128 ideas
| 18835 | Logic doesn't have a metaphysical basis, but nor can logic give rise to the metaphysics [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: There is surely no metaphysical basis for logic, but equally there is no logical basis for metaphysics, if that implies that we can settle the choice of logic in advance of settling any seriously contested metaphysical-cum-semantic issues. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 7.5) | |
| A reaction: Is this aimed at Tim Williamson's book on treating modal logic as metaphysics? I agree with the general idea that logic won't deliver a metaphysics. I might want to defend a good metaphysics giving rise to a good logic. |
| 18819 | The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: The realist principle that a statement may be true even though no one is able to recognise its truth is so deeply embedded in our ordinary conception of truth that any account that flouts it is liable to engender confusion. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 5.1) |
| 18826 | 'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: A statement is 'true at a possibility' if, necessarily, things would have been as the statement (actually) says they are, had the possibility obtained. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 6.6) | |
| A reaction: This is deliberately vague about what a 'possibility' is, but it is intended to be more than a property instantiation, and less than a possible world. |
| 18803 | Semantics for propositions: 1) validity preserves truth 2) non-contradition 3) bivalence 4) truth tables [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: The classical semantics of natural language propositions says 1) valid arguments preserve truth, 2) no statement is both true and false, 3) each statement is either true or false, 4) the familiar truth tables. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 1.1) |
| 12204 | The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: It is a widely accepted thesis that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §5) | |
| A reaction: Rumfitt goes on to defend this standard view (against Dummett's defence of S4). The point, I take it, is that one can only assert that something is 'true in all possible worlds' only when the worlds are all accessible to one another. |
| 18814 | 'Absolute necessity' would have to rest on S5 [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If there is such a notion as 'absolute necessity', its logic is surely S5. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: There are plenty of people (mainly in the strict empiricist tradition) who don't believe in 'absolute' necessity. |
| 18798 | It is the second-order part of intuitionistic logic which actually negates some classical theorems [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Although intuitionistic propositional and first-order logics are sub-systems of the corresponding classical systems, intuitionistic second-order logic affirms the negations of some classical theorems. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 1.1) |
| 18799 | Intuitionists can accept Double Negation Elimination for decidable propositions [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Double Negation Elimination is a rule of inference which the classicist accepts without restriction, but which the intuitionist accepts only for decidable propositions. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: This cures me of my simplistic understanding that intuitionists just reject the rules about double negation. |
| 18830 | Most set theorists doubt bivalence for the Continuum Hypothesis, but still use classical logic [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Many set theorists doubt if the Generalised Continuum Hypothesis must be either true or false; certainly, its bivalence is far from obvious. All the same, almost all set theorists use classical logic in their proofs. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 7.2) | |
| A reaction: His point is that classical logic is usually taken to rest on bivalence. He offers the set theorists a helping hand, by defending classical logic without resorting to bivalence. |
| 18843 | The iterated conception of set requires continual increase in axiom strength [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: We are doomed to postulate an infinite sequence of successively stronger axiom systems as we try to spell out what is involved in iterating the power set operation 'as far as possible'. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 9.3) | |
| A reaction: [W.W. Tait is behind this idea] The problem with set theory, then, especially as a foundation of mathematics, is that it doesn't just expand, but has to keep reinventing itself. The 'large cardinal axioms' are what is referred to. |
| 18836 | A set may well not consist of its members; the empty set, for example, is a problem [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: There seem strong grounds for rejecting the thesis that a set consists of its members. For one thing, the empty set is a perpetual embarrassment for the thesis. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 8.4) | |
| A reaction: Rumfitt also says that if 'red' has an extension, then membership of that set must be vague. Extensional sets are precise because their objects are decided in advance, but intensional (or logical) sets, decided by a predicate, can be vague. |
| 18837 | A set can be determinate, because of its concept, and still have vague membership [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistent with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of the concept A. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 8.4) | |
| A reaction: To be determinate, it must be presumed that there is some test which will decide what falls under the concept. The rule can say 'if it is vague, reject it' or 'if it is vague, accept it'. Without one of those, how could the set have a clear identity? |
| 18845 | If the totality of sets is not well-defined, there must be doubt about the Power Set Axiom [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Someone who is sympathetic to the thesis that the totality of sets is not well-defined ought to concede that we have no reason to think that the Power Set Axiom is true. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 9.6) | |
| A reaction: The point is that it is only this Axiom which generates the vast and expanding totality. In principle it is hard, though, to see what is intrinsically wrong with the operation of taking the power set of a set. Hence 'limitation of size'? |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
| A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
| 18815 | Logic is higher-order laws which can expand the range of any sort of deduction [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: On the conception of logic recommended here, logical laws are higher-order laws that can be applied to expand the range of any deductive principles. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: You need the concept of a 'deductive principle' to get this going, but I take it that might be directly known, rather than derived from a law. |
| 9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Logic is part of a normative theory of thinking, not a substitute for thinking. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.13) | |
| A reaction: There is some sort of logicians' dream, going back to Leibniz, of a reasoning engine, which accepts propositions and outputs inferences. I agree with this idea. People who excel at logic are often, it seems to me, modest at philosophy. |
| 18804 | The case for classical logic rests on its rules, much more than on the Principle of Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: I think it is a strategic mistake to rest the case for classical logic on the Principle of Bivalence: the soundness of the classical logic rules is far more compelling than the truth of Bivalence. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: The 'rules' to which he is referring are those of 'natural deduction', which make very few assumptions, and are intended to be intuitively appealing. |
| 18805 | Classical logic rules cannot be proved, but various lines of attack can be repelled [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: There is not the slightest prospect of proving that the rules of classical logic are sound. ….All that the defender of classical logic can do is scrutinize particular attacks and try to repel them. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: This is the agenda for Rumfitt's book. |
