48 ideas
23966 | The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie] |
Full Idea: 'Objective' is misleading because it is possible to be, from a personal point of view, more or less objective; objectivity admits of degrees… I prefer to speak of sciences as 'impersonal', because the personal view is lost. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: This evidently relates to Perry's claim that the world contains additional indexical facts. I think I agree with this thought. Objectivity is a mode of subjectivity. Thermometers are not 'objective'. Physics is certainly impersonal. |
16643 | Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura] |
Full Idea: An accident's aptitudinal relationship to a subject is essential, and this is never taken away from accidents….for it is true to say that they are suited to a subject. | |
From: Bonaventura (Commentary on Sentences [1252], IV.12.1.1.1c) | |
A reaction: This is the compromise view that allows accidents to be separated, for Transubstantiation, while acknowledging that we identify them with their subjects. |
16696 | Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura] |
Full Idea: Everything successive reduces to something permanent. | |
From: Bonaventura (Commentary on Sentences [1252], II.2.1.1.3 ad 5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.2 | |
A reaction: Avicenna first took successive entities seriously, but Bonaventure and Aquinas seem to have rejected them, or given reductive accounts of them. It resembles modern actualists versus modal realists. |
23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
Full Idea: An 'obscurum per obscurius' explanation is explaining something mysterious by something even more mysterious, | |
From: Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 6) | |
A reaction: Schulte's example is trying to explain mental content in terms of phenomenal experience. That is, roughly, explaining content by qualia, when the latter is the 'hard problem'. |
24005 | We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie] |
Full Idea: We know others' emotions by 1) understanding and explaining them, 2) emotional contagion, 3) empathy, 4) in-his-shoes imagining, and 5) sympathy. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 7 Intro) | |
A reaction: He says these must be clearly distinguished, because they are often confused. In-his-shoes is 'me in their position', where empathy is how the position is just for them. The Simulationist approach likes these two. Sympathy need not share the feelings. |
24006 | Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Empathy and in-his-shoes imagining are not sufficient for sympathy. Nor are they necessary. You can even sympathise with another when these are impossible, with the sufferings of a whale or a dog, for example. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 7 'Sympathy') | |
A reaction: Goldie is right that these distinct faculties are a blurred muddle in most of our accounts of dealing with other people. Empathy with a whale in not actually impossible, because we recognise their suffering, and we understand suffering. |
23973 | Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Emotions have more specific objects than moods. The difference is a matter of degree, so emotions don't necessarily have a specific object, and moods are not necessarily undirected towards an object, or lacking in intentionality. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'Intentionality') | |
A reaction: Could you simultaneously have an emotion and a mood which were in conflict, such as joy and misery (singing the blues), or love and hate ('odi et amo')? Could one transition into the other, as the object became clear, or faded away? |
23974 | Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Many philosophers who discuss the intentionality of the emotions seek to capture the intentionality of the emotions in terms of beliefs, or beliefs and desires. I think this is a mistake, and runs the risk of leaving feelings out of emotional experience. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'Intentionality') | |
A reaction: [He gives a list, which includes Kenny and Davidson] I would have thought that desires, at least, necessarily involve feelings, and neuroscientists seem to find emotions everywhere, including as part of belief. Be more holistic? |
23972 | A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie] |
Full Idea: In narratives the different elements of an emotion are conceived of as all being part of the same emotion, in spite of its complex, episodic and dynamic features. Verbs expressing emotions don not use continuous tenses, such as 'he is being in love'. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'What') | |
A reaction: Goldie is keen on seeing emotions as part of a life narrative. An intriguing problem for the metaphysics of identity. If someone's love for a person comes and goes, is it the same love each time? |
23978 | 'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie] |
Full Idea: There is a contrast in commonsense psychology between 'being emotional' and 'having an emotion'. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: Is this just that being emotional is displaying the existing emotion? Though we say someone is 'being emotional' when the emotion seems to take control of their actions. |
23992 | Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie] |
Full Idea: The Pintupi Aborigines of the Western Australian Desert have no less than fifteen words for different types of fear, including one for a sudden fear which leads one to stand up to see what caused it. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Evidence') | |
A reaction: Reminiscent of the many Inuit words for snow, but this time it is about human experience, rather than the environment. We must assume they can distinguish the different types, so these gradations are real. |
23979 | Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Our emotional responses can reveal to us what we value, and what we value might not be epistemically accessible to us if we did not have such responses. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'Conclusion') | |
A reaction: This obviously invites the question of whether the emotion reveals the value, or determines the value. I suspect it is more the latter, because it is hard to see what art (for example) could have for us if we had no emotional responses. |
23976 | If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie] |
