounds. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This is partly the 'argument from analogy', which seems a bit suspect (induction from a single instance), but it is also the rather undeniable Humean idea that we have a 'natural belief' in other minds, which we could never disbelieve. |
6416 | Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Russell gives an argument that other minds exist, because if one is entitled to believe this, then one can rely on the testimony of others, which, jointly with one's own experience, will give powerful support to the view that there a real spatial world. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 3) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: I rather like this argument. It is quite close to Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, which also seems to refute scepticism about other minds. I think Russell's line, using testimony, knowledge and realism, may be better than Wittgenstein's. |
5379 | If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell] |
Full Idea: But for our acquaintance with the contents of our own minds, we should be unable to imagine the minds of others, and therefore we could never arrive at the knowledge that they have minds. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Not only does this depend on the notorious 'argument from analogy', but it actually strikes me as false. If a robot observed a human to be writhing in pain, it would be mystified, until it inferred that we have minds in which we actually 'feel' damage. |
21569 | It is good to generalise truths as much as possible [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is a good thing to generalise any truth as much as possible. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic [1911], p.289) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim, which seems to have a similar status to Ockham's Razor. Its best justification is pragmatic, and concerns strategies for coping with a big messy world. Russell's defence is in 'as much as possible'. |
5410 | I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell] |
Full Idea: If I see simultaneously two shades of green, I can see that they resemble each other, and I see that they resemble each other more than they resemble a shade of red; in this way I become acquainted with the universal 'resemblance'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: This is strikingly different from the account of Hume, who seemed to regard resemblance as a fairly mechanical, computer-like activity of the brain, whereas Russell (an empiricist) responds by inclining towards Platonism. Hume sounds better here. |
4020 | The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: The modern notion of the self is defined by disengaged reason (with its associated freedom and dignity), by self-exploration, and by personal commitment. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |
A reaction: Taylor makes a good case that this broader view of how the self is seen is as important as narrow debates about personal identity. |
4002 | My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: My entire way of proceeding involves mapping connections between the sense of the self and moral visions, between identity and the good. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], Pref) | |
A reaction: An interesting project. Modern brain research supports the idea that emotions and values are tightly integrated into al thought. |
5381 | In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell] |
Full Idea: When I see the sun, it does not seem necessary to suppose that we are acquainted with a more or less permanent person, but we must be acquainted with that thing which sees the sun and has acquaintance with sense-data. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: I think this is exactly right. I personally believe that I have a very clear personal identity as I write this, but I do not believe that there is a strict identity with the person who wrote similar comments three years ago. So how do I change 'my' mind? |
5380 | In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell] |
Full Idea: When I am acquainted with 'my seeing the sun', it seems plain that on the one hand there is the sense-datum which represents the sun to me, on the other hand there is that which sees this sense-datum. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This appears to flatly contradict Hume's scepticism about seeing his 'self', but maybe Russell is only aware of his body, and then fictionalises a 'self' as the controller of this body. But I agree with Russell. I am the thing that cares about the sun. |
7546 | A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell] |
Full Idea: The real man, I believe, however the police may swear to his identity, is really a series of momentary men, each different one from the other, and bound together, not by a numerical identity, but by continuity and certain instrinsic causal laws. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.124) | |
A reaction: This seems to be in the tradition of Locke and Parfit, and also follows the temporal-slices idea of physical objects. Personally I take a more physical view of things, and think the police are probably more reliable than Bertrand Russell. |
4006 | I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: As a being who grows and becomes I can only know myself through the history of my maturations and regressions, overcomings and defeats. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §2.3) | |
A reaction: An important insight. My immediate sense of self makes my personal history central, not an extra. But a history must be a history OF something. |
6475 | In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell] |
Full Idea: In perception, the idea of the subject appears to be a logical fiction, like mathematical points and instants; it is introduced, not because observation reveals it, but because it is linguistically convenient and apparently demanded by grammar. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII) | |
A reaction: In 1912, Russell had felt that both the Cogito, and the experience of meta-thought, had confirmed the existence of a non-permanent ego, but here he offers a Humean rejection. His notion of a 'logical fiction' is behaviouristic. I believe in the Self. |
5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
Full Idea: If privacy is the main objection to introspective data, we shall have to include among such data all sensations; a toothache, for example, is essentially private; a dentist may see the bad condition of your tooth, but does not feel your ache. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II) | |
A reaction: Russell was perhaps the first to see why eliminative behaviourism is a non-starter as a theory of mind. Mental states are clearly a cause of behaviour, so they can't be the same thing. We might 'eliminate' mental states by reducing them, though. |
6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
Full Idea: Behaviourists refuse to admit images because they cannot be observed from without, but this causes them difficulties when they attempt to explain either memory or imagination. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: This is a striking objection to behaviourism, and it is rarely mentioned in modern discussions of the topic. They might try denying the existence of private 'images', but that wouldn't be very plausible. |
5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
Full Idea: There do seem to be psychological and physical causal laws which are distinct from each other. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II) | |
A reaction: This sounds like the essence of 'property dualism'. Reductive physicalists (like myself) say there is no distinction. Davidson, usually considered a property dualist, claims there are no psycho-physical laws. Russell notes that reduction may be possible. |
7550 | We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell] |
Full Idea: It seems not improbable that if we had sufficient knowledge we could infer the state of a man's mind from the state of his brain, or the state of his brain from the state of his mind. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.131) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as being a very good summary of the claim that mind is reducible to brain, which is the essence of physicalism. Had he been born a little later, Russell would have taken a harder line with physicalism. |
5369 | It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell] |
Full Idea: In the preceding chapter we agreed, though without being able to find demonstrative reasons, that it is rational to believe that our sense-data are signs of an independent reality. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: I wonder if Russell was the first to grasp this essential distinction. I suspect that three hundred years (1600-1900) were wasted in philosophy because they thought that everything rational had to be demonstrable. E.g. Hume on induction. |
5375 | Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell] |
Full Idea: The word 'know' has two senses: the first is 'knowledge of truths', which is opposed to error, applies to judgements, and is knowing that something; the second is 'acquaintance', and is knowledge of things, particularly of sense-data. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: We can also add procedural knowledge ('knowing how'). The question for Russell is whether his 'knowledge by acquaintance' can ever qualify as knowledge on its own, without the intrusion of judgements. Does perception necessarily have content? |
21711 | Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: The basic idea of Russell's new 'multiple relations' theory of belief was that belief does not relate an individual to a proposition composed of various individuals and universals, but rather relates the believer directly to those constituents. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 3.1 | |
A reaction: Russell abandoned his commitment to propositions in 1908, and retained this new view until 1918. Wittgenstein gave Russell hell over this theory. This view made his 'congruence' account of the correspondence theory of truth possible. |
5427 | Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell] |
Full Idea: Judging or believing is a certain complex unity of which a mind is a constituent; if the remaining constituents, taken in the order which they have in the belief, form a complex unity, then the belief is true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: The modern label of 'congruence' for this view of truth makes it clearer. We aim to get a complex unity of constituents in our minds which are in the same 'order' as the constituents in the world. It is a good proposal, but leaves 'facts' as a problem. |