| 18827 | If truth-tables specify the connectives, classical logic must rely on Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If we specify the senses of the connectives by way of the standard truth-tables, then we must justify classical logic only by appeal to the Principle of Bivalence. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 7) | |
| A reaction: Rumfitt proposes to avoid the truth-tables, and hence not to rely on Bivalence for his support of classical logic. He accepts that Bivalence is doubtful, citing the undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis as a problem instance. |
| 12195 | Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Our ordinary standards for deeming arguments to be sound vary greatly from context to context. Even the package tourist's syllogism ('It's Tuesday, so this is Belgium') may meet the operative standards for soundness. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], Intro) | |
| A reaction: No doubt one could spell out the preconceptions of package tourist reasoning, and arrive at the logical form of the implication which is being offered. |
| 12199 | There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: There is a modal element in consequence, in its applicability to assessing reasoning from suppositions. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §2) |
| 12201 | We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: A rule is to be rejected if it enables us to deduce from some premisses a purported conclusion that does not follow from them in the broad sense. The idea that deductions answer to consequence is incomprehensible if consequence consists in deducibility. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §2) |
| 18813 | Logical consequence is a relation that can extended into further statements [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Logical consequence, I argue, is distinguished from other implication relations by the fact that logical laws may be applied in extending any implication relation so that it applies among some complex statements involving logical connectives. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: He offers implication in electronics as an example of a non-logical implication relation. This seems to indicate that logic must be monotonic, that consequence is transitive, and that the Cut Law always applies. |
| 18808 | Normal deduction presupposes the Cut Law [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Our deductive practices seem to presuppose the Cut Law. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: That is, if you don't believe that deductions can be transitive (and thus form a successful chain of implications), then you don't really believe in deduction. It remains a well known fact that you can live without the Cut Law. |
| 18840 | When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: I do not regard Bivalence, when applied to vague statements, as an intuitively compelling principle which we ought to try to preserve. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 8.7) | |
| A reaction: The point of Rumfitt's book is to defend classical logic despite failures of bivalence. He also cites undecidable concepts such as the Continuum Hypothesis. |
| 12194 | Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Overt contradictions include formal contradictions of form 'B and not B', but I also take them to include 'This is red all over and green all over' and 'This is red and not coloured'. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], Intro) |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
| 18802 | In specifying a logical constant, use of that constant is quite unavoidable [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: There is no prospect whatever of giving the sense of a logical constant without using that very constant, and much else besides, in the metalinguistic principle that specifies that sense. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 1.1) |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
| A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
| 12198 | Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: The geometrical style of formalization of logic is now little more than a quaint anachronism, largely because it fails to show logical truths for what they are: simply by-products of rules of inference that are applicable to suppositions. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §1) | |
| A reaction: This is the rejection of Russell-style axiom systems in favour of Gentzen-style natural deduction systems (starting from rules). Rumfitt quotes Dummett in support. |
| 18800 | Introduction rules give deduction conditions, and Elimination says what can be deduced [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: 'Introduction rules' state the conditions under which one may deduce a conclusion whose dominant logical operator is the connective. 'Elimination rules' state what may be deduced from some premises, where the major premise is dominated by the connective. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: So Introduction gives conditions for deduction, and Elimination says what can actually be deduced. If my magic wand can turn you into a frog (introduction), and so I turn you into a frog, how does that 'eliminate' the wand? |
| 18809 | Logical truths are just the assumption-free by-products of logical rules [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Gentzen's way of formalising logic has accustomed people to the idea that logical truths are simply the by-products of logical rules, that arise when all the assumptions on which a conclusion rests have been discharged. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: This is the key belief of those who favour the natural deduction account of logic. If you really believe in separate logic truths, then you can use them as axioms. |
| 18807 | Monotonicity means there is a guarantee, rather than mere inductive support [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Monotonicity seems to mark the difference between cases in which a guarantee obtains and those where the premises merely provide inductive support for a conclusion. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: Hence it is plausible to claim that 'non-monotonic logic' is a contradiction in terms. |
| 18842 | Maybe an ordinal is a property of isomorphic well-ordered sets, and not itself a set [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Menzel proposes that an ordinal is something isomorphic well-ordered sets have in common, so while an ordinal can be represented as a set, it is not itself a set, but a 'property' of well-ordered sets. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 9.2) | |
| A reaction: [C.Menzel 1986] This is one of many manoeuvres available if you want to distance mathematics from set theory. |
| 17462 | A single object must not be counted twice, which needs knowledge of distinctness (negative identity) [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: One requirement for a successful count is that double counting should be avoided: a single object should not be counted twice. ...but that is to make a knowledgeable judgement of distinctness - to resolve a question of identity in the negative. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (Concepts and Counting [2002], III) | |
| A reaction: He also notes later (p.65) that you must count all and only the right things. |
| 18834 | Infinitesimals do not stand in a determinate order relation to zero [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Infinitesimals do not stand in a determinate order relation to zero: we cannot say an infinitesimal is either less than zero, identical to zero, or greater than zero. ….Infinitesimals are so close to zero as to be theoretically indiscriminable from it. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 7.4) |
| 18846 | Cantor and Dedekind aimed to give analysis a foundation in set theory (rather than geometry) [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: One of the motivations behind Cantor's and Dedekind's pioneering explorations in the field was the ambition to give real analysis a new foundation in set theory - and hence a foundation independent of geometry. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 9.6) | |
| A reaction: Rumfitt is inclined to think that the project has failed, although a weaker set theory than ZF might do the job (within limits). |
