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13076
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Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
The scholastics treated it as a step in the right explanatory direction to analyze a relational statement of the form 'aRb' into two subject-predicate statements, attributing different relational predicates to a and to b.
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 2.2.1)
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A reaction:
The only alternative seems to be Russell's view of relations as pure universals, having a life of their own, quite apart from their relata. Or you could take them as properties of space, time (and powers?), external to the relata?
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13102
|
If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
If we go for the necessity-of-origins view, A and B are different if the origin of A is different from the origin of B. But one is left with the further question 'When is the origin of A distinct from the origin of B?'
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)
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A reaction:
There may be an answer to this, in a regress of origins that support one another, but in the end the objection is obviously good. You can't begin to refer to an 'origin' if you can't identify anything in the first place.
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13103
|
Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
Scholastics distinguished criteria of numerical difference from questions of individuation proper, since numerical difference is a symmetrical notion.
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)
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A reaction:
This apparently old-fashioned point appears to be conclusively correct. Modern thinkers, though, aren't comfortable with proper individuation, because they don't believe in concepts like 'essence' and 'substance' that are needed for the job.
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13104
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Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
There is a contemporary property construal of haecceities, ...and a Scotistic construal as primitive, 'colourless' thisnesses which, unlike singleton-set haecceities, are aimed to do some explanatory work.
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.4)
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A reaction:
[He associates the contemporary account with David Kaplan] I suppose I would say that individuation is done by properties, but not by some single property, so I take it that I don't believe in haecceities at all. What individuates a haecceity?
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13100
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Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
We could think of 'substance' on the model of a mass noun, rather than a count noun.
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.3)
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A reaction:
They offer this to help Leibniz out of a mess, but I think he would be appalled. The proposal seems close to 'prime matter' in Aristotle, which never quite does the job required of it. The idea is nice, though, and should be taken seriously.
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13068
|
We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
In the 'blueprint' approach to substance, we confront at least three questions: What is it for a thing to be an individual substance? What is it for a thing to be the kind of substance that it is? What is it to be that very individual substance?
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.1)
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A reaction:
My working view is that the answer to the first question is that substance is essence, that the second question is overrated and parasitic on the third, and that the third is the key question, and also reduces to essence.
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13069
|
The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
There is a widespread assumption, now and in the past, that substances are essentially substances: nothing is actually a substance but possibly a non-substance.
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2)
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A reaction:
It seems to me that they clearly mean, in this context, that substances are 'necessarily' substances, not that they are 'essentially' substances. I would just say that substances are essences, and leave the necessity question open.
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13101
|
Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
A necessity-of-origins approach cannot work to distinguish things that come into being genuinely ex nihilo, and cannot work to distinguish things sharing a single origin.
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)
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A reaction:
Since I am deeply suspicious of essentiality or necessity of origin (and they are not, I presume, the same thing) I like these two. Twins have always bothered me with the second case (where order of birth seems irrelevant).
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13071
|
We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
The philosopher comfortable with an 'order of being' has richer resources to make sense of the 'in virtue of' relation than that provided only by causal relations between states of affairs, positing in addition other sorts of explanatory relationships.
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2)
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A reaction:
This might best be characterised as 'ontological dependence', and could be seen as a non-causal but fundamental explanatory relationship, and not one that has to depend on a theistic world view.
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20489
|
Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
We must agree with Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau that nothing genuinely worthy of being called a state of nature will, at least in the long term, be a condition in which human beings can flourish.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Conc')
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A reaction:
Given our highly encultured concept of modern flourishing, that is obviously right. There may be another reality where hom sap flourishes in a quite different and much simpler way. Education as personal, not institutional?
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20532
|
Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Love, or at least affection, not justice, is the first virtue of the family. Should mutual affection also be the first virtue of social and political institutions?
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 6 'Transcending')
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A reaction:
Surely this ideal should be at the heart of any society, no matter how far away from the ideal it is pushed by events and failures of character? I take 'respect' to be the form of love we feel for strangers.
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20490
|
For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
On the utilitarian account the state is justified if and only if it produces more happiness than any alternative. Whether we consent to the state is irrelevant.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Intro')
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A reaction:
The paternalistic character of utilitarianism is a familiar problem. I quite like this approach, even though liberals will find it a bit naughty. We make children go to school, for their own good. Experts endorse society, even when citizens don't.