6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
Full Idea: Surprise is a criterion of error. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: Russell is not too precise about this, but it is a nice point. Surprise is thwarted expectation, which implies prior misjudgement. |
21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
Full Idea: Correct judgements have a transcendent object; but with regard to incorrect judgements, it remains to examine whether 1) the object is immanent, 2) there is no object, or 3) the object is transcendent. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.67) | |
A reaction: Why is it that only Russell seems to have taken this problem seriously? Its solution gives the clearest possible indicator of how the mind relates to the world. |
22306 | To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell] |
Full Idea: To explain belief in what is false we shall have to regard what is called belief in a proposition as not a thought related to the proposition, but rather as a thought related to the constituents of the proposition. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Papers of 1906 [1906], V.321), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 40 '1906' | |
A reaction: Russell proposed a new theory of judgement, in order to explain erroneous judgements, given that true propositions are identical with facts. Of course there might be errors about the constituents, as well as about their structure. Othello is his example. |
5425 | In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell] |
Full Idea: The relation involved in judging or believing must, if falsehood is to be duly allowed for, be taken to be a relation between several terms, not between two. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: His point is that if a belief relates to one object ('D's love for C') it will always be true. Russell is trying to explain what goes wrong when we believe a falsehood. It is not clear how the judgement 'x exists' involves several terms. |
6097 | The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is very difficult to deal with the theory of error without assuming the existence of the non-existent. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §IV.3) | |
A reaction: This problem really bothered Russell (and Plato). I suspect that it was a self-inflicted problem because at this point Russell had ceased to believe in propositions. If we accept propositions as intentional objects, they can be as silly as you like. |
21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
Full Idea: Every property of the object seems to demand a strictly correlative property of the content, and the content, therefore, must have every complexity belonging to the object. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.55) | |
A reaction: This claim gives a basis for his 'congruence' account of the correspondence theory of truth. It strikes me as false. If I talk of the 'red red robin', I don't mention the robin's feet. He ignores the psychological selection we make in abstraction. |
7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
Full Idea: I believe Mont Blanc itself is a component part of what is actually asserted in the proposition 'Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high'; we do not assert the thought, which is a private psychological matter, but the object of the thought. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12), quoted by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4 | |
A reaction: This would appear to be pretty much externalism about concepts, given that Russell would accept that other people know much more about Mont Blanc than he does, and their knowledge is included in what he asserts. |
5384 | A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell] |
Full Idea: A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: I am doubtful about this. Do children, and even animals, have a concept of 'my mother', without ever grasping the generalisation to 'his mother'? Is the word 'this' a non-universal concept? |
10583 | Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation [Russell] |
Full Idea: The relations in an abstraction principle are always constituted by possession of a common property (which is imprecise as it relies on 'predicate'), ..so we say a common property of two terms is any third term to which both have the same relation. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §157) | |
A reaction: This brings out clearly the linguistic approach of the modern account of abstraction, where the older abstractionism was torn between the ontology and the epistemology (that is, the parts of objects, or the appearances of them in the mind). |
10582 | The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity [Russell] |
Full Idea: The principle of Abstraction says that whenever a relation with instances is symmetrical and transitive, then the relation is not primitive, but is analyzable into sameness of relation to some other term. ..This is provable and states a common assumption. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §157) | |
A reaction: At last I have found someone who explains the whole thing clearly! Bertrand Russell was wonderful. See other ideas on the subject from this text, for a proper understanding of abstraction by equivalence. |
10584 | A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation [Russell] |
Full Idea: The possession of a common property of a certain type always leads to a symmetrical transitive relation. The principle of Abstraction asserts the converse, that such relations only spring from common properties of the above type. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §157) | |
A reaction: The type of property is where only one term is applicable to it, such as the magnitude of a quantity, or the time of an event. So symmetrical and transitive relations occur if and only if there is a property of that type. |
6112 | Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is not one relation of meaning between words and what they stand for, but as many relations of meaning, each of a different logical type, as there are logical types among the objects for which there are words. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.153) | |
A reaction: This might be a good warning for those engaged in the externalist/internalist debate over the meaning of concepts such as natural kind terms like 'water'. I could have an external meaning for 'elms', but an internal meaning for 'ferns'. |
13468 | Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Russell inadvertently started the philosophy of language by declaring that some sentences (like "Everything is identical with itself") that seem utterly in order are meaningless and express no proposition. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 2 | |
A reaction: The normal candidate for this honour would be Frege, with the sense/reference distinction, but this idea sounds right to me. Declaring that some sentences are 'meaningless' really gets people excited and interested. I like the example! |
5388 | Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell] |
Full Idea: Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This is somewhere between Hume and logical positivism, but it concerns understanding (not meaning) of propositions (not sentences), and its acquaintance can be of universals as well as of sense experience. I like Russell's version more than Ayer's. |
6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is no conceivable method by which we can discover whether the proposition 'It snowed on Manhattan Island on the 1st January in the year 1 A.D.' is true or false, but it seems preposterous to maintain that it is neither. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: I love this example, which seems so simple and so clear-cut. It criticises verificationism, and gives strong intuitive support for realism, and supports the law of excluded middle. |
4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure if I understand this. Presumably phrases which appear to refer actually point at other parts of language rather than the world. |
5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
Full Idea: If I am right, referring is not the same as denoting and the referential use of definite descriptions is not recognised on Russell's view. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Keith Donnellan - Reference and Definite Descriptions §I | |
A reaction: This introduces a new theory of reference, which goes beyond the mere contents of linguistic experessions. It says reference is an 'external' and 'causal' affair, and so a definite description is not sufficient to make a reference. |
16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
Full Idea: In Russell's definition of 'denoting', a definite description denotes an entity if that entity fits the description uniquely. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.2 | |
A reaction: [Recanati cites Donnellan for this] Hence denoting is not the same thing as reference. A description can denote beautifully, but fail to refer. Donnellan says if denoting were reference, someone might refer without realising it. |
5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
Full Idea: Denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.43) | |
A reaction: This is the important idea that the sentence is the basic unit of meaning, rather than the word. I'm not convinced that this dispute needs to be settled. Words are pretty pointless outside of propositions, and propositions are impossible without words. |
5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
Full Idea: If we say 'Scott is the author of Waverley', we assert an identity of denotation with a difference of meaning. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.46) | |
A reaction: This shows Russell picking up Frege's famous distinction, as shown in 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'. To distinguish the meaning from the reference was one of the greatest (and simplest) clarifications ever offered of how language works. |
16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
Full Idea: Russell, since he eliminates descriptions from his primitive notation, seems to hold in 'On Denoting' that the notion of 'sense' is illusory. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity notes and addenda note 04 | |