Full Idea: The content of the recognition in 'feeling towards' is different from the content of the recognition where no emotion is involved. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'Education') | |
A reaction: ['Feeling toward' is Goldie's coinage, to capture the intentionality in felt emotion] Interesting, but not convinced. Maybe the emotion just follows fast after the mere recognition. When I recognise a friend in a crowd, that triggers a feeling. |
23977 | When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Consider striking a blow or seeking safety unemotionally. Now consider when you act out of emotion: angrily striking the blow, or fearfully running away. The phenomenology of such actions is fundamentally different in character. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'Explanation') | |
A reaction: True, I guess. This has the behaviourist's problem of Superactors and Superspartans, of pretended or suppressed anger or fear. There is a sliding scale from stone cold to frenzied emotion. |
23980 | It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie] |
Full Idea: The best understanding of a person's emotions …will be holistic in its overall approach, seeing feelings as embedded in an emotion's narrative, as part of a person's life. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 3 Intro) | |
A reaction: Sounds reasonable, but I didn't find it very helpful. When told that my Self or my life has a 'narrative' I don't learn much. The concept of narrative relies on selves and lives. Ditto for being told that emotions or language are 'holistic'. |
23982 | If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie] |
Full Idea: If emotion has the world-directed intentionality of 'feeling towards' it follows that it is not bodily feeling, for bodily feelings lack the required 'direct' (as contrasted with 'borrowed') intentionality. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 3 'Towards') | |
A reaction: This is a direct response to William James's view, and seems correct. It is a widely held view that emotions are usually 'about' something, and it is hard to see how getting red in the face could do that. |
23968 | If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie] |
Full Idea: If someone thought that reasons can be characterised impersonally, say in terms of causal role …it is then glaringly obvious that feelings cannot be left out, so they have to be added on. Hence I introduce the idea of 'feeling towards'. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: [compressed] That is, he wants us to see feelings as intentional, active, motivating and causal, and not the marginal epiphenomena implied by an impersonal account. I think he is right. |
23969 | We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie] |
Full Idea: One can be unreflectively emotionally engaged with the world, having feelings towards some object in the world, and yet at that moment not be reflectively aware of having those feelings. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm thinking that we do not just await some 'object' to trigger a background feeling, because we always have feelings. They are the continuous shifting wallpaper of our mental dwellings - which we sometimes notice. |
23984 | An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie] |
Full Idea: I see no need to insist that feelings …must be present at all times whilst you are having an emotion, …but without at least episodes of feeling, of which you can be more or less aware, an experience would not be an emotional one. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 3 'Unreflective') | |
A reaction: [He cites William James] An odd situation, but it is the same as many chronic illnesses. Presumably because of the actual episodes the person will be aware of the emotion as a background state of potential episodes. |
24001 | Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie] |
Full Idea: A mood can focus into an emotion, and an emotion can blur out of focus into the non-specificity of mood. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 6 'Mood') | |
A reaction: I am struck by how the strong emotion of a vivid dream can remain as an inarticulate mood for the rest of the day. |
23991 | Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie] |
Full Idea: It has been suggested that there are seven 'basic' emotions, based on cross-cultural studies of facial expressions. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Evidence') | |
A reaction: [Paul Ekman is cited] This makes the idea of universal basic emotions much more plausible. Goldie respects the research, but is cautious about inferences, mainly because digging deeper (such as interviews) makes it more complex. |
23970 | Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie] |
Full Idea: In an evolutionary and cultural account of emotions, I resist the 'avocado pear' conception of emotions, that our emotional behaviour comprises an inner core of 'hard-wired' reaction, and an out element which is open to cultural influences. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: He is concerned with whether emotions can be educated, and defends the view that they can all be channelled or changed. In particular he rejects the idea that the stone consists of 'basic' emotions, which are untouchable. |
23985 | A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie] |
Full Idea: The idea of basic emotions is that our concepts of emotions are hierarchically organised. For example, if anger is a basic emotion, then less basic species of anger might be annoyance, fury, rage, indignation, and so forth. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Evidence') | |
A reaction: Most modern theorists seem to reject this idea. In a family of related emotions (each having a similar focal object), it is hard to see which one of them is basic, other than being the best known. Maybe the weakest one is basic? |
23986 | Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie] |
Full Idea: The Chinese Li Chi encyclopaedia (1st century BCE) says there are seven 'feelings of men': joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Evidence') | |
A reaction: [In J.Russell 1991] Love sounds like a stronger version of liking. If you are trying to train your feelings, it is helpful to have a basic list of them, even if the list is rather speculative. |