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20493
|
Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Social contract theory ...satisfies the twin demands of universalism - every person must be obligated - and voluntarism - political obligations can come into existence only through consent.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Voluntaristic')
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A reaction:
I'm going off the idea that being a member of large society is voluntary. It can't possibly be so for most people, and it shouldn't be. I'm British, and society expects me to remain so (though they might release me, if convenient).
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20497
|
How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Even if a dictator wants to advance the interests of the people, how are those interests to be known? In a democracy people show their interests, it seems, by voting: they vote for what they want.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Knowledge')
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A reaction:
I suppose a wise and kind despot could observe very carefully, and understand the interests of the people better than they do themselves. Indeed, I very much doubt, in 2017, whether the people know what is good for them.
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20506
|
'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
The Federalists took the idea of 'separation of powers' from Locke and Montesquieu. This places the legislative, executive and judicial functions in independent hands, so that in theory any branch of government would be checked by the other two.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Representative')
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A reaction:
[The American Federalist writers of 1787-8 were Madison, Hamilton and Jay] This is a brilliant idea. An interesting further element that has been added to it is the monitoring by a free press, presumably because the other three were negligent.
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20530
|
Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Political choices can be made by the utility principles (maximising total utility), or maximin (maximising for the worst off, a view for pessimists), or maximax (not serious, but one for optimists, being unequal, and aiming for a high maximum).
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing')
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A reaction:
[my summary of a page of Wolff] Rawls embodies the maximin view. Wolff implies that we must choose between utilitarianism and Rawls. Would Marxists endorse maximin? He also adds 'constrained maximisation', with a safety net.
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20487
|
A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
As the anarchist picture of society becomes increasingly realistic and less utopian, it also becomes increasingly difficult to tell it apart from a liberal democratic state.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Anarchism')
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A reaction:
Nice challenge to anarchism, which is clear in what it opposes, but isn't much of a political philosophy if it doesn't have positive aspirations. Anarchists may hope that people will beautifully co-operate, but what if they re-form the state to do it?
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20511
|
Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Democracy is a way of expressing equal respect for all, which is perhaps why we withdraw the vote from criminals: by their behaviour they forfeit the right to equal respect.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Conc')
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A reaction:
I disagree, and he has converted me to franchise for criminals. One-off criminals do not forfeit my respect for them as people, though their action may merit a controlling response on our part. Bad character, not a bad action, forfeits respect.
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20499
|
Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Condorcet proved that provided people have a better than even chance of getting the right answer, and that they vote for their idea of the common good, then majority decisions are an excellent way to get the right result.
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|
From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Voting')
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A reaction:
[compressed] The point is that collective voting magnifies the result. If they tend to be right, the collective view is super-right. But if they tend towards the wrong, the collective view goes very wrong indeed. History is full of the latter.
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20518
|
Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Many laws of contemporary society are very hard to defend in terms of Mill's Liberty Principle, such as laws against duelling, incest between siblings, and euthanasia.
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|
From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Poison')
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A reaction:
[He cites Chief Justice Lord Devlin for this] Being killed in a duel can cause widespread misery. Fear of inbreeding is behind the second one, and fear of murdering the old behind the third one. No man is an island.
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20503
|
Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
As Marx observed, and as women have learnt to their cost, equal political rights are worth fighting for, but they are of little value if one is still treated unequally in day-to-day life.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Participatory')
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A reaction:
In fact social equality comes first, because that will imply political equality and financial justice. I think it is all covered under the virtue of 'respect', which should have pre-eminence in both public and private life.
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20512
|
Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
The normal liberal basic rights are right to life, free speech, free assembly and freedom of movement, plus the rights to vote and stand for office. Some theorists add the right to a decent living standard (shelter, food and health care).
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|
From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty')
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A reaction:
I think he has forgotten to add education. In Britain Beatrice Webb seems to have single-handedly added the living standard group to the list.
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20514
|
If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
If natural rights have a fundamental status, and so are not arrived at on the basis of some other argument, how do we know what rights we have?
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|
From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty')
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|
A reaction:
He cites Bentham as using this point. Utilitarianism at least provides a grounding for the identification of possible basic rights. Start from what we want, or what we more objectively need? Human needs, or needs in our present culture?
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20534
|
Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Justice is the last virtue of society, or at least the last resort. Rights, or considerations of justice, are like an insurance policy: something offering security to fall back on.
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|
From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 6 'Transcending')
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A reaction:
I like this. He points out that a good family doesn't talk of rights and justice. We want a friendly harmonious society, with safety nets.
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