| 17461 | Some 'how many?' answers are not predications of a concept, like 'how many gallons?' [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: We hit trouble if we hear answers to some 'How many?' questions as predications about concepts. The correct answer to 'how many gallons of water are in the tank?' may be 'ten', but that doesn''t mean ten things instantiate 'gallon of water in the tank'. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (Concepts and Counting [2002], I) | |
| A reaction: Rumfitt makes the point that a huge number of things instantiate that concept in a ten gallon tank of water. No problem, says Rumfitt, because Frege wouldn't have counted that as a statement of number. |
| 9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Vagueness in respect of membership is consistency with determinacy of the set's identity, so long as a set's identity is taken to consist, not in its having such-and-such members, but in its being the extension of a concept. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Logic of Boundaryless Concepts [2007], p.5) | |
| A reaction: I find this view of sets much more appealing than the one that identifies a set with its members. The empty set is less of a problem, as well as non-existents. Logicians prefer the extensional view because it is tidy. |
| 18839 | An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: A borderline red-orange object satisfies the disjunctive predicate 'red or orange', even though it satisfies neither 'red' or 'orange'. When applied to adjacent bands of colour, the disjunction 'sweeps up' objects which are reddish-orange. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 8.5) | |
| A reaction: Rumfitt offers a formal principle in support of this. There may be a problem with 'adjacent'. Different colour systems will place different colours adjacent to red. In other examples the idea of 'adjacent' may make no sense. Rumfitt knows this! |
| 18838 | The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: On Sainsbury's picture, a colour has an extension that it has by virtue of its place in a network of contrary colour classifications. Something is determined to be 'red' by being a colour incompatible with orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo and violet. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 8.5) | |
| A reaction: Along with Idea 18839, this gives quite a nice account of vagueness, by requiring a foil to the vague predicate, and using the disjunction of the predicate and its foil to handle anything caught in between them. |
| 14532 | A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| Full Idea: Rumfitt argues that there is a distinctive notion of necessity implicated in the notion of logical consequence. | |
| From: report of Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010]) by Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann - Introduction to 'Modality' 2 |
| 18816 | Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: The central characteristic mark of metaphysical necessity is that a metaphysical possibility respects the actual identities of things - in a capacious sense of 'thing'. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: He contrast this with logical necessity, and concludes that some truths are metaphysically but not logically necessary, such as 'Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus'. Personally I like the idea of a 'necessity-maker', so that fits. |
| 12193 | Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: By the notion of 'logical necessity' I mean that there is a sense of 'necessary' for which 'It is necessary that A' implies and is implied by 'It is logically contradictory that not A'. ...From this, logical necessity is implicated in logical consequence. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Rumfitt expresses a commitment to classical logic at this point. We will need to be quite sure what we mean by 'contradiction', which will need a clear notion of 'truth'.... |
| 12200 | A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: There is no reason to suppose that any statement that is logically necessary (in the present sense) is knowable a priori. ..If a statement is logically necessary, its negation will yield a contradiction, but that does not imply that someone could know it. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §2) | |
| A reaction: This remark is aimed at Dorothy Edgington, who holds the opposite view. Rumfitt largely defends McFetridge's view (q.v.). |
| 18825 | S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: I accept the widely held thesis that S5 is the logic of logical necessity. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 6.4 n16) | |
| A reaction: It seems plausible that S5 is also the logic of metaphysical necessity, but that does not make them the same thing. The two types of necessity have two different grounds. |
| 12202 | Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: While Fine suggests defining a narrow notion of logical necessity in terms of metaphysical necessity by 'restriction' (to logical truths that can be defined in non-modal terms), this seems unpromising for broad logical necessity, which is modal. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] He cites Kit Fine 2002. Rumfitt glosses the non-modal definitions as purely formal. The metaphysics lurks somewhere in the proof. |
| 18824 | Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Some philosophers describe the colour scarlet as a determination of the determinable red; since the ways the world might be are naturally taken to be properties of the world, it helps to bear this analogy in mind. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 6.4) | |
| A reaction: This fits nicely with the disposition accounts of modality which I favour. Hence being 'coloured' is a real property of objects, even in the absence of the name of its specific colour. |
| 18828 | If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Two possibilities are incompatible when no possibility determines both. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 7.1) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as just the right sort of language for building up a decent metaphysical picture of the world, which needs to incorporate possibilities as well as actualities. |
| 12203 | If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: A world is usually taken to be a fully determinate way that things could have been; but then one might seriously wonder whether anyone is capable of 'considering' such a thing at all. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §4) | |
| A reaction: This has always worried me. If I say 'maybe my coat is in the car', I would hate to think that I had to be contemplating some entire possible world (including all the implications of my coat not being on the hat stand). |
| 18821 | Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Possibilities are things of the same general character as possible worlds, on one popular conception of the latter. They differ from worlds, though, in that they are not required to be fully determinate or complete. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 6) | |
| A reaction: A rather promising approach to such things, even though a possibility is fairly determinate at its core, but very vague at the edges. It is possible that the UK parliament might be located in Birmingham, for example. Is this world 'complete'? |
| 18831 | Medieval logicians said understanding A also involved understanding not-A [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: Mediaeval logicians had a principle, 'Eadem est scientia oppositorum': in order to attain a clear conception of what it is for A to be the case, one needs to attain a conception of what it is for A not to be the case. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 7.2) | |
| A reaction: Presumably 'understanding' has to be a fairly comprehensive grasp of the matter, so understanding the negation sounds like a reasonable requirement for the real thing. |
| 18820 | In English 'evidence' is a mass term, qualified by 'little' and 'more' [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: In English, the word 'evidence' behaves as a mass term: we speak of someone's having little evidence for an assertion, and of one thinker's having more evidence than another for a claim. One the other hand, we also speak of 'pieces' of evidence. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 5.2) | |
| A reaction: And having 'more' evidence does not mean having a larger number of pieces of evidence, so it really is like an accumulated mass. |
| 12790 | Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan] |
| Full Idea: A generalisation is explanatory if and only if it is invariant. | |