23971 | Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Emotions are not based on syllogistic reasoning ….but the thoughts involved in an emotion can show it to be intelligible, intelligibility being a thinner notion than rationality. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 1 Intro) | |
A reaction: A nice distinction. The emotion is the best explanation. Compare 'intuition' and 'sensible' behaviour as also intelligible. An obvious problem is that if a person runs amok because they have a brain tumour, that is intelligible, but in no way rational. |
23967 | Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie] |
Full Idea: It is perfectly intelligible and entirely human to experience an emotion when seeing a low-flying bat, where we would not want to say that the experience was either rational or irrational. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: Goldie is attacking the common tendency of philosophers to over-intellectualise emotions. This example makes his point conclusively. |
23975 | Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie] |
Full Idea: The process of teaching a child how to identify things which are dangerous is typically one and the same process as teaching that child when fear is merited. ...'Dangerous' is an evaluative property, meriting a certain sort of response. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 2 'Education') | |
A reaction: I like this, because it shows the unity between our inner life and our experience of the external world. Concepts and emotions are usually responses, rather than private initiatives. |
23983 | We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie] |
Full Idea: In feeling towards things the imagination tends to 'run away with you', which is partly why the emotions are 'passions'; your thoughts and feelings are not always as much under your control as you would want them to be. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 3 'Towards') | |
A reaction: This may have the chronology wrong. 'Passion' doesn't mean uncontrolled. I take it that 'passion' was an older word for 'emotion', and became attached to the older view of emotions as dangerous and corrupting. |
23999 | Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie] |
Full Idea: To some extent our emotions cannot be controlled. But to say that we are not responsible for our emotions is to ignore the possibility of educating them over time, so that, ideally, our responses come to be consonant with deliberated rational choices. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Education') | |
A reaction: So people go on anger management courses, or talk through crises with councellors. This idea describes most people correctly, but some are in the grips of passions which seem impossible to control. |
23994 | Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Our emotional capabilities are not fully open to be developed. …First, they are to some extent cognitively impenetrable. Secondly, they can ground certain sorts of weakness of will, or akrasia. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Education') | |
A reaction: Education makes us more receptive to evidence. We could probably rate emotions on a scale indicating how easy they are to change. Jealousy seems tenacious. Most fears respond quickly to clear evidence. |
23998 | Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie] |
Full Idea: It is a mistake to speak as if emotional control is always a matter of controlling a token emotional response or action; …rather, it is like reshaping the channel along which future emotions can run. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Education') | |
A reaction: Presumably wise parents direct habitual feelings, where less wise parents respond to outbursts. The very best parents therefore presumably achieve complete brainwashing, and eliminate all initiative. Er, perhaps I've misunderstood? |
23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
Full Idea: Recent naturalisation of content now also has to offer a matching account of representational explanations in cognitive science. | |
From: Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 08.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Cummins, Neander and Shea] This is in addition to the 'status' and 'content' questions of Idea 23796. This seems to be an interesting shift to philosophers working backwards from the theories of empirical science. Few are qualified for this job! |
23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
Full Idea: We can say that non-Fregean content [reference] is (virtually) always contrued as broad, while Fregean content [sense] is usually contrued as narrow. | |
From: Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 3.2) | |
A reaction: I can't make sense of mental content actually being outside the mind, so I see all content as narrow - but that doesn't mean that externals are irrelevant to it. If I think that is an oak, and it's an elm, the content is oak. |
23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
Full Idea: Naturalistic accounts of content ask 1) what makes a state qualify as a representational state?, and 2) what makes a representational state have one specific content rather than another? | |
From: Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 4) | |
A reaction: [As often in this collection, the author uses algebraic letters, but I prefer plain English] I would say that the first question looks more amenable to an answer than the second. Do we know the neuronal difference between seeing red and blue? |
23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
Full Idea: Some theorists maintain that all states with representational content or intentionality must have phenomenal character …and we can also ask whether all states with phenomenal character also have representional content. | |
From: Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 2.4) | |
A reaction: He mentions that beliefs could involve inner speech. And pains and moods may be phenomenal but lack content. He also asks which determines which. |
23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
Full Idea: A 'naturalistic' explanation of content excludes primitive mental or normative notions, but allows causation, counterfactual dependence, probabilistic dependence or structural similarity. | |
From: Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 4) | |
A reaction: Apart from causation, what is permissible to naturalists (like me) all sounds rather superficial (and thus not very explanatory). I'm sure we can do better than this. How about using non-primitive mental notions? |