A reaction: Presumably we can eliminate sense from formal languages, but natural languages are rich in connotations (or whatever we choose to call them). |
5387 | It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is a matter of chance which characteristics of a man's appearance will come into a friend's mind when he thinks of Bismarck; thus the description in the friend's mind is accidental; he knows the various descriptions all apply to the same entity. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This seems to be an internalist account of reference, later called the 'bundle' theory of reference and associated with John Searle. It was attacked by Kripke. Personally I side, unfashionably, with Russell. |
4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell assumes that it is expressions which refer if anything does, but strictly speaking it is WE who refer with the use of expressions. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4.1 | |
A reaction: This sounds right. Russell is part of the overemphasis on language which plagued philosophy after Frege. Words are tools, like searchlights or pointing fingers. |
9022 | Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell used the phrase 'propositional function' (adapted from Frege) to refer sometimes to predicates and sometimes to attributes. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Willard Quine - Philosophy of Logic Ch.5 | |
A reaction: He calls Russell 'confused' on this, and he would indeed be guilty of what now looks like a classic confusion, between the properties and the predicates that express them. Only a verificationist would hold such a daft view. |
16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
Full Idea: Russell rejected Frege's sense/reference distinction, on the grounds that, if reference is mediated by sense, we lose the idea of direct acquaintance and succumb to Descriptivism. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 1.1 | |
A reaction: [15,000th IDEA in the DB!! 23/3/2013, Weymouth] Recanati claims Russell made a mistake, because you can retain the sense/reference distinction, and still keep direct acquaintance (by means of 'non-descriptive senses'). |
7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
Full Idea: Russell does not claim that Frege's notion of sense is incoherent, but rather that it is superfluous. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.9 | |
A reaction: My initial reaction to this is that the notion of strict and literal meaning (see Idea 7309) is incredibly useful. Some of the best jokes depend on the gap between implications and strict meaning. How could metaphors be explained without it? |
7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions proceeds by sketching the truth conditions of sentences containing descriptions, and arguing on various grounds that they are the correct truth conditions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.9 | |
A reaction: It seems important to see both where Russell was going, and where Davidson has come from. The whole project of finding the logical form of sentences (which starts with Frege and Russell) implies that truth conditions is what matters. |
21550 | Science reduces indexicals to a minimum, but they can never be eliminated from empirical matters [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is of the essence of a scientific account of the world to reduce to a minimum the egocentric element in assertion, but success in this attempt is a matter of degree, and is never complete where empirical matter is concerned. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mr Strawson on Referring [1957], p.121) | |
A reaction: He cites ostensive definitions. The key issue is whether they can be wholly eliminated when we try to be objective. Russell here endorses Perry's claim that they never go away. Personally I just think that (if so) we should try harder. |
5776 | A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell] |
Full Idea: A proposition may be defined as: what we believe when we believe truly or falsely. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], p.285) | |
A reaction: If we define belief as 'commitment to truth', Russell's last six words become redundant. "Propositions are the contents of beliefs", it being beliefs which are candidates for truth, not propositions. (Russell agrees, on p.308!) |
14451 | Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell] |
Full Idea: We mean by 'proposition' primarily a form of words which expresses what is either true or false. I say 'primarily' because I do not wish to exclude other than verbal symbols, or even mere thoughts if they have a symbolic character. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XV) | |
A reaction: I like the last bit, as I think of propositions as pre-verbal thoughts, and I am sympathetic to Fodor's 'language of thought' thesis, that there is a system of representations within the brain. |
14110 | Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell] |
Full Idea: A proposition, unless it happens to be linguistic, does not itself contain words: it contains the entities indicated by words. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §051) | |
A reaction: Russell says in his Preface that he took over this view of propositions from G.E. Moore. They are now known as 'Russellian' propositions, which are mainly distinguished by not being mental event, but by being complexes out in the world. |
21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: If p is a false affirmative proposition ...then it seems obvious that if we believe not-p we do know something true, so belief in not-p must be something which is not mere disbelief. This proves that there are negative propositions. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.75) | |
A reaction: This evidently assumes excluded middle, but is none the worse for that. But it sounds suspiciously like believing there is no rhinoceros in the room. Does such a belief require a fact? |
6091 | Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is obvious that a proposition is not the name for a fact, from the mere circumstance that there are two propositions corresponding to each fact, one the negation of the other. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §I) | |
A reaction: Russell attributes this point to Wittgenstein. Evidently you must add that the proposition is true before it will name a fact - which is bad news for the redundancy view of truth. Couldn't lots of propositions correspond to one fact? |
5781 | Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell] |
Full Idea: The important beliefs, even if they are not the only ones, are those which, if rendered into explicit words, take the form of a proposition. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III) | |
A reaction: This assertion is close to the heart of the twentieth century linking of ontology and epistemology to language. It is open to challenges. Why is non-propositional belief unimportant? Do dogs have important beliefs? Can propositions exist non-verbally? |
5782 | A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell] |
Full Idea: I shall distinguish a proposition expressed in words as a 'word-proposition', and one consisting of images as an 'image-proposition'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III) | |
A reaction: This, I think, is good, though it raises the question of what exactly an 'image' is when it is non-visual, as when a dog believes its owner called. This distinction prevents us from regarding all knowledge and ontology as verbal in form. |
19164 | If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell often treated propositions as facts, but discovered that correspondence then became useless for explaining truth, since every meaningful expression, true or false, expresses a proposition. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 6 | |
A reaction: So 'pigs fly' would have to mean pigs actually flying (which they don't). They might correspond to possible situations, but only if pigs might fly. What do you make of 'circles are square'? Russell had many a sleepless night over that. |
21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
Full Idea: In every proposition that we can apprehend, ...all the constituents are real entities with which we have immediate acquaintance. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.56), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7.2 | |
A reaction: This is the clearest statement of the 'Russellian' concept of a proposition. It strikes me as entirely wrong. The examples are always nice concrete objects like Mont Blanc, but as an account of sophisticated general propositions it seem hopeless. |
21702 | In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine] |
Full Idea: In 1918 Russell insists that the world does contain nonlinguistic things that are akin to sentences and are asserted by them; he merely does not call them propositions. He calls them facts. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Willard Quine - Russell's Ontological Development p.81 | |
A reaction: Clarification! I have always been bewildered by the early Russell view of propositions as actual ingredients of the world. If we say that sentences assert facts, that makes more sense. Russell never believed in the mental entities I call 'propositions'. |
6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
Full Idea: If you have just heard a loud clap of thunder, you believe what is expressed by 'there has just been a loud clap of thunder' even if no words come into your mind. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: This seems to me important, and accurate. We should not be too mesmerised by language. Animals have beliefs, and this is a nice example of an undeniable non-linguistic human belief. |
22307 | Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is perfectly evident that a proposition is not the name for a fact, from the mere circumstance that there are two propositions corresponding to each fact. 'Socrates is dead' and 'Socrates is not dead' correspond to the same fact. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Papers of 1918 [1918], VIII.136), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 42 'Prop' | |
A reaction: He finally reaches in 1918 what now looks fairly obvious. The idea that a proposition is part of the world is absurd. We should call the parts of the world 'facts' (despite vagueness and linguistic dependence in such things). Propositions are thoughts. |
14111 | A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell] |
Full Idea: A proposition is essentially a unity, and when analysis has destroyed the unity, no enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §054) | |