| From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §4) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Jim Woodward 2003] I dislike the idea that generalisations and regularities explain anything at all, but this rule sounds like a bare minimum for being taken seriously in the space of explanations. |
| 12789 | Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan] |
| Full Idea: The main alternative to the dispositional theory of biological functions (which confer a survival-enhancing propensity) is the etiological theory (effects are functions if they play a role in the causal history of that very component). | |
| From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3) | |
| A reaction: [Bigelow/Pargetter 1987 for the first, Mitchell 2003 for the second] The second one sounds a bit circular, but on the whole a I prefer causal explanations to dispositional explanations. |
| 14388 | Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan] |
| Full Idea: Nothing can count as a mechanism unless it produces some macro-level regular behaviour. To produce macro-level regular behaviour, it has to rely on micro-level regularities. | |
| From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5) | |
| A reaction: This is the core of Leuridan's argument that regularities are more basic than mechanisms. It doesn't follow, though, that the more basic a thing is the more explanatory work it can do. I say mechanisms explain more than low-level regularities do. |
| 14386 | Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan] |
| Full Idea: Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on the existence of regularities. | |
| From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the Humean rearguard action in favour of the regularity account of laws. Wrong, but a nice paper. This point shows why only powers (despite their vagueness!) are the only candidate for the bottom level of explanation. |
| 12787 | Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan] |
| Full Idea: To model a mechanism one must incorporate pragmatic laws. ...As valuable as the concept of mechanism and mechanistic explanation are, they cannot replace regularities nor undermine their relevance for scientific explanation. | |
| From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1) | |
| A reaction: [See Idea 12786 for 'pragmatic laws'] I just don't see how the observation of a regularity is any sort of explanation. I just take a regularity to be something interesting which needs to be explained. |
| 14384 | We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan] |
| Full Idea: Summary: mechanisms depend on regularities, there may be regularities without mechanisms, models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, and pragmatic laws do not depend epistemologically on mechanistic models. | |
| From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 14382 for 'pragmatic' laws. I'm quite keen on mechanisms, so this is an arrow close to the heart, but at this point I say that my ultimate allegiance is to powers, not to mechanisms. |
| 14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |
| Full Idea: I see nothing metaphysically wrong in an infinite ontological regress of mechanisms and regularities. | |
| From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5) | |
| A reaction: This is a pretty unusual view, and I can't accept it. My revulsion at this regress is precisely the reason why I believe in powers, as the bottom level of explanation. |
| 18658 | The 'Kantian' self steps back from commitment to its social situation [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The 'Kantian' view of the self strongly defends the view that the self is prior to its socially given roles and relationships, and is free only if it is capable of holding these features of its social situation at a distance, and judging them by reason. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 6.3) | |
| A reaction: There is no correct answer here, because I am capable of Kantian distancing, and also capable of submersing myself in the social constructions around me. If society fosters rebellion (1810s, 1960s) then we become more Kantian. |
| 18817 | We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: It is striking that our understanding of conditionals is not greatly impeded by widespread disagreement about their truth-conditions. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 4.2) | |
| A reaction: Compare 'if you dig there you might find gold' with 'if you dig there you will definitely find gold'. The second but not the first invites 'how do you know that?', implying truth. Two different ifs. |
| 18829 | The truth grounds for 'not A' are the possibilities incompatible with truth grounds for A [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: The truth-grounds of '¬A' are precisely those possibilities that are incompatible with any truth-ground of A. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 7.1) | |
| A reaction: This is Rumfitt's proposal for the semantics of 'not', based on the central idea of a possibility, rather than a possible world. The incompatibility tracks back to an absence of shared grounding. |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
| 18650 | Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Teleological theories take concern for the good (e.g. freedom or utility) as fundamental, and concern for people as derivative. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.a.ii) | |
| A reaction: There's a nice fundamental question with which to begin a discussion of value: which matters most - abstract values, or individual people? Placing a collective of people first (Stalinism?) seems to fall between them. |
| 18664 | Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: There is a significant strand of contemporary feminism which argues that we should take seriously women's different morality. ...The particularistic thought women employ is a better morality than the impartial thought men employ in the public sphere. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 7.3) | |
| A reaction: I had taken Particularism to be an offshoot of virtue theory, as promulgated by Jonathan Dancy. Evidently the influence of feminism is strong. Personally I think the world would be a better place if it was run by women. |
| 18624 | Utilitarianism is not a decision-procedure; choice of the best procedure is an open question [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Utilitarianism is essentially a 'standard of rightness', not a 'decision-procedure'. ...It is an open question whether we should employ a utilitarian decision-procedure - indeed, this question itself is to be answered by examining its consequences. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.3.b) | |
| A reaction: The point is that the aim is to maximise happiness, and you might do that by just maximising baked bean consumption, and not even thinking about happiness. This idea is labelled 'indirect utilitarianism'. Happiness does seem to be a by-product. |
| 18626 | One view says start with equality, and infer equal weight to interests, and hence maximum utility [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The first main argument for utilitarianism is that people matter equally, and hence each person's interests should be given equal weight, and hence morally right acts will maximise utility. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.a) | |
| A reaction: The point is that this starts from the aim of equality, and infers maximum utility as its consequence. Equality has a primitive value. Whenever you dig down to a primitive value in a theory, I just find myself puzzled. What can justify basic equality? |
| 18627 | A second view says start with maximising the good, implying aggregation, and hence equality [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The second main argument for utilitarianism defines the right in terms of maximising the good, which leads to the utilitarian aggregation standard, which as a mere consequence treats people's interests equally. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.b) | |
| A reaction: This takes maximum good as a primitive, and arrives at equality as the way to achieve it. So which is more morally fundamental, a maximum of goodness, or human equality? Kymlicka says this idea is too impersonal. |
| 18625 | To maximise utility should we double the population, even if life somewhat deteriorates? [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Morally, should we double the population, even if it means reducing each person's welfare by almost half (since that will still increase overall utility)? | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.b) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Derek Parfit for this] The key word is 'almost', which ensures a small increase in overall utility. I think this is a particularly good objection to utilitarianism, which aims to maximise an abstraction called 'utility'. |