23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
Full Idea: The phenomenal intentionality approach says that the content properties of mental states can be explained in terms of the phenomenal properties of mental states. | |
From: Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 6) | |
A reaction: [Searle and Loar are cited] Tends to be 'non-naturalistic'. We might decide that content derives from the phenomenal, but still without saying anything interesting about content. Mathematical content? Universally generalised content? |
23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
Full Idea: Conceptual role semantics says the content of a representation is determined by the cognitive role it plays with a system. | |
From: Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 4.5) | |
A reaction: Obvious problem: if 'swordfish' is the password, its role is quite different from its content. I've never thought that the role of something tells you anything about what it is. Hearts pump blood, but how do they fulfil that role? |
23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
Full Idea: A simple causal theory of content has the 'content indeterminacy' problem - that the presence of a cow causes 'a cow is present', but also 'an animal is present' and 'a biological organism is present'. | |
From: Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 4.1) | |
A reaction: That only rules out the 'simple' version. We just need to add that the cause (cow experience) is shaped by current knowledge and interests. Someone buying cows and someone terrified of them thereby produce different concepts. |
23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
Full Idea: The core idea of teleosemantics is that we need to explain how content can be accurate or inaccurate, true or false, realised or unrealised …which must appeal to the distinction between proper functioning and malfunctioning. | |
From: Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 4.4) | |
A reaction: My immediate reaction to this is that you don't learn about content by assessing its success. Surely (as with eyesight) you first need to understand what it does, and only then judge its success. …Though success and failure are implicit in function. |
23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
Full Idea: Teleosemantic theories usually give a causal account of mental functions …where some trait has a particular function if it was selected for that function by a process of natural selection. | |
From: Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 4.4) | |
A reaction: This is an idea I like - that something has a specific function if without that function it wouldn't have come into existence (eyes, for example). But presumably the function of a mind is to collect content - which does nothing to explain content! |
23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
Full Idea: Information theories of content [usually assume that] a column of smoke over there carries the information that fire is over there because it raises the probability of fire being over there. | |
From: Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 4.2) | |
A reaction: Theorists usually add further conditions to this basic one. Fred Dretske is the source of this approach. Not promising, in my opinion. Surely the content is just smoke, and fire is one of dozens of possible inferences from it? |
23995 | Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie] |
Full Idea: I call it 'last ditch' akrasia when we deliberately decide to do something, and then don't do it, and 'impetuous' akrasia when we rush into doing something which, if we had deliberated, we would not have done. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Education') | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced that his impetuous version counts as akrasia, which seems to be vice of people who deliberate. [But he cites Aristotle 1150b19-]. |
24000 | Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie] |
Full Idea: A justifying reason will show that what you did, all things considered, was the right thing to do; an excusing reason will not justify, but will give some excuse to explain why you did what you did. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 6 Intro) | |
A reaction: There are also internal reasons before the event, and explicit reasons afterwards. A mistaken justification might still be an excuse. |
24003 | Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Most traits are dispositions of a relatively stable sort, but traits need not be dispositions. A trait can be a lack of disposition. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 6 'Traits') | |
A reaction: Presumably only the lack relatively normal dispositions will count as traits. |
24002 | We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie] |
Full Idea: We significantly overestimate the role of character traits in explaining and predicting people's action: the so-called Fundamental Attribution error. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 6 'Traits') | |
A reaction: I think this point is incredibly important in daily life. 'When someone shows you who they are, believe them!' is a good thought. But we must distinguish the deeply revealing moment from the transient superficial one. |
24004 | Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie] |
Full Idea: Empirical psychologists have suggested that our practice of trait ascription is systematically prone to error. Some philosophers have concluded that the whole business of trait ascription, and of virtue ethics, should be abandoned. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 6 'Traits') | |
A reaction: [He cites Ross and Nisbet, and Gilbert Harman as a sceptic] I suspect the problem is that character traits are not precise enough for scientific assessment. How else are we going to describe a person? What else can we say at funerals? |
23993 | Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie] |
Full Idea: It is an unwarranted assumption that the only relevant evolutionary period in which our capabilities for emotions evolved is the period in which our ancestors were hunting and gathering. | |
From: Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], 4 'Education') | |
A reaction: Goldie says that the evolution of emotions could well extend to much earlier times. Presumably this also applies to other traits, notably those not obviously needed for hunting. Gathering needs long term planning. |