A reaction: The question of the 'unity of the proposition' led to a prolonged debate. |
19157 | Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson] |
Full Idea: Moore and Russell reacted strongly against the idea that the unity of the proposition depended on human acts of judgement. ...Russell decided that unless the unity is explained in terms of the proposition itself, there can be no objective truth. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], p.42) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 5 | |
A reaction: Put like this, the Russellian view strikes me as false. Effectively he is saying that a unified proposition is the same as a fact. I take a proposition to be a brain event, best labelled by Frege as a 'thought'. Thoughts may not even have parts. |
7534 | In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk] |
Full Idea: With a characteristic readiness to abandon views that he had previously considered definitively correct, Russell declared in 1906 that there were, after all, no such 'things' as propositions. It is judgements that are true or false. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood [1910]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.6 | |
A reaction: Written 1906. Russell developed a 'multiple relation theory of judgement'. But if a judgement is an assessment of truth or falsehood, what is it that is being assessed? |
21724 | The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: While the multiple relation theory (of belief, or of judgement) is nominally an account of belief and judgement, the emphasis in the account is on eliminating the need for propositions as objects of rational belief or judgement. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7.2 | |
A reaction: The idea is that the mind relates directly with the ingredients of the proposition, and with the universals (such as relations) which connect them. He cuts out the middle man, just as he cut out sense-data, for similar reasons of economy. |
6094 | An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is quite clear that propositions are not what you might call 'real'; if you were making an inventory of the world, propositions would not come in. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §III) | |
A reaction: I am not clear why this is "quite clear". Propositions might even turn up in our ontology as physical objects (brain states). He says beliefs are real, but if you can't have a belief without a proposition, and they aren't real, you are in trouble. |
6096 | I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell] |
Full Idea: Time was when I thought there were propositions, but it does not seem to me very plausible to say that in addition to facts there are also these curious shadowy things going about as 'That today is Wednesday' when in fact it is Tuesday. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §IV.2) | |
A reaction: You need to give some account of someone who thinks 'Today is Wednesday' when it is Tuesday. We can hardly avoid talking about something like an 'intentional object', which can be expressed in a sentence. Are there not possible (formulable) propositions? |
21712 | I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell] |
Full Idea: Time was when I thought there were propositions, but it does not seem to me very plausible to say that in addition to facts there are also these curious shadowy things going about such 'That today is Wednesday' when it is in fact Tuesday. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], p.197), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 3.1 | |
A reaction: [Ref to Papers v8] I take Russell to have abandoned his propositions because his conception of them was mistaken. Presumably my thinking 'Today is Wednesay' conjures up a false proposition, which had not previously existed. |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
Full Idea: We can reintroduce 'not' by a definition: the words 'this is not blue' are defined as expressing disbelief in what is expressed by the words 'this is blue'. In this way the need of 'not' as an indefinable constituent of facts is avoided. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Human Knowledge: its scope and limits [1948], 9) | |
A reaction: This is part of Russell's programme of giving a psychological account of logical connectives. See other ideas from his 1940 and 1948 works. He observes that disbelief is a state just as positive as belief. I love it. |
6093 | The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell] |
Full Idea: A logically perfect language, if it could be constructed, would be, as regards its vocabulary, very largely private to one speaker; that is, all the names in it would be private to that speaker and could not enter into the language of another speaker. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §II) | |
A reaction: Wittgenstein obviously thought there was something not quite right about this… See Idea 4147, for example. I presume Russell's thought is that you would have no means of explaining the 'meanings' of the names in the language. |
16478 | A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell] |
Full Idea: I once, to test the story of Buridan's Ass, put a cat exactly half-way between her two kittens, both too young to move: for a time she found the disjunction paralysing. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: Buridan's Ass is said to have starved between two equal piles of hay. Reason can't be the tie-breaker; reason obviously says 'choose one!', but intellectualism demands a reason for the one you choose. |
4003 | Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
A reaction: This seems an inevitable convergence of three centuries of thought about personal identity and morality. |
21740 | I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell] |
Full Idea: I hardly think myself that ethics ought to be included in the domain of philosophy. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch.22) | |
A reaction: He declines to give his reasons. The implication of the chapter is that ethics is essentially a social and political matter, so that individual ethical guidelines are unimportant. Maybe the woolliness of ethics was also an impediment. |
23154 | We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other [Russell] |
Full Idea: Instinctively we divide mankind into friends and foes - friends, towards whom we have a morality of co-operation; foes, towards whom we have that of competition. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
A reaction: Interesting, because I have though of cooperation and competition as intrinsic features of people, internal to their nature, but this idea observes that it is more external, as two responses to two sharply distinct aspects of experience. |
21741 | 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell] |
Full Idea: A sentence like 'You ought to do so-and-so' primarily has an emotional content. It means ' this is the act towards which I feel the emotion of approval'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
A reaction: I don't understand how I can say 'you ought to do p', and very clearly mean that the situation would be altogether better if p, only to be told by some philosopher that what I thought was a sensible judgement is actually an emotional outburst. |
21746 | Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell] |
Full Idea: If harmonious desires are what we should seek, love is better than hate, since, when two people love each other, both can be satisfied, whereas when they hate each other one at most can achieve the object of his desire. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
A reaction: A wonderful example of cool philosophical objectivity! Of course it is not true, because the fact that two people love one another doesn't not prevent them from having some incompatible desires, as every couple knows. |
21747 | Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell] |
Full Idea: The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
A reaction: Forty years later, Russell's famous filmed message to posteriority said exactly this. In decision making, get the facts; in relationships, show love and tolerance. I find both parts inspiring. |
21743 | In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell] |
Full Idea: During and immediately after the war [14-18], those who hated the Germans were happier than those who still regarded them as human beings, because they could feel that what was being done served a good purpose. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
A reaction: A striking remark. There are lots of situations where hatred seems to increase happiness. Russell is roughly defending consequentialism. |
20180 | A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life [Russell] |
Full Idea: A happy life must to a great extent be a quiet life, for it is only in an atmosphere of quiet that true joy can live. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
A reaction: Most people's image of happiness is absorption in an interesting task, or relaxing in good company. The idea that happiness is wild excitement exists, but is a minority view. |
21742 | Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell] |
Full Idea: Historically, virtue consisted at first of obedience to authority, whether that of the gods, the government, or custom. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
A reaction: Russell proceeds to demolish such a theory, which he finds it fairly easy to do. In Nietzsche's terms, he is only describing slave virtue. Each role in the world has its own virtues (and functions). Which gods are the most virtuous? |
4021 | Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §13.1) | |
A reaction: Which is why war is required. The growth of civil society meant the inevitable rise of other virtues. |
21517 | Individuals need creativity, reverence for others, and self-respect [Russell] |
Full Idea: What we shall desire for individuals is now clear: strong creative impulses, overpowering and absorbing the instinct of possession; reverence for others; respect for the fundamental creative impulses in ourselves. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Political Ideals [1917], 1) | |
A reaction: Interesting that when Russell focuses on morality, he turns to virtues, rather than to rules. He uses 'reverence' where I would favour 'respect'. His concept of creativity is broad, and does not just concern art etc. |