| 18638 | The difference principles says we must subsidise the costs of other people's choices [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The difference principle does not make any distinction between chosen and unchosen inequalities, ....but the difference principle requires that some people subsidise the costs of other people's choices. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.3.b.2) | |
| A reaction: We do this in education, allowing people to study things in which we can see little point. We subsidise public ceremonies which strike us as ridiculous. |
| 23418 | Liberal state legitimacy is based on a belief in justice, not in some conception of the good life [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: For liberals the basis of state legitimacy is a shared sense of justice, not a shared conception of the good. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'legitimacy') | |
| A reaction: For a liberal state to work, the citizens have to roughly believe in the core values of liberalism, which are primarily freedom and equality (and hence justice). |
| 18635 | Social contract theories are usually rejected because there never was such a contract [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Social contract theories have all been subjected to the same criticism - that there never was such a state of nature, or such a contract. Hence neither citizens nor government are bound by it. Contracts only create obligations if they are actually agreed. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: Even if they have been agreed in the past, why should subsequent generations be bound to them? Modern Germans aren't bound by their grandparents' oaths of allegiance to fascism. |
| 23369 | Some liberals thinks checks and balances are enough, without virtuous citizens [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Many classical liberals believed that a liberal democracy could function effectively even in the absence of an especially virtuous citizenry, by creating checks and balances. …One set of private interests would check another set of private interests. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the view of those who think a completely free market will evolve into a flourishing and just society. There is a basic debate about the importance of the character of the citizens in any polity. Marxists say they are entangled. |
| 23370 | Good citizens need civic virtues of loyalty, independence, diligence, respect, etc. [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Galston says responsible citizenship requires four types of civic virtue: general (law-abiding, loyal), social (independent, open-minded), economic (diligent, restrained, adaptable), and political (respect, sensible, judgement, engagement). | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: [Galston's 'Liberal Purposes' 1991] (compressed) This immediately seems to be asking too much, especially for those who know little, or are short of money. |
| 23373 | Liberals accept that people need society, but Aristotelians must show that they need political activity [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: To defend Aristotelian republicanism it is not enough to show that individual require society - liberals do not deny this. They must also show that individuals need to be politically active. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. People are not just inactive because they have been rendered powerless. In any group of people there are some who are keen to have a voice, or lead, and others who are largely happy to follow. |
| 23375 | Minimal liberal citizenship needs common civility, as well as mere non-interference [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Minimal citizenship is often seen as simply requiring non-interference with others, but that ignores a basic requirement of liberal citizenship, which is the social virtue of 'civility' or 'decency'. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: He makes the point that the minimal requirement has to be given up when there is a crisis, which needs much more involvement. This largely describes modern Britain, prior to the Brexit rift. |
| 23376 | Modern non-discrimination obliges modern citizens to treat each other as equals [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The extension of non-discrimination from government to civil society …involves a radical extension of the obligations of liberal citizenship. The obligation to treat people as equal citizens now applies to everyday decisions. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: This is very difficult for an older generation who felt their 'entitlement' as leading citizens, or who routinely favoured their local traditional community. But they just have to 'get over it'! |
| 23377 | The right wing sees citizenship in terms of responsibility to earn a living, rather than rights [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: According to the New Right, to promote active citizenship-for-all or entitlements, we must focus instead on people's responsibility to earn a living. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: Every creature has to earn a living, but one method is to successfully sponge off others. A cushy job is a sort of sponging. An excessively well paid job is a sort of sponging. Citizenship must involve responsibilities of some sort. |
| 23414 | Liberals say state intervention in culture restricts people's autonomy [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: According to liberal theory, a state which intervenes in the cultural market place to encourage any particular way of life restricts people's autonomy. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'social') | |
| A reaction: The communitarian idea is that the state should intervene, in order to foster the best aspects of communal culture. The dangers are obvious, and can be seen in any totalitarian state. A gentle hand on the tiller, perhaps? Increase the options? |
| 18630 | Utilitarianism is no longer a distinctive political position [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Modern utilitarianism, despite its radical heritage, no longer defines a distinctive political position. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.6) | |
| A reaction: This is his final sentence on the topic. I suppose utilitarianism exists as a moral theory at too high a level of generality to count as a political theory. |
| 18623 | The quest of the general good is partly undermined by people's past entitlements [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The existence of past entitlements on the part of particular people partially pre-empts, or constrains, the utilitarian quest to maximise the general good. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.3.a) | |
| A reaction: In other words, there is never a clean slate in politics (except in some hideously violent revolution). You might be able to justify to someone a withdrawal of their past entitlements. E.g. confiscating a stolen painting that was bought in ignorance. |
| 18628 | We shouldn't endorse preferences which reject equality, and show prejudice and selfishness [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Equality should enter into the very formation of our preferences. ....Prejudiced and selfish preferences should be excluded from the start, for they already reflect a failure to show equal consideration. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.5.b) | |
| A reaction: This is meant to block utilitarian summing of preferences like racism, but it feels like a rather desperate attempt to get righteous liberal values in at the beginning, where they can't be questioned. How can you justify equal respect and treatment? |
| 18629 | Using utilitarian principles to make decisions encourages cold detachment from people [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Acting directly on utilitarian grounds is counter-productive, for it encourages a contingent and detached attitude towards what should be whole-hearted personal and political commitments. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.7) | |
| A reaction: I've always seen this as an objection to utilitarianism, but I now see that it is only an objection to the decision procedure. We should be warm-hearted and committed, in the knowledge that this will increase benefits to all. Hm. A bit schizoid. |
