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20618
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Persons must be conscious, reasoning, motivated, communicative, self-aware [Warren, by Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Suggested characteristics of personhood: consciousness (esp. of pain); reasoning and problem solving; self-motivated activity; varied communication on many topics; self-concepts and self-awareness.
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From:
report of Mary Anne Warren (On the Moral and Legal State of Abortion [1973], p.55) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 8 'Standing'
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A reaction:
[a 'famous' article] A number of non-human animals come very close to passing these tests. I suspect the complex communication is only in there to disqualify them from getting the full certificate. (But she wrote on animal rights).
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14494
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Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S]
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Full Idea:
Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do, no purpose to serve, a species of noblesse which depends on the work of its inferiors, but is kept for show and might as well, and undoubtedly would in time be abolished.
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From:
Samuel Alexander (Space, Time and Deity (2 vols) [1927], 2:8), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation IV
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A reaction:
Wonderful! Kim quotes this, and labels the implicit slogan (to be real is to have causal powers) 'Alexander's Dictum'. All the examples given of epiphenomena are only causally inert within a defined system, but they act causally outside the system.
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3398
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Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S]
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Full Idea:
Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do and no purpose to serve.
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From:
Samuel Alexander (works [1927]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.129
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A reaction:
An objection, but not, I think, a strong one. The fact, for example, that sweat is shiny is the result of good evolutionary reasons, but I cannot think of any purpose which it serves. All events which are purposeful are likely to have side-effects.
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2854
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Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B]
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Full Idea:
Prescriptivism holds that if you think one 'ought' to do a certain kind of act, and yet you are not committed to doing that act in the relevant circumstances, then you either spoke insincerely, or are using the word 'ought' in a weak sense.
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From:
Brad W. Hooker (Prescriptivism [1995], p.640)
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A reaction:
So that's an 'ought', but not a 'genuine ought', then? (No True Scotsman move). Someone ought to rescue that drowning child, but I can't be bothered.
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20883
|
Modern utilitarians value knowledge, friendship, autonomy, and achievement, as well as pleasure [Hooker,B]
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Full Idea:
Most utilitarians now think that pleasure, even if construed widely, is not the only thing desirable in itself. ...Goods also include important knowledge, friendship, autonomy, achievement and so on.
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From:
Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 2)
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A reaction:
That pleasure is desired is empirically verifiable, which certainly motivated Bentham. A string of other desirables each needs to be justified - but how? What would be the value of a 'friendship' if neither party got pleasure from it?
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20885
|
Euthanasia is active or passive, and voluntary, non-voluntary or involuntary [Hooker,B]
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Full Idea:
Six types of euthanasia: 1) Active voluntary (knowing my wishes), 2) Active non-voluntary (not knowing my wishes), 3) Active involuntary (against my wishes), 4) Passive voluntary, 5) Passive non-voluntary, 6) Passive involuntary.
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From:
Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 5)
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A reaction:
'Active' is intervening, and 'passive' is not intervening. A helpful framework.
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20882
|
Euthanasia may not involve killing, so it is 'killing or not saving, out of concern for that person' [Hooker,B]
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Full Idea:
Passive euthanasia is arguably not killing, and the death involved is often painful, so let us take the term 'euthanasia' to mean 'either killing or passing up opportunities to save someone, out of concern for that person'.
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From:
Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 1)
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A reaction:
This sounds good, and easily settled, until you think concern for that person could have two different outcomes, depending on whether the criteria are those of the decider or of the patient. Think of religious decider and atheist patient, or vice versa.
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