4005 | To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: If you want to discriminate more finely what makes humans worthy of respect, you must call to mind the claim of human suffering, or what is repugnant about justice, or the awe you feel about human life. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
A reaction: A persuasive part of the claim that such feelings are inseparable from thinking about people in any way at all. |
4004 | Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: The issue of consistency presupposes intrinsic description. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §1.1) | |
A reaction: This may be the key criticism of Kant. The so-called 'maxim' of an action can be almost infinitely re-expressed to suit the agent. |
21745 | Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell] |
Full Idea: The supreme moral rule should be: Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
A reaction: Russell makes no reference to Kant, but this is obviously intended to rebut the more rationalist Kantian view of what is imperative. The use of 'harmonious' chimes in best with Plato's account of the soul in 'Republic'. |
4010 | In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: In mature utilitarianism , the stress on modern freedom emerges in the rejection of paternalism. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |
A reaction: This seems good; it is the beginnings of a rejection of paternalism. What is better, happiness or freedom? What is the value of freedom? |
5398 | Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell] |
Full Idea: All judgements as to what is useful depend upon some judgement as to what has value on its own account. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: This is a beautifully simple point to be made about utilitarianism. The notion that pleasure is the sole good is prior, and the first two sentences in Bentham totally beg that question. What is the value of pleasure? Is it wicked to turn down a pleasure? |
20177 | Boredom always involves not being fully occupied [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is one of the essentials of boredom that one's faculties must not be fully occupied. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
A reaction: He gives running for your life as an example of non-boredom. I suspect that this is only the sort of boredom that troubled Russell, and not the sort of profound boredom that led the actor George Sanders to suicide (according to his last note). |
20179 | Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this [Russell] |
Full Idea: A certain power of enduring boredom is essential to a happy life, and is one of the things that ought to be taught to the young. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
A reaction: As an example he suggests that Wordsworth would never have written 'The Prelude' is he had never been bored when young. Which suggests that Russell doesn't really get boredom, seeing it merely as a stimulus to work. |
20176 | Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power [Russell] |
Full Idea: Boredom has been, I believe, one of the great motive powers throughout the historical epoch, and is so at the present day more than ever. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
A reaction: Most of his essay tells us how to avoid boredom, rather than how it motivates. |
20178 | Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening [Russell] |
Full Idea: We are less bored than our ancestors were, but we are more afraid of boredom | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Conquest of Happiness [1930], 4) | |
A reaction: I get the impression that the invention of the powerful mobile phone has largely banished boredom from human life, except when you are obliged to switch it off. The fear of boredom may hence be even greater now. |
23153 | Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality [Russell] |
Full Idea: At a later stage in the development of civilization, a new kind of loyalty began to be developed, based on identity of creed. …Its military strength was displayed in Islam …and later loyalities of Catholics or Protestants could outweigh nationality. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The only examples of creed loyalty that come to mind are religious. With increased migration in the modern world the phenomenon of divided loyalties has grown. Can a political theory cope with divided loyalties? |
23152 | Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear [Russell] |
Full Idea: From early days down to modern times war has been the chief engine in enlarging the size of communities, and fear has increasingly replaced tribal solidarity as a source of social cohesion. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
A reaction: It is a feature of modern nationalism to try to generate fear of various outsiders, even in times of peace. Most of us despise such things, but the underlying desire for greater national unity is not unworthy. What enemies would a world state have? |
23155 | In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey [Russell] |
Full Idea: In historical societies such as ancient Egypt only a minority at the top of the social scale - the king, the aristocracy and the priests - needed any psychological mechanism towards social cohesion; all the rest merely obeyed. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 2) | |
A reaction: This is why even now I take obedience to be a key right-wing virtue, though it is usually reinforced through national myths and distorted proganda. Quasi-worship of the leader also seems to be a major ingredient. Obedience unifies armies. |
23156 | The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit [Russell] |
Full Idea: Short of the whole planet there is no visible limit to the advantages of size, both in economic and in political organisation. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 2) | |
A reaction: Obviously there are also disadvantages, such as the vast distances, and the alienation of people far from the centre. I take economies of scale to be one of the advantages of socialist nationalisations. |
23157 | Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires [Russell] |
Full Idea: Government has a negative function, to prevent private violence, to protect life and property, to enact criminal law and secure its enforcement. It also has a positive purpose, to facilitate the realisation of desires common to most of the citizens. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Interesting because the second purpose is rarely cited. Governments improve communications, facilitate trade, and encourage health and education services, which we all want. |
22809 | The social contract sees society as constituted by and for individuals [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: The social contract theory …has a vision of society as in some sense constituted by individuals for the fulfilment of ends which are primarily individual. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.29) | |
A reaction: It seems to be initiated by individuals who are only motivated by what is in it for them. This presumes self-sufficient adults, rather than children, or parents with children, or dependent people. The epitome of liberalism, perhaps. |
23151 | A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups [Russell] |
Full Idea: At a very early stage loyalty to a group must have been reinforced by loyalty to a leader. In a large tribe the king or chief may be known the everybody even when individuals are strangers. This makes possible increase in the size of the group. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 1) | |
A reaction: In this way humanity could move from hunter-gatherer groups to tribes or clans. In the UK even people who couldn't name the current Prime Minister are all fully aware of the monarch. In this way a merely constitutional monarch makes sense, |
21523 | We would not want UK affairs to be settled by a world parliament [Russell] |
Full Idea: We should none of us like the affairs of Great Britain to be settled by a parliament of the world. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Political Ideals [1917], 1) | |
A reaction: The UK is currently (Dec 2018) living with a plan to quit Europe, mainly on the grounds that a European parliament has some authority over Britain. In every country resentment of the government increases with distance from the capital city. |
23167 | Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers [Russell] |
Full Idea: The general principle of delimiting powers should be to leave to smaller bodies all functions which do not prevent larger bodies from fulfilling their purpose. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: In recent years in the UK smaller local bodies have been severely reduced in power by central government. This is nominally in favour of individuals, but in practice seems to have strengthened the centre. Russell was keen on devolving powers. |
21522 | Democracy is inadequate without a great deal of devolution [Russell] |
Full Idea: Democracy is not at all an adequate device unless it is accompanied by a very great amount of devolution. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Political Ideals [1917], 1) | |
A reaction: This whole book of Russell's is an appeal for the devolution of power, and for workplace democracy. |
23168 | A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses [Russell] |
Full Idea: The control of greedy or predatory impulses is imperatively necessary, and therefore States …are needed for survival. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: The anarchist replies that the corruption of this benevolent state is precisely the problem they are trying to avoid. Perhaps the emphasis should be on the rule of law, rather than on people holding centralised power. |
21521 | Anarchy does not maximise liberty [Russell] |
Full Idea: The greatest degree of liberty is not secured by anarchy. ...[22] The results of anarchy between states should suffice to persuade us that anarchism has no solution to offer for the evils of the world. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Political Ideals [1917], 1) | |
A reaction: I've heard Russell described as an anarchist, but this clearly wasn't true in 1917. Presumably liberty has to be protected. That we were watching anarchy between states in 1917 is a vivid observation. |
23163 | In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is obvious that in a state of anarchy there could not be universities or scientific research or publication of books, or even such simple things as seaside holidays. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: A seaside holiday seems possible, though it obviously needs means of publicity, and of transport. Why is a private university impossible? The general thought seems to be that anything very complex would be impossible. Maybe. |