| 18637 | Utilitarianism is irrational if it tells you to trade in your rights and resources just for benefits [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Utilitarianism is an irrational choice, for it is rational to ensure your basic rights and resources are protected, even if you thereby lessen your chance of receiving benefits above and beyond the basic goods that you seek to protect. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: [He's discussing Rawls] Utilitarians would obviously respond to this by saying that the rights and resources are needed to protect future benefits, so it would be short-termism to trade them in now. |
| 23371 | Modern democratic theory focuses on talk, not votes, because we need consensus or compromise [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Modern discussion has shifted from 'vote-centric' (or 'aggregative') to 'talk-centric' democracy. The vote-centric model has no mechanism for developing a consensus, or shaping public opinion, or even formulating an honourable compromise. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: I'm struck by the fact that a person's preferences betweent these two is a reflection of character, or basic attitudes to morality. Some people think democratically about their relationships, and others very obviously don't. |
| 23390 | In a liberal democracy all subjects of authority have a right to determine the authority [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: A liberal-democratic system is one in which those people who are subject to political authority have a right to participate in determining that authority. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.4) | |
| A reaction: This applies to immigrants. The most anti-democratic move in recent democracies is the strategy of trying to make it more difficult to vote, perhaps by demanding identification documents, or creating huge queues. |
| 18663 | Modern liberalism has added personal privacy to our personal social lives [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Modern liberalism is concerned not only to protect the private sphere of social life, but also to carve out a realm within the private sphere where individuals can have privacy. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 7.2.b) | |
| A reaction: Interestingly, he associates this development with the romantic movement, which designated social interaction as public and political, creating a need for true privacy. Privacy is the blessing and blight of the modern world. |
| 23374 | We have become attached to private life because that has become greatly enriched [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Our attachment to private life, I believe, is the result not (or not only) of the impoverishment of public life, but the enrichment of private life. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 7) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. Perhaps a sentiment expected more from a university lecturer than from a poorly-paid labourer. Does he mean watching innumerable TV shows instead of having sing-songs in the local pub? Increased leisure is indisputable. |
| 18632 | Liberalism tends to give priority to basic liberties [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: One way of differentiating liberalism is that it gives priority to the basic liberties. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.1.b) | |
| A reaction: [He is citing Rawls for this] This is not the same as extreme libertarianism, which makes liberty the only priority. The issue would be over which liberties count as 'basic'. Taxation would be a good test case. |
| 22818 | Liberals are not too individualistic, because people recognise and value social relations [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: It is alleged that liberals fail to recognise that people are naturally social or communal. …But liberals believe that people form and join social relations in which they come to understand and pursue the good. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality [1989], Conc) | |
| A reaction: This is particulary aimed at communitarians, who see liberalism as based on a distorted concept of people as isolated beings. Personally I am beginning to shift my views from Aristotelian communitarianism to modern liberalism, so I like this idea. |
| 23410 | Modern liberals see a community as simply a society which respects freedom and equality [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Most contemporary liberal philosophers have little to say about the ideal of community. …It is often seen as derivative of liberty and equality - a society lives up to the ideal of community if its members are treated as free and equal persons. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: He cites Rawls as an example. This is the central idea which was attacked by modern communitarians. A collection of scattered self-seeking isolated individuals doesn't seem to amount to a healthy communal life. Maybe community needs further rights? |
| 23387 | Liberals must avoid an official culture, as well as an official religion [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Just as liberalism precludes the establishment of an official religion, so too there cannot be official cultures that have preferred status. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.3) | |
| A reaction: This becomes tricky in schools, where the old way of teaching national literature and particular types of music has been eroded in modern times. But once wide diversity is allowed there is no single story which can be taught. |
| 23388 | Liberals need more than freedom; they must build a nation, through a language and institutions [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Liberals need to replace the idea of 'benign neglect', and recognise the central role of nation-building in a democracy. …This means promoting a common language, and equal access to institutions operating in that language. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.3) | |
| A reaction: 'Benign neglect' is non-interference with citizens' lives. Obviously the institutions include education, but is a state health service implied? Can equal access by guaranteed to private institutions? |
| 23380 | Some individuals can gain citizenship as part of a group, rather than as mere individuals [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: On the view of 'differentiated citizenship', members of certain groups would be incorporated into the community, not only as individuals, but also through the group, and their rights would depend in part on their group membership. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
| A reaction: This is obviously a strategy to enable marginalised individuals to be fully included in society. The downside is that individuals gain their social identity through a label, rather than through themselves, which pure liberals dislike. 'Identity politics'. |
| 23381 | The status hierarchy is independent of the economic hierarchy [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The evidence suggests that (contrary to the Marxist view) the status hierarchy is not reducible to the economic hierarchy. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
| A reaction: Kymlicka is particularly thinking of racism, which lowers the status of certain groups, even if they are economically successful. I console myself for my modest economic status by getting lots of education. |
| 23383 | Some multiculturalists defended the rights of cohesive minorities against liberal individualism [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Defending multiculturalism initially involved endorsing the communitarian critique of liberalism, and viewed minority rights as defending cohesive minority groups against the encroachment of liberal individualism. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.1) | |
| A reaction: Liberal individualists have to accept these criticisms from Marxists, communitarians and multiculturalists. The lone individual has no group that guarantees support, and individuals (especially the young) can easily sink. |
| 23384 | 'Culturalist' liberals say that even liberal individuals may need minority rights [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The 'liberal culturalist' position is that minorities which share basic liberal principles nonetheless need minority rights. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.2) | |
| A reaction: Disabled liberals are an obvious example. This strikes me as a promising version of liberalism, which accepts the criticisms of extreme individualism. |
| 23385 | Multiculturalism may entail men dominating women in minority groups [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Many feminists express concern that multiculturalism in practice typically means giving male members of the group the power to control the women in the group. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.2) | |
| A reaction: The way the young are treated might also be a problem. The underlying question is whether the minority group is more or less civilised than the central state. Liberalism always fights for the rights of the least powerful. |
| 23386 | Liberals must prefer minority right which are freedoms, not restrictions [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Liberal defenders of multiculturalism must distinguish 'bad' minority rights which are restrictions from 'good' minority rights which supplement individual rights. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.2) | |
| A reaction: Presumably no sensible liberal wants to remove all restrictions, so deeper values must be invoked to justify the mode of approved minority rights. A list of human goods seems needed. |
| 23389 | Why shouldn't national minorities have their own right to nation-build? [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Why should national minorities not have the same powers of nation-building as the majority? | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.4) | |
| A reaction: A 'national minority' is marked by a different language, or a different religion, or both. No one doubts the majority's right to nation-build. Some further principle would be needed to deny that right to a minority. Maybe the minority was there first? |
| 23391 | Multiculturalism is liberal if it challenges inequality, conservative if it emphasises common good [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Liberal multiculturalism challenges status inequalities while preserving individual freedom. …Conservative multiculturalism replaces liberal principles with a communitarian politics of the common good, at least at the local or group level. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8.6) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This sounds a bit simplistic. Recent emphasis on 'the common good', in the face of white supremacists etc., seems admirable, but surely challenging inequalities promotes the common good? Minority cultures are often conservative. |
| 18656 | Marxists say liberalism is unjust, because it allows exploitation in the sale of labour [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The fundamental flaw of liberal justice, Marxists claim, is that it licences the continuation of the worker by the capitalist, since it licences the buying and selling labour. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 5.2.a) | |
| A reaction: I can't see that all sale of labour is exploitation, if (for example) the wage paid was extremely high (maybe even higher than the employer's wage, which is possible). So exploitation involves something more. |
| 23409 | Community can focus on class or citizenship or ethnicity or culture [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: In recent centuries the ideal of community has taken many forms, from class solidarity or shared citizenship to a common ethnic descent or cultural identity. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: Language and religion are not explicitly mentioned, but must be implied. Supporting a major sports team is also worth mentioning. |
| 18659 | The 'Kantian' view of the self misses the way it is embedded or situated in society [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Communitarians believe that the 'Kantian' view of the self is false, because it ignores the fact that the self is 'embedded' or 'situated' in existing social practices, so that we cannot always stand back and opt out of them. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 6.3) | |
| A reaction: [Hegel and Charles Taylor 1979 seem to be the sources for this] I have several times been told that I am so typical of the culture I arose in that it is almost comical. This was quite disconcerting, but I got used to it, and now I love it. |
| 18660 | Communitarians say we should pay more attention to our history [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Communitarians like to say that political theory should pay more attention to the history of each culture. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 6.4.c) | |
| A reaction: I like this. Kylicka says communitarians tend not to do this, partly because history might reveal an unpleasant basis for present society (such as English country house life benefiting from slavery). The ignorance of history among politicians appals me. |
| 23419 | Communitarianism struggles with excluded marginalised groups [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The problem of the exclusion of historically marginalised groups is endemic to the communitarian project. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'legitimacy') | |
| A reaction: Put simply, old-fashioned styles of community are probably impossible in large modern states, some with rather arbitrary borders. |
| 18657 | Communitarian states only encourage fairly orthodox ideas of the good life [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: A communitarian state can and should encourage people to adopt conceptions of the good that conform to the community's way of life, while discouraging conceptions of the good that conflict with it. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 6.2) | |
| A reaction: This is the conservative aspect of communitarianism which many people (notably liberals) find uncongenial. This conservatism is implicit in Aristotle's account of virtue. I have become more conservative to accommodate it. |
| 23413 | Feminism has shown that social roles are far from fixed (as communitarians tend to see them) [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Communitarians say that some of our social roles must be regarded as fixed when planning our lives, …but the women's movement has shown how deeply entrenched social roles can be questioned and rejected. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'Embedded') | |
| A reaction: True, but parents walking out on young children also shows that. The ideal must be some sort of balance. |
| 23415 | Participation aids the quest for the good life, but why should that be a state activity? [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Communitarians rarely distinguish between collective activities and political activities. Shared participation aids intelligent decisions about the good life, but why should that be organised through the state, rather than by free individuals? | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'need') | |
| A reaction: Kylicka points out later that local groups can be very unintelligent or prejudiced. Modern media have changed that picture, because participation can be with geographically remote people. |
| 18649 | If everyone owned himself, that would prevent slavery [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The best way to prevent enslavement of one person to another is to give each person ownership over himself. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 4.2.c) | |
| A reaction: [The idea comes from Nozick, but Kymlicka is assessing how it should be understood] The best way to block any social evil like slavery is to make it unthinkable. Legislation is second best. Presumably I could sell myself into slavery (like Faust)? |
| 18640 | Libertarians like the free market, but they also think that the free market is just [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Not everyone who favours the free market is a libertarian, for they do not all share the libertarian view that the free market is inherently just. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 4.1.a) | |
| A reaction: Illuminating. It would appear that exploitation is possible within a strictly free market, so it seems unlikely that free markets are inherently just (unless you don't acknowledge that 'exploitation' is wrong). |
| 18651 | The most valuable liberties to us need not be the ones with the most freedom [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Different liberties promote different interests for many different reasons, and there is no reason to assume that the liberties which are most valuable to us are the ones with the most freedom. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.a.iii) | |
| A reaction: As I grow older I come more and more to think that freedom is overvalued. But have you tried the other thing? We complacently take huge freedoms for granted. Be passionate about fundamental freedoms, and relaxed about the rest. |