21528 | Groups should be autonomous, with a neutral authority as arbitrator [Russell] |
Full Idea: For maximum freedom with minimum force: Autonomy within each politically important group, and a neutral authority for deciding questions involving relations between groups. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Political Ideals [1917], 3) | |
A reaction: This is workplace democracy, and also considerable self-rule amongst minority groups such as religions. |
21527 | On every new question the majority is always wrong at first [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is a mistake to suppose that the majority is necessarily right. On every new question the majority is always wrong at first. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Political Ideals [1917], 3) | |
A reaction: Sounds like bitter experience. This is a good argument for taking time over decisions, and (topical) for a second referendum some time after the first one (if you must have a referendum). |
23166 | In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government [Russell] |
Full Idea: In a democracy you have a 20 millionth share in the government of others, but only a 20 millionth share in the government of yourself. You are therefore much more conscious of being governed than of governing. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: Nice. Add to that the fact that your share in governing others only occurs at election time. In between we are powerless spectators, but we are still governed. |
23169 | Democratic institutions become impossible in a fanatical democracy [Russell] |
Full Idea: Even democracy, when it becomes fanatical, as it did …in the French Revolution, ceases to be Liberal. Indeed, a fanatical belief in democracy makes democratic institutions impossible. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Philosophy and Politics [1950], p.26) | |
A reaction: Presumably this is because the supposed 'will of the people' is continually placed in opposition to the institutions. For example, there is a problem if a referendum is held, which produces a result in conflict with the institutions. |
21526 | Unfortunately ordinary voters can't detect insincerity [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is a painful fact that the ordinary voter, at any rate in England, is quite blind to insincerity. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Political Ideals [1917], 3) | |
A reaction: Gor blimey yes! Well said, Bertie. Even in the age of television, when you can examine them in closeup, people seem to confuse superficial charm with genuine positive convictions. Why are people better at detecting it in private life? |
23170 | Liberal opinions are tentative rather than dogmatic, and are always responsive to new evidence [Russell] |
Full Idea: The essence of the Liberal outlook lies ...in how opinions are held: instead of being held dogmatically, they are held tentatively (as they are in science), and with a consciousness that new evidence may at any moment lead to their abandonment. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Philosophy and Politics [1950], p.26) | |
A reaction: A nice assessment. Russell shows himself finally to be a Liberal. This flexible approach to opinions is what infuriates dogmatists from both the left and the right. It might be said that the basic evidence rarely changes. |
23172 | Empiricist Liberalism is the only view for someone who favours scientific evidence and happiness [Russell] |
Full Idea: Empiricist Liberalism (not incompatible with democratic socialism) is, as in Locke's time, the only philosophy that can be adopted by a man who demands some scientific evidence for beliefs, and also desires human happiness more than some party or creed. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Philosophy and Politics [1950], p.31) | |
A reaction: I like this way of presenting liberalism. In the modern world we are sunk if we don't pay attention to experts, so we all need a critical understanding of what counts as good evidence. Tricky in a world of lying media. |
23171 | Empiricism is ethically superior, because dogmatism favours persecution and hatred [Russell] |
Full Idea: Empiricism is to be commended not only on the grounds of its greater truth, but also on ethical grounds. Dogma demands authority rather than intelligent thought; it requires persecution of heretics and unbelievers, and favours systematic hatred. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Philosophy and Politics [1950], p.31) | |
A reaction: He links empiricism with the liberal outlook. At its best, the respect by empiricists for evidence is a sort of humility. |
22811 | Assigning a right based on a human capacity implies that the capacity should be developed [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: It would be incomprehensible and incoherent to ascribe rights to human beings in respect of the specifically human capacities (such as the right to beliefs or life-style) while at the same time denying that those capacities ought to be developed. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.33) | |
A reaction: Developed by whom? The agent, their family, or the state? At what point has someone got a capacity, with no further requirement to develop it? Taylor pulls rather large rabbits out of small hats. |
22815 | If freedom depends on society and culture, the greatest freedom is in shaping them [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: If realising our freedom partly depends on the society and culture in which we live, then we exercise a fuller freedom if we can help determine the shape of this society and culture. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.47) | |
A reaction: This is clearly in response to the critics of communitarianism who say that it is too conservative, because your values are created for you, by your community. |
22814 | Our reliance on other people close to us does not imply any political obligations [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: We must all be nurtures by others as children, and we only flourish as adults in relationship with friends, mates, children and so on. But this has nothing to do with any obligation to belong to political society. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.42) | |
A reaction: He is defending community, but not at that minimal human level. Political obligations follows from our need for a wider society, to achieve justice, education, travel, health etc. There are no rights without a society |
23162 | Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism [Russell] |
Full Idea: Nationalisation leaves managers and officials almost as remote from the workers as they are under a capitalist regime. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
A reaction: Russell's solution is workplace democracy. Presumably that could be imposed on a nationalised industry much more easily than on a profit-driven private capitalist industry. |
23165 | Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade [Russell] |
Full Idea: Economic justice is held by Socialists (rightly, in my opinion) to involve state ownership of key industries and considerable regulation of foreign trade. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: This must be to obtain greater control over the profits of industry, and also to prevent trade become too exploitative of weaker foreign nations. Britain had a socialist government when this book was written. |
21525 | When the state is the only employer, there is no refuge from the prejudices of other people [Russell] |
Full Idea: Under state socialism ...where the State is the only employer, there is no refuge from its prejudices such as may now accidentally arise through the differing opinions of men. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Political Ideals [1917], 2) | |
A reaction: There is also a strong likelihood in full state socialism that the state will control housing as well as employment. This hadn't come to pass in 1917. |
23160 | Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot [Russell] |
Full Idea: A society in which each is the slave of all is only a little better than one in which each is the slave of a despot. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
A reaction: This seems to apply quite accurately to the position of those state employees who have the lowest status and wages. Society as a whole exploits them, so it is hard to point the finger at their oppressors. |
21518 | Men unite in pursuit of material things, and idealise greed as part of group loyalty [Russell] |
Full Idea: Men combine in groups to attain more strength in the scramble for material goods, and loyalty to the group spreads a halo of quasi-idealism round the central impulse of greed. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Political Ideals [1917], 1) | |
A reaction: See the 'greed is good' speech in the film 'Wall Street'. This sounds like a description of the USA, but Russell was very much in England at this stage. |
23158 | Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker [Russell] |
Full Idea: The introduction of slavery began the divorce between the purpose of the work and the purposes of the worker. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
A reaction: Worth saying, because marxists tend to blame more recent capitalism for creating this problem (of 'alienation'). There are many degrees of slavery. |
21519 | We need security and liberty, and then encouragement of creativity [Russell] |
Full Idea: Security and liberty are only the negative conditions for good political institutions. When they have been won, we need also the positive condition: encouragement of creative energy. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Political Ideals [1917], 1) | |
A reaction: This sounds like some sort of liberal socialism. The nearest connection I can see is to the 'capabilities approach' of Martha Nussbaum. How do you intervene to encourage creativity? |
23161 | Slaves can be just as equal as free people [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is equality where all are slaves, as well as where all are free. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
A reaction: A nice observation, though a person is only a slave if someone controls them, so it is not strictly true. |
23159 | Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is a risk that, in the pursuit of equality, good things which there is difficulty in distributing evenly may not be admitted to be good. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 4) | |