| 18661 | Ancient freedom was free participation in politics, not private independence of life [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The liberty of the ancients was their active participation in the exercise of political power, not the peaceful enjoyment of personal independence. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 7.2.a) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. It takes a feat of imagination to grasp a world where the desire for freedom to sit at home and compile a database of philosophical ideas never even crossed anyone's mind. |
| 18633 | Equal opportunities seems fair, because your fate is from your choices, not your circumstances [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The ideology of equal opportunity seems fair to many people in our society because it ensures that people's fate is determined by their choices, rather than their circumstances. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: Is it that we surmise that people have 'free will', and then engineer a situation where it can be exercised? Is it that the rest of us don't want to feel guilty when someone else's life goes awry (because it was 'their fault')? |
| 18634 | Equal opportunity arbitrarily worries about social circumstances, but ignores talents [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The prevailing view [of equal opportunity] only recognises differences in social circumstances, while ignoring differences in natural talents (or treating them as if they were a choice). This is an arbitrary limit on the theory's central intuition. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: Of course we (society) can do a lot about your social circumstances, but very little about your talents, other than to develop them or thwart them. Talented children need more than mere 'opportunity'. |
| 18654 | Marxists say justice is unneeded in the truly good community [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Marxists believe that justice, far from being the first virtue of social institutions, is something that the truly good community has no need for. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to imply that in the truly good community there are nothing but truly good individuals, which is taking social determinism to its limits. Are all the citizens of a bad community inherently bad? |
| 18652 | The Lockean view of freedom depends on whether you had a right to what is restricted [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The Lockean camp defines freedom in terms of the exercise of our rights. Whether or not a restriction decreases our freedom depends on whether or not we had a right to do the restricted thing. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.a.iii) | |
| A reaction: My first instinct is to be sympathetic to this, since a detached and general notion of 'freedom' strikes me as suspect. He offers the rival 'Spenserian' view of freedom as just having the choice. |
| 23379 | Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Extending citizenship to include common social rights was a tool of nation-building, intended in part to construct and consolidate a sense of common national identity and culture. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
| A reaction: Kymlicka explains a lot of politics and society in terms of the desire of governments to 'build' their nation. You have to make people who are essentially powerless feel that they are at least in some way involved, and benefiting. |
| 23382 | Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The organisation of society on the basis of rights or claims that derive from group membership is sharply opposed to the concept of society based on citizenship. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
| A reaction: [from John Porter 1987] Does this imply that you might have rights as part of a group which you don't have as a state citizen? Positive discrimination, for example. Differential rights sounds like potential trouble. |
| 18655 | Justice corrects social faults, but also expresses respect to individuals as ends [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Justice is more than a remedial virtue. It does remedy defects in social co-ordination, ...but it also expresses the respect individuals are owed as ends in themselves, not as mean's to someone's good, or even to the common good. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: That is, I take it, that justice operates at two different levels in our theoretical social thinking. |
| 23411 | Communitarians see justice as primarily a community matter, rather than a principle [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Communitarians believe either that community replaces the need for principles of justice, or that the community is either the source of such principles or should play a greater role in deciding their content. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: [compressed] The idea that a racist or chauvinist or puritanical or insular community should decide justice for all its members sounds horrible. It drives you to liberal individualism, just thinking about it. |
| 23412 | Justice resolves conflicts, but may also provoke them [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Justice can help mediate conflicts, but it also tends to creat conflicts, and to decrease the natural expression of sociability. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'limits') | |
| A reaction: [He is discussing Michael Sandel on liberalism] Family life might not go well if all of its members continually demanded justice for themselves as individuals. Maybe our concept of justice is too individualistic? Do we need a sense of 'group' justice? |
| 23378 | The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: The development of the welfare state has been quite successful in integrating the working classes into national cultures throughout the Western democracies. | |
| From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) [2002], 8) | |
| A reaction: Hard-line capitalists tend to hate the welfare state, as unfair to high earners, but it not only makes workers feel involved, but also provides a healthier, happier, more knowledgeable work force for employers. |
| 14387 | Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan] |
| Full Idea: The dispositional theory of biological functions is not unquestioned. The main alternative is the etiological theory: a component's effect is a function of that component if it has played an essential role in the causal history of its existence. | |
| From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3) | |
| A reaction: [He cites S.D. Mitchell 2003] Presumably this account is meant to fit into a theory of evolution in biology. The obvious problem is where something comes into existence for one reason, and then acquires a new function (such as piano-playing). |
| 14382 | Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan] |
| Full Idea: A generalization is a 'pragmatic law' if it allows of prediction, explanation and manipulation, even if it fails to satisfy the traditional criteria. To this end, it should describe a stable regularity, but not necessarily a universal and necessary one. | |
| From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1) | |
| A reaction: I am tempted to say of this that all laws are pragmatic, given that it is rather hard to know whether reality is stable. The universal laws consist of saying that IF reality stays stable in certain ways, certain outcomes will ensue necessarily. |
| 14385 | Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan] |
| Full Idea: Strict regularities are rarely if ever discovered in the life sciences. | |
| From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §2) | |
| A reaction: This is elementary once it is pointed out, but too much philosophy have science has aimed at the model provided by the equations of fundamental physics. Science is a broad church, to employ an entertaining metaphor. |
| 14383 | A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan] |
| Full Idea: By 'law of nature' or 'natural law' I mean a generalization describing a regularity, not some metaphysical entity that produces or is responsible for that regularity. | |
| From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1 n1) | |
| A reaction: I take the second version to be a relic of a religious world view, and having no place in a naturalistic metaphysic. The regularity view is then the only player in the field, and the question is, can we do more? Can't we explain regularities? |