A reaction: Lovely sentence. The clarity and economy with which he expresses an intricate idea. Why can't you philosophers all write like that? This is not just the unequal distribution of scarce goods, but a subtler problem. The finest wines, for example. |
22810 | A right is not just a rule, but also asserts certain ideas of moral worth [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Asserting a right is more than issuing an injunction. It has an essential conceptual background, in some notion of the moral worth of certain properties or capacities, without which it would not make. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.33) | |
A reaction: A simple right may arise from a contract, which could be quite trivial, and of no moral importance. The winner of the egg and spoon race has a right to the prize, which is an ice cream. I think he means legal rights in a state. |
22812 | For most people the primacy of rights mainly concerns freedom [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Most of those who want to affirm the primacy of rights are more interested in asserting the right of freedom, and in a sense which can only be attributed to humans. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.40) | |
A reaction: This is probably more pronounced in North America than in Europe. It may be that without freedom a lot of the other rights are impossible. |
21524 | The right to own land gives a legal right to a permanent income [Russell] |
Full Idea: There are many ways of becoming rich without contributing anything to the wealth of the community. Ownership of land or capital, whether acquired or inherited, gives a legal right to a permanent income. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Political Ideals [1917], 2) | |
A reaction: I suspect that in the past land was the main source of this right, but now it is more likely to be capital. Land carries obligations of some sort, so income from capital is more fun. |
22813 | Property is not essential for life, but it may be essential for independence [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: It is standardly said that we need the right to property as an essential underpinning of life, but this is patently not true. …In reality it is actually seen as an essential part of a life of independence. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.41) | |
A reaction: Hence it has a high value for liberals, for whom an independent life is the prime social aspiration. The law of trespass will define the degree of independence provided by property. |
23164 | Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert [Russell] |
Full Idea: Justice has come to be interpreted as equality, except where exceptional merit is thought to deserve an exceptional but still moderate reward. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Authority and the Individual [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: Kekes rebels against this modern distortion of justice, which traditionally means everyone getting what they deserve - good or bad. The modern egalitarian view seems to be a rebellion against the harsh interpretation of the older view. |
21744 | Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell] |
Full Idea: To force a man to curb his desires, as we do by the criminal law, is not nearly so satisfactory as to cause him genuinely to feel the desires which promote socially harmonious conduct. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22) | |
A reaction: It is hard to disagree, but improving the desires of selfish and even vicious people is a rather challenging task. |
23417 | If the state is neutral, there won't be sufficient community to support a welfare state [Taylor,C, by Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Charles Taylor says the neutral [liberal] state undermines the sense of community which is required for citizens to accept the sacrifices demanded by the welfare state. | |
From: report of Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979]) by Will Kymlicka - Community 'legitimacy' | |
A reaction: As someone who believes in the welfare state, I think this is correct. Extreme individualistic liberalism is incompatible with a welfare state. A liberal society needs institutions which draw free individuals into the community. |
14387 | Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: The dispositional theory of biological functions is not unquestioned. The main alternative is the etiological theory: a component's effect is a function of that component if it has played an essential role in the causal history of its existence. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: [He cites S.D. Mitchell 2003] Presumably this account is meant to fit into a theory of evolution in biology. The obvious problem is where something comes into existence for one reason, and then acquires a new function (such as piano-playing). |
14175 | We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts [Russell] |
Full Idea: On the whole it is not worthwhile preserving the word 'cause': it is enough to say, what is far less misleading, that any two configurations allow us to infer any other. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §460) | |
A reaction: Russell spelled this out fully in a 1912 paper. This sounds like David Hume, but he prefers to talk of 'habit' rather than 'inference', which might contain a sneaky necessity. |
14172 | Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them [Russell] |
Full Idea: Some people would hold that two moments of time, or two points of space, imply each other's existence; yet the relation between these cannot be said to be causal. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §449) | |
A reaction: Famously, Russell utterly rejected causation a few years after this. The example seems clearer if you say that two points or moments can imply at least one point or instant between them, without causing them. |
4396 | The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell] |
Full Idea: The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.173) | |
A reaction: A bold proposal which should be taken seriously. However, if we drop it from scientific explanation, we may well find ourselves permanently stuck with it in 'folk' explanation. What is the alternative? |
8376 | If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell] |
Full Idea: A cause is an event lasting for a finite time, but if cause and effect are contiguous then the earlier part of a changing cause can be altered without altering the effect, and a static cause will exist placidly for some time and then explode into effect. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.177) | |
A reaction: [very compressed] He concludes that they can't be contiguous (and eventually rejects cause entirely). This kind of problem is the sort of thing that only bothers philosophers - the question of how anything can happen at all. Why change? |
8380 | Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell] |
Full Idea: A may be the cause of B even if there actually are cases of B not following A. Striking a match will be the cause of its igniting, in spite of the fact that some matches are damp and fail to ignite. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.185) | |
A reaction: An important point, although defenders of the constant conjunction view can cope with it. There is a further regularity between dampness of matches and their failure to strike. |
17633 | The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell] |
Full Idea: The law of gravitation leads to many consequences which could not be discovered merely from the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics [1907], p.275) |
14382 | Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: A generalization is a 'pragmatic law' if it allows of prediction, explanation and manipulation, even if it fails to satisfy the traditional criteria. To this end, it should describe a stable regularity, but not necessarily a universal and necessary one. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: I am tempted to say of this that all laws are pragmatic, given that it is rather hard to know whether reality is stable. The universal laws consist of saying that IF reality stays stable in certain ways, certain outcomes will ensue necessarily. |
14385 | Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Strict regularities are rarely if ever discovered in the life sciences. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §2) | |
A reaction: This is elementary once it is pointed out, but too much philosophy have science has aimed at the model provided by the equations of fundamental physics. Science is a broad church, to employ an entertaining metaphor. |
8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
Full Idea: An 'event' (in a statement of the 'law of causation') is intended to be something that is likely to recur, since otherwise the law becomes trivial. It follows that an 'event' is not some particular, but a universal of which there may be many instances. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.179) | |
A reaction: I am very struck by this. It may be a key insight into understanding what a law of nature actually is. It doesn't follow that we must be realists about universals, but the process of abstraction from particulars is at the heart of generalisation. |
8381 | The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is not in the sameness of causes and effects that the constancy of scientific law consists, but in sameness of relations. And even 'sameness of relations' is too simple a phrase; 'sameness of differential equations' is the only correct phrase. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.186) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a commitment to the regularity view, since there is nothing more to natural law than that the variables keeping obeying the equations. It also seems to be a very instrumentalist view. |
14174 | The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter [Russell] |
Full Idea: For us, as pure mathematicians, the laws of motion and the law of gravitation are not properly laws at all, but parts of the definition of a certain kind of matter. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §459) | |
A reaction: The 'certain kind of matter' is that which has 'mass'. Since these are paradigm cases of supposed laws, this is the beginning of the end for real laws of nature, and good riddance say I. See Mumford on this. |
5393 | We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell] |
Full Idea: If some law which has no exceptions applies to a case, we can never be sure that we have discovered that law and not one to which there are exceptions; also the reign of law would seem to be itself only probable. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: None of this can be denied. In modern physics, several supposed laws have come up for question. Is the proton stable? Are the gravitational constant or the speed of light necessarily fixed? Russell is doing epistemology. How do we conceive the laws? |
14383 | A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: By 'law of nature' or 'natural law' I mean a generalization describing a regularity, not some metaphysical entity that produces or is responsible for that regularity. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1 n1) | |
A reaction: I take the second version to be a relic of a religious world view, and having no place in a naturalistic metaphysic. The regularity view is then the only player in the field, and the question is, can we do more? Can't we explain regularities? |
14168 | Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times [Russell] |
Full Idea: The concept of motion is logically subsequent to that of occupying as place at a time, and also to that of change. Motion is the occupation, by one entity, of a continuous series of places at a continuous series of times. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §442) | |
A reaction: This is Russell's famous theory of motion, which came to be called the 'At-At' theory (at some place at some time). It seems to mathematically pin down motion all right, but seems a bit short on the poetry of the thing. |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: To reply to Zeno's Arrow Paradox, Russell developed his 'at-at' theory of motion, which says that to move from A to B is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Human Knowledge: its scope and limits [1948]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.2 | |
A reaction: I wonder whether Russell's target was actually Zeno, or was it a simplified ontology of points and instants? The ontology will also need identity, to ensure it is the same thing which arrives at each point. |
14171 | Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction [Russell] |
Full Idea: A force is the supposed cause of acceleration, ...but an acceleration is a mere mathematical fiction, a number, not a physical fact. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §448) | |
A reaction: This rests on his at-at theory of motion, in Idea 14168. I'm not sure that if I fell off a cliff I could be reassured on the way down that my acceleration was just a mathematical fiction. |
6470 | Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell] |
Full Idea: We offer the following tentative definition: The matter of a given thing is the limit of its appearances as their distance from the thing diminishes. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IX) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as empiricism gone mad. Russell is famous for being a 'realist', but you would hardly know it at this point. Personally I put emphasis on 'best explanation', which fairly simply delivers most of our commonsense understandings of reality. |
7551 | Matter is a logical construction [Russell] |
Full Idea: We must regard matter as a logical construction. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.132) | |
A reaction: A logical construction is a fancy way of saying a best explanation (but with Ockham's Razor hanging over it). A key component missing from Russell's account is that we can directly experience matter, because we are made of it. |
7547 | Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell] |
Full Idea: A true theory of matter requires a division of things into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.125) | |
A reaction: The division of matter in space seems decidable by physicists, but the division in time seems a bit arbitrary (unless it is quanta of time?). Russell focuses on observable qualities, but are there also intrinsic qualities? |
21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: In the beginning Russell's ontology included matter as basic, to be known, however, only by inference from sense-data. By the end he wanted to 'contruct' matter from sense-data. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 1 | |
A reaction: [see also p.133] Russell always seems to have been a robust realist about the external world, but the later view seems a lot less realist than the earlier view. |
6468 | There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell] |
Full Idea: In addition to the private spaces, ..there is the 'space of perspectives', since each private world may be regarded as the appearance which the universe presents from a certain point of view. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VII) | |
A reaction: This replaces his concept of 'public space', which he introduced in 1912. Russell gradually dropped this, but I like the idea that we somehow directly perceive space in two ways simultaneously (which led him to say that space is six-dimensional). |
7552 | Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell] |
Full Idea: The world of particulars is a six-dimensional space, where six co-ordinates will be required to assign the position of any particular, three to assign its position in its own space, and three to assign the position of its space among the other spaces. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.134) | |
A reaction: Not a proposal that has caught on. One might connect the idea with the notion of 'frames of reference' in Einstein's Special Theory. Inside a frame of reference, three co-ordinates are needed; but where is the frame of reference? |
14160 | Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry [Russell] |
Full Idea: I won't discuss whether points are unities or simple terms, but whether space is an aggregate of them. ..There is no geometry without points, nothing against them, and logical reasons in their favour. Space is the extension of the concept 'point'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §423) |
21581 | We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is no reason in experience to suppose that there are times as opposed to events: the events, ordered by the relations of simultaneity and succession, are all that experience provides. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 4) | |
A reaction: We experience events, but also have quite an accurate sense of how much time has passed during the occurrence of events. If asked how much time has lapsed, why don't we say '32 events'? How do we distinguish long events from short ones? |
14156 | Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line [Russell] |
Full Idea: To the mathematician as such there is no relevant distinction between the instants of time and the points on a line. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §387) | |
A reaction: This is the germ of the modern view of space time, which is dictated by the mathematics, rather than by our intuitions or insights into what is actually going on. |
22891 | We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon] |
Full Idea: Russell suggested, in defence of an empiricist theory of time-awareness, that a sense organ goes on vibrating, like a piano string, for while after the stimulation. Thus we can see the movement of a second hand, seen in several places at once. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 2 'Realism' | |
A reaction: Hm. If they were vibrating the last experience, they couldn't pick up the new one. When something fast happens the brain resonates fortissimo! If your eyes are moving it will be different neurons that get fired at each instant. |
14169 | The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: The universe is a somewhat ambiguous term: it may mean all the things that exist at a single moment, or all things that ever have existed or will exist, or the common quality of whatever exists. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §442) |
2609 | If God's decrees are good, and this is not a mere tautology, then goodness is separate from God's decrees [Russell] |
Full Idea: Theologians have always taught that God's decrees are good, and that this is not a mere tautology: it follows that goodness is logically independent of God's decrees. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Human Society in Ethics and Politics [1954], p.48) |
4009 | Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Late medieval nominalism defended the sovereignty of God as incompatible with there being an order in nature which by itself defined good and bad. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self [1989], §3.3) | |
A reaction: Part of their attack on Platonism. But what made them place such a high value on the sovereignty of God? |
5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |
Full Idea: 'There is one and only one entity x which is most perfect; that one has all perfections; existence is a perfection; therefore that one exists' fails as a proof because there is no proof of the first premiss. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.54) | |
A reaction: This is the modern move of saying that existence (which is 'not a predicate', according to Kant) is actually a quantifier, which isolates the existence claim being made about a variable with a bunch of predicates. McGinn denies Russell's claim. |
6119 | You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell] |
Full Idea: The fact that you can discuss the proposition 'God exists' is a proof that 'God', as used in that proposition, is a description and not a name. If 'God' were a name, no question as to its existence could arise. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VI) | |
A reaction: Presumably 'a being than which none greater can be conceived' (Anselm's definition) is self-evidently a description, and doesn't claim to be a name. Aquinas caps each argument with a triumphant naming of the being he has proved. |
21520 | That our heaven is a dull place reflects the misery of excessive work in life [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is a sad evidence of the weariness mankind has suffered from excessive toil that his heavens have usually been places where nothing ever happened or changed. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Political Ideals [1917], 1) | |
A reaction: Has any religion got an idea of heaven as a place full of lively activity and creative problem-solving? That is what suits us best. |